Although the Goeben was able to escape from the Russian fleet, it was the latter that kept the pressure on Turkey’s vulnerable maritime communications during April. On the 15th, the Derzki, Gnevny, and Pronzitelni, three of the large new Russian destroyers, attacked Eregli, Kozlu, and Zonguldak, sinking four steamers, and shortly afterward cruised the Anatolian coast in the eastern part of the Black Sea destroying a large number of small sailing craft.
On the day the Allies landed at Gallipoli, 25 April, the Russian fleet appeared off the Bosphorus, and two battleships, proceeding behind a number of sweepers and escorted by three destroyers, bombarded the forts at a range too great for the Turks to reply.20 They returned on 2 May when the battleships Panteleimon and Tri Sviatitelia moved in to pound the coast defenses while seaplanes launched from the Imperator Nikolai I covered the operation. The following day the Tri Sviatitelia, accompanied by the Rostislav, repeated the bombardment. The Goeben moved up to Beikos within the Bosphorus to try to fire indirectly at the Russians, but she did not sortie, and there is no report of any results. On 4 April the Russians moved north, where the Rostislav shelled Igneada near the Bulgarian frontier and seaplanes launched by the Imperator Nikolai I and Almaz bombed the town. During the same period, the cruisers Kagul and Pamiat Merkuria worked along the Anatolian coast sinking two steamers, capturing another, and sinking four sailing craft in the vicinity of Kozlu. In the closing stages of the operation, Russian destroyers sank another two steamers and a sailing craft.
Souchon sailed with the Goeben, Breslau, and Hamidieh on 6 May on a sweep to reconnoiter and attack Russian shipping. The Turco-German forces found none. The Russian squadron was back on the Anatolian coast on the 9th with cruisers and destroyers sinking four steamers and a large number of sailing craft in the area between Kozlu and Eregli. The Goeben immediately put to sea in an attempt to catch them. However, the Russians also intended to bombard the Bosphorus forts again, and early in the morning of the 10th, the battleships Panteleimon and Tri Sviatitelia and the seaplane carriers Almaz and Imperator Alexander I, escorted by minesweepers and destroyers, left the remainder of the Russian squadron to close the coast. They were reported by the Turkish torpedo boat Numune, patrolling off the entrance. The Numune’s German commander engaged the Russian minesweepers only to be driven off by the battleships. Captain Ackermann commanding the Goeben now thought he had an opportunity to catch part of a divided Russian squadron and steamed back toward the Bosphorus. He was wrong. The Goeben was spotted and reported by the Pamiat Merkuria, and the Russians broke off the intended bombardment and ordered a concentration of their forces. The Goeben therefore would have to contend with all five Russian battleships, not two. The Panteleimon and Tri Sviatitelia had still not joined when the two sides opened fire at 7:50 A.M. The Goeben concentrated on the leading battleship, the Evstafi, but her shooting was not good and she did not hit. The Russians were better, and the Goeben was hit twice. The damage was not serious, but by this time all five Russian battleships were in action and Ackermann decided to break off. Firing ceased at 8:12. Ackermann hoped to draw the Russians northward away from the Bosphorus and take advantage of the Goeben’s speed to double back. He succeeded; the Russians followed for a while, but gave up and turned for home. Ackermann could console himself that he had disrupted the Russian bombardment of the Bosphorus. It was also evident that the combined Russian squadron was too much for the Goeben, and it was lucky the Russian hits had not affected the speed on which her safety depended. Ackermann was possibly more fortunate than he realized. The Goeben had been spotted by the Tyulen, the second of the new Russian submarines, but the boat was not in a position to fire. The action also confirmed to the Russians the potential danger of dividing their battle squadron.21
