Am considering proposal to have four Brigades each of four Commandos under Sturges. You would have one Brigade, be deputy Force Commander and Senior Army Brigadier.9
Because all non-urgent signals had to pass through AFHQ and Fifteenth Army Group, Bob did not receive it until 25 July, and, when he did, it was corrupted, although the sense was clear. Bob was due to see Montgomery that day and brought the matter up with him. Montgomery was unhappy with the proposal, as a result of which Bob drafted a reply, which read:
Hope you will postpone decision until after the campaign. I have discussed employment of Special Service troops with General Montgomery who considers reorganisation on a divisional basis most unsatisfactory.10
He left the draft with Montgomery, who added the words ‘He would like to discuss the matter with you’. Whether or not the signal was sent, Mountbatten had not received it by 28 June, when he sent another signal repeating the contents of his earlier one, but adding:
Appreciate above suggestion alters proposal now before War Office and that it more than halves the size of your command. Do not propose to proceed unless you agree.11
At Haydon’s suggestion, Mountbatten then held a meeting with Lovat and the COs of the Commandos in the UK. Haydon himself was not present, as it was felt that they would speak their minds more freely without him. According to a subsequent letter from Mountbatten to Bob, the COs were not keen on rival Army and RM Brigades. Moreover, he continued, they also disliked an alternative suggestion, which appears to have been conceived entirely to placate Bob, that there should be two RM Brigades under their own brigadiers and two Army brigades commanded by full colonels under one brigadier, on the grounds that it would be unnecessarily clumsy and add an extra layer of administration.
In the knowledge that Hilary Bray was leaving for Algiers to join Bob’s HQ , in which he was to relieve Griff Hunt temporarily, both Mountbatten and Haydon asked him to carry detailed letters setting out the background. Bob sent a holding signal on 6 August, saying that his considered opinion was that there should be two parallel but separate organizations and that he was sending his full arguments back with Hunt. These were set out in a long handwritten letter to Mountbatten.
In the letter Bob stated that his views were motivated not by his own reduced role but by what he thought was in the best interests of Combined Operations in general and the Special Service Brigade in particular. He went on to say that the opinion he had expressed to Mountbatten before leaving for HUSKY was driven by his understanding at the time that, if the amalgamation did not take place, there would be two separate and rival organizations, one under the CCO and the other under the Adjutant-General RM, which ‘would bode nothing but evil for both parties’.12 Now that he understood that the CCO would control both, he saw no reason why they should not be separate but parallel. When he had met Mountbatten he had harboured concerns that the Army would see no need for the Commandos in future and thought that, in such circumstances, their chances of survival might be improved if they were affiliated to the RM Division. Subsequently, however, Leese, Dempsey and Guy Simmonds, the GOC of 1 Canadian Division, had all expressed great satisfaction with the Commandos, and he now believed that their role in the field was secure.
Bob went on to say that, although the two RM Commandos under his command had performed well overall, they had initially proved to be ‘a bit sticky’13 when sniped and mortared and had needed to be pushed, which would not have been the case with Army Commandos. He attributed this largely to the volunteer background of the latter and felt that their identity, individuality, esprit de corps and inspiration would be lost if amalgamated with the RM Division. His preference was thus for his own proposed reorganization of the Special Service Brigade to go ahead, as he believed had been agreed with the War Office, and that both it and the RM Division should report separately to Mountbatten.
Bob was already very much behind events. Notwithstanding Mountbatten’s earlier reassurance that the proposals he had set out would not go ahead without his agreement, in fact the wheels had already been set in motion, largely because the Royal Marines were pressing hard to begin converting their battalions. Mountbatten, who was by then at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec, made his decision, sending a signal to Haydon on 16 August:
