by Matthew Cobb
18 Rajsfus (1996), p. 357.
19 For a novelised account of this journey, based on eye-witness accounts and reproducing some archival material, see Chaigneau (1981). The details of the train and of those who escaped are taken from this source.
20 Bachelier (1996), section 7-3-12.
21 Rajsfus (1996), p. 358.
22 Only those whose electricity supply escaped the power cuts would have immediately noticed this. There were no transistor radios, so wireless sets relied either on mains electricity or – for the lucky few – massive accumulator batteries. For a discussion of the way that music was used as part of the Radio Paris propaganda broadcasts, see Méadel (2000).
23 Rebatet (1976), p. 186.
24 All details, including the unflattering portraits, from Hérold-Paquis (1948), pp. 19–21.
25 Cazaux (1975), pp. 138–9.
26 Le Parisien Libéré 22 August 1944. Rebatet was the author of the article attacking Laval that had led Je Suis Partout to be banned by Vichy (AN 72AJ/54/II/10, p. 15).
27 Rebatet (1976), p. 186.
28 Rebatet (1976), p. 186.
29 Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 181.
30 The first Rol knew about this declaration was when he saw it posted on a wall. He did not sign it, and he certainly did not write it. It was full of exaggerations and inaccuracies (Rol was not ‘Commander of Greater Paris’; ‘hundreds’ of prisoners had not been shot at Fresnes; the Germans were not taking hostages in each neighbourhood; the Germans were not putting about the rumour that Paris would be declared an open city; and so on), and the brutal call to ‘get a Hun’ had not hitherto been seen in Resistance statements. The tone and the manner of publication suggest strongly that this was produced by the Communist Party leaders of the FTP – Ouzoulias and/or Tillon – with the assumption that their comrade would agree. This probably explains why Rol seems to have been remarkably incurious about where it came from – several decades later he said that he agreed with its thrust, so he assumed responsibility for it. See Bourderon (2004), pp. 372–5 for a discussion of the affair.
31 Rebatet (1976), p. 187. The original French was ‘Qu’est-ce qu’on fout là?’
32 Pryce-Jones (1981), p. 248.
33 See Dunan (1945) for a description of what it was like creating a newspaper from scratch in the days that followed.
34 This is taken from Dutourd’s self-deprecating, amusing and probably unreliable memoir written in 1964 (Dutourd, 1983, pp. 11–12).
35 Cazaux (1975), p. 144.
36 Pasteur Vallery-Radot (1966), p. 279.
37 BAM VV, 17.8.
38 Tuffrau (2002), p. 76 describes the scene, which he witnessed.
39 Pryce-Jones (1981), p. 256.
40 AN 72AJ/61/II/8.
41 Tuffrau (2002), p. 77. On 15 August, writer André Thérive recorded in his diary that he had seen a car carrying ‘three young men in beachwear – orange or red trousers – bearded and with long hair like Bohemians; their luggage included skis (despite the heat) and a live bear in a cage’. He insisted ‘I have not made this up’ and ‘in the future I’ll be accused of lying or of having had a fantastic dream’ (Thérive, 1948, pp. 212–213). What should we make of this account – is it true, or not? How could we know?
42 Galtier-Boissière (1944), p. 254.
43 Bobkowski (1991), p. 606.
44 Pryce-Jones (1981), p. 242.
45 Pryce-Jones (1981), p. 243.
46 AN 72AJ/62/I/8, pp. 1–2.
47 Dubois (1944), pp. 41–2. Similar scenes were played out outside the offices of the Sicherheitsdienst (security police) on avenue Foch, while on the place de la Concorde, food was thrown to passing soldiers from the Navy stores (Martens & Nagel, 2006, pp. 519–520).
48 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 3.
49 For example, Cazaux (1975), p. 144.
50 Renoult & West (2008), p. 143.
51 Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 181.
52 The participants have left three accounts of this meeting: Taittinger’s self-serving memoir, which contains extensive and unlikely verbatim accounts (Taittinger, 1948, pp. 160–9); von Choltitz’s version, which is only a paragraph long (von Choltitz, 1969, pp. 227–8); and the diary of Maurice Toesca (Toesca, 1975, pp. 321–4). They are generally concordant.
53 Cazaux (1975), pp. 131–2.
54 Toesca (1975), p. 323.
55 Dubois (1944), p. 41.
56 Boegner (1992), p. 281.
57 Patin (1994), pp. 37–8.
58 Léautaud (1946), p. 37.
59 Denis (1963) reproduces the minutes of most of the CPL meetings. The meeting of 17 August is not among them, but according to Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), p. 463, the minutes consist of no more than two sentences.
