The United States realized it had been duped on Wednesday, June 26, when Spanish-language network Univision displayed Snowden’s Ecuadorian safe passage certificate. It was unsigned.24 The capital had not approved it. It no longer mattered that Snowden had arrived in Russia illegally. He was there and because he was in a transit zone, nothing could be done about it. People demanded to know who was responsible for the invalid document.
In June 2012, Julian Assange entered the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. He would be granted asylum two months later but remained stranded at the consulate.25 The WikiLeaks founder would have to step onto English soil in order to board a plane to his adopted country. If he were to do so, he would be immediately arrested. A European arrest warrant had been issued as part of a sexual assault investigation.26 It was here he met local Ecuadorian consul Fidel Narvaez. The diplomat had been assigned to stay in the embassy at night to deter police harassment of Assange. Over time, a bond was forged between the refugee and a person with a known history of social and civil activism. Narvaez had issued Snowden’s travel voucher at Assange’s behest.27 A few days after Snowden had settled into his suite at Sheremetyevo’s V-Express Capsule Hotel, Naraez appeared in Moscow.28
Regardless of who was ultimately responsible for getting Snowden to Russia, everyone had to plead ignorance and innocence.
China released an official statement regarding Snowden’s release: “The US Government earlier on made a request to the HKSAR Government for the issue of a provisional warrant of arrest against Mr. Snowden. Since the documents provided by the US Government did not fully comply with the legal requirements under Hong Kong law, the HKSAR Government has requested the US Government to provide additional information so that the Department of Justice could consider whether the US Government’s request can meet the relevant legal conditions. As the HKSAR Government has yet to have sufficient information to process the request for provisional warrant of arrest, there is no legal basis to restrict Mr. Snowden from leaving Hong Kong.”29 It made sure to add, “Meanwhile, the HKSAR Government has formally written to the US Government requesting clarification on earlier reports about the hacking of computer systems in Hong Kong by US government agencies. The HKSAR Government will continue to follow up on the matter so as to protect the legal rights of the people of Hong Kong.” Yuen confirmed, “Until the minute of Snowden’s departure, the U.S. government hadn’t yet replied to our requests for clarification.”30 Legal experts later confirmed China had operated within the bounds of law.31
What would appear to be an admission of guilt but a political formality nonetheless, Ecuador’s secretary of political management threatened legal action to whoever was responsible for leaking the illicit document to the press. The statement could be construed as Ecuador not wanting to be seen in the same disorganized light as America when it came to filing official paperwork or vain whitewashing because it hadn’t wanted the existence of the travel pass to be made public. Predictably, by Wednesday Narvaez was apologetic: “I am conscious of my responsibility and I assume it in its totality.” During his regular weekend address to the nation, Ecuador’s president, President Rafael Correa, stated, “If it is [true] that he [Narvaez] went beyond his authority, he will be disciplined accordingly.” But Ecuador had no intention of investigating Narvaez. In an ironic twist, the day after Correa’s announcement, metadata revealed the travel voucher had arrived in the in-box of Ecuador’s secretary of judicial affairs. It was undoubtedly presented to the president’s office.32
America had assumed Ecuador’s waiving trade agreement rights with the U.S. on Thursday was an indication it was intending to grant Snowden asylum. The country’s official statement was that economic privileges should not be contingent upon blackmail. The country was preempting the United States revoking the preferential tariffs granted in the 2002 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). Ecuador’s secretary of communications pithily suggested the U.S. should take its $23 million in savings and apply it to human rights education.33 He took the opportunity to add, “Finally, we would enjoy (sic) that the U.S. respond with the same urgency that they are asking of us to deliver Mr. Snowden when he enters Ecuadorian soil, to our requests to the U.S. Embassy in Ecuador, via communication POL 081/2013 that they deliver to us the many fugitives from Ecuadorian justice who are currently living in the United States, particularly the corrupt bankers who knowingly destroyed our economy in 1999, whose extradition has been repeatedly denied by the United States.”34 It was a wonderful show. Only U.S. and Ecuadorian officials knew the trade agreement status was on shaky ground before Snowden came into the picture. Neither party had expected it to be extended in the upcoming weeks.
Two days after Snowden’s arrival, Russian president Vladimir Putin told the press, “It is true that Mr. Snowden arrived in Moscow, which was completely unexpected for us.”35 He added, “As for his possible extradition, we can extradite foreign nationals only to those countries with which we have relevant international agreements on the extradition of criminals. We have no such agreement with the United States. Mr. Snowden has committed no crimes in the Russian Federation.” During a press conference five days later, Putin stated, “Russia never gives anyone up and doesn’t plan to give anyone up and no one has ever given us anyone” atop “[ … ] [Snowden] is essentially a fighter for human rights, and for democracy.”36
Having served 16 years in Soviet intelligence,37 Putin knew the value of a foreign intelligence worker. He was making it expressly clear that Russia had no intention of surrendering the American whistleblower. Russia’s leader was overtly declaring he was going to stand firm on international and national law. By referring to Snowden as a civil rights activist, Putin was also telling the world how his country perceived Snowden.
