by Matthew Cobb
12 Dronne (1970), p. 282.
13 Dunan (1945), pp. 272–3.
14 Dunan (1945), pp. 275–6.
15 www.gastoneve.org.uk/paris.html [accessed July 2012].
16 Vilain (1945), pp. 20–1.
17 They were allegedly served by women whose heads had been shaved because of ‘horizontal collaboration’ (Breton, 1964, p. 154).
18 All information in this paragraph from Roy (1944), pp. 44–8. Roy was an eye-witness. According to Gallois, Dronne radioed Leclerc: ‘Am at Préfecture. What should I do?’ ‘Stay there,’ replied Leclerc. AN 72AJ/61/I/17, p. 37. This can only be hearsay, as Gallois was not present.
19 AN 72AJ/61/II/1.
20 Breton (1964), p. 155.
21 The next day, Claude Roy, who was present, wrote in Front National that Dronne was slightly wounded in the fighting (Féron, 1945, p. 53). Dronne does not describe this.
22 A filmed reconstruction of this can be seen at www.ina.fr/video/CAB94080058/liberation-de-paris.fr.html [accessed July 2012].
23 Crénesse (1944), pp. 29–30. He continued:
These soldiers of the Leclerc Division and their comrades of the FFI on the place de Hôtel de Ville, machine guns over their shoulders, automatic weapons in their arms, revolvers in their hands, renewing an old acquaintance, seemed to me to symbolise the resurrection of France, the union of the fighting external armies and those of the Interior who have been hunting the Hun for the last five days and who have already liberated the main public buildings in the city, and taken the main strategic points in the city. The vanguard of the Allied army of liberation tells us that, in a few hours, the bulk of the British, American and French troops will be on this place de l’Hôtel de Ville, right in the middle of Paris, and that we will able to hail them, and the last Huns will have been chased from the capital!
24 Crénesse (1944), pp. 33–4.
25 Campaux (1945), p. 254.
26 The radio broadcast of the bells can be heard at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyKtQyIAzJU [accessed July 2012].
27 Dronne (1970) p. 285; Courtin (1994), p. 42.
28 Dronne (1970), p. 285; Mesquida (2011), p. 161.
29 Jacobs (n.d.), p. 35. Jacobs reproduces Peterson’s claim to have gone into Paris on the night of 24 August and to have met with Colonel ‘Maginetti’ (more likely, Minjonnet), Chief of Staff of the 2e DB, at the Arc de Triomphe. This seems extremely unlikely; there are no records of any 2e DB presence at the Arc de Triomphe at this time, Minjonnet’s column was stuck at Clamart, south-west of Paris, until the following morning, and there is no corroborating evidence of Peterson’s story.
30 Féron (1945), pp. 42–3.
31 Féron (1945), p. 43.
32 de Langlade (1964), pp. 210–11; Blumenson (1961) p. 615.
33 de Langlade (1964), p. 214. The whole area – including the bridge – has been completely redeveloped in one of the less prepossessing pieces of French urban architecture. There is no trace of de Langlade’s café.
34 Nordling (2002), pp. 139–40; the footnote by Fabrice Virigili gives ‘Lorrain Cruze’. Like Chaban, Lorrain Cruse – not Cruze – (‘Lelorrain’) (1915–1989) was an inspector of finances. Cruse took over after the arrest of Rondenay at the end of July.
35 There are contradictory versions of this moment. According to Nordling (2002), p. 151, ‘Lorrain Cruze’ telephoned the consulate from de Langlade’s headquarters at ‘Saint-Cloud’. ‘Cruze’ said that the Colonel wanted to enter Paris by going through Billancourt and the Bois de Boulogne; Bender, who was in the consulate, advised against it, citing the presence of the SS regiment in the Bois de Boulogne. De Langlade (1964) recalls that ‘Lorrain-Cruze’ encouraged him to head into Paris because there would be no oppposition, and the only thing that prevented him from being the first into the city was the lack of fuel (pp. 212–213). According to Collins & Lapierre (1965), pp. 241–2, Bender met Lorrain Cruse at Nordling’s bedside in the consulate and told the Frenchman how the 2e DB could enter Paris without encountering opposition. Cruse then disappeared on his bicycle with the news. De Langlade later discovered that Cruse was a close relative by marriage (de Langlade, 1964, p. 218).
36 de Langlade (1964), pp. 212–13. In these memoirs – allegedly written in the 1940s (p. 9) – de Langlade states that the head of the refuelling convoy had fallen asleep about 500 metres away. He also claims, somewhat bitterly, that a deliberate ‘political’ decision had been made by Leclerc to favour the Billotte and Dio columns: ‘Obeying political reasons, which had to dominate sentimental reasons, the General considered it right and necessary that the Billotte and Dio columns should be the first to enter Paris.’ de Langlade (1964), p. 211. He gives no indication of what these ‘political reasons’ might be.
