Meanwhile, in Jerusalem itself the inhabitants were braced for the inevitable attack. The city was hugely crowded. Many had fled there from other places now held by the Muslims, so it may have contained double its usual population.100 The chief men of authority were Balian of Ibelin and Patriarch Eraclius. Balian had been allowed to travel there to retrieve his wife and children on condition that he spent only one night in the city before taking them to Tripoli. He had, however, been persuaded by Eraclius that he could be absolved from his oath, and had excused himself to Saladin on the grounds that he had been prevented from leaving the city.101
The patriarch himself now sent dramatic appeals to Pope Urban III and to the secular princes of the West, possibly carried by Maria Comnena, Balian's wife, whom Saladin had generously provided with an escort to the coast. The letters are similar in content, but the language is adapted to appeal to the different recipients. The letter to Urban is replete with biblical references, while that to the princes bewails the misfortunes that have afflicted them and emphasises the magnitude of a military defeat that had cost 25,000 lives in a single day. Both stress the devastating loss of the True Cross and the enemy's intention to wipe the Christian name from the face of the earth. Eraclius tells the pope that he is not confident that they can defend the Holy Land for another six months and he lists twenty-eight places in the kingdom that have already been lost. Only Jerusalem and Tyre survive, he says. The letter to the princes names thirty-two places that have been lost, as well as a further thirty castles and casalia. In words reminiscent of Urban II's Clermont speech, he paints a picture of Muslims using the churches as stables and copulating with Christian women before the altars. Saladin is now so close to Jerusalem that they expect to be under siege at any moment. Defence can only be mounted with men and money from the West, and Eraclius offers a plenary indulgence and the promise of eternal life to any who will come to their aid.102
Saladin knew, of course, that above all he had to capture Jerusalem, and on 20 September he encamped his forces along the western and north-western walls, opposite the Jaffa and Damascus Gates respectively.103 After an initial attempt at negotiation by Saladin, who offered the same terms that had been accepted at Ascalon, was rejected, fierce fighting began almost at once. The author of the Libellus was one of those trapped in the city and he describes how showers of arrows poured over the walls, filling the hospitals with the wounded and overwhelming the doctors. He himself suffered an arrow in the bridge of his nose and, although the wooden shaft was removed, the metal remained in his face for the rest of his life.104 However, despite the intensity of the attack, the besiegers were unable to break in or force a surrender and, after five days, Saladin moved round to the eastern side on the Mount of Olives. From here his petraries and mangonels bombarded the city, and his miners began to burrow beneath the wall. Nobody could be found inside the city to defend the resulting gaps; the Libellus says that even an offer of 5,000 besants by the patriarch was insufficient to produce volunteers.105 Penitential processions had no effect, for God, believed Ernoul, would not listen to their prayers. ‘For the stench of adultery, of disgusting extravagance and of sin against nature would not let their prayers rise to God. God was so very angered at that people that He cleansed the city of them.’106
In reality the defenders knew that they could not survive and now tried to negotiate on the basis of Saladin's previous offer. Two attempts by Balian of Ibelin were rebuffed, partly because Saladin knew he had the upper hand and partly because the sultan must himself have been under pressure from religious leaders anxious to requite ‘evil with evil’ by avenging the massacre of 1099. In the end Balian used what leverage he had. They would, he told Saladin, kill their women and children, destroy the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa mosque, and slaughter the 5,000 Muslim prisoners they held. ‘Then we shall come forth, all of us, against you and fight you like desperate men fighting for their lives. Not one of us will be killed at that time until he kills many more of you. We shall die nobly or win victory gloriously.’107
Saladin's response was to offer to ransom the inhabitants: ten dinars for each man, five for a woman and two for a child. Anyone who did not pay would be enslaved, although Balian bought out 18,000 of the poor for the lump sum of 30,000 dinars. Even so, Ibn al-Athir says this still left another 16,000 who were taken as slaves.108 Most of the men would have ended up as forced labourers, but about half of those who had not been ransomed were women and children, who were divided up among their captors. Many of the more attractive women were obliged to become concubines, or were otherwise sexually abused, whatever their previous status in Frankish society.109 In these circumstances the Hospitallers released their portion of Henry II's deposits, for Saladin would have the money in any case if the city fell.110 Thus, on 2 October 1187, the keys of Jerusalem were handed over to Saladin, and the gates sealed to prevent any departures without payment of a ransom.
