20 See the section in chapter 1 titled “The Oath of Demophantos” for the evidence. Friedel (1937: 85) asserts that the provisions of the decree of Demophantos do not allow for the erection of a statue of the tyrant killer. This is incorrect. The Athenians erected statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. And, according to the oath of Demophantos, the Athenians will treat a fallen tyrannicide “just like” Harmodios and Aristogeiton.
21 Note that Aeneas Tacticus (10.16–17) recommends that it be publicly announced that, should one of the associates (sunontes) kill “the exile, the monarch, or the general,” he will be rewarded and guaranteed safe return to him home. As noted in the introduction to this book, Aeneas Tacticus is essentially recommending the promulgation of a tyrant-killing law. Note too that I. Erythrai 2 B (lines 14–end) perhaps provides incentives (or simply the authority) for individuals to inform magistrates about anti-regime behavior.
22 Berve (1967: 420) asserts without explanation that the daily stipend corresponds with the spirit of the Hellenistic period.
23 On mercenary soldiers killing a tyrant (their paymaster), note Xen. Hier. 6.11.
24 Note, too, the passage in Aeneas Tacticus noted above in note 21. A couple of possible striking omissions in the Ilion law’s incentive package should be noted. First, there is no indication that the state will provide for a tyrannicide’s children, should he die as a result of his deed. Second, there is no statement that a tyrannicide would be deemed “pure.” This latter point is minor and certainly implied. And both features might very well have been included in a lost part of the law. On a different note, Frisch (1975: 74) concluded that the rewards are moderate when compared to those given by the Athenians to Harmodios and Aristogeiton: there is no prohibition in the Ilian law against placing another statue by their statue, as there was in Athens (Syll.3 320 lines 30–33); there is no grant of sitēsis for a tyrannicide’s descendants, as there was in Athens (IG I3 131).
25 Frisch restores—and I have accepted—ἔσ]τω πολίτης (“let him be a citizen”) in line 39. Dittenberger leaves his text blank after μνᾶ[ς] and before [τὰ δὲ ἄ]λλα; IJG prints … τω πολίτη[ς. Frisch’s restoration seems reasonable. But note that, in line 30, the Greek for “let him be a citizen” is πολίτης ἔστω, while, in 39, Frisch’s restoration reverses the two words.
26 Koch (1996: 50) rightly notes that this provision (i.e., about confiscated property) concerns the leaders of the anti-democrats, not those who held office while the democracy was overthrown or who—again, during a nondemocratic regime—voted to execute an individual. The law lists penalties for those individuals elsewhere (lines 54–86, 97–106). Frisch (1975: 74) suggests that, according to this provision, part of the tyrant’s property would be given to the tyrannicide, part would be used to establish a fund for victims of the regime.
27 Thus Dittenberger (ad loc.) following IJG. It will be recalled that the decree of Demophantos also mandated that the slain tyrant’s property be sold and that one-half of the money raised be given to the tyrant slayer. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the other half went to the polis of Athens. But the decree of Demophantos did not state what the Athenians should do with the money.
28 Dössel (2003: 211) helpfully draws attention to a passage in a speech by Aischines (3.21): in Athens, magistrates were not allowed to rid themselves of assets or lower their net worth until they had successfully completed their euthynai. The purpose was to ensure that the magistrate could pay any fines that may be levied against him. Maffi (2005: 145) also came to this conclusion, citing the passage in Aischines.
29 Maffi (2005: 147) argues that τὸ δεύτερον in the phrase ἐὰν δέ τις | τὸ δεύτερον [σ]τρατηγήσηι | ἢ ἄλλην ἀρ[χὴν] ἄρξηι (lines 71–73) should be translated “en deuxième lieu.” That is, he does not believe that provision 6 focuses on magistrates who hold office a second time. Instead, he sees provision 6 as articulating the second part of a single provision that begins with (what I label) provision 5. The first part of that provision (= my provision 5) states that magistrates of a nondemocratic regime cannot rid themselves of any property; the second part (= my provision 6) states that, second (τὸ δεύτερον), those magistrates must pay back all the money they spent while in office. Maffi himself acknowledges (2005: 147) that this is a daring interpretation, without parallel. Indeed, the most natural reading of the Greek is “If someone holds the office of strategos a second time….” Maffi’s interpretation almost certainly should be rejected.
