A Naval History of World War I

by Paul G. Halpern

  Jellicoe resumed his course to the south-southeast after it had been clearly established the Nottingham had been torpedoed. He might still have intercepted Scheer with the battleships in supporting distance of the battle cruisers; the weather was clear and there was plenty of daylight left. A German error deprived the British of their chance. At 12:03 the zeppelin L.13, which had been shadowing the Harwich Force, reported that a strong British force including heavy ships was approaching Scheer from the south. Scheer believed he might have the long-sought opportunity to catch a portion of the Grand Fleet with his superior forces and turned away from Sunderland to the south. The zeppelin commander, Kapitänleutnant Prölss, was a reserve officer who was not a mariner by profession, but rather chief of the Magdeburg Fire Department.112 He has been understandably criticized in German publications for mistaking Tyrwhitt’s light cruisers for heavy ships but unwittingly may have saved the High Sea Fleet from a major defeat. After learning of E.23’s signal concerning the Westfalen, Tyrwhitt had steamed north looking for the Germans, but seeing nothing he turned—unknowingly away from Scheer—and proceeded southward to his station.

  Scheer abandoned his southward movement at 2:35 P.M. and set course for home. By then he had received the report from one of the submarines of the northern line that the Grand Fleet was approaching him from the north, whereas the British force to the south was apparently out of reach and it was too late to bombard Sunderland. Jellicoe, once he had been advised of Scheer’s change of course, realized a meeting was impossible and also turned for home. The British now had to run the gauntlet of submarines, and the light cruiser Falmouth of Beatty’s screen was torpedoed by U.66 at 4:52 and finally sunk by U.63 the next day while under tow to the Humber.

  Tyrwhitt also had turned in pursuit of the Germans and actually had Scheer in sight by 6:00. He considered the possibility of a night attack but finally realized he would not be able to get into a favorable position ahead of the Germans before the moon rose, after which such an attack would have been suicidal. Tyrwhitt later apologized to Jellicoe: “I hope I was right in not making a night attack. I could have made one but I don’t think I should have succeeded in doing any harm and should most certainly have been badly cut up as the night was not very dark.” He concluded, “I was groping in the dark all day!”113 On this note we might conclude our discussion of this frustrating day, which was indeed “Blind Man’s Bluff.”

  The 19th of August had important strategic results, or as the naval staff study remarked: “It is typical of the vagaries of naval war that while the Battle of Jutland, whose name is a household word, had no immediate effect on fleet strategy, August 19, a day when not a shot was fired on either side marks a definite turning point in the war at sea.”114 On the British side, Jellicoe complained to the Admiralty on 24 August that the number of destroyers available was inadequate for full screening, and it was extremely probable there would be further serious losses should the fleet move south on operations similar to 19 August. The Admiralty replied on 9 September that they could not supply vessels not yet available, were making great efforts to hasten completion of destroyers, would continue allocating new destroyers to the Grand Fleet until the number reached 100, but could not neglect their responsibilities in other areas.115

  These factors contributed to a change in strategy in which Jellicoe and Beatty were in full agreement. Beatty wrote Jellicoe on 6 September that the old proverb “When you are winning, risk nothing” might well be applied now, and that the North Sea south of latitude 55° 30’ N was a very unhealthy place for capital ships and should be left entirely to submarines. Jellicoe more than agreed, and on 13 September an important conference took place in his flagship Iron Duke with Vice Admiral Oliver, chief of the Admiralty war staff. Jellicoe argued that the main fleet should not go south of 55° 30’ N in longitudes east of 4° E unless under exceptional circumstances. The waters so far to the east could not be watched by their cruisers or submarines, and therefore offered the Germans the opportunity to prepare a mine or submarine trap on a large scale. In waters to the west, British submarines could probably report such traps, but because of the submarine danger the fleet should not go south of the Dogger Bank unless the number of destroyers was sufficient to provide a thoroughly efficient screen—which was not the case at the moment. Oliver revealed that the Admiralty had informed the cabinet the Grand Fleet could not be depended on to interfere with German raids on the east coast until twenty-eight hours after the arrival of the raiding forces. Oliver then proceeded to visit Beatty, and on the question of the fleet coming south found him “if anything more emphatic on this point than the C.-in-C..”

