If there were to be “few casualties” and “no serious combat” then Dulles and Bissell must have been anticipating the element of surprise. Two things tended to mitigate this idea of “surprise.” First, numerous stories on the guerrillas’ training in Guatemala began to appear in the American press: The Nation ran an editorial in its November 19, 1960, issue; pictures appeared in the Miami Herald the same month; in January 1961, a detailed account finally made the front page of the New York Times.30 Then, on March 17, one month before the invasion, that paper actually predicted an invasion of Cuba.31 Any Castro spy or sympathizer—of which there were many in the U.S.—could have sent him any of these articles. Beyond that, Castro was getting intelligence reports about riots taking place in Guatemala over the training of the Cuban brigade there.32 Secondly, in direct contradiction of the above, there was a police force at Playa Giron the night of the invasion.33 That force relayed a message to Castro. And Castro—who had placed his army on high alert in early April and placed his troops near probable landing sites—quickly deduced that this was the awaited invasion and not a diversion. Within ten hours he had his regular troops at the beach. In fact, Castro had been informed as to when the last landing ship had left Guatemala.34
We should note here that there was a political element to the plan. The CIA project officer, Tracy Barnes, had appointed E. Howard Hunt to piece together a group of leaders who, if the invasion succeeded, would then constitute a new government in Cuba.35 Hunt, now reunited with his Guatemala coup colleague David Phillips—who was director of propaganda on the project—was happy to be working again with his old chums like Phillips and Barnes. As he himself noted, it was “a cadre of officers I had worked with against Arbenz.”36 In fact, Hunt was informed that Phillips—who had been stationed in Havana for three years prior to the revolution—had already been at work on organizing Cuban students, women, and professional groups against Castro.
As anyone who has studied him knows, Hunt was quite conservative in his politics. A former cohort said that, “Howard was a regular rightwing nut” and a big backer of McCarthy in the fifties.37 Therefore, like certain business organizations we have mentioned, he proposed killing Castro in 1960 as a part of the operation.38 This murder reflex came from two things. First, his vehement Cold War attitude, which is exemplified by the following: “There can be no peace and security in the Western Hemisphere until communism is eradicated from Cuba. This can only be done with force of arms—and time is running out.”39 It also stemmed from his experience from the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz a decade earlier. As Larry Hancock has amply demonstrated, assassination was clearly a part of that operation, which Barnes, Allen Dulles’s Golden Boy, also was project officer on.40 After analyzing the evidence in newly declassified documents of the successful coup, Hancock writes: “Clearly … CIA field staff were very much involved with the subject of assassination and actively involved in preparing surrogate personnel to carry out political eliminations.”41 Further, the Agency had prepared an assassination manual in advance as part of the project. The manual had an organization chart showing how elimination teams would work during the coup. At a meeting of the coordinating team in March of 1954, three months before the coup, there was a discussion of the killing of fifteen to twenty top Guatemalan leaders using trained assassins from the neighboring Dominican Republic.42 Therefore, from this previous experience, Hunt understood that assassination was something not just to be tolerated, but planned upon.
Because of this outlook, as the CIA evolved its political front (originally called the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, or FRD) for the operation, two things became prevalent. First, these men were to be mostly figureheads. As both Arthur Schlesinger and Lyman Kirkpatrick have pointed out, the Agency looked upon these men with condescension. Kirkpatrick concludes in his internal Agency review that the political leaders visited the brigade recruits only one time, in March.43 Kirkpatrick then goes on to comment that this was an example of the Agency’s “high-handed attitude toward Cubans that became more and more evident as the project progressed.”44 He then says that this attitude contributed to the state of mind of the exiles that this was really an American project, not a Cuban one. And since this was the case, the Agency pitched many of their written FRD propaganda manifestos at investors and bankers. Therefore, Kennedy adviser Schlesinger asked: How could they be expected to win the hearts and minds of the working class? Especially since Castro had been trying to help those men and women for the two years he had been in power.45 Further, at least one of the leaders, Jose Miro Cardona, asked Schlesinger on April 12 why he, a Cuban exile leader, did not know any specifics about the plan.46 This was just five days before the launch of the invasion.