30 Thus Friedel (1937: 90).
31 Koch (1996: 54–55) suggests that the Ilion law articulates a careful distinction with regard to the participation of magistrates in a nondemocratic regime. The first stage—when the revolution actually takes place—is addressed in provision 5. In that case, the office holder is not necessarily complicit in the revolution and is unsure of what he should do. He might stay in office even if he does not fully support the new regime. Thus the penalty would not harm a well-intended office holder (assuming, of course, that he did not acquire another individual’s property). Provision 6 concerns the second stage, when it is clear that the democracy has been overthrown and that the office holder thus clearly chose to participate fully in the nondemocratic regime. In that case the “hurt” of the penalty is unavoidable: he must pay pack double the money that he managed because, by definition, he illegally appropriated the money. This is an interesting observation and is accepted, with some nuance, by Dössel (2003: 210 with n. 27). Maffi (2005: 146–47) rejects Koch’s theory by noting that, if a democratically selected magistrate continued to hold his office after an anti-democratic coup, he would be deemed to have been complicit with the anti-democratic regime once the democrats regained control of the polis. Koch’s theory probably should be rejected.
32 Dössel (2003: 211–12 with n. 30) suggests that the stipulation “while the Ilians are governed democratically” is included in order to prevent members of a successful anti-democratic coup from somehow using the provision against magistrates that had been selected during the previous democracy. Maffi (2005: 147–48), advances a very different interpretation of the phrase ὅταν | [βούλητ]αι, μέχ[ρι] τέλος δί|[κης γέν]ηται [δη]μοκρατου|[μένων Ἰλ]ιέων (lines 78–81). He does not believe that τέλος δί|[κης refers to a trial begun by the accusation of ho boulomenos. Instead he argues that it refers to the end of a period of time within which ho boulomenos can make his legal complaint to initiate a trial—what the Greeks called a prothesmia. Thus, in this interpretation, anybody can make an accusation against an official who worked in a non-democratic regime whenever he wants (ὅταν | [βούλητ]αι) from the time that the democracy is established until (μέχ[ρι]) an established closing date for such trials (i.e., τέλος δί[κης).
33 Koch (1996: 57) believes that the subject of ὑπόδι|[κος δὲ ἔστω is the individual who made the accusation (“der Kläger”) against someone for “giving or receiving money from them.” His reasoning: ὑπόδικος δὲ ἔστω is not included in provision 6, where the accuser is explicitly referred to as ho boulomenos (a “volunteer” who takes initiative); thus provision 7 likely articulates some risk to the accuser. This is unlikely correct: (1) it is not necessary grammatically (the likely subject of ὑπόδικος is the same subject as that of the two finite verbs: δῶι and λὰβηι (“gives” and “takes”); (2) one might seriously doubt that the law would specify any risk to a potential accuser: the whole law seems to be 100 percent with accusers and against the accused. Maffi (2005: 148–49) also rejects Koch’s interpretation. Maffi then offers his own interpretation of lines 84–85. He does not think that ὑπόδι|[κος (which he suggests should be restored ὑπόδι|[κωι) begins a new clause but, instead, modifies the magistrate that may be tried in court. He translates, “Il sera loisible de l’appeler en justice comme s’il était responsable du vol
de choses appartenant à l’Etate….”
34 Frisch (1975: 76) suggests that the targets of this provision were the regime’s “hangers-on” (Mitläufer).
35 Dössel (2003: 213) concludes that this provision was included in order to help ensure that property confiscated by a non-democratic regime would more likely be returned to its original owners after they returned from exile. She cites (2003: n. 33) an inscription from Mytilene (RO 85) as an example of the basic issue. One might also note Plut. Arat. 12–14 for a description of the dynamic in mid-third-century Sikyon. Dössel concludes that the guilty non-democratic magistrates and those complicit with them would be responsible for reimbursing a third party that had lawfully purchased confiscated property.
