Holtzendorff yielded on the submarine question in the face of pressure from the civilian members of the German government. Tirpitz’s successor Capelle apparently felt submarines could accomplish almost as much under prize rules, and may possibly have been willing to delay an unrestricted campaign until more of the submarines under construction had entered service. On 24 April the Admiralstab issued orders for the High Sea Fleet and Flanders Flotilla submarines to act against merchant ships according to prize regulations. But this was to hold only if they did not offer resistance or attempt to escape. Scheer, nevertheless, was furious, for he believed that war waged by U-boats according to prize law in the waters around Great Britain “could not possibly have any success” and “must expose the boats to the greatest dangers.” He recalled all submarines by wireless and announced that the campaign against British commerce had ceased. The Flanders Flotilla UB boats were also recalled; the UC minelayers continued their operations. Schwieger and U.20 apparently did not hear the signal, and on 8 May torpedoed and sank without warning the White Star liner Cymric (13,370 tons), which went down with a loss of five lives.59
What was the effect of this “sharpened,” though brief, second submarine campaign? The figures given by Admiral Spindler in the German official history indicate that following the cessation of the first submarine campaign from October to December 1915, German submarines in all theaters sank a total of 140 ships representing 361,326 tons. The figures are inflated by the Mediterranean, which accounted for 80 ships and 293,423 tons, a staggering 81 percent of the tonnage lost. In January 1916 German submarines in all theaters sank 25 ships, 49,610 tons; and in February 44 ships, 95,090 tons. The bad winter weather no doubt affected these figures. During the second submarine campaign, German submarines in all theaters sank in March 60 ships, 160,536 tons; and in April 83 ships, 187,307 tons. The sinkings understandably declined after the sharpened submarine campaign was called off. In May the sinkings in all theaters were 63 ships, 119,381 tons (37 ships and 72,092 tons in the Mediterranean); and in June 63 ships, 93,193 tons (43 ships and 67,125 tons in the Mediterranean). What portion of these losses were suffered by what the Germans now referred to as the Hauptfeind, the British? Fayle in the official history of seaborne trade lists British losses in March 1916 as 26 ships and 99,089 tons, and in April 43 ships and 141,193 tons.60 These figures were still far from Holtzendofff’s objective of 630,000 tons per month, but worrisome enough to the British because the April losses closely approached those of the record month of August 1915. They were greatly relieved when the campaign was called off, for British losses in May, a little more than 64,000 tons, were less than half the April total, and the June loss of 37,000 tons represented the lowest since August 1915. Nevertheless, Fayle acknowledges that the cumulative effect was serious. In the first half of 1916, the British lost nearly half a million tons of shipping, which represented two and a half times the shipbuilding output for the same period. The monthly entrances to British ports by British shipping showed a heavy decrease on those of 1915, and only relatively steady entrances under non-British flags kept the volume of imports from a sharp decline.61
The Germans lost only four U-boats in the waters around the British Isles in March and April. One of those losses, U.68 in the southwestern approaches on 22 March, was due to the depth charges of the Q-ship Farnborough. The Farnborough was under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gordon Campbell, considered the most famous of the Q-ship commanders, and the episode was a classic example of Q-ship tactics with the ship blowing off steam and the stokers and spare men pretending to abandon ship in a panic after the submarine had surfaced and fired a shot across the steamer’s bow. Once the submarine had closed, Campbell opened fire and finished her off with a depth charge.62
Scheer’s obstinacy in refusing to conduct U-boat warfare under prize rules has been criticized by former German naval officers. It may not have been devoid of political motivation, that is, a desire to provoke a sufficiently strong outcry to force Bethmann Hollweg—the enemy of unrestricted submarine warfare—from office. It is at least partially based on the experiences of the F.d.U., Bauer, who made a cruise in U.67 to the British coast and returned strongly opposed to the idea of trying to carry on under prize rules. However, the relatively high rate of sinking in the Mediterranean, where most submarine operations were conducted under prize rules, as well as the subsequent success of the Flanders U-boats in the Channel, seems to indicate Scheer had forfeited an opportunity. Captain Gayer, who was equally critical of the Admiralstab for failing to override Scheer’s orders, reported that there were some German submarine officers who estimated that from May to September 1916 the refusal to continue the submarine offensive under prize rules had saved the Allies as much as 1.6 million tons.63
