Margaritus was quite correct. None of the great rulers of the West could ignore the events in the Holy Land, whatever their personal feelings about crusading. In October, the defenders of Tyre had sent an embassy to the West led by Joscius, the archbishop, and this had inspired William II to equip his fleet and to begin his own preparations. Supplied with horses and money by William, Joscius had then travelled on to Rome and then Ferrara, where he met Gregory VIII.3 The pope, however, died on 20 December and it was left to his successor, Clement III, to activate his plans. Most importantly he sent Henry, cardinal-bishop of Albano, to the German emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, a veteran of the Second Crusade and the obvious leader of a new rescue mission. On 27 March, at Mainz, Frederick took the Cross, followed by many of the leading princes and ecclesiastics of the empire.4
Joscius, meanwhile, had continued his journey north and, in January, found Henry II and Philip II of France in conference at their traditional meeting place on the borders of Normandy between Gisors and Trie. Roger of Howden credits his inspired preaching with convincing the two kings and Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders, that they should undertake the expedition and, on 21 January, they too took the Cross. Many others rushed to join them, Roger says, because of the miraculous appearance of a cross in the sky.5 They did so in the knowledge that Richard, count of Poitou and duke of Aquitaine, eldest surviving son of Henry II, had already committed himself. If William of Newburgh is correct, this was apparently an impulsive act, for Richard took the Cross in November 1187 at Tours, within twelve hours of receiving the news, and was later rebuked by his father for not seeking his permission first.6
Given their past record, it is reasonable to assume that neither Henry nor Philip were enthusiastic crusaders, although Philip of Flanders had made a controversial appearance in the East in 1177–8.7 However, Henry in particular had little choice. Joscius was not the only envoy he received from the East, for the northern states had sent Anterius, bishop of Valania, and the bishop of Jabala, who perhaps carried the appeal of Aimery of Limoges in which he had told Henry that he should be ‘mindful of your renown and fame so that the God who raised you onto your throne may in turn be raised by you’.8 Later in the year Henry wrote to both patriarchs promising assistance ‘more quickly than you could believe’. He assured them that he and his son had set aside all worldly pleasures and that they would very soon be present in person.9
In fact, Saladin was in no immediate danger, for the organisation, financing and transportation of large-scale armies took many months, while the two principal figures were quite elderly men, who had suddenly been called upon to undertake the rescue of the Holy Land after long careers in which both had spent most of their time fighting to hold together and expand their huge domains in the West. Indeed, Henry was still struggling in the summer of 1189 when he was taken ill and died on 6 July.10 It does seem though that, whatever the obstacles, Frederick Barbarossa was determined that his reign should culminate in the recapture of Jerusalem. Even though he was in his mid-sixties and lacked the administrative machinery of his contemporaries in France and England, his was the first of the western armies to set out. On 11 May 1189, he left Ratisbon (Regensburg), aiming to take the land route through the Balkans and Asia Minor. No crusaders had done this since the Second Crusade, as the sea route was now safer and quicker. Frederick himself must have had misgivings; in his youth he had been a member of Conrad III's disastrous expedition of 1148. However, the sheer size of his army seems to have determined the choice, for he and his son Frederick, duke of Swabia, were accompanied by an archbishop, eight bishops, an abbot, a duke, two margraves and twenty-six counts.11 It is thought that the total number of men was between 12,000 and 15,000, of whom around 3,000 were knights.12
Extensive negotiations had been conducted in advance to ensure a smooth passage, especially with Isaac II Angelus, the Byzantine emperor, and Kilij Arslan II, the Seljuq sultan of Rum, whose representatives had reached an agreement with Frederick at the Diet of Nuremberg in late December 1188. Isaac had gained power in June 1185, when the unstable and violent regime of Andronicus II had collapsed and the emperor had been killed, but the Byzantines were no longer in a position to play a major role in Levantine politics in the way they had in the days of John and Manuel Comnenus, and inevitably Isaac was nervous, fearing that the crusade could be turned against him.13 Not surprisingly, therefore, he had been in contact with Saladin as well. In the summer of 1189, Ibn Shaddad says that they had agreed to establish a mosque in Constantinople and that a preacher had delivered the khutbah for the Abbasid caliph. Soon afterwards Isaac wrote to tell Saladin that the Germans had crossed into Byzantine territory, but that they had been so weakened by his troops that ‘they will be no benefit to their kindred and no harm to your Excellency’. It is evident, however, who was the stronger party, for Isaac chided Saladin for his failure to recognise ‘any of the good intentions and efforts of our Majesty’.14