Whereas it could exert pressure upon nearly autonomous Hong Kong until Beijing stepped in, Washington had a stalwart political adversary in Russia. Shortly after Snowden arrived, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov took the offensive: “We consider the attempts to accuse Russia of violation of U.S. laws and even some sort of conspiracy, which on top of all that are accompanied by threats, as absolutely ungrounded and unacceptable. There are no legal grounds for such conduct of U.S. officials, and we proceed from that.” The U.S. government had to change tactics. As White House Press Secretary Jay Carney lambasted Hong Kong for allowing Snowden to fly to Russia, “This was a deliberate choice by the government to release a fugitive despite a valid arrest warrant, and that decision unquestionably has a negative impact on the U.S.-China relationship,”38 the Capitol had decided it best to downplay Snowden’s importance. Washington was fearful it would be made a fool again and anxious that if it tried to flex its rhetorical muscles, it might incur political backlash. Four days after Snowden landed in Russia, Obama told reporters, “We’ve got a whole lot of business that we do with China and Russia and I’m not going to have one case of a suspect who we’re trying to extradite suddenly being elevated to the point where I’ve got to start doing wheeling and dealing and trading on a whole host of other issues, simply to get a guy extradited so that he can face the justice system here in the United States.”39 However, the U.S. government was discreetly offering Russia increased political cooperation in exchange for Snowden.
It was a wonderful drama, but what truly sold the world that Snowden’s association with the former Soviet Union was mere coincidence was Putin’s closing statement at a press conference following the first day of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum Summit. Russia’s leader declared, “He [Snowden] must stop his work aimed at harming our American partners, as strange as that sounds coming from my lips.”40 Snowden had applied for Russian asylum the previous day, June 30.41 The day after Putin’s conditions were made public, Snowden rescinded his asylum application. It was a convincing ruse because it appeared as if Snowden’s odds were good that he would find a temporary home with one of the 18 other countries which he’d applied on July 1.
It took Norway, Austria, Finland, Germa
ny, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Brazil, India and Poland less than a day to turn Snowden down. The first eight countries promptly absolved themselves of responsibility by deferring to their legal technicality that asylum applicants must be on native ground to be considered. Even though a nation’s foreign ministry is considered to reside on the respective country’s soil, they denied Snowden’s application because he had been unable to present it in person. Contenting itself with already having done its share, Ecuador would use this alibi after American vice president Joe Biden called Correa.42 Ecuador’s president politely bowed out of the Snowden affair by allowing his previous declaration that Snowden’s safe passage document had been a “mistake”43 to speak for itself. India rejected his claim outright, as did Poland, but the latter reinforced its stance by citing an applicant’s need to be on Polish land. Brazil responded by stating it wouldn’t respond, a decision it would later regret.44 As the world awaited answers from Iceland, China, Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, France and Italy,45 suspicions were immediately raised and conjectures made that the remaining countries’ hesitation signaled possible acceptance and admittance of Snowden.
Few thought France or Italy would humor him due to their ties to the U.S. It was obvious if China had wanted him, it would have kept him. Because the press had yet to account for why Snowden had not proceeded to Cuba, many suspected there was unvoiced reason for him not already being there. Only a handful of people were aware Iceland was a foregone conclusion before it was ever a consideration. France would later deny having received any paperwork before saying no, and Italy would use the well-worn excuse of needing him in the country to acknowledge his request. China stated it had no information to issue pertaining to Snowden.46 Cuba never responded. This left Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua.
Four days later, WikiLeaks announced Snowden had applied for asylum in six more countries. The website refused to name them, citing potential American influence as seen with Ecuador and what was reasonably assumed to have taken place with other nations.47 An unnamed U.S. government official later confirmed this: “There is not a country in the hemisphere whose government does not understand our position at this point.”48
As with his theoretical flight to Cuba, many of Snowden’s asylum applications were meant to lend verisimilitude to the feigned proceedings. The other tip-off that Snowden’s applications were not sincere was that six days before, he had given the SCMP approval to run another exposé, the one which he obligated the newspaper to sit on until the U.S. had filed its charges against him. Only after Snowden had landed where he’d intended to stay did he give the news outlet permission to release incriminating information about him.
On June 24, the day after the whistleblower arrived in Russia, Los Angeles awoke to “Snowden sought Booz Allen job to gather evidence on NSA surveillance.”49 The article opens succinctly, “Edward Snowden secured a job with a US government contractor for one reason alone—to obtain evidence of Washington’s cyberspying networks,” before adding, somewhat sardonically, “the South China Morning Post can reveal.” It quotes Snowden, “My position with Booz Allen Hamilton granted me access to lists of machines all over the world the NSA hacked. That is why I accepted that position about three months ago.” As before, due to scarcity of material, the SCMP inserted its new information between previous and current press reports. Yet it made sure to send a chill down Washington’s spine by quoting Snowden’s long-term intention: “[ … ] I would like to make it [confidential American intelligence disclosures] available to journalists in each country to make their own assessment, independent of my bias, as to whether or not the knowledge of US network operations against their people should be published.” It is highly doubtful Snowden would have made such a bold, incendiary declaration if Russia hadn’t guaranteed him a safe haven two days before he sat down to speak with the SCMP.
