by Meda Ryan
5 Mulcahy papers University College, Dublin, Archives, P7/B/192/ 301.
6 Ibid. P7/B/192/204.
7 Ibid. P7/B/193/211.
8 Ibid. P7/B/192/19.
9 Ibid. P7/B/192/72.
10 Ibid. P7/B/192/71.
11 Ibid. P7/B/192/196. In this letter O’Duffy expressed his opinion that he had hopes that the ‘army situation would be settled by 1st July’.
12 Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin, Archives P7/B/192/ 20.
13 Letter to his brother Tom, 18/4/1922 (Lynch private family papers).
20. Arms exchanged in northern offensive
In the northern counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone, the election of May 1921 showed that of fifty-two seats in the whole area unionists secured forty, Republicans six and nationalists six. This illustrated that a minority of the population was Republican. However, the IRA, unknown to their compatriots in the rest of Ireland, continued under great difficulties to fight the British occupation forces. The material and moral support that was given by the majority of people in the rest of the country was lacking in this northern region. Despite handicaps, difficulties, and limitations, the IRA army units in these counties fought with strength and efficiency.
A ‘Northern government’ for the six counties came into existence as a result of an act passed by the British parliament on 23 December 1920 and the elections held under it on 24 May 1921. The act also provided for a ‘Southern Parliament’ for the remainder of the country and for a council of Ireland composed of an equal number of representatives from each area. Lloyd George and his government set up a unionist and Orange authority for the six counties which, determined to liquidate the IRA, proved to be even more unyielding than the British. The truce brought no more than a temporary cessation to hostilities. In the early months of 1922, Sir Henry Wilson was engaged as military advisor in the six counties. In March a Special Powers Bill was enacted which imposed the death penalty for possession of arms, authorised flogging for certain offences, enabled trial by jury to be suspended and coroner’s inquests to be abolished.
The Ulster Special Constabulary, ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ classes, was rapidly expanding. Added to this were thirteen British battalions in the Royal Ulster Constabulary police. From early 1922 a policy of terrorism was implemented against Catholics and nationalists; burnings, lootings and evictions were the order of the day. (In the two years which ended in June 1922, 23,000 persons had been driven out, nearly 500 had been killed and over 1,500 wounded.) Liam Lynch and other members of the army were aware of the policy of terrorism even before the split in the army on the treaty issue. Army policy was that men and material from other areas should reinforce the Northern Division and that the northern minority should be aided to fight back against the forces engaged in such lawlessness. Even after the army split both sides had a common policy which they continued to operate jointly, though two separate army commands had been set up.
From documents available, the indications are that Collins was extremely anxious to work with Lynch on ‘the Northern issue’. He knew that Lynch had the military experience as well as an overall view of the capabilities of the men in the Southern Division.
Lynch and Barry, in the Cork brigades, had found kidnapping a successful weapon at vital periods during the War of Independence; now during this intermediary period, this weapon was again used. When Collins failed to secure a reprieve for three IRA men due to be hanged in Derry jail and the release of Dan Hogan and his staff at Monaghan, IRA units under the command of Seán Mac Eoin, kidnapped forty-two loyalists and took them across the border as hostages. This operation, first outlined by Lynch1 and sanctioned by Collins was successful.2Hogan was released, the Derry men were reprieved, and the hostages were returned unharmed.