Isaac had certainly been hindering Barbarossa's army. Nicetas Choniates, who was governor of the theme of Philippopolis at the time, blames the Byzantine envoys for provoking the Germans and Isaac for ordering attacks on the army. He says these actions caused him ‘a host of troubles’ and evidently would have preferred to have eased the passage of the crusaders through the lands that he administered.15 In a long letter to his son Henry, written in November 1189, Frederick complained that they had run into trouble as soon as they had reached Byzantine territory. As they travelled through Bulgaria they were harassed by archers and refused the market facilities promised at the Diet of Nuremberg. After six weeks they reached Philippopolis, which was deserted, and there they learned that Isaac had imprisoned Barbarossa's envoys. ‘This,’ commented Ernoul, ‘is not something to be surprised at, for the Greeks have always hated the Church of Rome and Latin Christians.’16 A series of attacks on Byzantine towns obliged Isaac to return the ambassadors ‘with great pomp’, but a prolonged exchange of messages served only to delay the army until the onset of winter, leaving Frederick no alternative but to wait until spring. Anticipating trouble, he ordered Henry to make secret arrangements with Genoa, Venice, Ancona and Pisa, so that the following March they could launch a combined attack on Constantinople, without which he could not see how they were going to be able to cross into Asia Minor.17 On 22 November, the German army established itself in winter quarters at Adrianople, which was deserted just like Philippopolis.18
Isaac was exaggerating when he told Saladin that ‘they have been so weakened that they will hardly reach your lands’, but he had nonetheles made a considerable impact. Although not many men had been killed, the Germans had lost large numbers of horses, the shortage of which remained a problem for the rest of the crusade, while delays crossing Bulgaria had postponed the confrontation with Saladin until the summer of 1190, three years after the battle of Hattin. Eventually, on 14 February, after a winter during which, at times, the discipline of the German army showed signs of breaking down, a new agreement was made with Isaac and, in late March, the army was able to cross at Gallipoli, well away from Constantinople itself.19
The march across Asia Minor was, as Frederick knew, even more difficult, firstly because of Greek harassment and then, from late April, because of attacks by the Seljuqs under Qutb al-Din Malikshah, the son of Kilij Arslan. By the time they reached Iconium on 17 May, the Germans were in a poor condition, suffering from severe shortages and growing manpower losses, yet they still managed to take the city, forcing Kilij Arslan to make peace and arrange markets. Moreover, this victory brought a large quantity of plunder, the value of which may have been as high as 100,000 marks.20 On 30 May, they re-entered Christian territory at Laranda (Karaman) on the borders of Cilicia.21
Despite previous setbacks, therefore, at this point the army remained formidable, as well as quite well endowed with financial resources, but on 10 June 1190, the whole enterprise was undermined by the death of the emperor. In the heat of midsummer he decided that he would swim the River Saleph
, apparently despite receiving advice to the contrary. According to the anonymous cleric responsible for the chronicle of ‘Ansbert’, Frederick drowned in a whirlpool, although the effort may have precipitated a heart attack first.22 Nicetas Choniates, who had initially described him as ‘the evil beyond our borders’, clearly believed that Frederick's death was a great blow to the Christian cause. ‘His burning passion for Christ,’ he said, ‘was greater than that of any other Christian monarch of his time.’23 It is perhaps indicative of the toll taken by the journey that, although Frederick of Swabia was able to take command, the German crusade began to disintegrate. The emperor's body was taken to Tarsus. From here, some sailed to Tripoli, while others went to Saint Simeon and from there to Antioch. A third group carried on overland to Antioch. Frederick of Swabia reached Antioch on 21 June, only for there to be an outbreak of disease which struck ‘both nobles and the poor, old as well as young’.24