The Russian bombardments of the Bosphorus probably had little effect on the Gallipoli campaign. They had been sporadic and the attacks were not pushed home. On the other hand, the Russian attacks on the Turkish coal traffic in the Black Sea had a very real effect on the Ottoman Empire’s ability to continue the war. By the first half of April, the Mittelmeerdivision was feeling the pinch, and Souchon complained he had to avoid “useless” sorties into the Black Sea because of the necessity to economize on fuel. The Turks and their German advisors realized the great importance of the Austrian campaign against Serbia in the Balkans, for the stout Serbian resistance blocked the convenient rail and river route from Germany. There seemed a direct link between the ability of the Austrians to open the Danube route and the ability of the Ottoman Empire to continue the war.22
By the end of May, the Russians were able to achieve what amounted to a blockade, albeit imperfect, of the Bosphorus. The Russians still had only two modern submarines available for this patrol, and their action was as yet ineffective. It was those large, fast Russian destroyers that really hurt the Turks. Zonguldak, the main coal port, was roughly 150 miles from the safety of the Bosphorus. The Russian destroyers, in groups of two to four, made periodic sweeps along the Anatolian coast destroying or capturing Turkish shipping. There were four of these sweeps in the second half of May, and with their supply of steamers dwindling—by mid-May they had lost about one-third of their commercial shipping—the Turks were forced to make increasing use of smaller sailing craft, which were not as efficient.23 Souchon used the occasion of a formal visit to Enver Pasha on 9 May congratulating him on recently receiving the Iron Cross (First Class) to warn about the coal difficulty. Souchon, overestimating the capabilities of Russian submarines, wondered why they had not cut off the coal trade long ago. He warned that the Turkish fleet might run out of coal within six weeks.24 Souchon confided to his wife that he was powerless against the Russian destroyers and that Turkish headquarters did not fully recognize the seriousness of the situation. Souchon, who repeatedly remarked that the struggle against Turkish negligence was as wearing as the struggle against the enemy, observed that the Turks had not restricted the use of coal by private firms and somewhat naively believed the fleet could protect the colliers. Souchon thought, however, that the Goeben would burn as much coal protecting the colliers slowly loading on the open coast as the colliers would load. She would also be exposed to submarines.25
The arrival of the first German submarines, U.21 and UB.8, at Constantinople during the first week of June brought some relief to the Turks. The Russians, after another sortie of the fleet against Zonguldak, Kozlu, and Eregli on the 7th, decided they did not have enough destroyers to protect the slow old battleships and cruisers and suspended operations by the battleship squadron until the fast new dreadnoughts entered service later in the year. The destroyers, however, continued their raids, and on the night of 10 June, the Derzki and Gnevny, after sinking two steamers and a sailing vessel in Zonguldak, were sweeping toward the Bosphorus when they ran into the Breslau about 30 miles north of the Strait. The Turks had been using their cruisers and torpedo boats to protect the coal traffic. In the short, sharp encounter in the dark, the Breslau got in the first salvo, and the Gnevny, hit repeatedly and with her main steam pipe cut, was left helpless in the water. The Germans thought they had sunk her. The Breslau, in turn, received three hits from the Derzki, before the action was broken off. The Gnevny was in a dangerous position when dawn broke, unable to move and close to the enemy coast, but fortunately for the ship’s company, who were prepared either for desperate resistance or to scuttle the ship, the Derzki was the first to arrive and towed her crippled consort back to Sebastopol.26
The Russians probably overreacted to the arrival of German submarines. Obviously, the German primary objective was the Allied fleet off the Dardanelles. UB.7, considered too underpowered and weakly armed to face conditions at the Dardanelles, cruised in the Black Sea from 5 to 22 July, but without success. The Turks and Germans decided to establish a system of observation and signal posts along the coast to coordinate their defenses, including the submarines. But the Black Sea was never a priority for German submarines, nor did they experience great luck in it.