The offensive, which began in Belfast on 18 May 1922, included men from the Southern Division. Whether reports of the results came to GHQ or to the IRA Executive, views were exchanged by both sections of the army. Lynch and Deasy liaised on the one side and Collins, Mulcahy, and O’Duffy on the other.3
Private negotiations for army unity, as well as decisions on the north, were on-going between Lynch and GHQ at Beggars Bush. According to a memo by the deputy chief-of-staff at GHQ, J. J. (Ginger) O’Connell, Liam Lynch was a constant visitor ‘and was on better terms with the rest of GHQ staff than were O’Connell himself or General Emmet Dalton.’ Lynch’s membership of the supreme council of the IRB was the co-ordinating link between Michael Collins, the president of that council, and other leading members – Mulcahy and O’Duffy.4
Lynch and Collins took a leading part in the formulation and operation of the measures agreed upon. It was decided to send a number of experienced officers from Lynch’s division to the north to take charge of some of the divisions there, and to co-operate in activities against the forces of the northern government. Seán Lehane, Charlie Daly, Maurice Donnegan, Seán Fitzgerald and Séamus Cotter were appointed brigade commanders; other officers from the First Southern Division numbering about twenty were included in the party. Machine gunners were to follow. The operation was to take place from the Northern and Midland Divisions, which were outside the six county border. Donegal in the west would co-operate with Frank Aiken’s division in Louth and Armagh, in the south-east. Their task was to make war on the crown forces in the north both on, and inside, the border.
Both sides of the army in the northern operation co-operated, but the pro-treatyites (Collins, Mulcahy, O’Duffy and Beggars Bush section) insisted that rifles or other weapons transferred to the Provisional Government by the British would not be taken into action, because these could be identified and might create embarrassment. These weapons were meant only to suppress the anti-treatyites. Arrangements were therefore made whereby Cork brigades supplied an agreed number of rifles towards the northern operation. Beggars Bush replaced these by handing back an equal number of British supplied weapons, in return. Most of the arms for the north came from the First and Second Southern Divisions.
Liam Deasy recollects, ‘Liam Lynch, Seán Lehane and I went to the Four Courts on 15 April to arrange an exchange of rifles from the Cork brigades which were to be sent north to the areas along the border. These were to be exchanged for British rifles which had been supplied to the Free State army and which would be forwarded to the Cork brigade. This was one of many such exchanges which was secretly carried out through the mutual co-operation of both sections of the army, though there were problems with some reaching their proposed destination; Collins and Mulcahy were deeply implicated with us in these transactions.’
Before the signing of the treaty, Seán MacBride had been involved in the arrangement of a shipment of arms from Germany; following the signing, he asked Collins if there was to be any change of policy, but was told to carry on as before. This was done; a few shipments came into Waterford following which there was a considerable amount of collaborating between Collins and Lynch and the other Four Courts men. ‘We were aware that arms were being transferred between the Four Courts and Beggars Bush. The result of the exchange was that arms were sent to Charlie Daly, Seán Lehane and others in Donegal. This was done to impede the new six county government and also as an aid to the Catholic minority. I believe Collins was genuine as was Lynch in this collaboration.’5
Pax O’Faolain recalls that in the summer of 1921, Charlie McGuinness was in charge of a cargo of arms due to land off Helvick Head, but, it appears that as a result of British intelligence, the ship and its cargo were seized. Bob Briscoe and Seán MacBride were in continuous negotiations for further arms’ shipments from Germany. On 11 November 1921, the Frieda arrived off Helvick and lorries were on the spot to transport the contents of the cargo which consisted ‘principally of Peter the Painters, parabellums, rifles and ammunition.’
