In contrast to Ernoul, two later crusaders – Guy of Bazoches, who came to the East in July 1190, and Roger of Howden, who arrived in June 1191 – both say that Sibylla had been pressed to divorce Guy because her marriage represented a disparagement of her rank, but that she had refused to accept any one as ruler other than her husband. In Roger of Howden's version, she actually agreed to a divorce, only to choose Guy once she had been crowned, although it is by no means clear how this was actually implemented.29 These stories seem to indicate that there was considerable tension among the supporters of Sibylla in Jerusalem at this time, some of whom perhaps had an eye to reconciling those barons who could accept Sibylla's hereditary rights, but could not stomach Guy of Lusignan.30 The anonymous author of a work called Libellus de expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum, who was in the Holy Land at this time, describes a fraught atmosphere in which some shouted that the coronation was the will of God, while others believed that, because of it, the Sepulchre of the Lord and the city of Jerusalem would be destroyed. ‘There arose dissension in the land which was so great, that scarcely two people would agree with each other.’31
The exact sequence of events is not therefore known, but it does not change the fact that Raymond and the barons were left to react to events rather than taking the initiative themselves. Their response was to find a candidate of their own and then take Jerusalem by force. Among the barons at Nablus was Humphrey IV of Toron, husband of Isabella, Sibylla's half-sister, and therefore an obvious counter, for Isabella had been born while Amalric was king and her mother, Maria Comnena, had been legitimately married to him at the time. But Humphrey could not face the consequences of such a move, which would have meant civil war. During the night he fled to Jerusalem and the next day submitted to Sibylla, effectively undermining baronial resistance.32 The barons therefore saw no alternative but to swear homage to the new rulers; only Baldwin of Ramla, his resentment at Guy's marriage to Sibylla in 1180 still strong, refused to agree, although he may have done homage in the end in order to protect his son's inheritance. He then rode north to Antioch, where he was received by Bohemond III, apparently delighted to see him. According to Ernoul, anxious to fashion his story to apportion blame for the eventual outcome, Baldwin had told the barons at Nablus that Guy was a madman and a fool and would lose the land.33
Raymond of Tripoli, however, represented a bigger problem. Gerard of Ridefort advised Guy to assemble the host and besiege Tiberias, advice that probably stemmed from his hatred of the count, but that also represented a legitimate means of dealing with a recalcitrant vassal. Ernoul says that Raymond was pleased when he heard this news, presumably because he believed it would give him the opportunity to overcome Guy by force. He then ‘sent to Saladin who was lord of Damascus telling him that King Guy was gathering his troops to make war on him, and Saladin replied that if he should need help he would come to his aid’. Saladin had troops stationed at Banyas, about 40 miles away.34
The Muslim sources provide corroboration for Raymond's move, for they show that Saladin knew of these dissensions, which were evidently to his advantage. According to ‘Imad al-Din, Guy had demanded that Raymond give an account of his rule, but he neither obeyed nor responded. Ibn al-Athir says that Raymond had been asked specifically to account for money collected and he had replied that everything had been spent on Baldwin V's government. Saladin had responded to Raymond's overtures by releasing some of the knights of his whom he had been holding, and promising the help he needed to make himself ‘an independent ruler for all the Franks’.35 After this, Raymond's enthusiasm for the Muslims only increased. ‘At this point,’ says ‘Imad al-Din, ‘if he had not feared the people of his own religion, he would have embraced Islam.’36 Whatever the truth of this, if the revolts of Hugh of Le Puiset in 1134 and of Gerard of Sidon in 1160 were treasonable, then so too was Raymond's alliance with Saladin in 1186.37
Guy now seems to have been convinced by Balian of Ibelin that to attack the count in these circumstances, with winter coming on, would be reckless. Tiberias appears to have been defended by both Christian and Muslim forces (part of the agreement with Saladin), and Balian assured the king that Saladin would meet any attack with such force that ‘if you go there not a man will escape’. Instead, Balian volunteered to act as mediator, but Raymond would not relent unless Beirut was restored to him, creating a stand-off that lasted over the winter of 1186–7.38 Certainly the divisions were stark. On the one hand, there was Raymond of Tripoli, whose record suggested he could not be trusted and who harboured ambitions for the throne, and on the other, Guy of Lusignan, who found it difficult to create a broad base of loyalty, not the least because many thought that he was not competent to rule.