37 von Arnim (1995), pp. 248–9.
38 Jay (n.d.), p. 76. According to Collins & Lapierre (1965), pp. 253–4, the group sat down to a meal of asparagus in hollandaise sauce, followed by pâté de foie gras and profiteroles with chocolate. Jay was scornful of this description: ‘Journalistic claptrap!’ (Jay, n.d., p. 76.)
39 von Choltitz (1969), pp. 249–50.
40 von Arnim (1995), p. 249.
41 Cobb, 2009a, pp. 57–8. Those who were sentenced by Roskothen include the men and women of the Musée de l’Homme group; amazingly, the survivors of this group do not appear to have thought ill of Roskothen.
42 Roskothen (1977), pp. 303–304.
43 Martens & Nagel (2006), p. 524.
44 BAM VV, 24.8.
45 Bood (1974), p. 333.
46 Boegner (1992), p. 292.
47 Patin (1994), p. 84.
48 de Beauvoir (1965), p. 596.
49 Touche (1946), pp. 103–104.
50 Bourderon (2004), p. 450.
51 Guéhenno (2002), p. 438.
52 Mesnil-Amar (2009), p. 127.
53 Model & Bradley (1991), pp. 265–6.
54 Questioned by the Americans after the war, Hitler’s aide, General Warlimont, was unable fully to explain Hitler’s apparent obsession with holding Paris:
Q: What was Hitler’s object in holding on to Paris? Prestige value?
A: His object in holding on to Paris was not so much prestige as to prevent your getting the routes leading north from Paris and a fear that you would push north before it was possible to evacuate the coastline between the Seine and the Somme. Thus, the retention of Paris was to some degree militarily justifiable. Hitler believed your main effort would be directed against Paris and retaining Paris would in itself influence your drive along the whole Seine front. (ETHINT 1, pp. 42–3.)
55 Helm (1996), pp. 19–20.
56 Massu (1969), p. 148.
57 Renoult & West (2009), pp. 198–200.
58 de Langlade (1964), p. 214.
59 Touche (1946), pp. 103–104.
60 Boegner (1992), p. 293.
61 Crénesse (1945), p. 38. This was also recorded by Marc Boegner (Boegner, 1992, pp. 293–4).
CHAPTER 15
1 Pierquin (1983), p. 133.
2 Fournier & Aymard (2009), pp. 146–7 provide both photographs and war diaries. A major problem in establishing a precise chronology of events is caused by the fact that the Germans had imposed Berlin time on the city (GMT +1 hour), while the Allies operated on London time (GMT -1 hour). Combatants on either side and civilian observers could be referring to either of these times.
3 Fournier & Aymard (2009), pp. 149–82 provide an amazingly detailed set of amateur photographs of the entry of the 2e DB into the capital.
4 Galtier-Boissière (1944), pp. 275–6.
5 Thomas (1995), p. 218.
6 Manchester Guardian 28 August 1944.
7 Castetbon (2004), p. 206.
8 Pudney (1944b). An audio file of a BBC broadcast by Robert Reid can be heard at news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_6540000/newsid_6546500/6546557.stm [accessed July 2012]. For more on Reid and his activity in Paris, see Crang (2007).
9 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, pp. 28–30.
10 The declara
tion is reproduced in Dansette (1946), p. 512 and Breton (1964), p. 181.
11 See for example the description of the boys’ school on the rue Doussoubs in the 2nd arrondissement, AN 72AJ/62/IV/1, p. 7; or the boys’ schools in the 13th arrondissment, AN 72AJ/62/IV/1, p. 49.
12 AN 72AJ/62/IV/1, p. 41. In Pré-Saint-Gervais, just on the eastern edge of the city, schoolchildren went on a march around the neighbourhood, waving hastily made flags (AN 72AJ/62/IV/2, p. 198).
13 Naville (1950f); Bood (1974), p. 334. The Red Cross looked after the women, who were in a diplomatic limbo, until 15 December, when they were finally recognised as prisoners of war.
14 Jay (n.d.), p. 85.
15 Von Choltitz (1969), p. 252; Jay (n.d.), p. 85; von Arnim (1995), p. 250.
16 Von Arnim (1995), p. 250.
17 Martens & Nagel (2006), p. 530.
18 Ritgen (1995), pp. 197–8.
19 AN 72AJ/62/IV/2, p. 188.
20 Ritgen (1995), p. 199.
21 According to FFI leader Vigne, the FFI had taken control of the telephone exchange shortly before the men of the 2e DB arrived on the scene (ML Vigne).