Saladin had dismissed Margaritus by telling him that it made no difference how many enemies were sent against him as his mission was blessed by God. In fact, the news of Frederick Barbarossa's crusade had caused him deep anxiety. Ernoul says that he dismantled the walls of Latakia, Jabala, Gibelet and Beirut so that the emperor would not be able to garrison them, which, if true, suggests that Saladin was not confident he could prevent the Germans from marching south.25 This accords with the information given by Ibn al-Athir. Some of Saladin's advisers wanted him to oppose Frederick before he could link up with the Franks, but he decided instead to send contingents from Aleppo, Jabala, Latakia and Shaizar to keep a watch on the frontier rather than committing himself entirely to the north.26
Ibn Shaddad was sent to call up the lords of Sinjar, the Jazira, Mosul and Irbil, and, on 23 October 1189, set out to inform an-Nasir, the caliph at Baghdad, and ask for his help. They had heard, says Ibn Shaddad, that the emperor led a great host of 200,000 or perhaps even 260,000 men.27 Saladin had little faith in Kilij Arslan, whom he believed had made a secret agreement with the emperor, and it was therefore a huge relief when he heard that Frederick had drowned.28 Even so, a letter from Gregory IV, the Armenian Catholicos, was hardly reassuring: according to him, the crusaders still had 42,000 men, who remained determined. ‘Their cause is a great one and they are serious in their enterprise and of prodigious discipline …’29 However, observation of those who travelled overland to Antioch led to a second letter from which it is clear that the Germans were not in a good state. They had been attacked by the small garrison left at Baghras and had lost many of their possessions, apparently because they had incautiously believed that the castle was still in the hands of the Templars.30 ‘They are very numerous, but they are weak, short of horses and equipment. Most of them have their baggage on donkeys and weak horses.’ Gregory had heard that both Leo of Armenia and Bohemond of Antioch were planning to take advantage of them.31
Saladin's reluctance to commit large forces to intercept Frederick Barbarossa was primarily caused by the problems he faced in the kingdom of Jerusalem. In his survey of Saladin's conquests, Ibn al-Athir had overlooked one important fortress, that of Beaufort (Shaqif Arnun), situated high above the Litani River, about 17 miles to the north-east of Tyre.32 This was the seat of Reynald of Sidon, who had escaped from Hattin in the breakout led by Raymond of Tripoli. Reynald was a fluent Arabic-speaker and familiar with Islamic history and religious belief; consequently, he seems to have captured the interest of the Muslim chroniclers. When Saladin camped outside his castle on 5 May 1189, his forces had been besieging Beaufort for a year and it had nearly run out of provisions. With the fall of the other castles Reynald knew he was totally isolated and realised that his only hope was to play for time, since he must have imagined that sooner or later substantial numbers would arrive from the West.
Apparently, one day he suddenly appeared at the entrance to Saladin's tent. He was honourably received and offered to become ‘the sultan's mamluke’, since once he had surrendered he would no longer be able to live among the Franks and would need a fief in Damascus to support himself and his family. Both Saladin and Ibn Shaddad seem to have taken pleasure in his company, and he was given three months to retrieve his family and retainers from Tyre, but in fact he used the period to reinforce the defences and bring in provisions. It now became obvious to the Muslims that, as Ibn Shaddad put it, his whole purpose was procrastination. On 13 August, Reynald was finally forced to agree that the time limit had expired, but he was apparently unable to persuade the garrison to capitulate, although Saladin soon realised that this was a ploy that had been arranged beforehand. He was taken to Banyas and put under guard, where ‘neither words nor torture’ succeeded in forcing him to give in and he was sent on to Damascus, where he was thrown into prison.33