Guy may also have been influenced by an awareness of his weak position. He knew that he was resented by a significant proportion of the baronage and that, as Balian of Ibelin pointed out, he could not afford to lose both Raymond of Tripoli and Baldwin of Ramla. Moreover, even his own partisans could not be relied upon. In the midst of this crisis Reynald of Châtillon had heard of a rich caravan travelling from Cairo to Damascus and he at once left for Kerak. Assembling as many men as he could, he seized the caravan, taking prisoners and booty back to Kerak. As this was a violation of the four-year truce made by Raymond of Tripoli, Saladin demanded that Guy order the return of the people and the spoils. Reynald, nevertheless, replied that ‘he would not do so, for he was lord of his land, just as Guy was lord of his, and he had no truces with the Saracens’.39 In short, he believed that he was entitled to extract what he could from caravans passing through his territories. At this point, the kingdom of Jerusalem was showing signs of having lost its cohesion, on the brink of breaking up into a collection of semi-autonomous fiefdoms, none of which, on its own, was capable of resisting Saladin's coalition.
In fact, both ‘Imad al-Din and Ibn al-Athir claim that Reynald had broken an agreement with Saladin to allow free passage of caravans. ‘The prince of Kerak Arnaud was the most perfidious and the most wicked of the Franks,’ says ‘Imad al-Din, ‘the most avaricious, the most eager to cause harm and to do evil, to break firm promises and serious oaths, to violate his word and to perjure himself.’ Despite Saladin's demands, Reynald refused to return men, horses or goods. ‘Imad al-Din says that ‘the sultan swore then that he would have his life’.40
Nobody therefore would have been surprised to learn that, shortly before Easter 1187 (29 March), Saladin was gathering his forces for a full-scale invasion. ‘This year,’ says Ibn al-Athir, ‘Saladin wrote to all his lands, summoning men to the Jihad. He wrote to Mosul, the Mesopotamian regions, Irbil and other places in the east and to Egypt and all of Syria, calling upon them to engage in the Jihad and ordering them to make all possible preparations.’ Saladin himself set out for Bosra with the intention of preventing Reynald from attacking pilgrims coming from Mecca, or blocking the forces he had called up from Egypt. He then besieged Kerak directly, destroying the crops there and at Montréal, effectively confining Reynald to his castle.41
It was now imperative that the quarrel between Raymond of Tripoli and Guy of Lusignan be settled, so the king agreed to send a delegation to Tiberias to make peace. Ernoul's account of what followed is convincing because it must have been drawn from a close personal knowledge of events, as Balian of Ibelin was a key player and Ernoul seems to have accompanied him throughout.42 The masters of the military orders, Joscius, archbishop of Tyre, and Balian set out as a group, while a fifth member, Reynald of Sidon, travelled by another route. They spent the night at Nablus, where Balian stayed behind to deal with personal business, promising to catch up with them the next night. However, at the same time, Saladin ordered his son, al-Afdal, to send a force into the territory around Acre to lay waste to the region.43 Ernoul says that this was retaliation for the activities of Reynald of Châtillon, but this seems to be a contrivance to shift the blame onto Reynald, for it is not confirmed by the Muslim sources. The Muslim force was commanded by Muzaffar al-Din, lo
rd of Harran and Edessa, and to reach the area he needed to travel through Raymond of Tripoli's Galilean lands. Raymond had no option but to allow this under the terms of his agreement with Saladin, but he set conditions that the Muslims should do no damage to any towns or villages, while warning the Franks not to venture out as they would be killed. The force was to cross the Jordan at sunrise and return at sunset.
Among those who received warning from the count were the members of the party coming to negotiate peace with him, who by this time had reached the Templar castle of La Fève (al-Fula), and to Gerard of Ridefort it must have seemed bizarre that such an enemy force should be allowed into the kingdom, intent on destroying valuable Christian resources at a time when the threat from Saladin was so imminent. La Fève was an important Templar base in the centre of the kingdom, garrisoned by between fifty and sixty knights, and stocked with supplies.44 From here Gerard sent out for reinforcements to another Templar castle, at Caco (Khirbat Qara) about 4 miles away. Ernoul says that eighty Templar knights, the ten Hospitallers who had formed the escort for Roger des Moulins and another forty secular knights from the royal garrison at Nazareth now gathered to confront Muzaffar al-Din's force.