  The Admiralty decided on 25 September that they agreed with the conclusions reached at the conference in the Iron Duke and promised to press on with work at Rosyth to enable the main portion of the fleet to be based farther to the south. The fleet would not be ordered south of the concentration point to the east of the Long Forties in rough weather when destroyers could not keep up, and, unless there was a German invasion attempt or a good opportunity to bring the German fleet to action in daylight in appropriate waters, capital ships were to keep to the north of the parallel of Horns Reef and avoid the vicinity of mined waters.116

  There were strategic changes after 19 August on the German side as well. Scheer was ready to try a similar operation in September with three rows of U-boats instead of a single line, with the boats in the second and third lines deployed opposite the gaps in the front line. Scheer reported that poor weather made scouting impossible and prevented implementation of the plan. He was ready to try again in October, but by then found that the Supreme Command had decided to withdraw the U-boats from the High Sea Fleet and use them for the resumption of the war against commerce under prize rules. Scheer opposed this; in his mind it must be unrestricted submarine warfare or nothing. However, the commander of the Flanders Flotilla, Korvettenkapitän Bartenbach, after a trial mission by UB.18 at the end of July in which only ships clearly established as transports would be attacked without warning, had come to the conclusion that submarine warfare against commerce, even under prize rules, could still produce useful results in the western portion of the English Channel.117

  The German high command’s decision in early October to resume restricted submarine warfare against commerce was in direct opposition to Scheer’s opinion. The campaign was not totally restricted; the Germans reserved the right to sink armed merchantmen without warning. Scheer therefore had to relinquish the High Sea Fleet’s U-boats and alter his plans for a new sortie. On 10 October he sent out a screen of destroyers to examine merchantmen and capture prizes in the North Sea. The High Sea Fleet came out in support, but Scheer was careful as to his choice of favorable waters, light and wind conditions, and the amount of time between a possible encounter and the onset of darkness.118 The fleet came out to the center of the North Sea east of the Dogger Bank with a wide destroyer screen and preceded by zeppelins, but bad weather restricted the ability of the destroyers to go as far as planned, and the German wireless interception station at Neumünster warned Scheer they had intercepted British signals diverting merchant ships and recalling light forces, thereby indicating the British knew he was out. Scheer returned to port without accomplishing anything. The light cruiser München was torpedoed off Terschelling by E.38 but was towed home by the cruiser Berlin.

  The British once again knew from wireless interceptions that the Germans were planning to come out. The local defenses on the east coast were alerted, but the Grand Fleet was only brought to short notice. It did not leave harbor while the German intentions were unknown. This reflected the new strategy and indicated that in the North Sea a stalemate was in effect as far as the major surface fleets were concerned. The situation was basically imposed by submarines. The major British offensive patrolling also was now carried out by submarines, although the Admiralty did not seem to realize their value and held back submarines in east coast harbors to defend against German raids. The Germans w
ere never able to come out again without being detected by British submarine patrols.119

  Scheer, deprived of submarines to provide advance warning that Jellicoe was at sea, had to abandon his strategy of trying to catch a portion of the Grand Fleet. The High Sea Fleet did not undertake another offensive sortie in the North Sea until April 1918. The role of the great ships was now to support the activities of the submarines. On the night of 23–24 October the Third and Ninth Flotillas, representing twenty-four precious destroyers, were transferred from the High Sea Fleet to Zeebrugge and placed temporarily under the orders of the Marinekorps Flanders. Their objective was to combat the light forces of the Harwich Force and Dover Patrol and to facilitate the passage of submarines through the Strait. The transfer indicated the Germans recognized that the center of gravity of the naval war had shifted to the submarine campaign against commerce.120