Nevertheless, says ‘Imad al-Din, this did not enrich the public treasury, because ‘the tax was not guarded as it ought to have been’. A combination of negligence, disorder and corruption meant that many escaped without making the full payment. Muslim officials were bribed so that people were let down over the walls on ropes, concealed in baggage or disguised as Muslim soldiers. Important leaders obtained immunities: Muzaffar al-Din, for example, claimed 1,000 prisoners on the pretext that they were Armenians who came from the lands he held around around Edessa. Saladin, often castigated for his financial naïvety by ‘Imad al-Din, granted him and others such requests.111 Muzaffar al-Din was not the only one to take advantage. Ibn al-Athir says that Saladin knew that Eraclius was a rich man and that he was taking out a huge sum from the churches, but refused to break his oath and only charged him the standard ten dinars.112 ‘Imad al-Din thought that the patriarch was worth 200,000.113 At the other end of the scale, Saladin seems to have been willing to let those who were completely destitute leave without paying, setting up a checkpoint at the postern gate near the house of St Lazarus. However, when one of the Muslims pierced a gourd carried by one of the ‘poor’, thinking it contained wine, money spilled forth and the concession was immediately abandoned.114 On the Christian side, Ernoul says that the Templars and Hospitallers, freed from the threat of plunder, did not give as much as they might have. ‘Had they thought that violence would be done them, they would have given more than they did.’115 The losses that ‘Imad al-Din regretted were compounded by Saladin's own generosity. Between the capture of the city on the 2nd and Saladin's departure on the 30th, he distributed to his emirs and the ulema (Islamic scholars) sums amounting to 220,000 dinars and kept nothing for himself.116
The refugees who escaped enslavement were accompanied for part of their journey by armed escorts provided by Saladin.117 Their numbers were too great to travel in one body and they were divided into three groups, led by the Templars, the Hospitallers and, finally, by Balian of Ibelin and Patriarch Eraclius. The Muslim writers lose interest in them once they had entered Christian territory, but some went to Tyre while others tried to make their way to Tripoli. Ernoul, however, says that they were plundered of what little they had by Reynald, lord of Nephin, and that those who escaped were treated in the same way by the count of Tripoli's men after the count had refused them entry to the city. Some reached Antioch, and others eventually managed to settle in Tripoli. It is not clear if Ernoul is referring to Raymond of Tripoli in this passage, since at some point in the autumn Raymond had become ill (from pleurisy, according to Ibn Shaddad) and died, leaving his lands to Bohemond, second son of Bohemond III of Antioch.118 Others went south and joined the exiles from Ascalon and Gaza. These managed to reach Alexandria, where they were allowed to stay by the local governor until they could take ship for the West in the next spring sailing. The visiting Italian merchants were reluctant to take them, but were forced to do so by the governor, who refused to return their steering oars, deposited with him during the winter to ensure that they paid the required taxes, until they had a
greed.119
In these circumstances, with survival the evident priority, it is unlikely that anybody gave much thought to the preservation of the kingdom's archives. Seventy years later the Cypriot jurist Philip of Novara claimed that ‘the assises, good usages and good customs’ had all been deposited in a chest in the Holy Sepulchre, locked with nine separate keys. ‘All was lost when Saladin took Jerusalem. Never again was there an assise or usage, or agreed custom written down.’120 If this was true, then the disappearance of the so-called Letres dou Sepulcre removed nearly ninety years of legislation that had underpinned the administration of the kingdom. However, the Letres probably never existed in the first place: they were a convenient fiction invented for contemporary political reasons.121 Of course, many documents belonging to both public and private bodies must genuinely have been lost, including the royal archives, which had certainly been in existence in 1180 when, as chancellor, William of Tyre recorded the deposit of a royal charter there.122 However, it seems improbable that such a valuable (and presumably portable) chest as that referred to by Philip would not have been removed or hidden in anticipation of the attack on the city, just as the Nazareth capitals appear to have been.