When Hunt was added to the political arm of the operation, the name of the Cuban political group evolved into the CRC, or Cuban Revolutionary Council. Its main members were Miro, Tony Varona, and Manuel Artime (the last was extremely close to Hunt). And a second point now becomes more obvious. As Kirkpatrick writes, this was essentially a centrist spectrum, which eventually tilted right when Ricardo Rafel Sardinia was added in August of 1960.47 This was by design. One internal CIA report stated that the Agency had “plenty of flexibility to choose the Cuban group we would eventually sanction as a provisional government.”48 In January of 1961, with Hunt now firmly in control of this aspect, another report stated that it was the Agency rather than the Cubans who were making all plans and decisions: “We have charted five different lists of proposed assignments for any future provisional government of Cuba and are compiling biographic data on those Cubans who might be utilized by us in forming a future Cuban government.”49 This last statement seems even stranger upon reflection. Because it seems to say that it will be the United States that charts out both policy and the people leading it if the invasion succeeded. In other words, it faintly sounds like a return to the days of Batista. And, although Kirkpatrick does not cite the author of the memo, the language and attitude seem reminiscent of Howard Hunt, who, with the exception of Artime, thought little of the leaders. And, in fact, Hunt himself writes in his book on the subject, Give Us this Day, that he was in charge of escorting the CRC exile leaders into a liberated Havana and staying on as an adviser after the first post-Castro elections.50 Further, according to Hunt, until Kennedy was inaugurated, Richard Nixon was the action officer in charge of the Bay of Pigs at the White House. Any bottlenecks would be cleared by his representative General Robert Cushman, and Hunt could call Cushman anytime. Nixon, and his friend, the wealthy industrialist William Pawley, clearly favored more conservative recruits for the operation. And this is how Hunt was gladly proceeding. Until Kennedy was inaugurated.
At that point, Schlesinger, with Kennedy advisers Richard Goodwin and Chester Bowles, now recommended that the CRC become more liberal. The man they wanted for that liberal position was Manolo Ray. Ray was a civil engineer in Cuba who turned against Batista in 1957. He formed a highly effective underground movement against him, and when Castro took charge, he appointed Ray Minister of Public Works. Ray resigned when Castro began to nationalize industries and expropriate land. He now formed a resistance movement against Castro. In November of 1960, Ray left Cuba and entered the USA. Because he was considered to the left of the other CRC leaders, Artime and Hunt strongly resisted him. In fact, in the coming years, there would be a rivalry between Artime and Ray. Hunt despised Ray so much that when one of the directors of the CRC supported his joining the group, Hunt essentially expelled him.51 But Kennedy insisted on including Ray in the CRC. He even had Bissell call Hunt to make sure it happened. This was something Hunt could not tolerate. Therefore, near the eve of the invasion, Hunt resigned his post rather than work with Ray. He moved over to the propaganda arm and worked with his friend Phillips.52 But interestingly, Hunt writes in his book that this was just for him to get away from Ray. If the invasion had succeeded, he was still to fly with the CRC into Havana.53
The number of CIA employees and Cuban refugees involved
in the April 17 invasion exceeded 3,000. As stated above, Dulles and Bissell assured Kennedy of its success. But from the beginning, the assault devolved into a debacle.