36 Maffi (2005: 155–56) offers a very different interpretation of the clause ἐ|ὰν δέ τις τύραννος ἢ ἡγεμὼν ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ ὅσ|τις Ἰλιέων ἀρχὰς συ[ν]αποδεικνύηι μετὰ τού[των] (lines 106–8). He first notes that this provision (i.e., provision 10) is very similar to provision 5. Provision 5 seeks to prevent anybody from buying or in any way acquiring anything from anybody who, during a nondemocratic regime, served as any financial magistrate or taxed either an Ilian or a metic. Thus Maffi believes that provision 10 should be interpreted as referring to all magistrates in a nondemocratic regime: they cannot buy anything; provision 5, that is, deals with illegal magistrates unloading property while provision 10 deals with illegal magistrates acquiring property. Evidence in support of his theory rests heavily on a very strained interpretation of ἢ ὅσ|τις Ἰλιέων ἀρχὰς συ[ν]-αποδεικνύηι μετὰ τού[των] (lines 107–8). He suggests it does not mean “or whoever appoints Ilion’s magistrates with them”; instead it means “ou tout autre magistrat que quiconque des Iliens aura démontré avoir coopéré avec eux dans cette sorte d’opérations.” This interpretation of the Greek is almost certainly incorrect.
37 Koch (1996: 50) wonders whether or not the person who bought something πρὸ τούτων (sc., the tyrant, leader of the oligarchy, or office-appointing official) would receive compensation once the democracy is reinstated—perhaps from the fund set up per provision 3. This is quite unlikely, since such an individual would have been complicit with the tyranny: he would have bought something “on behalf” of the regime leaders. Koch is led to this consideration, it appears, because he interprets, in note 55, πρὸ τούτων as meaning “in ihrem Auftrag.”
38 Koch (1996: 60n80) does not believe that this provision concerns formal death-sentence trials. He suggests, instead, that the provision concerns anybody killed as a result of regime policy or practice during a nondemocratic regime. His reasoning is that provision 9 concerns executions subsequent to a trial. This is an understandable position. But provision 8 does appear to deal with court cases (thus the provision refers to ὁ κατηγορήσας and τιμαί) and provision 9 deals with executions specifically brought about by magistrates (and certainly appears to envision something different than a normal trial in the dikasterion; see below). Maffi (2005: 149–50 with n. 19) essentially agrees with Koch, although admitting that the provision might address executions pursuant to a trial.
39 IJG accepts the standard punctuation (which I too accept) whereby a comma is placed right after—not, as Frisch prefers, right before—δεσμῶν and translates (II: 31) “s’il a dû fuir pour échapper à la prison.” This is possible. But one might expect the use of a preposition such as ἀπό: compare the restoration in line 102. Friedel (1937: 91) accepts the traditional punctuation yet translates it differently: “[Wenn aber ein Bürger … ] zu einer Gefängnisstrafe verurteilt wurde.” Berve (1967: 420) both appears to accept the traditional (i.e., not Frisch’s) punctuation and interprets the language as Friedel did. Maffi (2005: 151) accepts the traditional punctuation and translates it as “[Si un homme … ] s’est soustrait aux entraves.” Koch (1996: 57) and Dössel (2003: 203), however, accept Frisch’s translation.
40 For φεύγηι as “defendant” with the potential punishment in the genitive, see LSJ s.v. φεύγω IV. For the plural δεσμοί meaning “imprisonment”, see Thuc. 7.82.2.
41 See RO 84B (lines 3–6) for an example—in Chios—of confining someone until he provided guarantors for assigned penalties.
42 IJG translates (II: 31) “doubles amendes et doubles domages-intérêts.” Friedel (1937: 91), Berve (1967: 420), and Koch (1996: 57) translate it similarly. Maffi (2005: 151) translates it like IJG yet he translates timai as “pénalité.”
43 Koch (1996: 57–58) suggests that lines 94–95 (ἐὰν δὲ χρήματα ἐ[κ]τείσηι, διπλάσια ἀποτινέ|[τ]ω ὁ κατηγορήσ[ας]) seek to protect a former magistrate of an anti-democratic regime from having to pay his mandated penalty twice: the subject of ἐ[κ]τείσηι is thus the former magistrate of an anti-democratic regime. This interpretation likely should be rejected: as I noted above with reference to provision 7, the whole law seems to be 100 percent with accusers and against the accused.