It seems most unlikely that the Christians knew the size of the Muslim force beforehand, but when they sighted it they must have realised at once that they were heavily outnumbered, for it may have contained as many as 7,000 men. Ernoul says that an argument broke out, during which Roger des Moulins and a leading Templar called James of Mailly tried to dissuade Gerard of Ridefort from making an attack, but Gerard derided Mailly as a coward.45 The author of the Libellus, however, says nothing about a dramatic clash of opinions, instead recording inspiring speeches given by both Gerard and Roger des Moulins when they heard about the Turkish incursion.46 If, of course, at this point the size of the Muslim force was not known, then the Libellus is not incompatible with Ernoul's account.
They met at the Spring of the Cresson, north-east of Nazareth, on or near the road between Saffuriya and Tiberias, just over 2 miles west of Kafr Sabt, on 1 May 1187, and the Christians were overwhelmed.47 Only Gerard and three knights escaped, while the remainder were killed or captured, as well as the people of Nazareth who, apparently at Gerard of Ridefort's instigation, had come out expecting to find spoils after a Christian victory. In a letter to Pope Urban III, Gerard himself said they had had 110 knights against 6,000 and that Roger des Moulins, Robert Frenellus, the Templar marshal, and James of Mailly, together with fifty Templar knights and ten sergeants, had died.48 It was, says Ibn al-Athir, a battle to turn black hair to grey. Raymond of Tripoli had to endure the sight of the heads of men he knew fixed to Muslim lances as the returning Muslims rode back through his lands.49
Balian of Ibelin arrived at La Fève to find it deserted and was told the news by a Templar knight. Had he not stopped for mass with the bishop of Sebaste, says Ernoul, he too would have been involved in the battle. Balian and Joscius of Tyre reached Tiberias on 2 May, as did Reynald of Sidon, where they found a very shaken Raymond of Tripoli. Gerard of Ridefort had initially set out with them, but was unable to continue because of the pain of his wounds. Shock must have hastened the reconciliation between the count and the king that was then agreed. They met at the Hospitaller castle of St Job outside Jerusalem, where both dismounted and Raymond fell on his knees before the king, who lifted him up and embraced him.
It was only just in time, for the crisis was upon them. Saladin now had an army of at least 30,000 trained troops, which was considerably augmented by an unknown number of volunteers. Taqi al-Din, Saladin's nephew, who had been sent to watch the northern frontier, had made a truce with Bohemond of Antioch, and had joined the main Muslim army at ‘Ashtara, on the Damascus road, about 28 miles to the east of Tiberias. By 27 June, the army had taken up a position near the crossing of the Jordan at as-Senebra, just to the south of the Sea of Galilee. The excitable ‘Imad al-Din described the army as similar to an ocean, enveloping the area to such an extent that the land disappeared under the spread of the tents.50 In response, King Guy now mustered the host, while Raymond left to collect his own men from Tiberias. Help was requested from Bohemond III, who sent Raymond, his eldest son, with fifty knights. The army then gathered at the Springs of Saffuriya, as it had done in the past, and Eraclius took out the True Cross, which he entrusted to the prior of the Holy Sepulchre, ‘for he had an excuse and could not go’.51 Gerard of Ridefort advised the king to announce that all those who would join them would be well paid, as he would release the money deposited with the Temple by Henry II. This money enabled Guy to assemble a formidable army of his own, although he could not match Saladin. He had about 1,200 knights at his disposal, plus mounted sergeants, turcopoles and foot soldiers. The Libellus describes the turcopoles as ‘innumerable’ and puts the number of foot soldiers at over 18,000, although Ernoul's final figure for the whole army is more than 40,000.52
