In July British, French, Serbian, Italian, and, eventually, American troops were established at Murmansk and extended their activity southward along the railway to Kandalaksha, Kem, and Soroka on the White Sea. By the beginning of August the Allies had taken Archangel. The majority of naval forces were British, including the light cruiser Attentive and seaplane carrier Nairana, although the Americans were represented by the cruiser Olympia—Admiral Dewey’s flagship at the Battle of Manila Bay—and the French by the old armored cruiser Amiral Aube. The Allies then began an advance southward up the Dvina River in an attempt to make contact with the anti-Bolshevik Czech Legion, reportedly anti-German and anxious to continue the war but stranded deep in Russia along the Trans-Siberian railway. Captain Altham of the Attentive was named senior naval officer Dvina. The British were forced to improvise, converting two paddle steamers to fragile gunboats, joined by Russian naval motor launches and other river craft. The motley flotilla was later joined by the monitors M.25 and M.23. The Dvina Flotilla even improvised its own seaplane carrier with the Attentive’s fore derrick fitted to a barge to hoist in and out single-seater seaplanes from the Nairana. The riverine warfare was somewhat reminiscent of Mesopotamia, but with far greater extremes of climate. In June, according to Captain Altham, the ice in the White Sea made it scarcely navigable, while a month later the weather was almost semitropical and they were glad to have mosquito nets.
The Dvina Flotilla, acting in concert with Allied forces on shore, clashed repeatedly with Bolshevik forces, both river craft and batteries on land. By the end of September they had cleared the river channel as far as Pushega, roughly 250 miles up the Dvina. By that time, however, the gunboats had to be withdrawn to prevent them from being trapped by ice, which could form up to a foot thick within a single night, and army outposts eventually had to be pulled back.93 On 11 November the Armistice on the western front went into effect, marking what is generally considered the end of the First World War. On this date in north Russia, Allied troops under General Maynard held Murmansk and the Murman railway as far south as Soroka, while further east General Poole’s forces held Archangel and the Archangel-Vologda railway as far south as Obozerskaya and the Dvina upstream to the fortified base at Bereznik with outposts at Kurgomin-Tulgas. The Czech Legion, one of the ostensible causes for intervention in the first place, remained far out of reach and never would join the forces in north Russia. Although the gunboats Glowworm, Cockschafter, Cicala, and Cricket, originally built for operations in China, reached Archangel just before ice closed the port, the Allies had a period of enforced inactivity due to the winter to decide what to do. The 1919 campaign of intervention in north Russia in which the Allies sought to assist the anti-Bolshevik White Russian forces that were in the process of forming that winter is well beyond the scope of this study.94 The operations in the north were complemented by operations in the Black Sea, the Caspian, and a lively campaign in the Baltic.95 A Russian campaign, given the natural difficulties and distances involved, was likely to be an open-ended commitment, and it is not surprising that after the tremendous strain of four years of war, the Allied governments and public finally chose to limit their operations and, ultimately, to cut their losses and withdraw.
6
THE ADRIATIC
ITALY ENTERS THE WAR
The geography of the Adriatic played a major part in determining the nature of the naval war fought there. The Adriatic forms a long, relatively narrow rectangle between 60 and 100 miles wide. Consequently, there was not the scope for the large sweeps characteristic of the North Sea. The enemy was only a few hours’ steaming distance away. This proximity put a premium on quick reaction and allowed small craft to be used to a far greater extent than in the North Sea. With the development of mines, torpedoes, submarines, and, later, high-speed motor torpedo boats, the campaign in the Adriatic took on the features of naval guerrilla war. The ambush, rather than the classic encounter between rival squadrons, characterized the war. Nevertheless, both sides had powerful dreadnoughts and battleships. The numbers were far smaller than in the North Sea: four Austrian dreadnoughts against six Italian dreadnoughts when all had entered service. These ships might be used at any time, and the possibility always had to be provided for. The core of the Austrian fleet, four dreadnoughts and three modern semidreadnoughts of the Radetzky class, was the classic example of the fleet-in-being, and the potential menace of their big guns eventually tied up more than twice their number watching them.