The submarine was far and away the major weapon used by the Germans against British commerce. However, surface raiders also reappeared during this period. The first and most successful was the Möwe (4,788 tons), converted from the Laeisz Line’s fruit carrier Pungo. The Möwe sailed from the Elbe on 29 December 1915 under the command of Korvettenkapitän Graf zu Dohna-Schlodien with five hundred mines in addition to her armament of four 15-cm guns, one 10.5-cm gun, and two torpedo tubes. Her first mission before turning to commerce destruction was minelaying, and on 1 January she laid 252 mines off the Pentland Firth. The mines sank the predreadnought King Edward VII and two merchant vessels on the 6th. The Möwe proceeded to lay more mines off the estuary of the Gironde, which claimed three steamers and three to four French fishing craft, before heading out into the Atlantic. By the time she returned safely to Wilhelmshaven on 4 March 1916, she had sunk fourteen ships, all but one British, representing 49,739 tons. Her commander, who appears to have behaved quite humanely toward his prisoners, also sent another captured ship into Norfolk, Virginia, with the crews taken from his prizes.
The other raiders were less successful. On 26 February Wolf (I), the former Hamburg-Amerika line Belgravia (6,648 tons), ran aground in the lower Elbe while proceeding to sea and damaged her engines attempting to get free. She had to be taken out of service. The Greif, the former German-Australian line’s Guben (4,962 tons), sailed from the Elbe on 27 February, but British wireless intelligence had been aware of a raider’s departure, patrols were deployed off the Norwegian coast, and when the Greif broke wireless silence her position was established by direction-finding stations. On the 29th the Greif was intercepted by the armed merchant cruisers Alcantara (16,034 tons) and Andes (15,620 tons). The raider attempted to pass as a Norwegian ship and lured the Alcantara close enough before opening fire to inflict mortal damage. The Greif was also badly damaged, and the Andes, joined by the light cruiser Comus, completed her destruction.64
The Möwe’s average monthly bag on a two-month cruise of more than 24,800 tons of shipping was substantial but small in the context of the submarine war. The German naval leaders obviously regarded the submarine as the most potent weapon against merchant shipping, but in their eyes the diplomatic restrictions hobbled them, and Scheer refused to operate under prize rules in the north. On 30 April he received the kaiser’s approval for the cessation of the submarine war on commerce. The submarines of the High Sea Fleet were now employed for military purposes until the political and military situation demanded the resumption of the campaign against trade. Scheer intended to use the submarines in conjunction with operations by the High Sea Fleet, and this set in motion the train of events that led to the Battle of Jutland.65
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
Shortly after he assumed command of the High Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Scheer and his staff, notably Captains Adolf von Trotha and Magnus von Levetzow, produced a program in early February that bore the title “Principles Covering the Conduct of the Naval Campaign in the North Sea.” The objective was to implement a more aggressive and active strategy for the fleet. The Germans recognized that the existing ratio of strength prohibited them from seeking a decisive battle with the British, and their strategy would have
to be such as to prevent this decisive battle being forced on them. Nevertheless, by exercising systematic and constant pressure, the Germans would attempt to force the British to abandon their waiting attitude and send out some of their forces, thereby giving the Germans favorable chances for attacking. This pressure would be exerted by the submarine war against commerce, mining, attacks on trade between the British Isles and Scandinavia, aerial warfare, and intensive sweeps by the High Sea forces. This would include airship raids on England in conjunction with destroyer sweeps. Finally, the Germans would exert still greater pressure by bombarding coastal towns, again with the object of inducing the British to take countermeasures that would give the Germans the opportunity to engage under favorable conditions. At first glance this might sound like more of the same methods employed earlier in the war, but Scheer was quick to point out the earlier sweeps had been undertaken with either inferior forces or under circumstances in which the main fleet could not intervene in time to be of any use.66