MacBride and Briscoe negotiated and organised a further arms shipment, which was brought into Ballynagaul on 2 April 19
22. This cargo, according to Pax O’Faolain, ‘consisted of boxes of ammunition, rifles and parabellums – about six tons.’ The collection supervised by Dick Barrett and received by Dan Gleeson and Seán Gaynor were ‘transferred in vans northwards. Under the arrangements between Collins and Lynch ... we imported guns and we sent them to the north. Had we been preparing for a Civil War we would have held them here.’6
It is ironic that while the British government were sending arms and ammunition to Beggars Bush, with Collins’ acknowledgement that they were to be used to quell the men under Lynch’s command, Frank Fitzgerald, with Lynch’s approval, was making arrangements with arms’ dealers in London to secure arms which would be exchanged for those sent by the British government (10,000 rifles, 2,000 revolvers, 5 machine guns, 80 tons of bomb-making chemicals).7
Vigorous retaliation against the activities of the crown forces in the north, as agreed by both sides of the army, involved the risk of British re-occupation of the whole country and a renewed struggle with possible dire consequences – but that was a risk Lynch and the anti-treatyites were prepared to take. Disastrous though this might have seemed, Liam Lynch preferred it to the alternative of Civil War. No doubt Michael Collins felt this too. For both of them it was very evident that the project of mutual co-operation and brotherhood, mutually striking at a common enemy was far more desirable than were the heartaches of bringing their own people together during convention. ‘They had, each for the other, a regard that went deeper than friendly comradeship – these two men that Ireland could so ill-afford to lose who were soon to die tragically on opposite sides in a war of brothers.’8
Although these two men had a common policy with regard to the six county area it was difficult to keep that policy isolated from the predominant issue which divided the entire country and the army. In the Irish Independent on 26 April 1922 Eoin O’Duffy made an inaccurate reference to the arms. Lynch’s reply on the following day shows how confused transactions of the time were and how close the country was to Civil War:
With reference to the alleged holding up of arms intended for the northern areas, these are the facts. The C/S and A/G phoned me to forward 30 Thompson guns, 10,000 rounds .303 and also 100 rifles, these latter to be exchanged as soon as could be arranged. The following supplies of arms and ammunition were forwarded within 36 hours; 30 Thompson guns, 8,000 rounds of ammunition for T.M. Guns, 10,000 rounds .303, 75 rifles.
I also sent ten machine-gunners. Any of these supplied, I afterwards learned, did not get to the north, and the gunners after being detained for a week or so at Beggars Bush, were ordered home to their own areas after all being so urgently required by phone for the north. It is very easy to judge where the responsibility lies for the situation which now exists.
A general attack on the crowned forces in the six county area was planned in which units of the Fifth Northern and First Midland divisions were to participate. Columns were to be formed, the members of which would remain on continuous active service, and they would be maintained out of funds provided by Beggars Bush headquarters. Five hundred men were sent from the Second and Fourth Northern Divisions to the Curragh on an intensive two weeks training course: however Civil War intervened and the Curragh training dragged out to three months.
Frank Aiken had endeavoured from the outset to keep his division, the Third Northern, united in any decisions it might make on the question of the treaty. This unity of policy was what Lynch had also hoped for in the Southern Division.
On 18 April, Liam wrote to his brother Tom from GHQ in the Four Courts, ‘not knowing the hour we will be attacked by machine-gun or artillery,’9and a few weeks later, as the situation developed, he wrote that he was ‘absolutely convinced of wiping out the supposed Free State; but we don’t mind giving it a slow death, especially when it means the avoidance of loss of life and general Civil War. If we are forced to it we will concentrate all our forces to wipe it out.’10
As time progressed it was becoming obvious to Dalton and O’Connell that they would eventually have to fight Lynch.11
A crisis developed on 7 June 1922 when Lynch and Mulcahy came together in a final attempt to avert a Civil War. Mulcahy and O’Duffy compromised by withdrawing troops from both Limerick and Templemore; J. J. O’Connell (deputy chief-of-staff, Beggars Bush) saw this ‘as part of their general policy of conciliating Lynch.’12A series of prolonged negotiations were in progress during May and early June with both parties conceding points in an effort to reach a consensus on army reunification. On 12 May 1922 Lynch wrote to General O’Duffy:
Since the Truce was declared no satisfactory effort has been made to discover a basis for army unification. Progress is impeded by officers on committee on your side not being willing to discuss the vital matters at issue. I must now request you to attend a meeting at 11 a.m. on Monday next the 15th instant at the Mansion House, after which negotiations must cease if a definite understanding for agreement is not reached.13