Politics also played an important role. The Italians might later have the theoretical support of up to seven French dreadnoughts, but the two fleets were not combined and the efficacy of their cooperation was questionable, even if the problem of command had not proved insolvable. The Italians had one constant demand on which they would not compromise: command in the Adriatic must be Italian. The Italian naval leaders also had one burning desire—to avenge the defeat at Lissa in 1866. One would have to study the history of the Risorgimento—the movement by which Italy achieved unification in the nineteenth century—to understand the intensity of Italian feelings on the subject of the Austrian enemy, the Adriatic, and command in that sea.
As far as the Italians were concerned, the Austrians possessed all of the geographical advantages. The coast on the eastern, or Austrian, side of the Adriatic was irregular, indented with bays, and for the most part screened by a chain of offshore islands with navigable channels between them, behind which ships could move and emerge suddenly for attack. The Italian coast, on the other hand, was open to attack and relatively unprotected. The Austrians had excellent naval bases at both ends of the Adriatic, the strongly fortified Pola—their main base—in the north, and the Bay of Cattaro in the south, with secure anchorages in between. The Italians had few secure anchorages on their side of the Adriatic, except for Venice and Brindisi, and the capacity of the latter was limited. The Italians later found that even the character of the water favored the Austrians; the Italian side was muddier and aided concealment of submarines, whereas the Austrian side was often clear, enabling submarines to be seen even when submerged. As the air war developed, the Italians found conditions also favored the Austrians. Italian airmen making dawn attacks found the sun in their eyes and the coast obscured in shadow; Austrian airmen attacked the Italian coast from out of the sun. Virtually all Italian naval literature and planning of the period stress these geographical factors.1
The leaders of the Austrian and Italian navies, Admiral Anton Haus and Vice Admiral Paolo Count Thaon di Revel, respectively, were in a unique position. Before the war they were allies in the Triple Alliance and in 1913 had even met secretly in Zurich to discuss possible joint operations. Both men realized they were just as likely to be at war with each other, and the possibility they would be allies disappeared when the Italians proclaimed their neutrality at the outbreak of the war. The major question became, Would the Italians remain neutral (and gain more by doing so) or join the ranks of the Entente? The matter was hotly debated within Italy and was by no means a foregone conclusion. However, the Entente had a fundamental advantage. They could offer the Italians territory torn from their Austrian enemy. The Germans could only offer territory they could pressure their Austrian ally to give up. The Entente could invariably offer more for Italian participation than the Central Powers could offer for continued Italian neutrality. Italy’s “defection” from the Triple Alliance, or “treachery” in Austrian eyes, meant that Haus pursued an even more cautious policy in the face of the superior French fleet in order to preserve his own forces to counter an eventual Italian move (see chapter 3).
Thaon di Revel was the dominant figure in the Italian navy for much of the First World War. He was capo di stato maggiore from March 1913 until his resignation in October 1915, and commander in chief at Venice from October 1915 to February 1917. Revel had resigned because of chronic divergence of views with the ministers of marine and disputes over the power and functions of the chief of the naval staff. In his mind there could not
be two heads of the navy. The minister, Vice Admiral Camillo Corsi, attempted to combine the political office of minister of marine with the position of chief of the naval staff. The experiment was not a success, and Revel returned in February 1917 as capo di stato maggiore and commander in chief of the mobilized naval forces. This not only gave him increased powers but also implied he could assume command of the fleet in a major action. This was another dubious assumption, that Revel would always arrive from Rome before the fleet had to sail in an emergency. Nevertheless, this energetic, autocratic, and forceful Piedmontese, whose family had a long tradition of service to the kings of Piedmont in the days before unification, made his mark not only on the Italian navy but eventually on the Allies. By 1918 Thaon di Revel was notorious for his rigid insistence on due regard for Italian concerns and needs, which he felt the other Allies did not always adequately appreciate. The Allies often viewed this as selfish egoism, and the British, Americans, and French regarded him as a major obstacle to Allied unity, the man most to blame for the fact that the Allies would never achieve the same degree of unity in the war in the Mediterranean as they would achieve on the western front under the leadership of Marshal Foch.2