Pundits immediately began to speculate whether Greenwald, Poitras and Gellman had asked Snowden to get hired on at BAH in order to extract data.50 Greenwald and Poitras were too offended to hold their tongues. If proven true, the accusations could implicate the journalists in one or more of the charges put to Snowden. Poitras claimed51 she was unclear where Snowden had worked before meeting him in Hong Kong. To her credit, since the documents he had in his possession related to various facilities, operations and stations worldwide, it would be difficult for an untrained eye to determine where he had stolen the information. Regretting he’d hedged the details of his communication timeline with Snowden, Greenwald called the allegation “baseless innuendo.”52 Gellman kept characteristically silent. Snowden had revealed in his interview with Poitras that he’d worked for another intelligence agency, the CIA, and the Post reporter knew it would be revealed he’d been employed as a NSA contractor for another firm. Less than two months later, the press broke the news that Snowden had an extended tenure with Dell.53
Snowden was not worried he would not be permitted to continue his journalistic pursuits in Russia. He had already distributed a considerable amount of information to his chosen journalists, and, as he would declare on July 12, he “cannot control them [the writers and their decision to act upon the material].”54 During the week they’d spent with him in Hong Kong, Greenwald and Poitras had been briefed by Snowden over what the documents were, how to interpret them, their meaning and their implications. He was still in contact with Gellman.55 At this stage Snowden was merely acting as an advisor, permitting the press to do its work. He even admitted his role in the proceedings wasn’t vital. On June 17 he’d informed the world, “All I can say right now is the US Government is not going to be able to cover this up by jailing or murdering me.”56 The day after the SCMP released its jawdropping report regarding Snowden’s reasons for joining BAH, The Daily Beast published an interview with Greenwald which explained Snowden’s cryptic statement.57 It also served to increase the severity of Washington’s Snowden-induced migraine.
Greenwald relays that Snowden had made copies of all the purloined files and distributed them to several unnamed people, sealing the files’ contents under heavy encryption. However, as Greenwald reports, “If anything happens at all to Edward Snowden, he told me he has arranged for them to get access to the full archives.”58 Snowden had created a timed contact release program much like the ones used by outdoor enthusiasts. An account is created which specifies when the user will be departing, the individual’s destination and the latest time the person should return. If the user fails to log into the account before the slated deadline, an email is automatically sent to those placed on an emergency contact list with the relevant information. If Snowden missed resetting the account’s timer, the key to the encrypted files would be released to his chosen data bankers. It is characteristic of Snowden to want to control the files and explains his demand for Internet access while in exile.59 This also sheds light on Snowden’s statement, “The truth is coming, and it cannot be stopped.” When he originally made the declaration during the June 17 Q & A session, it had ostentatious overtones. With Greenwald’s report, the statement is understood to be more literal than figurative.
Snowden had told the SCMP that he intended to release top secret disclosures to the nations to which the surveillance applied. The world didn’t have to wait long to see whether Snowden would keep his promise. Even though he was unable to reach Western Europe, he had associates that could.
Poitras had remained in Hong Kong on the off chance Snowden might request a follow-up interview atop wanting to get footage of the ensuing protests and support rallies for the NSA leaker. However, the day after her Snowden interview aired, she was forced out of her hotel room. She began receiving anonymous calls, and people were repeatedly knocking on her door. After being escorted by security through a back exit, she relocated and tried to meld into the city’s seven million people. She surrendered after a CNN reporter identified her on June 15. She summarily flew to Berlin. Her flight from recognition was an attempt to supersede authorities from intercep
ting the data Snowden had recently issued her. It was also a reprieve into the sanctuary of her German apartment, which she maintained to escape harassment by American intelligence. There she continued editing her interview footage and, in line with Snowden’s wishes, prepared her own series of disclosures that related to Europe and Germany for the German press.60
Europe took little notice of Snowden’s BAH admission because Norddeutscher Rundfunk, also known as North German Broadcasting (NGB),61 and Germany’s largest newspaper, the Munich-based periodical Süddeutsche Zeitung, broke another story an hour later.62 “Britain Draws from German Internet” reveals that GCHQ was using Tempora to wiretap transatlantic Telephone Cable No. 14 or “TAT-14.” TAT-14 is a major fiber-optic backbone connecting Germany with the United States through Britain. The hub is utilized by Denmark, France and the Netherlands and approximately 50 international companies route phone calls and Internet connections through the line. As with Greenwald’s Verizon exposé, Süddeutsche Zeitung reports English telecoms Vodafone and British Telecommunications were willful surveillance participants.
Vodafone reported it was within the legal confines of the countries in which it was operating. British Telecommunications offered no comment. German intelligence as well as Telekom, the primary German communication provider that uses TAT-14, claimed to have no knowledge of the surveillance practice.
The Edward Snowden Affair Page 14