22 AN 72AJ/61/II/2, p. 2.
23 The names of the three fighters were Albert Béal, Henry Kayatti and Marcel Bisiaux. Fournier & Aymard (2009), pp. 184–6.
24 Jacobs (n.d.), p. 37.
25 Pyle (1944), p. 313.
26 AN 72AJ/62/IV/2, p. 182.
27 Chaban-Delmas (1975), pp. 103–104. Chaban paints a typically disarming portrait of his younger self: ‘Leclerc recognised me, not only because he was expecting me, but also because my clothes meant that I could not pass unnoticed amid his troops: I was wearing walking boots, jodhpurs belonging to a member of my family, puttees and a sub-lieutenant’s jacket onto which I had sewn two stars on each sleeve. To top it all, I was also wearing a khaki cap that was as pointed as anything’ (p. 104). Film showing his meeting with de Gaulle a few hours later confirms this comic description. See also Plate 31.
28 AN 72AJ/61/I/17, p. 39.
29 Fournier & Aymard (2009), p. 176. According to de Chézal (1945) p. 235, one of these men was Maclou, the driver of the tank Le Tromblon.
30 Pierquin (1983), p. 134. A member of the 2e DB, ‘Duc’, was also mistaken for a sniper, when he was in fact looking for snipers (Fonde, 1969, p. 104). Colonel Bruce of the OSS was convinced that some of the snipers were indeed either Germans or members of the Milice (Lankford, 1991, p. 174).
31 Berlière & Liaigre (2012), pp. 58–9. For the fate of Madame Goa, who had been in a mental hospital earlier in her life, see chapter 18. There is a novelised account of the death of Max Goa in Boudard (1977), p. 143 – Boudard was a young FFI fighter in the neighbourhood and may have been an eye-witness.
32 de Saint-Pierre (1945), pp. 103–104.
33 de Saint-Pierre (1945), pp. 111–114.
34 Bood (1974), p. 337.
35 Billotte (1972), p. 322. According to Dronne (1970), Luizet and Ely were also present, along with Parodi’s aide, Félix Gaillard (p. 300).
36 See the reproduction of the letter in Renoult & West (2010), p. 18.
37 Billotte claimed that his ‘promotion’ was the work of Gaillard and de la Horie and that he did not notice at the time (Billotte, 1972, p. 323). De Gaulle officially made him a general a few days later.
38 Touche (1946), p. 106. The banner stretched across the road from number 54 to number 61.
39 For details of Gisèle Hasseler’s role, including her mention in dispatches by Billotte on 27 August 1944, see Dunan (1945), pp. 313–27. See also Billotte, (1972), p. 323; Dronne (1970), p. 300; Nordling (2002), p. 152.
40 All details from Nordling (2002), p. 153. According to Nordling, von Arnim let it be known that von Choltitz would not put up much of a fight and would surrender as soon as regular troops entered the Hôtel Meurice. However, none of the three key German protagonists who were present in the Hôtel Meurice – General von Choltitz, Lieutenant von Arnim and Colonel Jay – mention any contact with Bender or Nordling in their memoirs, nor do they refer to any ultimatum letter (von Arnim, 1995; von Choltitz, 1969; Jay, n.d.). Walter Dreizner did describe the event in his diary/memoir, but it is not clear where or when he obtained this information (Martens & Nagel, 2006, p. 528, n. 45). According to Dansette (1946), when Bender returned to the Swedish consulate, he told de la Horie that as long as von Choltitz was allowed to make a symbolic ‘last stand’, he would surrender without much of a fight (p. 373). The war diary of the Groupe Tactique Warabiot, of which Billotte was part, simply states that von Choltitz said ‘his military code of honour forbade him from surrendering without a fight’ (Fournier & Aymard, 2010, p. 28).
41 Billotte (1972), pp. 323–4.
42 Pierquin (1983), p. 133.
43 See the photograph in Anonymous (1945).
44 A few days later, Paul Tuffrau noted that a placard had been placed on the tank reading: ‘There were five Frenchmen and we are all still alive. We’ll get the enemy. Vive de Gaulle.’ (Tuffrau, 2002, p. 127.)
45 Fournier & Aymard (2010), pp. 70–9.
46 Fournier & Aymard (2010), pp. 71–4. This group was known as the ‘Lorris maquis’.
47 All details from Castetbon (2004), pp. 211–217. There is a plaque to Michel’s memory on the low wall of the right-hand side of the quai d’Orsay, opposite the Chambre des Deputés.