  There was also an incident early in November, small in the context of the war, but which clearly demonstrated how the role of capital ships and submarines had been reversed. On 2 November U.30’s diesel engines broke down while the submarine was operating off the Norwegian coast approximately 25 miles west of Bergen. The submarine sent a wireless message for help, and U.20, returning from the southwest of Ireland and approximately 40 miles away, heard the message and came to assist. The British also intercepted the message and destroyers were sent to sweep up the Norwegian coast. They were too late, for the two submarines had proceeded in company toward Bovsbjerg on the Jutland Peninsula where U.30 was to be met by tugs. They reached the vicinity of Bovsbjerg on the evening of 4 November when a fog came up and both boats ran aground. U.30 managed to free herself but could no longer submerge freely and remained in the vicinity of the stranded U.20. The Germans feared that British patrols would catch the submarines or that the Danes would intern U.20 if they did not get her off quickly enough. Scheer sent powerful reinforcements—the destroyers of the Fourth Half-Flotilla, covered by the battle cruiser Moltke and the Third Battle Squadron. The British were able to intercept the German wireless messages and alert the British submarine J.1, which was on patrol in the vicinity. Commander N. F. Laurence of J.1 managed to get in an attacking position and fire four torpedoes, one of which hit the Grosser Kurfürst and another the Kronprinz. The dreadnoughts were not sunk, however, and were able to return to port on their own power. The destroyers could not dislodge U.20, which was blown up and her crew brought home.

  The Kaiser subsequently criticized Scheer over the affair, pointing out that to risk the Moltke and an entire battle squadron and have two battleships put temporarily out of commission for the sake of a single U-boat showed a lack of proportion and must not happen again. Scheer disagreed and felt that the kaiser’s policy would impose too great a restraint on the fleet. He was summoned to Pless on 22 November and defended himself with the argument that the dangers that submarines normally faced were so great that the fullest possible support from the fleet was justified. The submarine crews could not be allowed to feel that they would be left to their fate if they ran into difficulties. The whole German naval strategy would sooner or later have to be concentrated on the U-boat campaign, and the fleet would have to devote itself to a single task, getting U-boats safely to sea and bringing them safely home again.121 There can be no more striking demonstration as to how the nature of the war at sea had changed by autumn of 1916. An entire squadron of precious capital ships—the prewar standard of naval strength—had been risked to salvage a single submarine. The next step was for the Germans to make the fateful decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare regardless of the diplomatic consequences. The naval war was about to reach its crisis.

  11

  THE SUBMARINE CRISIS: 1917

  THE DECISION FOR UNRESTRICTED WARFARE

  In October 1916 Holtzendorff launched the restricted submarine campaign according to prize rules, which has been overshadowed by later events but was not devoid of results. Sinkings had already risen sharply in September to 172 ships, representing 231,573 tons. This was largely due to the entry into service of the larger and more potent UB.II boats of the Flanders Flotilla, which could now operate well beyond the Channel into the western approaches or as far south as the Gironde. The Allied losses grew higher: in October 185 ships, 341,363 tons; in November 180 ships, 326,689 tons; in December 197 ships, 307,847 tons; and in January 1917,195 ships, 328,391 tons. The Germans lost during this period only 10 boats (3 in the unhealthy Black Sea), giving an exchange ratio of 65 ships sunk for every U-boat lost.1

  The German submarines continued to extend their operations on a significant scale, reinforcing the Mediterranean Flotilla (see chapter 12), working briefly off the coast of North America, and making a successful raid into the Arctic. There were sinkings involving American citizens, of which the most noteworthy were probably the Marina and the Arabia. There were six Americans among the eighteen lost when the Donaldson line’s Marina (5,204 tons) was torpedoed without warning by U.55 off Fastnet on 28 October. The Marina had, however, carried defensive armament, which in German eyes made her fair game. On 6 November the P&O liner Arabia (7,933 tons) was torpedoed by UB.43 off Cape Matapan in the Mediterranean. The loss of life was restricted to eleven of the engine room staff killed in the first explosion, but the liner had been torpedoed without warning by a submerged submarine, and it was thanks only to good seamanship, luck, and the prompt arrival of rescuing ships that the 439 passengers (169 of them women and children) survived. The Arabia incident demonstrated that the Germans had broken their promise about not sinking passenger liners without warning, but they were prone to take liberties in the Mediterranean where American citizens were less likely to be encountered.2 The United States government protested these and other sinkings; the Germans replied with justifications and excuses.

