The terms of the surrender negotiated by al-Mastub, the commander of the garrison, were that the city was to be given up, including all engines, equipment and ships, and payment of 200,000 dinars was to be made. The Muslims were to hand over 1,500 prisoners from the common people and another 100 selected by the Franks, and the True Cross was to be returned. As Conrad of Montferrat had acted as intermediary, he was to receive 10,000 dinars together with another 4,000 dinars for his men. In return the garrison would be permitted to leave with their dependants and personal goods.140 The kings now divided the spoils between them, causing much resentment among those who had suffered for nearly two years in the siege; the fulfilment of promises that they would receive a share was so delayed that, says Roger of Howden, ‘many, forced by poverty, withdrew from them’.141
One prominent crusader – Leopold V, duke of Austria – was especially offended. He had arrived from Vienna in the spring of 1191 before the two kings, and at once became de facto leader of the German contingent, for Frederick of Swabia was already dead. He therefore believed himself to be entitled to a share of the spoils. According to Richard of Devizes, writing with knowledge of King Richard's later imprisonment in Austria, ‘he appeared to claim for himself a part of the triumph. If not at the order at least with the consent of the offended king, the duke's banner was cast into the dirt and trampled upon as an insult to him by his mockers.’ The duke did not stay to be humiliated further. ‘Later, as quickly as he could, full of wrath, he sailed back to his own land.’142
Richard now seems to have tried to persuade Philip to commit himself to another three years in the East, with the aim of achieving a complete conquest. But Philip believed he had done his duty, and on 31 July he sailed to Tyre and from there to France, much to the righteous indignation of the Anglo-Norman chroniclers.143 Like Richard, he had been ill and, not unreasonably, feared that he might die in Palestine, as so many others had done during the siege. Rank was no protection from disease, as had been shown by the death of Philip of Flanders on 1 June.144 Moreover, he had concrete political reasons for his renewed presence in France for, with the death of Philip of Flanders, he claimed that Péronne now belonged to the royal demesne.145 His departure was an evident worry to Richard I, since the French king would certainly threaten his continental lands, despite past promises and Richard's status as a crusader. On the other hand, the situation had its attractions for a man of Richard's personality, leaving him undisputed leader of the crusade. Hugh, duke of Burgundy, left in command of the French, was in no better position to compete with him than Leopold of Austria had been.
Richard's first important act after Philip's departure has been the subject of great controversy ever since, for, on the afternoon of 20 August, he brought 2,700 prisoners held since the fall of Acre to the plain between Tell al-'Ayadiya and Tell Kaisan, and had them all killed. When the Franks retreated ‘Imad al-Din was among those who went out to see what had happened. Passing among the naked bodies strewn across the ground, he saw them as martyrs who ‘had been stripped in order to be clothed in a robe of the silk of paradise that Allah had generously offered them’.146 Richard was apparently convinced that Saladin was procrastinating in fulfilling the terms of the agreement made at the fall of the city with the aim of delaying any attempt at reconquest or attempt on Jerusalem and, knowing that he could not take them with him on the forthcoming march, the king had decided to kill them.147 The Muslim reaction to what was regarded as the king's ‘perfidy’ was to return the Frankish prisoners due for release to Damascus and to put the True Cross into the treasury. It was never recovered or seen by the crusaders again.