48 Castetbon (2004), pp. 206–209.
49 Fournier & Aymard (2010), p. 79. These figures are based on a cross-referencing of eye-witness accounts and contemporary photographs. For a detailed description of the fighting in this neighbourhood from a civilian point of view, see Tuffrau (2002), pp. 102–109.
50 The commander of one of the 2e DB groups involved in the fighting around the Jardin du Luxembourg was Commander Putz (1895–1945), who, like Fabien and Rol, had fought with the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. He was later largely responsible for the creation of La Nueve, the Spanish battalion within the 2e DB (Mesquida, 2011). There are various versions of the battle for the Senate and the nature of the command structure, although none of them provide contemporary evidence. According to de Boissieu, who was initially in command of the 2e DB attack, ‘General Leclerc ordered me to continue the attack on the Luxembourg garrison, and even sent the “Fabien battalion” to help me – the leader of this group, Colonel Fabien, was to remain with General Leclerc to act as a liaison with Colonel Rol-Tanguy, while his deputies were put under my orders. It was thus that in Paris I had the honour of commanding a troop of FFI-FTP in order to neutralise the Jardin de Luxembourg!’ (De Boissieu, 1981, p. 254.) According to Albert Ouzoulias, who was one of Fabien’s Communist Party comrades, ‘An unforgettable thing took place. General Leclerc put seven tanks under the orders of Fabien, one of the commanders of the insurrection of Paris, a 25-year-old engineering worker.’ (Ouzoulias, 1972, p. 451.) According to FTP leader Charles Tillon (Tillon, 1977, p. 272), ‘the Colonel commanding one of the 2e DB groups promised to put two mechanised platoons under his orders.’ Communist leader Jacques Duclos said: ‘The attack at Luxembourg was led by Colonel Fabien. Nine tanks, seconded from the 2e DB, worked with him.’ (Duclos, 1970, p. 230.) Rol’s vision was somewhat different: ‘The reality was much less exciting than the legend. Fabien never commanded any armoured vehicles but, as part of a joint operation with a section of the 2e DB, he provided infantry. That does not diminish his worth, but simply sets the story straight.’ (Bourderon, 2004, p. 458.) Rol’s description is supported by the two earliest accounts of Fabien’s involvement. FFI commander Barat described how Fabien’s group was one of two that were ‘supporting’ the attack by the Leclerc division (Barat, 1945, p. 85, n. 1). Commander Dufresne of the FFI wrote: ‘Nine tanks attacked while my comrades [of the FFI] acted as accompanying light infantry’ (Massiet, 1945, p. 202).
51 Tuffrau (2002), p. 105.
52 Tuffrau (2002), pp. 105–106.
53 There is a plaque to Jean Lavaud’s memory at 55, rue d’Assas, on the spot wh
ere he was killed.
54 Lankford (1991), p. 172.
55 Fournier & Aymard (2009), pp. 189–98; Billotte (1972), p. 219. In fact, the Germans to the west of Paris were already pulling back.
56 Fournier & Aymard (2010), pp. 4–13 provide a detailed account of the battle for the Majestic, including maps, contemporary photographs and film evidence, and memoirs by participants.
57 This can be seen at around 22:00 in La Libération de Paris (1944).
58 Corporal Néri was badly burnt while Commander Mirambeau was wounded. Strikingly different accounts of this event were later provided by Colonel Massu and Colonel de Langlade, both of whom were present. Both are reproduced in Fournier & Aymard (2010), p. 15.
59 de Langlade (1964), pp. 221–2.
60 Fournier & Aymard (2010), p. 15. The exact words were: ‘Vacherie, qué cirque!’ A photograph of Desbordes crouching behind the tree can be seen in Plate 31.
61 Accounts of this incident are confused, partly because of its similarity to the earlier grenade attack that severely wounded Corporal Néri and Commander Mirambeau, and to the later killing of the four ‘Georgians’, all of which took place at the place de l’Etoile within the space of an hour. However, there is no doubt that all three incidents took place, and were all separate in time and space.
62 Photographs of the scene, taken from different angles, show six or seven corpses (Fournier & Aymard, 2010, pp. 14–15). This is also the figure given by de Langlade, who was in the midst of the shooting (de Langlade, 1964, p. 222), and by Colonel Bruce in his diary (Lankford, 1991, p. 173).
63 Boegner (1992), p. 295.
64 The scene with the dead men was included in La Libération de Paris (1944). The footage, which can be seen at 0:24:00–0:24:30, confirms Boegner’s observation that the four men were not wearing boots. This detail, and the number and location of the bodies, demonstrates that this incident was a separate one from the killing of the seven Germans shortly before.
65 La Libération de Paris (1944), 0:24:00–0:24:30. Two stills from the film, showing the four men alive and dead, are in Fournier & Aymard (2010), p. 15.
