The second relevant provision is number 12, the “memory sanction” provision. It required that the inscribed names of prominent members of an anti-democratic regime be erased from tombstones, the priest lists, and offerings in the temple of Athena. The people of Ilion thus imagined that a future tyrant might be (or have been) a priest and had likely dedicated offerings in the temple of Athena. A priest would have been a wealthy and prominent man: the tyrant-killing law itself indicates (line 123) that not all individuals were qualified to be priests and, as is well known, in Hellenistic Asia Minor priesthoods were often sold to the highest bidder.67 Individuals from both Ilion and the wider Troad, however, dedicated offerings in Ilion’s temple of Athena. Andrea Berlin (2002) has demonstrated that, beginning already in the mid fourth century, regional powers dedicated offerings in the temple of Athena in order to advance their political objectives.
The political history of the Troad and its immediate environs supports the basic profile derived from the law’s provisions. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, regional strongmen, dynasts, dominated Ilion throughout much of the Classical period. And as evidenced by several examples, such was the case for the region in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods. One might note, for example, the aforementioned Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus. An inscription (RO 68) repeatedly refers to his hetairoi (“companions,” lines 1–2, 10–11, 13, 15, 20–21, 24): they likely commanded garrisons in the towns under his regional control.68 The descendants of exiled Spartans and Eretrians who assisted the Persians at the time of the Persian Wars controlled small cities in the Kaïkos valley, even issuing coinage, into the mid fourth century.69 The sarcophagus from Çan discussed above (note 48) quite likely belonged to a fourth century Anatolian dynast. In circa 275, Aristodikides of Assos (a “friend” of Antiochos I) was strong enough to successfully request that the king give him 8,000 plethra (2,000 hectares) of land—and, importantly, he added it to the city of Ilion (I. Ilion 33 = RC 10–13). And most famously, the Attalid Kingdom was essentially founded in 283, when Philetairos started ruling as a dynast—and allied with Seleukos—rather than as Lysimachos’s subordinate.70 Further examples could be cited.71
Thus the tyrannical threat confronting the Ilians after the battle of Kouroupedion was similar in nature to that which confronted them for over a century: regional strongmen or dynasts. Such men likely sought to control as many communities as they could, perhaps with the acquiescence of larger powers—like, for example, the Dardanian dynasts under the Satrap of Phrygia or Philetairos under Lysimachos—perhaps not. And it is certainly possible that there were a greater number of opportunities for such men to make power grabs in the aftermath of Kouroupedion: the Seleukids needed to consolidate their control; the Gauls were causing havoc.72 The region was at risk of splintering into a number of fiefdoms.
HOW MAINTAIN POWER?
Analysis of the tyrant-killing law suggests that the members of Ilion’s nondemocratic regime were expected to implement a rather straightforward, yet comprehensive regime-preservation plan. The first part of the plan was to take money or property from the people of Ilion. Four of the law’s seventeen extant provisions reflect this concern. The Ilians crafted provision 5, it will be recalled, to facilitate efforts to recoup property that had been confiscated by financial magistrates or taxing officials. Provisions 6 and 7 explicitly seek to prevent anti-democrats or their supporters from handling “the dēmos’s money” (chrēmata dēmosia). And, as noted above, the clear implication behind provision 10 is that anti-democrats might force somebody to sell something, presumably at a low price.
The second part of the anticipated plan was to pay people—with, at least in part, the extracted money or property—to support the nondemocratic regime. Anti-democrats would be expected to purchase mercenary soldiers, of course. That is not stated in the tyrant-killing law. But it does refer to the tyrant’s stratiōtai (lines 46–47). And, as noted above, that word simply means soldiers, but it can certainly mean mercenary soldiers. In addition, in Greek political culture, there was a strong connection between tyrants, mercenaries, and taxes.73 The Spartan tyrant Nabis, for example, reportedly taxed his subjects harshly in order to pay for mercenaries, giving the pretext of an Achaean threat as justification (Polyb. 13.7). And, more generally, Xenophon’s Hiero bemoans the fact that tyrants must extract money from the citizens to pay for mercenaries (Hier. 8.9–10).
In addition to mercenaries, the Ilian democrats apparently expected the members of the nondemocratic regime to purchase political support with public money. Even the most oppressive regimes require some citizen support, people with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. And regimes acquire that support, in large part, by offering money and status. Three of the law’s provisions (5, 7, 10) thus represent attempts to prevent the creation of such an elite.
The final part of the anticipated regime-preservation plan was to induce an “anti-mobilization” threshold among the population through a combination of both intimidation and deception. The use of mercenary soldiers would be the most obvious element of the intimidation campaign. Their presence alone would send a clear message to democrats that the regime is well guarded and that any uprising will be forcefully repressed. If people thought that other people thought that, the average individual would require a prohibitively high percentage of the population to mobilize in defense of the democracy before he would do so too. In addition to such explicitly military functions, however, mercenary soldiers could serve (inter alia) as spies or assassins.74 Nikokles, the tyrant of Sikyon, for example, reportedly sent hired agents to spy on Aratos while he was in exile in Argos (Plut. Arat. 6.4–
5). And Nabis reportedly (Polyb. 13.6) sent mercenaries (μισθοφόροι) to hunt down and kill his political enemies.