Ibn Shaddad says Saladin was furious at the delay. He had good reason to be because, on 22 August, he heard the extraordinary news that Guy of Lusignan was leading a force towards Acre. According to Ernoul, Guy's brother, Geoffrey, together with Andrew, brother of Erard, count of Brienne, had sailed to Tyre without waiting for the main crusader armies. He was told that Guy had gone to Antioch with his other brother, Aimery, and Gerard of Ridefort, master of the Temple. Together they assembled a force of some 600 knights and returned to Tyre, only to find that Conrad of Montferrat would not allow them entry. At this point Guy had few options: there was nothing for him at home in Poitou, his military reputation (never great) had been destroyed, his kingdom was almost entirely in the hands of Saladin, and the only city holding out, Tyre, was controlled by a man who clearly believed that Guy had forfeited the right to rule and that he should take his place. Geoffrey told him that crusaders from the West would soon arrive. ‘It is,’ he said, ‘much better that they should find that you have besieged a city than that you have been idle.’34 Guy, reinforced by absolution from his oath to Saladin, and urged on by his brothers and Gerard of Ridefort, therefore decided to move on Acre, even though his force was totally inadequate.35
They made their way along the coast, shadowed by Pisan ships to which they could retreat if necessary. The presence of Ubaldo, archbishop of Pisa, the papal legate, who had arrived on 6 April, added a layer of official backing to the venture.36 Ibn al-Athir presents Saladin as keen to attack them en route, but deterred by his emirs, who argued it would be easier to eliminate them when they reached Acre.37 Consequently, on 28 August, Guy was able to establish himself on a low hill called Tell al-Fukhkhar, about 36 metres high, and about half a mile to the east of the city. This was quite a good position since Acre was situated on a plain and gave good views in all directions, while enabling Guy to press the city quite closely. Any further away and they would not have had sufficient men to make any real impact. The Pisans established a beachhead, while also attempting to blockade the harbour. Saladin, with far more men at his disposal, spread out along the surrounding hills, placing himself on Tell Kaisan, about 5 miles south-east of Acre, and then extending right to Tell al-'Ayadiya and left to the Na'aman River.38
Guy's attempted siege of Acre had profound effects upon the military situation. In the view of the Norman poet Ambroise, who arrived with Richard I's forces in June 1191, ‘this was the beginning of the deliverance of Christendom’.39 Ibn al-Athir says that Saladin had planned to attack Tyre in 1189 since he was worried about its constant reinforcement, but he did not want to leave Beaufort uncaptured in his rear.40 Moreover, although the truce with Antioch had expired in May, Saladin was in no position to take advantage during the summer of 1189, saving Antioch from what, the previous autumn, had looked like its inevitable fall. The threat that Guy's forces presented was not as negligible as has sometimes been suggested. According to the author of the first book of the Itinerarium, who seems to have acquired his information from participants quite soon after the events, Guy had just under 9,000 men when he set out from Tyre, of whom 700 were knights.41 Once outside Acre, they were augmented both by men coming from Tyre and by new crusaders arriving from the West, so that by the end of August Ibn Shad
dad estimated their strength at 2,000 mounted men and 30,000 foot, sufficient to cover about half of the city.42
There are no unbiased observers and nobody counted these men, but the list of new arrivals is impressive. These included James, lord of Avesnes-sur-Helpe, a prominent vassal of both the counts of Flanders and of Hainaut, who landed on 1 September, followed soon after by a substantial Danish and Frisian fleet. Before the end of the month they had been joined by Philip of Dreux, bishop of Beauvais, described by the Itinerarium as ‘a man more devoted to battles than books’, his brother, Robert, count of Dreux, and Ludwig III, landgrave of Thuringia, who achieved the singular feat of persuading Conrad of Montferrat to accompany him to Acre.43 By this time Ibn Shaddad thought they had a large enough force to encompass Acre completely, a situation that, on 14 September, led to an attack by Taqi al-Din that dislodged the Franks. This enabled the Muslims to resupply the city; indeed, on 17 September, Saladin himself entered Acre and viewed the enemy's camp from the walls.44
This may have been the trigger for the general attack made by the Christians on 4 October. Ibn al-Athir thinks that they believed that Saladin's army was relatively weak at this point and that they should seize their opportunity before the arrival of reinforcements from Egypt or the return of the men sent to blockade Antioch, Tripoli and Tyre.45 They emerged on a wide front, ‘like a plague of locusts, creeping across the face of the earth,’ says Ibn al-Athir. Since Hattin, they had no longer had the protection of the True Cross; instead four persons, walking in front of the king, carried the Gospels covered with a satin cloth.
The Crusader States Page 46