The recapture of Acre was a great triumph for the crusaders, but no substantial damage had been inflicted on Saladin's army and most of his conquests were untouched. Most importantly, he still held Jerusalem and the holy places, which remained the central goal of the crusade and the chief justification for its immense costs in lives and money. Richard therefore had important strategic decisions to make and, despite his flamboyant image, he chose not to take a direct route to Jerusalem, but instead decided to follow the more cautious option which was to lead the army south along the coast, taking advantage of his control of the sea to protect his right flank and using the more mobile elements as a screen on the landward side.148
Starting out on 22 August, in a striking demonstration of the skills of fighting on the march, for the next sixteen days the Christians pushed south along the coastal road, most of the time protected at the front by Richard and his household and at the rear by the military orders. Even so, it was hard going. Showers of arrows fell into the main body of the army, killing and wounding both men and horses, while at night the heat and the insects allowed little rest. Captured men and women were taken to Saladin, who had them executed, often having them tortured and mutilated first, ‘as he was still in an extreme rage at what had been done to the prisoners at Acre’.149 For Ambroise, the pain of the human and environmental hazards almost seems to merge. The Turks, he says, were like ‘an annoying venomous fly’. In an age when horse armour was a rarity, the damage to and loss of horses were very high, driving the Templars in the rearguard close to despair. The reluctance of many to join the host is hardly surprising, preferring as they did the wine and women of Acre to the hardships and dangers of the march.150
On 5 September, talks between Richard and al-Adil had broken up in anger, when Richard had demanded that the Muslims restore the lands they had taken and that they return to what he called their ‘own countries’. Sooner or later matters had to come to a head, and they did so on the morning of Saturday the 7th, after the Christian army emerged from a wooded area known as the forest of Arsuf, to the north of the town, and encamped on the plain near the Rochetaille River.151 Richard had anticipated battle, as he was aware that Saladin had been gathering as large an army as possible, having called in forces from across his empire. Indeed, Saladin had been reconnoitring potential sites almost since the march began. Ibn Shaddad says that he had ‘every intention of bringing the enemy to a pitched battle that day’.152
The Christian army set out for Arsuf at dawn, organised into twelve squadrons, with the Templars in the van and the Hospitallers in the rearguard.153 There appear to have been about 1,200 knights and approximately 20,000 foot, a force not dissimilar in size to that at Guy of Lusignan's disposal at Hattin. The Muslims attacked incessantly during the morning and thought that they had the enemy ‘in their power’, only to be surprised by a mass cavalry charge once the infantry had reached the open ground of the Arsuf plantations. Ibn Shaddad was in the centre when he saw three separate groups charging at the right, left and centre simultaneously and, by his own account, ran first to the left and then to the right in a desperate attempt to save himself. In the end he managed to get back to Saladin and his personal guard, although he had very few men with him. All around men were fleeing in what Ibn Shaddad describes as ‘a complete rout’. However, when the attackers pulled up, fearing an ambush, the Muslims had a chance to counterattack, only to be charged again. A third attack by the Christian cavalry enabled them to reach a series of hillocks, where they again halted.154
This broadly accorded with what Richard had intended, although the constant fighting during the morning, when many horses were lost, seems to have provoked the Hospitallers into a premature charge, forcing the king's hand. He reacted at once by following up with the Anglo-Norman and Templar forces, and it must have been the sight of these galloping towards him that had put Ibn Shaddad into a panic.155 This was a Christian victory in the sense that Muslim losses had been very heavy, including several prominent emirs. However, the Muslim army may have been as much as twice the size of that of the Christians, so the damage inflicted was not as great as this figure suggests. It is noticeable that the Muslims were still able to attack the Christian army on 9 September as it made its way to Jaffa, whereas a comparable Christian counter after Hattin would have been inconceivable.156 Christian losses had been much less, alt