60 Rol later claimed that the question of arms was discussed at this meeting (Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon, 1994, p. 194). Hamon’s apparently contemporaneous diary (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 5) suggests that this discussion in fact occurred on 18 August (see chapter 7).
61 Dansette (1946), p. 163; Denis (1963), p. 97; AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 2. Dansette (1946) p. 163 claims that COMAC also met on 17 August; the date was in fact 16 August (see chapter 5).
62 Frustratingly, there are no records of this meeting of the CNR Bureau in the Archives Nationales in Paris, or in the various works dealing with the history of the CNR, beyond the brief account in Dansette (1946), pp. 163–4.
63 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 3.
64 See Parodi’s brief summary of the meeting in his message to Algiers, AN 72AJ/235/II/300. The meeting also put the finishing touches to a CNR Action Programme (AN 72AJ/49/III/32) that called for extensive nationalisations and social reforms and ordered the FFI immediately to launch attacks on the Germans. Most importantly, the programme publicly complained about the lack of arms and called on the Free French to do everything possible to remedy the situation. It had no effect. Although adopted on 17 August, the Action Programme had gone through a very long gestation, traces of which remained. For example, the CNR called on the FFI to cooperate with the Allies ‘in case of Allied landings’. At Champigny in the south-western suburbs, Albert Ouzoulias called a meeting of all the local FTP leaders, ordering them to seize vehicles, adapt them for battle, and prepare for the insurrection (Ouzoulias, 1972, p. 424).
65 Messages 52–5 of 17 August 1944, AN 72AJ/235/II/299–302.
66 Dansette (1946), p. 167.
67 A colourful account of the journey can be found in Closon (1974), p. 213–26.
68 AN 72AJ/235/II/303.
69 Institut Hoover (1958), pp. 296–7.
70 AN 72AJ/61/I/14, p. 2.
71 Touche (1946), pp. 84–5.
72 Penrose (2005), p. 71. This page also shows Miller’s photograph of the cyclists, together with their bicycle. A few days later, Colonel Rol’s headquarters was moved into a bunker that had emergency power generated by bicycles (see chapter 10, n. 40). The power-generating cyclists in the French animated film Les Triplettes de Belleville (2003) were not entirely fictional.
73 All these letters are reproduced in Dansette (1946), pp. 466–9. The respective part of the letter to Bouffet and Bussière reads:
The government has been constrained by the Occupation Authority to leave Paris, and the strongest protests that I made to the German Ambassador have had no effect. I therefore instruct the Prefect of the Seine and the Prefect of Police, each in their relevant fields, to take all appropriate dispositions in order to ensure public order, food supplies, transport and, more generally, to deal with all the questions that affect the material and moral life of the Parisian population to which I remain so attached. I also entrust you to welcome the Allied military authorities and to represent the French government to them.
74 Laval’s daughter, Josée de Chambrun, has written her own very personal account of this last day. Institut Hoover (1958), pp. 1078–81.
75 Taittinger (1948), p. 159.
76 Galtier-Boissière (1944), pp. 253–4.
77 Bourget (1984)
pp. 272–3. This account is based on contemporary reports by emergency workers.
78 Cazaux (1975), p. 144.
79 Crémieux-Brilhac (1976), p. 180.
80 The chronic lack of weapons was revealed when the regional FFI drew up a plan for protecting the ten key power stations in the Paris region. The idea was to protect each site with 100 résistants, who would stop any attempt by the Germans to sabotage the installation. The FFI estimated that for each site they would need three machine guns, three pistols and fifty grenades. In reality, this level of armament would do nothing to prevent German troops from doing their worst, but as the FFI admitted, they could not supply even such a meagre level of weaponry (Massiet, 1945, p. 119).
81 This formulation was agreed after an argument between Georges Boris in London and de Gaulle’s office in Algiers. De Gaulle’s initial instruction to Paris workers read: ‘Return to work immediately and in an orderly fashion as soon as the Allies arrive’ (Crémieux-Brilhac, 2010, p. 297). Boris was concerned that de Gaulle’s formulation gave the impression that the Free French feared the working class and that they wanted to stop any strike movements as soon as possible. (Both of these ‘impressions’ were basically true.) Boris felt that calling for an ‘immediate and orderly’ return to work seemed condescending and reactionary – the population would quite naturally end up taking a few days off in the explosion of joy that would follow liberation. De Gaulle’s response to this criticism is not known, but the next day Algiers adopted Boris’s more vague formulation – ‘Return to work as soon as the Allied forces arrive’. Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, Boris’s friend, comrade and biographer, points out that Boris is mentioned only once in the three volumes of de Gaulle’s war memoirs, and suggests that this was a consequence of de Gaulle’s irritation at this criticism (Crémieux-Brilhac, 2010, p. 298). This was partly a storm in a teacup, but it also revealed a very important truth: the Free French were extremely concerned about workers going on strike, no matter how useful that might be in military terms, because they feared the strikers would not go back to work. And that was not at all the kind of liberated France that de Gaulle wanted to see.