The fact that the planes used in the preliminary bombing expeditions on April 15 were owned by the United States was exposed. And since Castro understood an attack was coming, he had dispersed his Air Force over several sites so that no one sortie could eliminate them all.54 Therefore, that mission failed to eliminate the T-33 jet fighters, which were active with machine guns two days later when the actual invasion began. Allegedly due to heavy waves, the diversionary landing near Guantanamo Bay could not take place. The main invasion force at the Bay of Pigs landed successfully, but two ships were sunk, with ammunition, communications gear, and aviation fuel, crippling radio contact among the exiles.55
But the two biggest mistakes were in the Agency’s predictions of Cuban responses. Dulles and Bissell had told Kennedy it would take days for Castro to get troops, artillery, and tanks to the front. They also had stated that large numbers of Cubans would join the brigade once it landed. Both assertions were wrong. The Cuban people rallied to the island’s defense, and, as stated above, large forces were deployed against the invaders within ten hours. In fact, by that time, the invasion force was already outnumbered. And Castro already had tanks and mortars at the front.56 Conversely, and in a complete reversal of what the CIA told Kennedy, not one sympathizer reached the shore to aid the exile army. In fact, Castro later crowed how the relatively small amount of people in that area completely backed him.57
Just how bad was the planning for the operation? If anything, the coruscating Kirkpatrick report may understate it. Former Castro Air Force Chief Pedro Diaz Lanz had been a favorite of both Hunt and Phillips. But they could not find a position for him in the invasion in 1960. Out of the blue, he was recalled by the CIA in March of 1961. He was told to create a small landing force of about 160 men. When the CIA told them to leave for Cuba to land at Oriente province, some of them did not even have one week’s training. Worse, they were not told of their landing site until they were at sea.58 Worse still, no one was awaiting them upon their arrival. When Diaz Lanz sent a reconnaissance patrol ashore, they found that instead, there was a large Cuban force lurking there. They retreated. Diaz then radioed back to the CIA and asked for an alternative landing site. There was none for them. Diaz actually called this utter incompetence “complete treason.”59
After twenty-four hours, Castro had enough infantry and armor at the front to prepare to polish off the brigade.60 By April 19, forty-eight hours after the initial landing, the invasion force was completely frozen, unable to advance at all. With no beachhead secured, and in fact with Cuban tanks shelling the beach, the rest of the supply boats now retreated well over fifty miles offshore.61 By the end of the second day, two of the three landing zones had been taken by Castro’s forces.62 Deputy Director Charles Cabell went to analyst Victor Marchetti and told him there were Soviet MIGs strafing the landing force. He tried to get Marchetti to relay that message to the White House. Cabell hoped to use this piece of false information to get Kennedy to send in Admiral Arleigh Burke’s naval task force, which was about ninety miles off the coast of Cuba at the time. Marchetti refused since he knew by previous information collection that there were no MIGs in Cuba at that time.63 Even with that fact in mind, there were still appeals to Kennedy to send in air power. He decided against direct U.S. intervention. But then, the CIA overruled Kennedy. They gave orders to fly missions to bomb Castro’s airfields. But according to Kirkpatrick and Peter Kornbluh, fog prevented the pilots from locating the targets.64
In the midst of this disaster, the CRC was sending out messages—many of them penned by Hunt and Phillips—saying that Castro’s regime was about to fall.65 In reality, on April 19, less than seventy-two hours after the initial landing, the last part of the brigade in the last landing zone surrendered. Since the supply ships were stationed well over fifty miles offshore, the resupply effort was considered futile. This final force, with ammunition running out due to both the sunken and distant ships, was confronted with thousands of regular Cuban troops and several tanks.66 When the invasion was defeated, U.S. ships ferried some survivors back to Florida. Castro captured more than 1,200 soldiers. Over a hundred members of the brigade were killed. On April 21, Kennedy stated in public that he took full responsibility for the failure. But in private, the very next day, he commissioned a White House inquiry led by General Maxwell Taylor into what had actually happened.67 Taylor’s report was filed in June. Kirkpatrick’s report was filed in October. In November, Kennedy fired Dulles, Cabell, and Bissell.68 What were the grounds?
One of the most interesting aspects of the Taylor Commission report is the testimony of Allen Dulles. Dulles understood that his job and career were on the line. Therefore his answers to difficult questions were evasive. When Admiral Arleigh Burke asked him if the responsibility for the conduct of the operation was not all at CIA, the following dialogue appeared:
Dulles: But that was done by military personnel.