hough there was great lamentation at the death of James of Avesnes, unhorsed during the battle and, together with his kinsmen, surrounded by a large group of Turkish soldiers.157
The significance of this battle has been much debated. For some it was no more than ‘a temporary tactical success’, while others think that it provided a second chance to march on Jerusalem, for Saladin's forces were in disarray and crusader morale was high.158 It is evident, though, that the Muslims who were there did not see it as a routine engagement. Ibn Shaddad says that Saladin could not be consoled, while the troops were ‘either wounded in body or wounded in the heart’, and Ibn al-Athir's opinion is that, had the Franks continued their pursuit, ‘the Muslims would have been destroyed’.159 The nature of the battle confirms this view. Modern studies show that the lance was the weapon most likely to kill, since its impact and its accuracy were both much greater than those of arrows. Since in this engagement the most evident feature is the series of Christian charges, it is probable that the Muslims suffered far more fatalities than at any other point on the march.160 Ambroise is equally forthright about the intensity of the battle. Echoing the fears of Fulcher of Chartres over ninety years before, he says: ‘In the whole army there was no man who was so confident that he did not wish in his heart that he had finished his pilgrimage.’161
Yet, when the Christians reached Jaffa on 10 September, they remained there until 31 October, while Richard refortified and resupplied it and other smaller nearby fortresses, convinced that the coast had to be secured first if it was ever to be viable to hold Jerusalem again. To this end, Jaffa, as it had done ever since the First Crusade, remained a vital means of maintaining the essential links with the West. Saladin's view cannot have been very different, for he spent most of the rest of September dismantling the defences of Ascalon, although he had initially hoped to garrison it. The latter idea appears to have horrified some of his councillors, clearly scarred by recent experiences. ‘Imad al-Din says that ‘they had been frightened by the events at Acre and its defence over three years which finally ended to the disadvantage of the Muslims’. ‘Imad al-Din much regretted what he saw as cowardly advice, but Ibn Shaddad says they argued that otherwise ‘the Franks might gain control of it intact, destroy the garrison and use it to take Jerusalem … and cut our communications with Egypt’.162 Much of the demolition was accomplished before the Franks even found out about it.163
On the face of it Richard remained confident. In a letter of 1 October, probably meant for general consumption, he said that he hoped to take Jerusalem by mid-January, but in another letter of the same date, sent to Garnier of Rochefort, abbot of Clairvaux, he wrote that, while he believed that the Lord's inheritance would be fully restored, nevertheless money was running out and ‘we can in no way remain in Syria beyond next Easter’, a perspective somewhat different from that adopted less than three months before, when he had tried to persuade Philip II to commit himself for the next three years.164 A measure of Richard's uncertainty can be seen in his willingness to negotiate, since, as his letter indicates, it was in Saladin's interest to spin out talks as long as possible. When, a year later, Richard proposed a truce, Saladin's emirs advised him to accept on the grounds that, although the Franks could not be trusted to keep their promises, nevertheless if they dispersed, there would be no one left in Palestine capable of offering resistance.
At the same time Richard started to talk about mounting an invasion of Egypt, a plan which, if serious, could not possibly have been implemented without the Italian fleets. In his capacity as overlord, on 13 October, Richard confirmed the privileges granted to the Pisans by King Guy, but he needed the support of their rivals, the Genoese, as well.165 Two days before, therefore, he had written to the Genoese consuls, asking them to send forces for such a venture. ‘If indeed you bring your whole fleet of ships, you will receive your share of the land which, by the help of God, we shall be able to win from the Saracens in keeping with the agreement that we shall make between us.’166 On 26 October, Guy confirmed the Genoese privileges at Richard's request.167 It is not at all clear whether Richard really intended to attack Egypt before attempting to capture Jerusalem but, taken in the context of continuing negotiations with al-Adil, all this activity must at the least be seen as an attempt to increase his bargaining power.
