The United States was acutely aware of the threat that fascism posed to its international interests, and in a report to the State Department in 1938, Jefferson Caffery had credited Vargas for this tough stance against Axis elements in Brazil. “The vigorous anti-Nazi campaign now being conducted by the Brazilian authorities, a campaign which is in direct contradiction to the previous historical attitude of the government of Brazil to the German minority in this country, is due largely to the changed point of view of President Vargas,” Caffery noted. Whereas previous Brazilian administrations had been accommodating toward Germany, the Estado Novo took a position that was much more amendable to the United States. As Caffery put it, “President Vargas has now become convinced that it is not conducive to the welfare of Brazil to permit Nazi activities here.”18
Even as Caffery applauded Brazilian efforts to tackle the problem, however, Germany, Italy, and Japan had all been increasing their efforts to develop ties with their respective communities in Brazil.19 At the start of 1939, the German community in Rio Grande do Sul still held Nazi parades, complete with uniforms, flags, and military drills. Such activities took place openly and were often watched by large and enthusiastic crowds. Alert to the evolving threat, Washington was constantly demanding more information from Caffery about fascist activities in Brazil and about the country’s immigrant communities in general, information that Caffery was not always able to provide.
Following one such request from the State Department, Caffery summoned American consular officials around Brazil for a conference in Rio to discuss German and Italian activity in Brazil. These foreign servicemen were asked for detailed analysis of activities in their respective areas. The meeting revealed a number of black holes in American intelligence gathering in Brazil. Following a request from Washington for statistical information of the numbers and breakdown of the various immigrant communities in Brazil, Caffery wrote, “there is a complete dearth of this type of information,” admitting that “accurate information will only be available after the next census, which is to be held in 1940.”20 The Americans were not alone in their inability to properly assess the size of Brazil’s immigrant communities. The British foreign office had no accurate information either, apart from data from the previous census in 1920. The political department of the British foreign office made an approximate calculation and estimated that Brazil contained 220,000 Germans, 800,000 Italians, and 280,000 Japanese, out of a national population of roughly forty million.21 These were simply guesses, however. Nobody, including the Brazilian authorities, had any reliable information on just how many foreign immigrants were living in Brazil—a fact that greatly concerned the Americans, the British, and, not least, President Vargas himself.
Great Britain, like the United States, welcomed Vargas’s efforts to tackle the problem of potentially destabilizing immigrant populations after 1938. British embassy officials dispatched to check on the German community in Rio Grande do Sul discovered that Brazilian political police were having some success in stopping the overtly pro-Nazi activities of German expatriates in the region.22 The success rate was no more than 50 percent, however, “owing,” the British claimed, “to the inefficiency of the police machinery.”23 British officials also noted that because German immigrants were by and large well educated, in contrast to much of the local Brazilian population (British estimates at the time suggested that 80 percent of Brazilians were illiterate), Germans occupied the leading positions in society.24 A great proportion of Brazil’s industry and agriculture was controlled by Axis-born citizens and their descendants, and the government was reluctant to take effective action against them for fear of damaging the state’s economy.25 Ironically, Germans’ high positions in Brazil had the effect of making many of them more conservative than they might otherwise have been. Despite Nazi regimentation, German immigrants were somewhat held back by the fear of the repercussion any unsuccessful actions would have on their economic position in society.26
Events in Europe had only made Brazil’s German question more dire. As German troops continued their advance into Poland, Vargas understood that he would need to keep an even closer eye on the Axis groups in Brazil. His commitment to tracking pro-Nazi elements in the country would become even more crucial—for both Brazil’s internal politics and its international relations—in the days ahead.
September 3, 1939, was a beautiful winter morning in Rio. The weather forecast had warned of showers during the day, but the deep blue sky and bright sunshine indicated otherwise. It was a holiday in Brazil, part of a weeklong festival known as Semana da Pátria, a celebration of the government’s achievements and a chance for the population to say “thank you” to the regime. Later in the day, some twenty thousand youths marched through Rio in a demonstration of Brazil’s sporting prowess.27 Vargas, who always watched the annual parade from a specially constructed podium, called it “a magnificent show.”28
As Vargas enjoyed lunch in the Guanabara Palace following the parade, Cariocas, residents of Rio, were heading out to the city’s beaches for a day of relaxation. Flamengo Beach, the beach closest to the palace, provided tourists and Cariocas alike with a stunning view of the mouth of Guanabara Bay, one of the largest and most famous bays in the world. Traveling through Rio in the 1930s, Waldo Frank described it as “a pause, deep blue, where sun and hill and sea have come together. . . . A conch of mountain melting into sea, a sea compressed by hills into a single sapphire, model the bay into a vision that touches the sense like a loved woman’s breast; that overwhelms as the touch of a breast may be overwhelming.”29
Viewed through the prism of Rio’s natural splendor, the trouble across the ocean in Europe must have seemed a world away—even to a man as fixated on the turmoil as President Vargas, who after signing the decree on Brazilian neutrality still found time to go for a scenic ride through Rio.30 Yet the international pressure that had been building over the past decade was about to reach its point of rupture—and its neutrality aside, Brazil would be swept up in the coming explosion just as surely as the rest of the planet.
Rio’s newspapers had been full of developments from Europe, but the biggest news of all had yet to arrive. On September 3, Cariocas expected to learn at any moment that Great Britain and France had declared war on Germany, the only logical result of their alliance with Poland and Hitler’s long campaign of aggression toward the Western democracies. And sure enough, the airwaves erupted with the news that the long-feared world war—the second in just three decades—had finally broken out.