1. There must be one Special Service Force under General Sturges
2. Army Commandos to continue under Laycock with groups each commanded by a Colonel.
3. This organization to be reviewed one month after Laycock’s return.
4. Inform Laycock.14
Bob was deeply unhappy with what had happened. On 21 August he wrote to Angie:
If they are going to mess the Special Service Brigade about they will have to find a new commander and I shall return with ill grace, complaining vitriolically, to be a GII CW or go and learn about armoured cars and command a squadron of the Blues, or, if they will not have me, a Mobile Bath Unit or a Field Bakery – or become a full Sanitary Colonel with a green band around my hat and sit gloomily contemplating the similarity between latrines and Staff Officers who cannot appreciate the value of morale and esprit de corps.15
Bob’s mood was not improved by the receipt of a letter from Haydon, which he described to Angie as ‘very rude’.16 It was certainly extremely blunt, not least because Bob’s long letter to Mountbatten had been opened in the CCO’s absence by Wildman-Lushington, who had taken the gravest exception to the comparison drawn between the Royal Marine and Army Commandos. Haydon later wrote apologizing for an ‘ill-tempered letter’,17 but it was clear that there had been great exasperation at Bob’s attitude, which was holding up the reorganization. Mountbatten also wrote on 24 August, telling Bob that he understood his arguments but that the decisions taken must now stand. He also told Bob that he would soon hear ‘a very staggering piece of news’,18 which would mean his stepping down as CCO.
It became clear subsequently that the members of the Special Service Brigade in the UK were themselves far from happy with the proposals. Lovat wrote to say that he and the COs had been told by Mountbatten at their meeting with him that Bob was 100 per cent behind the idea of amalgamation, no matter what form it took; they had only later understood that this had been inaccurate, by which time it was too late. In another letter, John Sooby of the Special Service Brigade told Bob that they had been offered just three staff positions, and junior ones at that, out of thirteen at the new Force HQ. He neatly summed up the situation as: ‘the Battle has been lost and the Marines have gained possession of the Field.’19
It is clear that Mountbatten was determined to drive through the reorganization, which was the only way in which the future demand for Commandos could be satisfied, and that he relied heavily on his selective interpretation of Bob’s immediate reaction to the proposals in order to gain acceptance from Lovat and his COs. It is equally clear, in spite of Bob’s protestations to Mountbatten, Haydon and even Angie, that he had no ambition for himself. He was in fact deeply disappointed at the turn of events from a personal perspective, so much so that in early September he sent the following signal to Mountbatten:
Most Secret. Personal for Mountbatten and Haydon from Laycock. Request that I may be relieved of my command on conclusion Avalanche for following reasons. One G.O.C.O.’s letter of 14 Aug shows mistrust and disregard of all my recommendations. Two C.C.O.’s letter of 24 Aug repudiates three separate undertakings in his previous signals and letters. I cannot decently interpret this repudiation except as further mark of lack of confidence in me by C.O.H.Q. Three and far more important is my conviction that these proposals which have already been implemented in some respects must eventually prove destructive to tradition morale individuality and technique of Commandos whose interests are paramount with me. I believe that these decisions are ill advised and will cause widespread concern when they are eventually communicated to the officers and men whom I now command.20
And there the matter stood, just as Bob was about to participate in one of the most important All
ied operations of the War.
Chapter 17
Avalanche
Bob and Tom Churchill had not been in Algiers for much more than a week when Operation BUTTRESS was cancelled in favour of Operation AVALANCHE. The latter would involve landings by Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s Fifth US Army in the Bay of Salerno, chosen as the furthest point north over which air cover could be provided from Sicily. X Corps, now commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Richard McCreery, who had had succeeded Horrocks when the latter was seriously wounded by a German fighter in Bizerta, was to land on the left on either side of the town of Salerno, with Lieutenant General Ernest J. Dawley’s VI US Corps on the right, close to the ruined ancient Greek city of Paestum.