Revel was also thoroughly realistic, and quite conscious of the changes in naval technology that made it suicidal to try to carry on the traditional close blockade. He also had the example of the war in the north. The Italians assumed, correctly, that the Austrian strategy would be a continuation of the methods they had used against the French. They would maintain the fleet-in-being, keeping their big ships secure in their well-fortified bases, while whittling away the Italian superiority in numbers through mines and torpedoes and waiting for the opportune moment to strike. How could the Italians induce the Austrians to sortie from Pola for a naval battle under conditions favorable to them? The possible courses of action included a blockade of the Strait of Otranto, bombardments of Fiume or Trieste, the temporary occupation of Adriatic islands such as Lagosta and Curzola, attacks on Austrian signal and semaphore stations, and mining the channels between the islands. The bombardments of Fiume and Trieste could be ruled out, the former was too dangerous and difficult to approach up the gulf known as the Quarnero, while the latter contained a large Italian population and was close to the main Austrian base, which would expose the bombarding vessels to torpedo attack at night. An attack on Cattaro, the southernmost Austrian base, might cause the Austrian fleet to sortie, but the Italians did not think they had the means for such an attack. Revel’s emphasis, however, was clear. Whatever the Italians did to further their objectives, they should never run the risk of putting their battleships in danger from mines and torpedoes, nor should they subordinate the conduct of their forces to opposing fleeting raids by the enemy on the Italian coast. Their objective in all operations, Revel wrote in January 1915, was to cause major damage to the enemy while receiving the minimum, and this was to be achieved by aggressive action on the part of light craft and torpedo boats. The big ships were to be preserved for combat against their enemy counterparts.3
The commander in chief of the Italian fleet was initially inclined to be more aggressive. The Italian battle fleet at the beginning of the war was led by Vice Admiral Luigi Amadeo di Savoia, Duke of the Abruzzi. Abruzzi, a cousin of King Victor Emmanuel III, was the third son of Amadeo di Savoia, Duke of Aosta, who had been briefly King of Spain (1871–73). Well born, and with the manners and charm of a grand seigneur, Abruzzi was probably one of the best-known Italians of his time, owing to a series of well-publicized expeditions before the war to the Arctic, the Himalayas, and the Ruwenzori Mountains of central Africa. He presented the image of a dashing chief, but somehow, because of the changed conditions of warfare, never lived up to the high expectations people had of him.4 Abruzzi was loath to expose the Italian fleet to the attrition of a distant blockade of the Strait of Otranto and wanted through a series of aggressive measures to force the Austrians to sortie by means, for example, of a bombardment of Fiume or a landing in force at Trieste, or by appearing off Pola and decimating the Austrian fleet as they came out and before they could develop their battle formation.5
Revel’s strategy, the one the Italians followed, was more Fabian. The most aggressive action at the beginning of hostilities would be to seize a secure anchorage in the Sabbioncello Channel between the Sabbioncello Peninsula and the island of Curzola. This was close enough to Cattaro (72 miles) for the Italians to destroy any light Austrian forces coming out of the base, but far enough from the main Austrian base at Pola (195 miles) to avoid being surprised by the Austrian fleet. Revel envisaged two principal phases for maritime operations in the Adriatic. During the first phase, the Italian fleet would be based at Brindisi and Taranto, and operations would take place in the lower and central Adriatic. They would include all actions permitted by circumstances that might induce the Austrian fleet to come southward and give battle. The Italian fleet would only move into the upper Adriatic in the second phase of operations, which would be after the Italian army had succeeded in pushing the Austrians out of Monfalcone and back toward Trieste. The Italian fleet would then help to speed the occupation of Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula and cut Austrian communications along the coast.