CHAPTER 7
1 Crémieux-Brilhac (1976), p. 184.
2 Tuffrau (2002), p. 79. Daniel Boisdon also walked down the boulevard Saint-Michel, and noticed that a cinema and nearby several shops were riddled with bullet-holes. He was told that a convoy had shot at the passers-by and people coming out of the cinema, and that a woman had been killed. AN 72AJ/62/III/4, p. 17.
3 Cazaux (1975), p. 148; Dubois (1944), p. 47.
4 The full message reads:
More details Paris situation: many bloody incidents provoked by excitement of population, nervous German troops, and Gestapo provocations. Sporadic shooting last night, notably Place Odéon, Place Médicis, in front of the Gare du Nord, Boulevard de la Chapelle, Boulevard Barbès. Place de la République SS fired machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns. Shots fired at German troops on Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle; latter burned house . . . and café . . . All those trying to flee were machine-gunned. Number of other victims rue Saint-Denis and Faubourg Saint-Denis. Rue Rivoli this morning, for no reason, German truck opened fire killing woman. (Chevrillon, 1995, p. 158.)
Chevrillon was one of Parodi’s coders; against all the rules, she kept some key messages, which she reproduced in her memoirs. Some of these messages (including this one) are not present in the Archives Nationales collection AN 72AJ/235/II.
5 AN 72AJ/234/VIII/3, p. 11.
6 Galtier-Boissière (1944), p. 257.
7 AN 72AJ/62/III/4, p. 17. Victor Veau reported hearing explosions at the same time (BAM VV, 18.8).
8 AN 72AJ/62/IV/2, p. 183, AN 72AJ/62/IV/2, p. 186.
9 Benoît-Guyod (1962), p. 285.
10 AN 72AJ/62/IV/2/p. 236.
11 Bourget & Lacretelle (1980), pp. 188–90; Ouzoulias (1972), p. 425; L’Humanité 23 August 2004. The latter article reproduces the account of Georges Valbon, who was aged twenty when he participated in the events. He recalled that two German Tiger tanks were sent against the Mairie. The events are celebrated in a mural painting by Charles Fouqueray in the council chamber of the Mairie de Montreuil. Some of the portraits used by Fouqueray for his composition are taken from photographs of the insurrection in Paris rather than Montreuil.
12 Cazaux (1975), p. 147. Taittinger discussed the situation with a delegation of the strikers (Taittinger, 1948, p. 182). According to a CGT internal report of the demonstration (presumably written by Véry – reproduced as Annexe VIII in Cogniot et al., 1974, p. 237) there were 5–6000 people present. Parodi sent a message to London describing the demonstration: ‘Towards noon in front of Hotel de Ville, demonstration by postal clerks on strike, marching, singing Marseillaise, Internationale, carrying French, English, American flags.’ (Chevrillon, 1995, p. 158). The CGT report made no mention of the ‘Internationale’ being sung.
13 Cogniot et al. (1974), p. 237.
14 Taittinger (1948), pp. 182–3.
15 Culmann (1985), p. 281.
16 BAM VV, 18.8. Senator Jacques Bardoux, who was continually and ineffectually active in the background throughout August 1944, trying to find a political solution that would give pride of place to the Senate, wrote in his diary that he met with a number of senators and ‘the “political delegate” of de Gaulle’ (Bardoux, 1958, p. 348). Parodi was de Gaulle’s political delegate, but I can find no corroboration of his presence, and the issues discussed – primarily the exchange of letters between Abetz and Laval of the previous evening – do not seem likely to have interested him.
17 BAM VV, 18.8. One of Yves Cazaux’s contacts at the Préfecture at Versailles told him that in the morning Free French army officers, part of Allied staff headquarters, came to discuss with the Versailles civil servants the state of food supplies in the locality (Cazaux, 1975, p. 146). While this may have been true, it seems highly unlikely – the 2e DB was still 150 km from Versailles. The key point is that Cazaux believed it to be true.