The first German action came on the night of 10 February when a strong German destroyer flotilla sank the sloop Arabis, which, together with the newly formed Tenth Mines weeping Flotilla, had been sweeping one of the war channels kept clear for the fleet east of the Dogger Bank. Jellicoe and Beatty, along with Tyrwhitt and the Harwich Force, were ordered out, but had no chance to engage. Unfortunately on returning to Harwich, Tyrwhitt’s flagship, the cruiser Arethusa, was mined and sunk in a new field laid by one of the submarines of the Flanders Flotilla.67
On 5–6 March, Scheer carried out the first of what he termed the High Sea Fleet’s “greater enterprises,” bringing the fleet to the latitude 53° 30’ (approximately that of Terschelling), the farthest south it would come during the war. The sweep was made in conjunction with a zeppelin raid on Hull and Immingham, while submarines from the Flanders Flotilla were stationed off the British coast. Scheer hoped to intercept British patrols. The Grand Fleet and Harwich Force were out again, but there was never any chance of an encounter. The British were able to recall their patrols in time once Scheer broke wireless silence, thereby indicating he was at sea. The Germans, in turn, apparently intercepted the British recall signal and Scheer turned for home.68
The main British strategy remained unchanged. Jellicoe told the first lord: “The Grand Fleet can never have any other objective than the High Sea Fleet, and until the High Sea Fleet emerges from its defenses I regret to say that I do not see that any offensive against it is possible.” Minor offensives were possible, notably seaplane attacks against zeppelin bases in Schleswig. The offensive means were feeble, consisting of the seaplane carrier Vindex, a former Isle of Man Steam Packet Company vessel that had been converted to carry five seaplanes in a hangar aft, with a launching platform for two aircraft with fixed undercarriages forward.69 After two abortive attempts the British launched a raid on 25 March directed against the presumed zeppelin station at Hoyer on the Schleswig coast. The Harwich Force escorted the Vindex to well inside the Vyl light vessel south of Horn Reefs, while Beatty and the battle cruisers were out in support. Despite constant snow squalls, the Vindex managed to launch five seaplanes. Unfortunately, they found no zeppelins at Hoyer. One aircraft did locate zeppelin sheds farther inland at Tondern, but ice jammed her bomb racks and she could not release them. Only two aircraft returned; the other three had been forced by engine trouble to land in German territory. While searching for the missing aircraft, Tyrwhitt’s destroyers clashed with two German patrol trawlers, which were sunk, but the British force was now subjected to air raids. Unfortunately, the destroyer Medusa was rammed by the destroyer Laverock, and despite efforts to tow her home in bad weather, she eventually had to be abandoned. The Admiralty, on intelligence that the High Sea Fleet was putting to sea, ordered Tyrwhitt to withdraw at once. Scheer, however, unsure of British intentions, kept the big ships back and contented himself with sending out strong cruiser and destroyer forces. He lost one destroyer, S.22, to a mine. During the stormy night the Harwich Force, steaming in close order and without lights, had another brush with German forces, and the light cruiser Cleopatra rammed and sank the German destroyer G.194, only to be rammed in turn by the cruiser Undaunted. The latter was badly damaged and could not steam faster than 6 knots. The Germans intercepted the wireless message reporting the accident, and Scheer ordered the High Sea Fleet out toward the British position, whereas the Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet to concentrate east of the Long Forties—the area of the North Sea approximately 100 miles east of Aberdeen. But the German cruisers reported the weather too rough for an engagement, and Scheer returned to port. Once again there was no clash between the major fleets.70