The Muslim sources convey a powerful sense that momentous events had taken place. The surrender on Friday 27 Rajab (2 October) was on the eve of the Prophetic Ascension recorded in the Koran, according to Ibn Shaddad. In stark contrast to Ernoul's diatribe about the stench of Christian sin, Ibn Shaddad said that the timing of events meant that God had enabled Jerusalem to be returned to the Muslims on the anniversary of the Prophet's Night Journey, a sign of his acceptance of ‘this professed obedience’. The wider Muslim world was well aware of what had happened, for when news that Saladin was moving his army to besiege Jerusalem spread, it attracted ‘a vast crowd of men of religion, Sufis and mystics’ to witness the conquest, and the ulema from Egypt and Syria all travelled there. Ibn Shaddad says no one of any importance was absent.123
Saladin then set about the purification of the city, restoring buildings to their states prior to the Christian conquest. The gilded cross on top of the Dome of the Rock was pulled down and, according to the Templar Terricus in a letter to Henry II of England early in 1188, it was ‘publicly beaten for two days as it was carried around the city’. The marble pavement placed over the rock itself to prevent pilgrim souvenir hunters from breaking off bits was removed. Christian carvings around the shrine were broken up. A carved wooden pulpit, made on the orders of Nur al-Din for the time when Jerusalem would be reconquered, was brought from Aleppo. Additional buildings, especially those erected by the Templars on the western side of the al-Aqsa, were cleared away. Inside the al-Aqsa the mihrab was uncovered and the building refurnished with carpets and prayer mats. Madrasas were established in former Christian buildings, including those once occupied by the Hospitallers. Saladin's family performed various acts of piety; among these was the sprinkling of rose-water in and around the Dome of the Rock by Taqi al-Din.124 The Christian presence was not entirely erased, however, for Terricus says that the Syrians were allowed custody of the Holy Sepulchre for a year, while ten Hospitaller brothers were permitted to continue to tend the sick in their house for the same period.125
The taking of Jerusalem was a huge coup, which Saladin hoped would finally establish his reputation throughout the Muslim East as the great leader of the jihad. Indeed, when Saladin left Jerusalem on 30 October, his men spread out across the plain, apparently gripped by a state of euphoria. ‘One of their desires,’ says ‘Imad al-Din, ‘was to plunge the blood of the infidels into the ocean.’126 In fact, an-Nasir, the Abbasid caliph, was far from enthusiastic about the increase in Saladin's power and made his discontent known in a letter to the sultan in December 1187.127 Moreover, practical problems remained: Tyre was under the control of Conrad of Montferrat, who had no intention of capitulating, while key inland castles were still resisting despite sieges begun soon after Hattin. At Tyre, Conrad had taken the opportunity to strengthen the defences, deepening the ditch and ensuring that the sea wall was continuous. Extensive underwater rocks made it difficult for hostile ships to come close to the walls.128 ‘The city,’ says Ibn al-Athir, ‘became like an island in the midst of the sea, impossible to reach or approach.’129 On the landward side siege operations could only be conducted against the relatively short eastern face, and attackers could be harassed by crossfire from small boats on the inlets to the north and south.