XIII Corps of Eighth Army would still be carrying out Operation BAYTOWN across the Straits of Messina. Bob confirmed that 3 and 40 RM Commandos and the SRS would be at Dempsey’s disposal, and all planning for that part of the Special Service Brigade was now passed to Durnford-Slater and Franks, acting under the orders of the Corps HQ. This allowed Bob and Churchill to focus on 3 and 41 RM Commandos’ role in AVALANCHE. Operating under the command of 46 Division, they were to land at the small fishing village of Marina, where the coastline of the Bay of Salerno bends round to become the Amalfi Coast, take the adjacent town of Vietri sul Mare and move inland from there to control the La Molina Pass, through which ran the main road from Naples to Salerno. Meanwhile, 46 Division would be landing on the far side of Salerno and would only be able to relieve the Commandos once it had taken the town. Bob was especially pleased, however, to hear that Bill Darby and his US Rangers would be landing some five miles to his left at Maiore, blocking the coast road from Amalfi and seizing the Chiunzi Pass, through which another road ran from the Plain of Naples.
The change of plan meant that Bob was to stay in Algiers for far longer than he had originally expected. In his absence the last operation carried out by the Commandos in Sicily took place. This was BLACKCOCK, which involved a landing on 16 August by 2 Commando near Scaletta, south of Messina, in conjunction with 4 Armoured Brigade. The intention was to cut off the Axis forces retreating up the coast road from Catania, but the birds had already flown and just one solitary lorry was detained. Another landing then took place even closer to Messina, just north of San Stefano. There was no opposition, and at 09.00 on the following day 2 Commando was the first British unit into Messina, to find the Americans already in possession of the city.
Salerno.
Tom Churchill now flew to Palermo to find a site for 2 and 41 RM Commandos, which would be embarking there for AVALANCHE. Bob arrived on 27 August and the two Commandos over the next few days. The location was chosen for its proximity to the Rangers, the Commandos being treated to their very superior American rations for the duration of their stay. The members of Bob’s HQ were invited by Major General Lord Rennell, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer in the Allied Military Government, to use the facilities in his nearby villa, which included hot baths. Randolph Churchill, who had attached himself to Bob when the Brigade HQ was divided into two, took up residence there.
In addition to their rations, and thanks to Bob’s close relationship with Darby, the brigade received from the Americans a very useful increment to its establishment in the shape of a heavy mortar company. This was equipped with the 4.2” mortar, which had a far greater range and weight of shell than the 3” mortar issued to the Commandos and proved in due course to be an extremely valuable weapon. Bob had also been allocated a troop of 6-pounder anti-tank guns and two detachments from a field ambulance.
On 7 September Brigade HQ and 2 Commando embarked in HMS Prinz Albert, a former Belgian cross-channel ferry converted into an LSI, whilst 41 RM Commando boarded two LCI(L)s.1 Together with the LSIs and other craft carrying the Rangers, the convoy sailed from Palermo on the following morning. Giving a toast to their future success in the wardroom with his brother Jack and Randolph Churchill, Tom Churchill pondered on the operation’s codename, given that it was late summer and the weather was still very warm. Randolph observed that it had most likely been chosen because the Germans were about to receive an avalanche of Churchills!
That evening, the news of the Italian armistice was broadcast over the ship’s loudspeakers, providing a momentary hope among many of the troops waiting to land that they would encounter no resistance. They were to be gravely disappointed.
Because of the likelihood of minefields, the LSIs hove to seven miles from shore, nearly twice the distance which Bob had thought was too far away at Bardia. However, this was no raid; the Commandos were expecting to be ashore for several days, with no prospect of an early withdrawal back to the ships. The LCAs carrying 2 Commando and the Brigade HQ were lowered at 02.15 on 9 September and began to move towards the shore. They were preceded by two minesweepers clearing a wide channel and the destroyer HMS Blackmore, which was to bombard the enemy batteries. There had been some debate during the planning as to whether the approach should be made in complete silence, so as not to alert the defenders, or under cover of a bombardment. Bob decided that the destroyer should open fire on a coastal battery believed to be manned by the Germans shortly before the LCAs hit the beach. This duly happened, and there was no response. Led by Jack Churchill carrying his claymore, 2 Commando landed intact at 03.30 and, having left a troop behind to hold the beachhead, through which Brigade HQ and 41 RM Commando passed twenty minutes later, moved up towards Vietri.