  The Americans were equally if not more affected by the appearance of German submarines in American waters. The Germans developed the large submarine Deutschland, ostensibly under the merchant flag, to serve as a blockade runner with admittedly small but vital cargoes. The Deutschland made two round voyages in the summer and fall of 1916. Her sister ship the Bremen disappeared without a trace after sailing at the end of August. The Deutschland was undoubtedly a great curiosity for Americans. The U.S. government managed to skirt potentially awkward diplomatic repercussions and the Germans garnered an extensive amount of publicity, even if in the final analysis the tangible results were small.3 The visit of Kapitänleutnant Hans Rose and U.53 to Newport, Rhode Island, on 7 October was much less benign. The submarine remained in port only a few hours, and Rose invited American naval officers for a tour of inspection. A number of officers from the Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet accepted. He then proceeded to sink five ships off the American coast. None were American, three were British and the others Norwegian and Dutch. The sinkings took place in international waters off the Nantucket light vessel under prize rules, and, in fact, were observed by American destroyers who rescued the survivors. At one point the submarine had actually been forced to reverse engines to avoid a collision with a destroyer. At another moment Rose even asked an American destroyer lying near the Dutch ship to move a little farther away so the freighter could be torpedoed. The voyage of U.53 was an obvious demonstration of what German submarines were capable of and a not very subtle reminder to the United States that American waters were not immune.4

  The results of this final “restricted” submarine campaign may have been impressive, a reflection of the much larger number of submarines the Germans had available for the campaign. This grew from 87 out of 119 operational boats in October to 103 out of 148 operational boats in January. Nevertheless, only 20 percent of the Allied ships sunk during this period had been torpedoed without warning, while about 75 percent had been sunk by gunfire. Scheer and his chief of staff, Trotha, were convinced the campaign could not be decisive. Trotha believed that the American attitude prevented them from wielding the U-boat weapon as a sword certain to bring them victory, that they had used
it instead “as a soporific for the feelings of the nation, and presented the blunt edge to the enemy.” A modern analyst is inclined to agree. Admiral Hezlet points out that at the end of the two-year period 1915–16, the British merchant marine was still 94 percent of the size it had been at the beginning of the war, and even if the Germans had been able to employ twice the number of submarines and the British had not taken any new countermeasures, it would still have taken the Germans another two years to defeat them by this method alone.5

  By the close of 1916, the balance of strength in the lengthy debate within Germany over unrestricted submarine warfare shifted inexorably in favor of those who favored its resumption. The failure of German peace proposals to arouse an acceptable response from the Allies and the successful conclusion of the Romanian campaign, which freed troops the high command considered necessary to deploy in case unrestricted submarine warfare brought Denmark and Holland into the war, had much to do with helping to create the favorable atmosphere.6 Holtzendorff, the chief of the Admiralstab, had played a role described by Professor Herwig as “tortuous.” His policy pleased no one and made him a target for the intrigues of partisans of unrestricted submarine warfare in the High Sea Fleet, notably Scheer, Trotha, and Levetzow. Holtzendorff was finally converted in December and submitted the widely quoted memorandum on the subject to Field Marshal von Hindenburg, now chief of the general staff. The memorandum, which Holtzendorff described as an extension of an earlier one of 27 August, was subsequently printed and apparently widely distributed. The German naval attaché in Vienna, for example, handed a copy to the Marinesektion on 17 January. Obviously it had not been created in a vacuum. There had been a series of earlier and lengthy memoranda sponsored by the Admiralstab officers Captain Grasshoff and Commander Ernst Vanselow. They included two by economic experts, the banker Dr. Richard Fuss and Professor Hermann Levy. The latter emphasized Great Britain’s vulnerability to a stoppage of vital imports, particularly wheat. The memoranda provided a scientific veneer for what would become Germany’s fateful gamble. Significantly, Admiral von Müller, chief of the kaiser’s naval cabinet and generally regarded as a moderate on the U-boat question, disregarded Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s request to keep the memoranda secret and circulated close to five hundred copies to naval and military leaders.7