Messages then reached them that Tiberias was under siege and Countess Eschiva was in great distress. Guy of Lusignan had schemed to become king and now the responsibility lay on his shoulders. According to a letter from the Genoese consuls to Pope Urban III, written in late September, which is based on information from a Genoese merchant in Acre, Guy had originally intended ‘to fortify his cites and localities rather than make an immediate attack on the invader’.53 He twice took counsel from his leading vassals and the military orders and on both occasions the advice was conflicting. Raymond of Tripoli wanted him to send to Antioch for more help, including from Baldwin of Ramla, during which time he argued that Saladin's army, worn down by the heat, would lose momentum. Raymond's view seems to have been that either Saladin would be forced to retreat, giving the Christians the opportunity to fall on his rearguard, or he would push into the kingdom, exposing himself to counterattack. The place to camp would be in front of Acre, where they would be well supplied with food and water, and into which they could retreat should things go wrong. In contrast, Gerard of Ridefort and Reynald of Châtillon, as might be expected from their previous records, wanted to take the initiative and drive Saladin out of the kingdom. Raymond's advice, they said, was duplicitous, for Saladin would take advantage of the king's passivity and Guy would lose his kingdom.54
On the evening of Thursday 2 July, the king held a third council, and this time appears to have accepted Raymond's view that he did not have the strength to confront Saladin and that he should therefore stay where he was. According to Ernoul, however, after nightfall, Gerard of Ridefort convinced Guy that Raymond was a traitor whose main motive was to put the king to shame, and that they should tackle Saladin at once. It is not known how long the Christians had been at Saffuriya, but Saladin had begun to move his army on the previous Friday, 26 June, so they may have been there for up to five days. Indeed, during this time Saladin had advanced to Kafr Sabt, on the plateau overlooking the Roman road and hardly more than 10 miles away, in an attempt to draw out the Franks but, although he had waited for two days, he had been unsuccessful.55 It was therefore to the surprise of the other leaders that, in the early hours of the morning of 3 July, Guy ordered his forces to leave the springs in order to march east along the Roman road that led along the valley to the south of Mount Turan.56
As presented by Ernoul, the aim was to relieve Tiberias. When they heard that the countess had sent for help, the knights were supposed to have said: ‘Let us go and rescue the ladies and maidens of Tiberias.’ Such a chivalric gesture may well have appealed to the audiences of the Old French continuations of William of Tyre, but it seems hardly credible as the basis for a serious military decision, especially given the previous enmity between Guy and Raymond. Moreover, Raymond was opposed to the idea, for he knew that, although the town had fallen, the countess was quite well defended in the moated citadel and, should she need to abandon it, she could take to the boats on the lake. On the other hand, both ‘Imad al-Din and Ibn al-Athir claim that Saladin had attacked Tiberias as a means of persuading the Franks to leave Saffuri
ya. ‘For he did not doubt,’ says ‘Imad al-Din, ‘that the Franks, as soon as they knew of his arrival, would be eager to help the town and he [Saladin] would thus be able to engage them in battle and destroy them.’57
In fact, both sides were influenced by pragmatic military reasons, largely derived from the dire experiences of the campaign of September and October 1183.58 On that occasion, Saladin had indeed been obliged to retreat, but the human and material costs to both sides had been heavy. Many men had been killed and the Christian army had suffered an acute shortage of supplies. Raymond's advice that they should fall back on Acre suggests that he believed that Saffuriya was a far from ideal place to make a stand because, as in 1183, communications with the coast could be cut off. Mere defence based on the springs would not have been enough to see off a coalition on this scale; indeed, Saladin's credibility as a leader of the jihad rested upon the success of this campaign.59 Guy, however, drew a different lesson from the events of 1183, for he had lost his position as bailli as a result and had effectively been forced into a kind of internal exile by Baldwin IV. It would not have been difficult to persuade him that Raymond of Tripoli was motivated by malice. William of Tyre, who had a very unfavourable view of Guy, nevertheless said that some thought that he had been undermined by those who did not want him to receive credit for any victory.60 Moreover, Reynald of Châtillon's policy of unrelenting aggression towards Saladin had had some success. Despite great efforts, Saladin had not been able to take Kerak, while Reynald had proved a constant threat to the caravans travelling between Cairo and Damascus. Ibn al-Athir, aware of these disputes, saw the arguments as a direct confrontation between Reynald and Raymond. ‘That is enough making us frightened of the Muslims!’ he has Reynald say to Raymond, ‘There is no doubt that you are on their side and favour them, otherwise you would not have spoken so.’61
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