Provision 8 suggests that anti-democrats might also use the law courts (dikasteria) to intimidate the population. The feared dynamic might have been similar to what Aristophanes parodied of later-fifth-century Athens: demagogues, in an effort to both ingratiate themselves with the members of the regime and make financial gain, recklessly indict individuals for purportedly “treasonous” behavior.75 And because tyrants are notoriously and understandably paranoid, that dynamic might have been quite pronounced in a tyrannical regime.76 An informal and self-sustaining spy system would emerge.
The use of special tribunals to issue death sentences is the final element of an intimidation campaign reflected in the law. This is similar to the use of the courts. But there is an important difference: with special tribunals, regime members both issue the indictment and render the verdict. There is no need for a lay accuser (who might not materialize). It is quite possible, then, that tribunals would be used (inter alia) to intimidate regime members—people whom “ordinary” citizens would be afraid to accuse. Also, this would ensure that dissenters would be punished even if no lay accuser came forward.
Provision 11 provides the evidence for a campaign of large-scale deception. That provision focused on the possibility that anti-democrats might disguise the nature of their regime, making it look like a democracy when it is, in fact, an oligarchy. The law specifically notes rigging the process of selection to the boulē or other magistracies as a means toward that end.77 And we can assume that the anti-democrats would engage, at the same time, in pro-democracy lip service, such as what happened in Athens and Eretria.78 If such machinations were conducted successfully, democrats might conclude, or think that others have concluded, that the ruling regime is democratic and thus legitimate. And since the democracy was new, the populace might have been somewhat naïve and thus more susceptible to sophisticated acts of deception.
It thus appears as though the people of Ilion were concerned that the anti-democratic regime would complete what might be called the “triad of nondemocratic regime maintenance.” First, take money. Second, use that money to purchase support. Third, atomize the population through intimidation and deception. Once all three parts are operative, the resulting d
ynamic reinforces itself in a vicious spiral: anti-democrats are better able to take more money; they purchase more and better support; they more effectively intimidate, deceive, and thus atomize the population. The people of Ilion likely had experience with that and sought to prevent it by promulgating their tyrant-killing law.
Effectiveness
I argue in this section that the promulgation of their tyrant-killing law actually helped the Ilian pro-democrats maintain their newly founded democratic regime. The argument is somewhat involved and is not—indeed cannot be—ironclad. But the validity of two subtheses makes a fairly strong case.
The first subthesis is that anti-democrats apparently were deterred from staging a coup after the promulgation of the tyrant-killing law. Support for that claim is provided, to begin with, by the likelihood that pro-democrats would have had a difficult time responding to a coup d’état, were nothing done to assist their efforts. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, various regional strongmen, Persians, and tyrants dominated Ilion from (at least) the end of the fifth century until Alexander’s conquest. Ilion was apparently democratically governed from the late 330s until shortly after the battle of Ipsos in 301. But, as argued above, it fell to a tyrant sometime during the reign of Lysimachos. Thus, when the tyrant-killing law was promulgated, the Ilians had, for all intents and purposes, only about thirty years of experience with democracy; and, quite importantly, that period ended with a successful anti-democracy coup d’état. Consequently, pro-democrats lacked the trust and the experience needed to maintain a pro-mobilization threshold sequence. They were vulnerable.
Second, there likely were anti-democrats, local or regional, who wanted to overthrow Ilion’s democracy after the promulgation of the tyrant-killing law. The fact that the Ilians promulgated their lengthy law is powerful evidence for the existence of such a threat: they thought that they were confronting a very serious and well-orchestrated opponent. And one must not forget that the Troad was still a very dangerous, volatile region in the early to mid-third century. In a letter to Meleagros (I. Ilion 33 = RC 10–13—dated 277), for example, Antiochos I decreed (lines 46–49) that the royal peasants (basilikoi laoi) be allowed to live on the land near Petra (a stronghold near Ilion) “because of the safety” that that stronghold provided. Anti-democrats, assuming they existed, might be expected to take advantage of such a dynamic.
