by Stout, Jay
Nothing noteworthy happened for nearly fifteen years. And then, on August 23, 2007, Manfred Mueller of Saechsische Zeitung wrote an article about a search being conducted by JPAC. The subtitle noted that, “A team of the MIA search service of the US armed forces puts the Canitz Cemetery under the looking glass.”12 Canitz is a small town adjacent to Riesa to the west.
Mueller interviewed one of the JPAC team members, Lieutenant Frank Huffman, who he described as somewhat reticent to share information. “We are looking for the crewmembers of three aircraft, a bomber and two fighters which were shot down over Saxony and Brandenburg.” Characteristically, Huffman would not disclose the names of the men for which the team was searching.
In contrast to the American officer’s reluctance to make known the specifics of his mission, Mueller told him about the 1993 search that Tony Meldahl and Rudolf Daum had undertaken. “When confronted with the information about Daum, Lieutenant Huffman became interested and began to investigate. There now was no doubt—the Americans were hunting for the remains of Lieutenant Colonel Elwyn Guido Righetti.” In fact the JPAC team might well have been looking for Righetti, but he was probably only one of many MIA servicemen for whom they were searching. Several American fliers had gone unaccounted for in the area, to include Daniel Langelier and Philip Erby. Both men were pilots with the 55th’s 343rd Fighter Squadron. And both were shot down during the same mission as Righetti.
“According to information from JPAC,” Mueller wrote, “Elwyn Righetti was buried in some area around Riesa. The Americans discovered the grave of an unnamed soldier in the village cemetery. However, is this who they are searching for? It could also be a Russian, or, much more likely, a German soldier.” Mueller’s question remains unanswered, and it is doubtful that the JPAC team discovered anything related to Righetti.
JPAC was back in the area two years later and a reporter from Saechsische Zeitung was again there to ask questions. Sandro Rahrisch wrote an article published on April 15, 2009. It was headlined: Americans are Looking for a Missing Pilot. His subtitle noted that, “A US military team continues to gather clues about a military pilot who disappeared. Now they are in Grossenhain.”13
Again, if the JPAC team was looking for Righetti, they were in the wrong location. Tom Welch’s imprudent 1945 letter to the family had done damage he never could have imagined. Rahrisch’s article went far afield and described JPAC’s interest in an aircraft wreck supposedly located in a lake near Kamenz. It also mistakenly associated Righetti with a P-51 pilot that, “survived by jumping out of his plane and using his parachute, and then he was taken prisoner by Luftwaffe officers.” This parachuting pilot was almost certainly Thacker. Again, there is no indication that this JPAC team learned anything relevant to Righetti.
However, it is apparent that the government maintained an interest in finding Righetti. On November 17, 2010, a historian with DPMO e-mailed a German researcher who had been caught up in the search. The e-mail declared that a DPMO person was meeting with Ernie Righetti that following weekend. The family learned nothing from the meeting, however both Ernie and Doris contributed DNA samples. Whether these were intended to be matched against a set of remains that had already been recovered, or to be available in the event that promising remains were found, is unknown.
At this point, with the information available, it is impossible to know with certainty what happened to Righetti. Certainly, the popular notion that he was murdered by a mob of German civilians or by local government officials is plausible although there is absolutely no direct evidence to support it. If such was the case, it is remarkable that despite all the searching—and decades after the fact—no one has come forward with a confession, an eyewitness account or even second- or third-hand hearsay. Such crimes, especially if committed by more than one or two people are very difficult to keep secret. This is particularly so when such knowledge can be used to gain leverage or power in local politics or village vendettas.
It might have been additionally difficult for civilians to kill Righetti because he carried a sidearm. He always wore a .45 caliber pistol when he flew and declared more than once that he would use it if he had to. “We all knew we would be probably be killed if captured by civilians rather than the military,” Russell Haworth said. Righetti’s crew chief, Millard “Doak” Easton, recalled, “He showed me the .45 and said, “If they get me, I’ll take some of them too.”
Certainly, making such a declaration is one thing, whereas actually following through is quite another. It is possible that Righetti surrendered to a large and well-armed mob of German civilians only to be subsequently lynched. But again, it is unlikely that such a crowd could have kept the secret.
Perhaps more likely is that Righetti was picked up, spirited away and murdered by SS or other military personnel. As already noted, Thacker came into contact with the SS, so there is no question that there were units in the area. And, although Thacker wasn’t murdered, the SS certainly had a history of killing downed Allied flyers. William Cullerton of the 355th Fighter Group actually survived such an encounter. He was shot down on April 8, 1945, while strafing the airfield at Ansbach. He evaded for two days until April 10, when the wooded area in which he was hiding was hit by an American artillery barrage:
I saw wood penetrating wood—shards of wood shot through a tree trunk … I ran up a little mound and when I went down the berm there were about fifteen German soldiers in SS uniforms. They all turned and aimed their guns at me. So I surrendered. They told me, “You stand here.” And I was standing in one spot about ten yards away from them and they were having a little meeting—they were deciding what to do with me. And a guy came over and disarmed me. He had my .45 [pistol]. Then he said, “For you the war is over,” and that son-of-a-bitch pressed my pistol against my stomach and shot me with my own gun. I flew through the air, spun around and fell down.14
Cullerton was left for dead. Nevertheless, despite the round that passed through his body—badly damaging his liver—he survived and was dragged from the woods a couple of days later. After a period of indifferent medical care he escaped back into the forest when it was rumored that the Germans were readying to kill their Allied patients. Ultimately, he was rescued by an American armored unit.