Even so, the Muslims were taken by surprise when, in late October 1191, Richard made the extraordinary proposal that al-Adil should marry Joanna, Richard's sister and widow of William II of Sicily. The seat of their power would be in Jerusalem, and they would hold all the castles, but the local Franks and the military orders would be satisfied by the restoration of their lordships on the coast, while the priests and the monks would live in Jerusalem under a guarantee of safe-conduct. Prisoners on both sides would be released. According to Ibn Shaddad, who acted as the envoy between Saladin and al-Adil, Saladin three times approved these terms, mainly because he did not think that Richard was serious and that ‘it was intended to mock and deceive him’. However, judging by Joanna's furious reaction, it seems that her brother really did mean it. Even Ibn Shaddad knew about the family row. ‘It made her very displeased and angry … How could she possibly allow a Muslim to have carnal knowledge of her!’ As far as Richard was concerned, if this was the problem, then he proposed that al-Adil become a Christian, a suggestion that Ibn Shaddad thought was intended as a means of keeping the door open for further negotiation.168 ‘Imad al-Din, who also took part in discussions about the matter between al-Adil and several leading emirs, has a different view, for he was intrigued by the idea that ‘the word war would be transformed into peace, thanks to a woman’, and he presents Joanna as having been deterred by the Christian priests from giving her sex to a Muslim, claiming that she ‘now abhorred what she had coveted’.169
By early 1192, it does seem as though Saladin's policy of delay was working, and to this end he aimed to undermine any peace talks. After one such session, in November 1191, he had told Ibn Shaddad, ‘If death should happen to strike me down, these forces are hardly likely to assemble again and the Franks will grow strong. Our best course is to keep on with the Jihad until we expel them from the coast or die ourselves.’170 Once again the winter weather prevented any large-scale campaigning, as the crusaders struggled to keep their equipment from rusting and rotting. The plan to move on Jerusalem in January was aborted on the advice of the leaders of the military orders and the local baronage, while much time and money were spent refortifying Ascalon after the damage done to it by Saladin's men during the previous September. ‘When this news was known, revealed and it was realised that the army was to turn back (let it not be called retreat),’ says Ambroise, ‘then was the army, which had been so eager in its advance, so discouraged, that not since God created time was there ever seen an army so dejected and so depressed, so disturbed and so astounded, nor so overcome with great sadness.’
Ambroise, ever reluctant to criticise his hero, nevertheless sees this as a missed opportunity for, unknown to the Christians, the Turks were in a weak state, suffering from the winter snows, which had killed many of their horses and other animals. He thinks that had the crusaders attacked, the city would have been taken.171 He is followed in this by Richard de Templo, but, unlike Ambroise, Richard does not think Jerusalem could have been held for long, for once their pilgrimage had been completed, most of the crusaders would have left for home.172 Saladin was, indeed, more vulnerable, having allowed the dispersal of many of his troops during the winter season when, on 12 December, he had retreated to Jerusalem. However, he had also spent time reinforcing the city's defences with a deeper fosse and stronger walls, work done through the forced labour of nearly 2,000 Frankish prisoners.173
Meanwhile, Saladin knew that Richard was presiding over a fractious and disunited army. Some of the prostitutes whom the king had prevented from accompanying the march south had turned up in Jaffa, having sailed down the coast in whatever ships or boats were available.174 When, in mid-November 1191, Conrad of Mont
ferrat had proposed a separate peace, it is not surprising that Saladin had seized the opportunity to spread dissension within the Christian ranks.175 In February 1192, Richard quarrelled with the duke of Burgundy, who, in common with many other members of the army, returned to Acre. They had parted in acrimony when the duke had asked the king for more money to pay his troops, which Richard was unwilling to provide, presumably because he needed it for the rebuilding of Ascalon. Fighting between the maritime cities had also broken out, with the Pisans taking Guy of Lusignan's side and the Genoese supporting Conrad of Montferrat.176 By his Easter deadline (which fell on 5 April in 1192), Richard was no nearer to recovering the holy places than he had been six months before. When news quickly followed of problems in England, Richard announced that he would have to leave.177
For all Richard's vigour and bravery and evident commitment to the holy war, there are signs that the crusade was beginning to disintegrate around him. He now had no real alternative but to accept the general will that Conrad of Montferrat become king, abandoning his previous support for Guy of Lusignan. As Ambroise says, Guy was now left without a kingdom, despite what the poet saw as his immense contribution to the Christian cause.178 He was therefore compensated with the island of Cyprus, which Richard knew he could not hold indefinitely himself and which he had initially sold to the Templars.179 As the Muslims rightly feared Conrad's martial qualities, this may not have been a bad outcome for the Franks in the East, but the arrangement fell apart when, on 28 April 1192, Conrad was killed in Tyre by two members of the Assassins, apparently in revenge for a past insult. This forced another change of policy, and Henry of Champagne was accepted as ruler, marrying the pregnant Isabella on 5 May, only a week after her last husband had been murdered.180
The Crusader States Page 49