18 Dubois (1944), p. 48.
19 Dubois (1944), p. 49.
20 Pierquin (1983), p. 131.
21 Dubois (1944), p. 50; Boegner (1992), pp. 281–2.
22 Greiner & Schramm (1982), p. 347.
23 Martens & Nagel (2006), pp. 519–520.
24 ETHINT 67.
25 A-968, p. 14.
26 Ritgen (1995), p. 128; Beevor (2009), p. 469. Beevor (2009) highlights the difficulty of knowing exactly what was happening inside the pocket, in particular because of the exaggerated claims of the USAAF and RAF, which claimed ‘preposterously high’ rates of destruction of German vehicles (p. 466).
27 Buffetaut (2004), pp. 12–17, reproduces photographs of German troops using ferries, canoes and even a home-made raft to get across the river. Strikingly, no vehicle heavier than a small lorry can be seen.
28 Renoult & West (2008), pp. 163–4.
29 B-728, p. 5.
30 A photograph and transcription of this order are in Renoult & West (2008), p. 150.
31 Ballarin (2010). The FFI fighters were Christian Pouillard and Maurice Cayen. Ballarin lists only five men; the plaque on the side of the RN 307 gives the names of eight men.
32 Renoult & West (2008), pp. 163–6.
33 AN 72AJ/62/IV/2/p. 69.
34 AN 72AJ/62/IV/2/p. 257.
35 Renoult & West (2008), p. 158.
36 Renoult & West (2008), p. 172. This source includes an impressive photograph of the tank blocking the street.
37 ETHINT 67; Bayerlein describes the ‘six’ tanks as having been part of the 12th SS Panzer Division ‘Hitler Youth’. However, this group was still trapped in the Falaise pocket on 18 August. For Renoult & West (2008), p. 174, there were a dozen Tiger 2 tanks from 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, commanded by Captain Walter Scherf. Despite the discrepancies in the details, I have assumed these two events are one and the same. According to Chef d’escadron Vigne of the FFI sous-secteur Nord 2, in the evening of 18 August, the Resistance attacked
and destroyed a Tiger tank on the quai des Célestins (ML Vigne). I have seen no other reference to this event.
38 Cazaux (1975), p. 148.
39 Cazaux (1975), p. 151.
40 Cazaux (1975), p. 150. For details of the Tiger tank, see von Senger und Etterlin (1969) pp. 68–73.
41 B-015, p. 16; B-611, p. 16. Pictures of the devastation caused by the explosion can be seen in Renoult & West (2008), p. 160. The exact cause is not known; it has been suggested that the explosion was not due to the Panzerfaust demonstration, but rather because of the accidental detonation of a lorry-load of explosives (Renoult & West, 2008, p. 159).
42 Model & Bradley (1991), p. 249.
43 Blumenson (1996), p. 518.
44 B-741, p. 9.
45 Lankford (1991), p. 154.
46 Navarre (1978), p. 299.
47 Navarre (1978), p. 299; AN 72AJ/59/IV/2, p. 80. Le Goff might have been the ‘Lieutenant P’ who was brought back from Le Mans by Bernard de Billy on his motorbike on 16 August, but the exact identity of the men is confused (see chapter 5 note 17). In de Saint-Hilaire’s detailed account of the adventure (Navarre, 1978, pp. 298–301), Le Goff is presented as his ‘bodyguard’. The documents carried by de Saint-Hilaire were presumably those referred to by the head of FFI regional intelligence, L’Arcouest, in his letter to Rol-Tanguy dated 18 August 1944, although as L’Arcouest refers to a ‘motorcyclist de Bourgoin’ (Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon, 1994, p. 182) this may indicate a different mission. One of the documents, relating to a detailed description of the German tanks in the Paris regions, is reproduced in Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 183. For an account of the Kléber-Marco circuit’s work by de Saint-Hilaire, including this expedition, see www.aassdn.org/xlde11532.htm [Accessed July 2011].
48 An amateur film of Auneau shot at the time by Jacques Dagron shows US soldiers carrying vast bouquets of flowers, and the corks popping on many bottles of champagne. See memoire.ciclic.fr/1394-avant-programme-liberation-a-auneau [accessed June 2011]. All other details from Navarre (1978), pp. 298–9.
49 Fourcade (1972), vol. 2, pp. 287–9. The story is somewhat unbelievable (which does not make it untrue): they were stopped by a German patrol who searched their luggage, but thankfully did not look inside the neatly folded pair of grey trousers which contained the precious documents. Nevertheless, the soldiers were suspicious and took the two men off to a nearby house where they were locked up in a desultory fashion – the Germans were not too concerned with their prisoners, leaving them alone in the house, with the motorbike at the front door, so they apparently simply walked out and got back on the bike.