Another possibility is that Righetti was caught up and killed in a prisoner hunt. On the same day he was shot down, a group of concentration camp prisoners marched into Glaubitz, just east of Riesa. They halted to rest at the town’s sporting field when the area came under air attack. One report stated that they were strafed by American fighters. In the ensuing confusion the guards took cover and many of the prisoners fled to the nearby Glaubitzer Forest. Once the threat of air attack passed, the escaped prisoners were hunted down, executed and buried in a mass grave in the forest.15
Although Righetti went down to the west of Riesa, and Glaubitz was to the east of Riesa, the distance between the two could have been as little as three or four miles. If he had in fact evaded to the cover of the forest at Glaubitz, it is quite possible that he could have been caught up in the hunt. It follows then that he might have been captured and executed, or killed while trying to avoid capture.
Beyond these options the speculation grows increasingly diaphanous. Perhaps Righetti hid for a few days and was later killed by a farmer while asking for or stealing food. Or, because the area was full of refugees fleeing the advancing Soviets he might have been robbed and killed for who he was, or what he carried and wore—a pistol, good boots and warm clothing. Or he might have been shot or killed while trying to cross the lines to the west or the east. Certainly, an artillery barrage could have rendered him into unidentifiable bits.
Another possibility that must be considered puts all the different analyses and speculation into total disarray. That possibility is that Carroll Henry and the rest of the 338th misidentified the airfield that Righetti had attacked. A close examination of the group’s mission summary report shows that there was a great deal of uncertainty about where the 55th
actually made its attacks on April 17. For instance, the report does not identify Kamenz by name, but instead declares, “At about the same time [as Righetti’s attack on Riesa] south of Dresden, 5 FW 190’s were sighted taking off from and [sic] A/F [airfield] all bombed up. Some dropped their bombs, some dropped in with their bombs.”16 In fact, Kamenz was not “south of Dresden,” but instead was about 25 miles northeast of Dresden. The report includes several similar mistakes, although it does declare that Righetti did attack the airfield at Riesa.
On the other hand, the group’s historical data summary for April 1945 declared that Righetti was Missing in Action, “2 miles west of Grossenhaim [sic] airdrome, Germany.”17 This was an error as Riesa is approximately ten miles west of Grossenhain and Righetti was last seen flying to the west from Riesa. Moreover, the first page of the Missing Air Crew Report incorrectly noted the location as thirty miles south of Dresden, while the accompanying hand-drawn map—part of the same report—showed the location at Riesa, northwest of Dresden.18
Such confusion was not unusual at all. The Eighth’s fighter pilots flew to all corners of the continent from one day to the next and did not become intimately familiar with the landscapes below them. In fact, getting lost was not unheard of, and some fighters never returned to their bases but rather ran out of fuel over the North Sea. Indeed, even bombers with navigators lost their way; neutral Switzerland was mistakenly bombed so often that George Marshall, the Army’s chief of staff, sent Carl Spaatz on a special delegation to apologize to the Swiss government.
Still, there is no way of knowing the truth and the Riesa airfield remains the most obvious candidate for the airfield that Righetti strafed.
A final option must be deliberated when reviewing Righetti’s possible fate. Although the Soviets denied any knowledge of him, it is an understatement to declare that they were not always forthright. Nor has Russia been upfront since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In fact, it is possible that Righetti bellied his aircraft onto the road at Zaußwitz as described by Werner Schäfer. After making his last radio call, he could have escaped to the countryside and hidden for the next several days. He had the woodcraft and the physical stamina to do so.
Subsequently, when the Soviets rolled into the area several days later, it would have been logical for Righetti to believe that he was safe. He might have approached a Red Army unit and identified himself as a ranking American pilot. Had that been the case, he would have been passed up the chain of command until reaching someone of authority. Once it was understood who he was—and that there was no record of his fate on either the German or American side—the Soviets might have held him.
Forever.