Abruzzi was anxious to include Cattaro in the plans. He proposed sending howitzers to Mount Lovčen, where they would be in a position overlooking the gulf. This would have been roughly on the same scale as the unsuccessful French operations the preceding autumn. Revel also liked the idea of operations against Cattaro, but with a much more serious military force, perhaps in the second phase of operations. He was thinking of a real siege. This might be the means to force the Austrian fleet to come out for battle in waters favorable to the Italians, and in any case causing Austrian morale to suffer. The capture of Cattaro by an Italian force also would support Italian claims on the eastern shore of the Adriatic at any future peace conference. Serious operations against Cattaro involved the Italian army, however, and General Luigi Cadorna, the chief of the army general staff, was strongly opposed. Cadorna envisaged making his major effort with all available troops on the northeastern frontier in the direction of Trieste and was loath to disperse men and matériel on what were for him merely secondary objectives. Cadorna was also very niggardly in the men and matériel he agreed to provide for the seizure of the anchorage at Sabbioncello—a regiment of second-line reserve troops and some artillerymen for four 76-mm landing guns to be furnished by the navy. Only four 280-mm howitzers would be sent to Mount Lovcen. The howitzers never reached Montenegro; they were used instead for the defense of Brindisi harbor, and the plans to seize the anchorage at Sabbioncello were deferred. Revel concluded that the anchorage might become a considerable burden, as even the reduced number of troops would have to be maintained over a none-too-secure line of communications while the enemy fleet was in being, and this would tie down naval forces that could be employed more efficiently elsewhere. The navy was obligated to support the seaward flank of the army’s advance in the north, and if this forced the Austrian fleet out to give battle in the early days of the war, the base would be superfluous. If, on the other hand, the Italian fleet had to move north to support the army on the 15th to 20th day of the war, the base would have to be abandoned.6
The Italians would not be making war in isolation, they would be part of an Allied coalition. How did the Italian plans and intentions square with those of the British and French? The Treaty of London was signed on 26 April, obligating the Italians to enter the war within a month.7 The bargaining had been difficult, particularly because of Russian opposition to Italian claims in the Adriatic. Article three of the treaty stipulated: “The Fleets of France and Great Britain will give their active and permanent assistance to Italy until the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet or until the conclusion of peace.”8
A naval convention, signed in Paris on 10 May, established the details of this naval cooperation. The bargaining was equally difficult, foreshadowing Italy’s turbulent relations w
ith the Allies for the remainder of the war. Revel did not get his requirements, and there were even fears the disputes would call into question the entire Treaty of London before a compromise was reached.
The convention provided for a “First Allied Fleet” to be established under the commander in chief of the Italian fleet. The “First Allied Fleet” would consist of most of the Italian fleet; twelve French destroyers, to be joined by as many torpedo boats, submarines, and minesweepers as the French commander in chief could detach; if possible, a squadron of aircraft and a French seaplane carrier; four British light cruisers, to arrive as soon as they were replaced by French cruisers at the Dardanelles; and a division of four British battleships. The commander in chief of the Italian fleet would have the initiative and complete direction of operations executed in the Adriatic by the “First Allied Fleet.”
If this “First Allied Fleet” had to move to the northern part of the Adriatic for any operation requiring all of the Allied forces, a “Second Allied Fleet” would be formed. This would be under the commander in chief of the French fleet and would consist of French battleships and cruisers and those Italian and British ships not already allotted to the Italian commander in chief. The “Second Allied Fleet,” with its flotilla craft, would be ready to reply to the appeal of the commander in chief of the Italian fleet. The Allies promised that as long as enemy naval forces were in the Adriatic, they would support the Italian fleet so as to maintain, as much as possible, a force clearly superior to the enemy.
There was a codicil to the convention that spelled out the specific details. These included the stipulation that six of the twelve French destroyers would be oil-burning, and, as far as possible, of more than 600 tons displacement; six French submarines would be at the disposal of the Italians; the number of French cruisers at the Dardanelles would increase to four as soon as possible, and each French arrival would release a British cruiser for the Adriatic; and, likewise, four British battleships with 12-inch guns currently at the Dardanelles would leave for Taranto as soon as they were replaced by French ships. The major ambiguity remained unanswered by either the convention or its codicil. Who would command if the “Second Allied Fleet,” essentially the French battle squadrons, was ever called to operate inside the Adriatic? The convention of August 1914 stipulated that the French commander in chief was also the Mediterranear commander in chief, and the French were hardly likely to consent to his being placed under Italian orders, just as the Italians would never consent to anyone but an Italiar commanding in the Adriatic. The circle could not be squared and the problem surfaced whenever there was any possibility the French battle fleet would actually have to help the Italians.9
A Naval History of World War I Page 25