Finally, democracy was Ilion’s “normal” regime type after the promulgation of the tyrant-killing law. All extant inscriptions that date to the years after the battle of Kouroupedion and give some indication of regime type suggest that the dēmos controlled the polis.79 There is, in addition, no literary evidence that suggests that a nondemocratic regime governed the polis. And it is worth pointing out that the Ilians modeled their important temple of Athena, built after the promulgation of the law, on the Athenian Parthenon: (1) it has carved figural metopes on all four sides—the only other such example in the eastern Mediterranean is the Parthenon; (2) one of the themes represented in the metopes is the Ilioupersis, a theme also represented on the Parthenon.80 One might suppose, then, that the Ilians imitated the Athenian democratic politeia too.81
Although not directly relevant to the argument, one should note that the Ilians’ material conditions improved in the decades following the promulgation of their tyrant-killing law. Improvement began under the early Seleukids, to which period we have evidence for an increase in trade and, for the first time, house building in the lower city.82 And starting circa 250 the people of Ilion commenced a large-scale building program: fortification walls, a temple of Athena, a temnos portico with adjoining propylaia, a bouleuterion, restoration of the south side of the mound.83 That might reflect a more dynamic, democratic political culture.84
The second subthesis is that the promulgation of the tyrant-killing law likely would have deterred anti-democrats from staging a coup. That is impossible to prove, of course. But I can demonstrate that, by promulgating the law, pro-democrats increased the likelihood that they would both successfully mobilize in defense of their regime and punish all who participated in the anti-democratic coup. And the greater the likelihood they could do that, the more likely anti-democrats would be deterred from staging a coup. As a consequence of promulgating their tyrant-killing law, the Ilian democrats significantly increased the probability that, should there be a coup d’état, they could mobilize in the defense of their regime. The spark plus bandwagon dynamic, as would be expected, is particularly significant. All members of the Ilian society, citizens, free foreigners, and slaves, were explicitly incentivized to commit tyrannicide. And, as noted in the discussion of the law’s first section, by increasing the number of opportunities for assassination, Ilian pro-democrats increased the likelihood that there would be an assassination. Equally important, however, is the fact that, after the promulgation of the law, it would have been common knowledge that there was widespread commitment to defend the democracy. Promulgation of the law would have generated such knowledge, of course: the Ilians had a theater by 306 (I. Ilion. 1 line 10), and in a polis of Ilion’s size, discussion and ratification of a law in such a setting would have generated deep common knowledge among the citizenry.85 But it is also important to remember that the Ilians likely overthrew a tyranny shortly before they promulgated their law. Thus the credibility of their commitment to defend the democracy would have been virtually beyond doubt. As a result, individuals would lower their personal revolutionary thresholds and particularly brave individuals would lower theirs to 0. The Ilians thus would be defined by a pro-mobilization threshold sequence.
In addition to the all-important spark plus bandwagon dynamic, the promulgation of the law increased the likelihood that individuals would participate in a large-scale resistance movement, should that become necessary. There are two contributing factors. First, the tyrant-killing law explicitly incentivized wealthy individuals to contribute to such a movement and sought to ensure that those incentives were seen as credible (provisions 14–17).86 Second, after the promulgation of the law, there was common knowledge of widespread credible commitment to defend the democracy. Thus wealthy individuals would be more likely to contribute because the movement likely would succeed; and other individuals—almost certainly including citizens of the poleis of the koinon87—would be even more likely to join because the movement would be adequately supplied or funded. And it is also worth pointing out that there are several examples of successful resistance movements in Greek history: the movement against the Thirty Tyrants succeeded (chapter 1); Eretrians, led by (the future tyrant) Kleitarchos, reclaimed their city (chapter 2); democrats of Priene reclaimed their city from the tyrant Hiero (I. Priene 37, 111–12); and Aratos led a successful movement to take back Sikyon from the tyrant Nikokles (Plut. Arat. 4–9).
In addition to increasing the likelihood that the democrats would reclaim control of the polis in the event of a coup, the promulgation of the tyrant-killing law made it clear that the pro-democrats, once they assume control of the polis, will punish anybody who benefited from or cooperated with the nondemocratic regime. If somebody benefited economically, he would lose more than he gained: thus provisions 5, 6, 7, and 10. If somebody used the courts (or participated in a special tribunal), he, too, would lose more than he gained: thus provisions 8 and 9. And anyone who participated in the coup in any way would be punished with a memory sanction: thus provision 12. In short, the democrats publically ruled out any possibility of an amnesty.
One might thus conclude that, by promulgating their tyrant-killing law, the Ilians deterred anti-democrats from staging a coup. First, the democrats will likely retake control of the polis and, in the process, kill many of those defending the nondemocratic regime. Second, once the democrats take control, they will punish everybody who was involved with or otherwise benefited from the nondemocratic regime. Anti-democrats would therefore conclude that, should they stage a coup, an insufficient number of people would follow them; they thus would choose not to defect. The res
ult would be a stable democracy. And in the years after the promulgation of their law, the Ilian democracy was, in fact, stable and prosperous.
Conclusion
In the conclusion to chapter 4, I demonstrated that Alexander the Great heavily promoted anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing ideology during his conquest of western Asia Minor: he publicly referred to prominent members of cities’ pro-Persian faction as “tyrants”; he issued an anti-tyranny proclamation after the battle of Gaugamela; he made known his intention to return to Athens the original statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. I now defend this much bolder thesis: the promulgation of anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing laws and decrees contributed significantly to the success of democracy in Hellenistic western Asia Minor. As would be expected, the argument in defense of that thesis is complex, consisting of several parts.
First, the citizens of several different poleis, dispersed widely in and around western Asia Minor, promulgated anti-tyranny or tyrant-killing laws or decrees during the first two generations of the Hellenistic period. The final three chapters of this book studied significant examples in Eresos, Erythrai, and Ilion. And, as noted in the introduction to this book, we must add a few more (mostly fragments) to that list.
Death to Tyrants! Page 32