44 Lines 102–3 are difficult. I have accepted the standard (Dittenberger) restoration: ἐὰν τὴν | δίκ[ην ἀποφεύγηι τις, ψῆφον πρ]οσθέμενος. In this case ἐὰν τὴν | δίκ[ην ἀποφεύγηι almost certainly means “if someone goes into exile to escape a trial” and the following participle, πρ]οσ-θέμενος, is causal: “since he voted.” The law thus seeks to ensure that such an individual will still pay a very high price for his vote: the Ilians will punish his family. IJG (II: 31), Friedel (1937: 91), and Berve (1967: 420) interpret it similarly. If, however, τὴν | δίκ[ην ἀποφεύγηι means “be acquitted” or “escape conviction” (which is perfectly good Greek—cf. Ar. Nub. 167) the participle πρ]οσθέμενος must be concessive: “although having voted.” But, in that case, the scenario is difficult to imagine: the law would seek to punish someone who, during a nondemocratic regime, (allegedly) voted for an individual’s execution despite the fact that he (i.e., the person who voted for the execution) was subsequently acquitted in a trial held (almost certainly) under the reinstated democracy. Despite its difficulty, Maffi (2005: 154) suggests such an interpretation. Frisch restores the text differently: ἐὰν τὴν | δίκ[ην μὴ νικήσηι, ψῆφον πρ]οσθέμενος. In this case one might translate, “If he did not prevail at trial, although having voted to kill [the defendant].” This makes sense, especially when the following ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι is recognized as a potential result clause, bordering on a purpose clause. Thus the law would seek to punish an individual—Frisch argues just the accuser (Ankläger)—who voted for an individual to be executed even if that individual was not actually executed. This interpretation (accepted by Koch [1996: 59–60] and Dössel [2003: 214]), however, likely should be rejected. First, later in the law (lines 157–58, 163–64) “to prevail in a trial” uses the dative, not the accusative: ἐὰν δίκηι νικᾶται. Second, the following stipulation that a “murder may not be atoned for” seems to suggest that both protases (i.e., “if clauses”) contained in section 9 refer to a situation where an individual was, indeed, executed.
45 It is to be noted that the text printed here accepts the standard emendation of ἐπιγαμία〈ι〉ς (i.e., it does not accept ἐπιγαμίας which is inscribed on the stone). Frisch (1975: 77) does not accept that emendation and takes ἐπιγαμίας to be accusative plural and the subject of the infinitive μὴ καταλλάσ[σεσ]θαι. He thus translates, “Einen Mord sollen die Familien nicht versöhnend beilegen, auch nicht mit Geld.” But it is easy to believe that the engraver made a simple mistake (as he did in lines 53–54, where he used accusatives where genitives are clearly required). And ἐπιγαμία in the plural means intermarriage (LSJ s.v. IIb). I thus conclude that both nouns were supposed to be datives of instrument and the infinitive is passive (LSJ s.v. καταλλάσσω II.2).
46 Compare the ma
ssacre of the Eleusinians during the time of the Thirty (Xen. Hell. 2.4.8–10). Kritias demanded that the vote—like that envisioned in this provision—be open. Thus everybody’s hands would be bloody.
47 This basic interpretation is favored by Maffi (2005: 157–58).
48 I borrow the term “memory sanction” from Flower (2006). Memory sanctions appear to have been somewhat uncommon in the ancient Greek world. Well-known Athenian examples are these: against Hipparchos, sometime after his ostracism of 487 (Lykourg. Leok. 117–19); against Philip V in 200 (Livy 31.44.4); against Peisistratos, the son of Hippias, whereby the dēmos “effaced the inscription” (ἠφάνισε τοὐπίγραμμα: Thuc. 6.54.7) of the altar to the twelve gods; as indicted by his altar to Apollo, that altar would have contained his name. One might also note that the Amphipolitans, in 422, obliterated (ἀφανίσαντες) anything that reminded them of Hagnon (Thuc. 5.11.1). It is interesting to note that a local dynast’s sarcophagus from Çan (midway between Ilion and Daskyleion) that dates to the first half of the fourth century might contain evidence of a memory sanction: the figure of an individual has been chiseled out. It is thus quite possible that the Ilians were drawing on a local Persian practice. For the sarcophagus, see Sevinç et al. (2001). That memory sanctions were a Persian practice: Sevinç et al. (2001: 395n50). The article does not mention the Ilian tyrant-killing law.
49 IJG (II: 33) translates mnēmeion as “monument.” Friedel (1937: 93) translates it as “Erinnerungszeichen.” Frisch (1975: 70) translates it as “Erinnerung.” Dössel (2003: 204) translates it as “Gegenstand des Erinnerns.”
50 Dössel (2003: 218) contrasts this with the Athenian pro-democrats’ practice to publicly record the name of anti-democratic revolutionaries. She cites Andok. Myst. 78.
Death to Tyrants! Page 34