The Russians also tried their own form of submarine warfare. They had developed the Krab, a submarine minelayer, and on the night of 10–11 July, she laid fifty-eight mines between the two lighthouses at the mouth of the Bosphorus. It was a deliberate attempt to prevent the Goeben from sailing to disturb the transfer of the as yet unfinished and unarmed Imperatritsa Maria, the first of the Black Sea dreadnoughts, from Nikolaev to Odessa and then Sebastopol. The submarines Morzh, Tyulen, and Nerpa, representing the best the Russians had available, also were deployed off the Bosphorus. In fact, the Morzh had to tow the Krab after the newly completed submarine’s engines malfunctioned. The Krab, when launched in 1912, had been the world’s first submarine minelayer and had aroused a good deal of interest in naval circles. The long delay in completion meant that by the time she finally entered service, the Germans had evolved what turned out to be a superior design in the UC boats. The Krab never really fulfilled the great hopes placed on her, and she remained the only one of her class. The Krab’s minefield was quickly discovered and swept, although a Turkish gunboat was damaged in the field on the 11th.27
The early Russian minefield laid in December 1914, rather than the Krab, was responsible for the damage to the Breslau, which struck a mine off the Bosphorus on 18 July while leaving to cover the return of transports. The cruiser took on 642 tons of water, and, although in no danger of sinking, was out of action for several months, given the difficulties of repair in Turkish waters. The Turks now had only one cruiser—the slow and weakly armed Hamidieh—besides the precious Goeben to assist their handful of hard-worked torpedo boats in protecting transports. The Russian destroyers continued their depredations, and Souchon was forced, most reluctantly, to commit the Goeben to escort transports. This was dangerous, for the Russian submarines Morzh and Tyulen were now operating along the Anatolian coast as well as off the Bosphorus, where they had not accomplished very much. On 10 August the Tyulen torpedoed a 1,545-ton collier off Kirpen, the lead ship of a convoy of five escorted by the Goeben, Hamidieh, and three torpedo boats. The two submarines tried unsuccessfully the following day to get into a firing position against the Goeben herself.28
Regardless of the danger, the Goeben was the only ship the Turks had that could guarantee the safety of the coal convoys. This was clearly demonstrated on 5 September when the destroyers Bystry and Pronzitelni attacked a convoy of three colliers out of Zonguldak despite the escort of the cruiser Hamidieh and torpedo boats Numune and Muavenet. The colliers were ordered to hug the coast while the escorts engaged. The Russian gunnery was described as excellent, and the destroyers kept beyond the range of the Turkish torpedo boat’s armament, so that only the Hamidieh could engage with her two 150-mm guns. Both guns broke down, and the Hamidieh was forced to call on the Goeben for assistance. The battle cruiser had steam up and raced out of the Bosphorus, but in the meantime the Russian destroyers doubled back to the convoy and the Turkish ships, with destruction imminent, ran themselves aground near the mouth of the Sakaria River. The Goeben had been too late to save them, and while returning to the Bosphorus the following day, she spotted the submarine Nerpa on the surface. The Goeben opened fire but did not hit. A disgusted Souchon concluded it was better not to use the Hamidieh and the remaining colliers, now down to only eight or nine, had best sail independently to the Bosphorus where they could be met by Turkish torpedo boats.
There were, however, political as well as military reasons for protecting those few colliers. The Turkish torpedo boats could only be effective as protection against submarines, not the big Russian destroyers, and the Goeben was soon out again to drive off three Russian destroyers attacking three colliers on 21 September. The Goeben periodically escorted coal transports until 14 November when, despite an escort of two torpedo boats, the submarine Morzh narrowly missed hitting her with two torpedoes off the northeast entrance to the Bosphorus. Souchon then stopped the procedure; the risks were too great. He decided to restrict the coal traffic to colliers, generally belonging to German companies, which were fast enough to make the Zonguldak to Bosphorus trip in a single night. They would be escorted by Turkish torpedo boats off the Bosphorus during daylight hours.29
The fact that the Turks and Germans were forced to employ their major asset escorting slow old colliers could be counted as a major success for the Russians. Kapitänleutnant Rudolph Firle, the aggressive young officer in command of the Muavenet (who had sunk the battleship Goliath in the Dardanelles the preceding spring), complained: “These Russian destroyers with their artillery and speed are the real masters of the sea and need fear no one.”30