Burke: But not under our command structure.69
General Lyman Lemnitzer, chair of the Joint Chiefs at the time, also scored Dulles on this point. When asked if he “or the Joint Chiefs were the defenders of the military aspects of the operation, or was it the CIA?” Lemnitzer replied that “The defenders of the military parts of the plan were the people who produced it; and that was the CIA. We were providing assistance and assuring the feasibility of the plan.”70
Dulles also tried to take back his and the CIA’s earlier promises about the key component of internal uprisings that would aid the strike force. He said that in the revised plan, this was not so crucial. Robert Kennedy pounced on this denial:
Kennedy: Then what was the objective of the operation?
Dulles: Get a beachhead, hold it, and then build it up.71
Kennedy was flabbergasted at this reply: “How could you possibly do that—take 1000 or 1,400 men in there and hold the beachhead against these thousands of militia?” Later on, Dulles was further exposed on this point. For both Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the operation was reliant on the contingent uprisings. In fact, Rusk said that “the uprising was utterly essential to success in terms of ousting Castro.”72 When General Shoup, the Marine Commandant, was asked the same question, he said dependence on the uprisings was absolute; the operation’s ultimate success relied on them. When Shoup and Lemnitzer were asked for the source of the intelligence on the uprisings—for which the ships were loaded with 30,000 extra rifles—both said the intelligence came from CIA.73 So clearly, Dulles was prevaricating on this point.
The Taylor Commission then caught Dulles in another lie. Both Dulles and Bissell had told the White House that if the landing failed, the option was to “go guerrilla.” The Taylor proceedings spent much time adducing this point. Dean Rusk said that if there were not an uprising, he had been told the landing force would head for the hills. He was then asked, “Was the point made that this area had not been used for guerrilla operations in this century?” Rusk replied that he did not recall that point being made.74
Lemnitzer said that he had been informed by the CIA that this was the contingency option also. In fact, he actually said, “Every bit of information that we were able to gather from the CIA was that the guerrilla aspects were always considered as a main element of the plan.” He was then told that President Kennedy had that same impression, but the commission had discovered that this possibility never existed. Lemnitzer replied, “Then we were badly misinformed.”75
In a rather surprising development, it turned out that not even the troops were informed that they were to go to the hills and fight guerrilla style if the landing failed. Two Cuban exiles testified that there was no plan to retreat to the mountains and fight like guerrillas. In fact, such an option was never even mentioned to them.76 When Dulles was confronted by this above testimony, he was then asked: How could th
e troops have gone guerrilla without training or instruction? His reply was startling: “I wouldn’t wholly buy that. These people had a cadre of leaders—20 percent to 30 percent would be the leaders. They knew about guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas in World War II never had any training until they got into a guerrilla operation.”77
In other words, the brigade members were supposed to invent techniques as they went along. These are the gyrations of a man frantically treading water to (unsuccessfully) avoid going under. And for good reason. One of the most significant witnesses undermining Dulles’s oversight of the plan was Hunt’s nemesis Manolo Ray. As author Michael Morrisey points out in his analysis of Maxwell Taylor’s report, it seems that the CIA never really wanted what Kennedy actually envisioned, a true guerrilla-style counterrevolutionary force in the Escambray Mountains of central Cuba. For instance, Ray wanted the CIA to aid in his plan to take the Isle of Pines, a large island off the southwest corner of Cuba, thereby freeing political prisoners located there and maintaining a good geographic launching pad for raids on Havana and also to unite with rebels in the Escambrays. Ray testified that the Agency never supported, or seriously entertained, these guerrilla tactics.78 As previously stated, much of this is probably due to Hunt’s sneering and imperious attitude toward Ray. Ray went on to tell the commission that he—and others—were never for the strike-force plan. Ray wanted to use his contacts on the island, especially in the labor movement, to cause genuine uprisings that would unite with tactically trained guerrillas. Then came a colloquy that harks back to the CIA’s control of the political arm and Howard Hunt’s political philosophy. Ray stated that: “Another thing that was wrong with the plan was the fact that many of the elements of the invasion force represented the old [Batista] army. We felt that it was wrong to give the impression that the old army was coming back, and we protested.”
Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, & the Garrison Case Page 7