However, anecdotal accounts aside, there is little real evidence that the Soviets kept Americans after World War II. But the issue is not entirely settled and the Comprehensive Report of the U.S. Side of the U.S–Russia Joint Commission of POW/MIAs, dated June 17, 1996, declared: “There are a number of ongoing issues of concern to the U.S. side of the WW II W[working] G[roup] and the Commission. They deal primarily with details on the fates of individual American servicemen. Requests for additional information from the Russian side have been made. Research to clarify details related to the fates of these servicemen continues in U.S. archives.”19
The report additionally states: “It remains to be determined whether any American prisoners of war liberated in 1945 by Soviet forces were not returned to US military control but were held in Soviet prisons. There were individuals known to have been POWs of the Germans who did not return to U.S. military control after VE Day. Military authorities expended considerable effort, including inquiries to the Soviets, in determining what might have happened to these men.”20 Further, the commission was perplexed by the nature of at least one bit of evidence: “One intriguing aspect of this case [another serviceman—NOT Righetti], however, is that the Soviet era documents we received from the Russian archives refer to American POWs in Soviet camps during 1946 and 1947 in a seemingly matter of fact way.”21
California Senator William Knowland queried the Army at the behest of Mom Righetti. The reply from the Adjutant General of the Army, Major General Edward Witsell, dated April 11, 1946, indicated that there were ongoing efforts to return American soldiers from Soviet-held territory during that period. “The United States Military Mission to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in cooperation with the Russian government, has been making every effort to effect the return of our soldiers from Russian-held territory as soon as their presence becomes known.”22
Notwithstanding these statements, there is little information in the public domain that indicates the Soviets purposely kept large numbers of men who had formerly been held in German POW camps. That this is so is borne out by the fact that the government was not inundated after the war by inquiries from families wanting to know where their POWs were.
In fact, as described in a letter to Righetti’s mother, the American Embassy in Moscow—as directed by no less a figure than Eisenhower—“asked the Soviet authorities to try to find your son. On November 30, 1945, however, they informed us that their search had proved fruitless and that they could find no record of him in the Soviet Union.”23
However, as unlikely as the possibility seems, it is difficult to argue that the Soviets could not have held men whose disposition was unknown—as was the case with Righetti—against their will. In the pandemonium of the Red Army’s advance through Europe, and away from prying eyes, it would not have been difficult to secret Allied personnel away to locations where they could be exploited for their military or technical knowledge. Once that was done it would have been easy to dump them into the labor gulags where they could be worked in anonymity until they died. It is an unsettling topic as even a quick scan of the literature raises disturbing and unanswered questions.
Indeed, the government is still investigating various possibilities in the context of what role they might have played in the disappearance of American servicemen: “In the course of eight field investigations, spanning almost ten years, no such information was discovered. DPAA [Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency] continues to have JCSD [Joint Commission Support Directorate] researchers working in former Soviet archives look for any materials pertaining to possible American losses, including Col[onel] Righetti.”24
Congress, which itself is no model of sagacity or efficiency, directed the aforementioned consolidation of JPAC and DPMO with elements of the Air Force’s Life Sciences Lab. Notwithstanding the hard work of certain individuals within them, the organizations had proved themselves unequal to their tasks. The new organization is the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, or DPAA. It is curious that Congress believed that combining three nonperforming organizations would produce a fully functioning agency, but few will argue against the notion that Congress is a great manufacturer of incomprehensibilities.
My experience with the DPAA was mixed, but ultimately satisfactory. After I provided information on the possible burial site of a missing American—not related to the Righetti case—the DPAA thanked me for reaching out. When I asked about Righetti, the organization acknowledged that his case was well known and that the government was eager to locate his remains. I explained my interest and requested material related to recent recovery efforts.
The initial response was enthusiastic and encouraging, but—without going into stultifying detail—there followed a long period with little progress. Certainly, I understood there were priorities more important than my request. However, after several months my frustration exceeded a certain threshold and I reluctantly contacted the head of the DPAA directly. Lieutenant General (Retired) Michael Linnington responded immediately and we shared an agreeable telephone conversation during which he described how the organization was, in fact, very energized to execute its mission. The activities he described and the statistics he cited were heartening.
General Linnington also apologized for the delays associated with my request and followed up with the Office of the Secret
ary of Defense for Public Affairs which was holding the information that the DPAA had generated in response to my request. Presumably in reaction to General Linnington’s keen interest, approval for release of that information was expedited. It was finally received two days prior to the contracted delivery date of the manuscript for this book.
I provide this recap not only to illustrate my own “woe-is-me” difficulties, but also to highlight how families like the Righettis are simply worn down over the decades by the government’s seeming indifference. Indeed, one disgruntled wag declares that the mantra of DPAA’s management is, “Delay, deny, and wait for the families to die.” Tellingly, when I first met the family and declared my intent to engage with the various relevant government agencies, that declaration was met with a note of skepticism, if not outright derision: “We’re not going to get our hopes up again.”
In fact, the material I received from the DPAA duplicated much of what I had already discovered. Nevertheless, there was value in knowing that the government’s investigations produced results that nearly mirrored my own; it indicated that there was no cache of publicly accessible documents that I had failed to uncover. What the DPAA did not have were the interviews conducted with local residents by Rudolf Daum during his collaboration with Tony Meldahl in 1993. This was material that Tony had earlier offered to share, however that offer went unacknowledged by the government.
The information the DPAA most recently forwarded showed that the government reinvigorated its efforts to find Righetti’s remains more than a decade ago, and remains committed to the present day:
Between 2002 and 2007, the Department of Defense conducted new analyses of information related to Col[onel] Righetti’s case. Multiple agencies—the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) and the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL), Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) and the U.S. Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD, within DPMO), all charged with accounting for American service members still missing from past conflicts, sent investigative teams to Germany in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, to investigate potential information concerning the circumstances of Col[onel] Righetti’s loss.25