It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate the effectiveness of the Russian blockade, particularly of the Bosphorus. A British observer with the Black Sea Fleet reported that the Russian destroyers may have been effective, but they did not keep to the sea long enough. Part of the problem was the necessity of the destroyers retaining what the British considered an excessive portion of their fuel as ballast, thereby reducing their radius of action. The Russian submarine crews were also inexperienced, and at the end of 1915 there was still a shortage of submarines suitable for maintaining the watch off the Bosphorus. Vessels coming from Romania and Bulgaria to the north were able to evade the blockade by hugging the Bulgarian coast. The Russians admitted that the Black Sea Fleet still suffered from the fact that until roughly three years earlier it had been a negligible quantity and the major Russian effort had been concentrated in the Baltic, where Germany represented the most formidable potential enemy.31
The operations of German submarines in the Black Sea brought some relief to the Turks. In September UB.7 and UB.8 worked off the Russian coast, and the former sank the British steamer Patagonia (6,011 tons) off Odessa on the 15th. UB.14 and UC.13 also entered the Black Sea a few weeks later. The actual German submarine successes in 1915 were relatively small, but the Russians replied to the new menace by forming “submarine hunting groups” composed of varying numbers of destroyers. The Russians had no more success “hunting” submarines than the British and French had elsewhere, but the effort tied up destroyers that might have been better employed on other duties. These operations also delayed the implementation of the directive of the Russian high command issued on 9 September, giving priority to the attack on Turkish shipping as well as cooperation with the Russian army in the Caucasus. The prospect of a landing at the Bosphorus became more distant. With the failure of the new British landing at Suvla, there was little likelihood the Allies would break out of the Gallipoli Peninsula and, consequently, even less probability the Russians would have an opportunity to land at the Bosphorus.32
The two new Russian dreadnoughts did much to checkmate the Goeben. The Imperatritsa Maria was in service by the end of the summer, and the Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya was available for operations in December. The Russians paired each with one of their few cruisers to create a “maneuver” or “battle”—accounts differ—group. A third “maneuver” group, really a reserve, was formed from the three to five old Russian battleships. Destroyers were attached to each group in varying numbers as available. The dreadnoughts were each armed with twelve 30.5-cm guns, and the Russians considered each of these groups, although slower, strong enough to take on the Goeben and Breslau combined. The Russian fleet therefore returned to the Turkish coast, and on 1 October, the old battleships and cruisers moved in to shell Zonguldak and Eregli while the Imperatritsa Maria covered their seaward flank.
A new front opened for the Russians when Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in September 1915. This meant the end of Serbia, the opening of the direct rail route from Germany to Constantinople, the dispatch of another Anglo-French expedition to Salonika, the commencement of a new front and campaign in the Balkans, and, finally, the end of the Dardanelles expedition. It had little effect on the naval situation in the Black Sea. Bulgarian naval power was minimal, an old gunboat and a half dozen coastal torpedo boats, but the Bulgarian ports of Varna and nearby Euxinograd were now available for
German submarines, and UB.7 and UB.8 were transferred to the Bulgarian coast. The Russian fleet conducted three operations against Varna and Euxinograd in the remaining months of the year. The operations of 20 to 22 and 25 October—the latter including aerial attacks by seaplanes launched from the Almaz and Imperator Nikolai I—and 24 to 26 December do not appear to have accomplished very much. They exposed the Russian squadron to submarine attack off Varna on 27 October when the two German submarines tried to attack the old battleships shelling the port. The submarines were spotted in the smooth water and attacked, but UB.7 managed to launch a torpedo at the Panteleimon. The Germans heard an explosion and thought they had hit, but the torpedo missed. Nevertheless, the Russians broke off the attack.33
Admiral Ebergard was very nervous about risking his fleet against Varna. Ebergard, generally described as a courtly old gentleman, honest and never an intriguer, had little of the aggressiveness or fire associated with Admiral Essen in the Baltic. The younger Russian officers, who seemed to have idolized Essen, regarded Ebergard as slow, cautious, and generally unenterprising. He had been ordered to undertake the operations against Varna against his own judgment as he considered the results to be obtained would probably be small. Ebergard, in fact, urged a visiting British admiral to point out to the tsar that if the operations were repeated, they should be prepared for losses, for they could easily have lost a battleship off Varna.34 A few months later, on 10 March 1916, the Russians aborted a planned seaplane attack on Varna covered by the Imperatritsa Ekaterina and the Second Battle Group when German aircraft attacked the covering destroyers and the torpedo boat Leitenant Pushchin was mined and sunk.35
A Naval History of World War I Page 41