This meeting led to further proposals; a memorandum sent by Lynch on 4 June, suggesting the formation of an army council to uphold ‘the maintenance of an Irish Republic ... with a working agreement ... between the government of the Republic and the Executive of the IRA.’14Richard Mulcahy, minister for defence sent a response on 12 June in which he outlined proposals for army reunification which allowed for ‘a periodic Convention to elect an Army Council of seven’, and that the minister for defence be appointed by the government, and the chief-of-staff to be appointed by the minister for defence.15In the Mulcahy papers there are several letters from Lynch dealing with this issue. Mulcahy notes ‘the Four Courts representatives considered that the GHQ staff document ignored the cause of the split, which they alleged was the Treaty.’16Other correspondence demonstrate Lynch’s insistence that the signing of the treaty created the army split.17Mulcahy appears to accept this. Lynch suggested that upon O’Duffy’s resignation he himself would succeed him as chief-of-staff, with Liam Deasy as deputy. Florence O’Donoghue calls it an ‘abnormal suggestion’. A document entitled ‘Final Proposals for Agreement’ from GHQ suggested staff re-organisation with ‘deputy chief-of-staff – Liam Lynch – to be specially charged with re-organisation. Deputy chief-of-staff – Liam Deasy – in charge of training.’18 (In this proposal it appears that there would be two anti-treaty men in the position of deputy chief-of-staff – one in change of re-organisation and the other on training.) The formulation of a war council of eight members would have given the anti-treaty side five representatives against three pro-treaty. (Of the six principal members of GHQ staff three would been pro-treaty and three anti-treaty, but it was expected that Eoin O’Duffy would become commissioner of the gárda siochána – on 22 May, he had tendered his resignation from post of chief-of-staff.)
O’Connell who held the position as deputy chief-of-staff at Beggars Bush totally disagreed with the plan formulated by Collins, Mulcahy and O’Duffy for reunification of the army under the Provisional Government.
Lynch, Deasy and Seán Moylan were in favour of the reunification proposals, but when the Executive met on 14 June the proposals were rejected, though a resolution was passed which stated that, ‘No offensive will be taken against the Beggars Bush forces.’19Following this meeting Lynch wrote to the minister for defence and expressed the view that deputy chief-of-staff was not on, for the Executive:
Personnel of GHQ of your ‘Immediate proposals’ are not acceptable. While the Political Agreement provided for a M/D representing the army we are agreeable to present M/D until sanctioned or otherwise by next Convention. Executive insists on C/S but are prepared to give Beggars Bush forces D/C/S, Q/M/General, Director/ Publicity.20
The Four Courts Executive wanted Lynch to hold the position of chief-of-staff at GHQ in the proposed army reunification; they were prepared to have a Beggars Bush member as deputy rather than visa versa as suggested by Beggars Bush.
De Valera, at a later date, in an interview with
the Melbourne Irish News said that Lynch had a suspicion that Beggars Bush ‘were playing for time’, but was hopeful of unification of both wings ‘and the continuation of the army united as the army of the Republic ... The lengths to which he was prepared to go even made him to be suspected of a tendency to go too far by some of his comrades ...’21
Lynch was hopeful that under the Pact in a coalition agreement with a responsible government, the army situation could be resolved; however, the political situation now appeared to deteriorate. Griffith and Collins were summoned to London on 26 May 1922. Collins returned and signed, with De Valera, a joint appeal to the nation to observe the Pact. Collins again went to London on 13 June and on his return he travelled to Cork, making a speech on 14 June which was clearly in breach of the Pact.
The constitution, which had been long awaited, appeared in the press on the morning of Friday 16 June 1922, the day of the general election. It brought bitter disappointment to Republicans – included was the oath of allegiance to a British monarch and the constitution itself was made subject to the terms of the treaty. In addition, this copperfastened the 1920 Government of Ireland Act – a partitioned Ireland (six northern counties) as part of the British empire.
The hopes and expectations of Liam Lynch were sadly shattered. He wrote to his brother that night:
Well, Tom, the situation generally is beyond anything I could any longer hold out hope for. As you often said, I always held out hope to the last, but really all are blighted now and as far as I am personally concerned I feel all my life’s work has been in vain. Surely this is a terrible way to feel. Would we could even get back our glorious dead.22
Here was a note of despair! A shattered dream for a man who had tried, at all costs, to maintain some semblance of unity.