It is not surprising that after these experiences Jellicoe concluded that air raids and mining activities could not be used as a means of drawing the High Sea Fleet to sea and must be treated as definitely minor operations. Jellicoe was apparently worried that there was a feeling at the Admiralty that might lead them to push him into a more active policy. The Admiralty, despite the lack of results, still gave air raids heavy support and pressed him to plan another in the belief it would force the German fleet out. Jellicoe disagreed, for to draw the Germans out the raid would have to take place in daylight, so that the British force would be reported as approaching. If the German heavy ships decided to come out, they would not be clear of their minefields and in a position where the British could engage them until 4:00 P.M. As Jellicoe told Beatty, “This is no time to start a fight in these waters.” It would mean the British hanging around “in a bad locality” expending fuel, especially from destroyers. The British could not wait for the following day, because by then the destroyers would be out of fuel and the light cruisers running short. Jellicoe opposed engaging the High Sea Fleet close to the German minefields and the German submarine and torpedo-boat bases. He concluded: “Patience is the virtue we must exercise.” The British would have to wait until the Germans gave them a chance in a favorable position.71 Beatty agreed: “Your arguments re the fuel question are unanswerable and measure the situation absolutely. We cannot amble about the North Sea for two or three days and at the end be in a condition in which we can produce our whole force to fight to the finish the most decisive battle of the war: to think it is possible is simply too foolish and tends towards losing the battle before we begin.” Beatty believed that “when the Great Day comes it will be when the enemy takes the initiative,” and until then they ought to investigate the North Sea with minesweepers to ascertain what waters were safe, so that when the Germans did take the initiative they could judge where they could engage them.72 The exchange between Jellicoe and Beatty is interesting, for Jellicoe anticipated one of the major British problems at the Battle of Jutland when the main encounter between the fleets did indeed take place late in the day with only limited time before the onset of darkness.
Would the fleets ever meet? It seemed not. On 20 April British cruisers sailed for a raid into the Kattegat to operate against German trade and divert German attention while the Russians relaid minefields that had been displaced by winter ice. The move was altered by intelligence on the 21st that the High Sea Fleet was preparing for sea; the Grand Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were ordered to sea. The next morning the Admiralty found that the High Sea Fleet was returning to port but that there was a chance to intercept the German battle cruisers near Horn Reefs. Beatty, followed by Jellicoe, rushed to the scene, but unfortunately for the British, a dense fog developed during the night and the battle cruisers Australia and New Zealand collided. Later that night three of Jellicoe’s destroyers were also in collision, and a neutral merchantman collided with the dreadnought Neptune. Frustrated by the fog, the British canceled the operation and returned to refuel.
Scheer gave the British another chance with a “tip and run” raid by the German battle cruisers, supported by the High Sea Fleet, against Lowestoft on 24–25 April. The operation was to coincide with the Easter Sunday Irish rebellion in Ireland. The Admiralty, as usual, knew the Germans
were at sea but did not at first know their objective. The Grand Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were ordered to sea, but their southward journey was slowed by heavy seas. Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force, 3 light cruisers and 18 destroyers, were also approaching from the south, but Tyrwhitt had been weakened by having to detach 12 destroyers to cover the laying of new minefields and a mine and mine-net barrage off the Flanders coast.
The operation began badly for the Germans when the Seydlitz, flagship of Rear Admiral Boedicker—commanding the German reconnaissance forces in the temporary absence of the ill Rear Admiral Hipper—struck a mine near Norderney and had to return to port with 1,400 tons of water in the ship. Boedicker transferred his flag to the Lützow, and the four remaining German battle cruisers and six light cruisers encountered the much weaker Harwich Force at about 3:50 A.M. on the morning of the 25th. Scheer and the High Sea Fleet remained off Terschelling, roughly 70 miles away. Tyrwhitt turned south and tried to draw the Germans after him. Boedicker refused to be drawn, and the battle cruisers proceeded to bombard first Lowestoft and then Yarmouth. Tyrwhitt consequently returned to the north and engaged the Germans in an action in which his flagship, the light cruiser Conquest, was hit by five 12-inch shells and badly damaged. Boedicker apparently lacked the killer instinct and refrained from attempting to cut off and destroy the weaker British force. Instead, the German battle cruisers turned for home, and Scheer also turned for home when Boedicker was about 50 miles from him.
A Naval History of World War I Page 54