Saladin arrived on 12 November, and, on the 25th, began an assault. Conrad responded by asking for help from Tripoli, but the ships sent were caught in a storm and did not reach him.130 Saladin also tried to use sea power, bringing in ten galleys from Acre, a move that almost succeeded. However, early one morning five of his galleys blockading the entrance to the harbour were caught by surprise and quickly overwhelmed. Their crews were killed or dived into the sea, leaving insufficient ships to continue, and Saladin was obliged to order them to sail to Beirut. According to Terricus, looking for some good news amidst the gloom, the fleet commander and his subordinates were captured and Saladin had his remaining galleys drawn up on land and burnt.131 This encouraged the defenders to make a sortie, during which the Muslims wrongly thought they had captured Conrad. As ‘Imad al-Din comments, the Muslims had become used to easy victories; they now became increasingly disgruntled and Saladin found it difficult to persuade them to continue. Finally, on 1 January, as the bad weather closed in, he decided to lift the siege and retreat to Acre.132 ‘He gave leave to all the armies to return to their homelands, to rest during the winter and return in the spring. The armies of the East, Mosul and others departed, as did those of Syria and those of Egypt. His special guard remained resident in Acre.’133
Ibn al-Athir is blunt in his assessment of where the blame lay. Saladin was responsible for the failure, for he had given the Frankish knights safe-conducts which enabled them to assemble at Tyre, as well as time to send for help from overseas, which greatly strengthened their morale. He admits, however, that to an extent Saladin's hand had been forced by some of his emirs, who feared that as his money ran low, the sultan would start to borrow from them; as a consequence, their efforts had been less than wholehearted.134 Tyre, nevertheless, was the most difficult of the coastal cities to take. Apart from Ascalon, it had been the last major port to fall to the Franks, who had been unable to capture it until 1124, a quarter of a century after the fall of Jerusalem. Even then, it had taken nearly five months to bring about its surrender, despite the presence of a powerful Venetian fleet.135 Conrad had arrived at Tyre by chance, but he was the right man in the right place.
While Tyre held out on the coast, isolated pockets of resistance remained inland. As might be expected, these were the strongest Frankish castles, mainly controlled by the military orders, where most of their surviving personnel had found refuge. Although Chastel Neuf had surrendered while he was besieging Tyre, in early 1188 Saladin had not taken Kerak and Montréal in Transjordan, nor the Galilean castles of the Hospital at Belvoir and the Temple at Safad, all of which had been expensively rebuilt in the 1170s.136 He had left forces around these enclaves in order to keep the garrisons pinned inside the walls since, as there was no prospect of relief, it was only a matter of time before they ran out of supplies and surrendered, but such patient waiting was hardly a practical way of managing his main army, which required more action and the returns that went with it.
At Belvoir, which overlooked the route along the Jordan valley, part of his objective was to maintain a free passage, and Saladin was much distressed when one stormy night in January his men were surprised by a Hospitaller sortie. Many of the besiegers were killed or captured and their supplies seized, enabling the Hospitallers to hold out for another year, as Belvoir did not fall until 5 January 1189. This was a notable, if small-scale, success for the garrison. Terricus says that the besiegers had been supporting themselves with arms and provisions from the Templar supply depot at La Fève, which the Muslims had taken in J
uly 1187, and that most of these had been regained in the Hospitaller raid.137 Saladin now decided that he could not succeed here until he had gathered what Ibn Shaddad calls ‘a concentration of forces’ and therefore raised the siege.138
If there were to be no more rapid capitulations in the kingdom of Jerusalem, it was now time for Saladin to turn his attention to the two northern crusader states.139 In the spring he had moved from Acre to Damascus, and he set out from there in mid-May 1188. Qadas, south of the lake of Homs, was used as an assembly point, and here he met ‘Imad al-Din Zengi, lord of Sinjar, and forces from Mosul and the Jazira.140 The ensuing campaign is well documented, for the three most important contemporary Muslim chroniclers – Ibn al-Athir, ‘Imad al-Din and Ibn Shaddad – were all eyewitnesses.141 Saladin's immediate target was Tripoli, although neither Ibn al-Athir nor Ibn Shaddad says so, perhaps because it turned out to be his second failure to take a major coastal city in the space of a few months. Tripoli appears to have been saved by the arrival of a formidable Sicilian fleet which may have consisted of as many as sixty galleys. It had been sent by King William II, who apparently intended to crusade himself in partnership with his brother-in-law, Henry II of England. This was only the second serious intervention in Outremer by the kings of Sicily since the repudiation of Queen Adelaide in 1117, an action for which the successors of Baldwin I had paid dearly.142 Ernoul claims that William was trying to assuage his guilt; he had planned an attack on Constantinople and for the previous two years he had been recruiting crusaders and pilgrims who might otherwise have given their services to the crusader states.143
The Crusader States Page 44