The battery, which was 2 Commando’s first objective, turned out to be unmanned, but some prisoners were taken in the vicinity. Two troops were despatched towards Salerno, to be confronted on the way by a Tiger tank. A couple of rounds from a 6-pounder appeared to jam its turret and it withdrew. Meanwhile, 41 RM Commando established itself in the hills on either side of the La Molina Pass, where they also met some resistance, including a Mark IV tank, which was knocked out with a PIAT.
Although there had been no concerted defence, there were still plenty of Germans around. On their separate ways up to Vietri, both Tom Churchill and Bob came face to face with an enemy soldier. Churchill had no time to draw his pistol, whilst Bob fired his and missed. Both were saved by the fast reactions of their batmen, who killed one German and incapacitated the other.
As the day went on, the position became clearer. The Germans still had a firm hold on the La Molina Pass and had brought 41 RM Commando to a halt. They were also resisting strongly in Salerno itself, and although a recce squadron broke through from 138 Brigade, under whose immediate command the Special Service Brigade temporarily came, it was not followed by any infantry battalions. The beach at Marina came under heavy mortar fire, causing casualties, as a result of which the LCAs disappeared without unloading the stores, which included most of the personal kit of the troops. Moreover, the LCA crews spread the news that Vietri had been recaptured by the Germans, prompting a staff officer of 46 Division to come through on the radio with orders for the Special Service Brigade to retake it. Tom Churchill replied that he was speaking from the centre of town, which was fully under British control, and suggested that the staff officer might like to re-check his sources.
The news from the Rangers on the left was good. They had achieved complete surprise and secured the Chiunzi Pass, from the heights of which they could look down on the Bay of Naples. As a result there was no threat, at least, from the direction of Amalfi.
On the following day Brigadier Harding of 138 Brigade arrived at Bob’s HQ , now established in a large school in Vietri which had previously served as a German barracks and was full of their clothes and some cases of tinned food. Harding said that he was being threatened from the north and was unable to provide any immediate help other than his Brigade Support Group, which arrived with heavy machine guns and more 4.2” mortars. He was asked to supply additional 4.2” mortar and PIAT ammunition, as both were running out, and to arrange naval gunfire support for 41 RM Commando, which was now under heavy pressure. Later in the afternoon, Major General ‘Ginger’ Hawkesworth, the GOC
of 46 Division, also appeared. He was pleased with the Commandos’ performance, but unable to promise any relief.
Meanwhile, 2 Commando had been in action for most of the day, wiping out a German machine gun position overlooking Vietri, with some help from Bob doing the spotting for the mortars with his binoculars, and later taking a key hill feature to prevent 41 RM Commando being outflanked on the left. The HQs of both Commandos were hit by mortar fire and at 41 RM Commando the signal section was nearly wiped out, requiring replacements from Brigade HQ. Lumsden was wounded and succeeded by his second-in-command, Major J. R. Edwards. The viaduct carrying the Amalfi road across the valley north of Vietri remained under heavy fire.
On D+2 two battalions from 138 Brigade arrived to relieve the two Commandos, which had suffered serious casualties over the previous fortyeight hours and were withdrawn that evening into a rest area between Vietri and Salerno. The respite was very brief, as at 08.30 the next day they were ordered back into the line, fighting hard and suffering further casualties in the valley and on the hills at either side.
On D+4 2 Commando came under heavy attack again. This time the action took place around the village and nearby hill of Dragonea, where two forward troops of the Commando were overrun and the second-in-command, Major Lawrie, was killed. One troop of 41 RM Commando, led by Teddy Edwards, the acting CO, arrived to assist and, alongside a troop from 2 Commando under Captain the Duke of Wellington and with artillery support from 71 Field Regiment, assaulted the hill and recovered all the positions which had been previously lost. This turned out to be the turning point of the battle, as the Germans withdrew under cover of smoke.
Commando General Page 22