Cariocas took the news of the war with their usual mixture of excitement and mild indifference. Europe appeared remote, but the older generation of men chatting in beachside cafes understood that navy ships of the warring powers were likely to come close to the shores of Brazil. Vargas’s policy of Brazilian neutrality was warmly welcomed in Rio as a mature and sensible strategy. There was no appetite for war and little anti-Axis—let alone pro-Allied—sentiment could be detected among the masses heading out to the beaches. Cariocas were, in truth, more concerned about getting the first few days’ worth of tanning on their skin before the start of the oppressive summer months from December.
On September 4, 1939, Vargas recorded in his diary without further comment, “the entrance of Britain and France into the war.”31 For the Brazilian president, the moment of truth had arrived. Vargas had long entertained grandiose plans for Brazil, but now events outside of his control had set those dreams within his reach. If he could maintain his trading relationships with both the United States and Germany, Brazil would be able to continue to grow and modernize even in the midst of a global war. Vargas saw no need to follow the advice of his ambassador in Washington by choosing between Brazil’s two largest trading partners; the United States, he knew, could help transform the Brazilian economy, while German arms could make the Brazilian armed forces the strongest military on the continent, and cutting off either party would only set back Brazil’s progress. By keep
ing both parties guessing as to his allegiances, Vargas could continue to reap benefits from both. If he played his cards wrong, of course, he might lose one—or even both—of his lucrative alliances, and watch his hopes for Brazil die with them.
Osvaldo Aranha spent the day after the declaration of war in his office in the Itamaraty Palace, where he could gaze out his window at the palace’s beautiful garden and swimming pool. He still had much work to do before Brazil’s position of neutrality was official. At the last minute, minor changes had been made to the Brazilian decree outlining the government’s position. The changes were legalistic in nature, but a tired Aranha had an argument with Vargas’s secretary at the Catete Palace over the exact wording of the decree. Once the decree had been finally agreed, Aranha started the process of officially informing the warring parties and the Americans of Brazil’s position.
None of the ambassadors with whom Aranha spoke raised any formal objection to the position of the Brazilian government. On the contrary, they all welcomed Brazil’s statement of neutrality in the hope that they would be able to continue to develop their influence within the country. Great Britain and Germany, along with the United States, hoped that the onset of war would not prevent them from developing further trade links with Brazil. In private, all three countries received assurances by members of the Brazilian government that this was very much the hope of Brazil as well.
4 A Shot Across the Bow
The war in Europe began with a series of impressive and rapid German victories. The German army swiftly overran Poland, and on September 27, 1939, Warsaw surrendered. On April 9, 1940, the Germans attacked the Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Norway. The Danes surrendered the same day, but the Norwegians bravely held out for two months before surrendering on June 9. After the invasion of northern Europe, Germany turned its attention to the west, launching attacks on Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on May 10, 1940; the German Wehrmacht occupied Luxembourg that same day, and Holland surrendered on May 14. Two weeks later, on May 28, Belgium followed suit. The Germans—now backed by Italy, which had entered the war on June 10—then moved toward France.1
The Brazilians watched the war in Europe with increasing concern. Germany’s stunning advances in Europe had deprived Brazil of hugely valuable trading markets. The loss of the markets for Brazilian exports was problematic enough, but there was also a growing feeling that the Axis powers would prevail in the European war: Germany and Italy were poised to overrun France, and there was a chance Spain would throw in its lot with the Axis as well. The evacuation of the defeated British forces from the Dunkirk beaches in France in late May and early June, meanwhile, was covered heavily in the Brazilian press, further dampening any optimism about the Allies’ prospects. Unless the United States entered the war, the consensus in Brazil was that once the Germans were finished with France, they would overrun Great Britain as well.
With the Allied position in Europe collapsing, President Vargas decided it was time to remind Washington not to take Brazil for granted, nor to forget its trading partner’s needs. Benito Mussolini’s decision for Italy to join the Axis had amplified Brazilian fears about unruly immigrant populations—Brazil’s Italian population, in one estimation, being second in number only to the Portuguese population—and this development, as well as Germany’s spate of recent military victories, put more pressure on Brazil to abandon its relations with the United States and side with the Axis. Vargas needed to make clear to President Roosevelt that any further trade with Brazil would come at a steep price. Vargas chose a high-profile event in Rio, at which several US officials would be in attendance, to make his move. The timing of his address, coming the day after Italy joined the war, was no coincidence.
June 11, 1940, was a perfect late-autumnal morning in Rio. Traditionally, the autumn and winter months brought the city much less rainfall than the more tropical summer season, which ran from December through the new year to Carnaval in late February. There were only a few scattered wispy clouds in an otherwise clear sky, the temperature was a pleasant eighteen degrees Celsius, and the sea was almost totally calm, with a slight swell at the water’s edge. Conditions could not have been better for Brazil’s annual Navy Day.
In Rio’s harbor, anchored offshore at the entry to Guanabara Bay, sat most of Brazil’s naval fleet. Its flagship, the Minas Gerais, glistened impressively in the sunlight, its deeply tanned officers turned out in immaculately pressed white dress uniforms complete with colorful medal ribbons. Senior officers from other ships in the fleet had assembled on the flagship’s deck for a celebratory lunch, and stood around smoking as they awaited the arrival of their commander in chief.
Vargas had worked on his speech late into the previous evening. When the text was complete, he showed it to Alzira, who was busily decoding classified diplomatic cables for her father in the presidential secretary’s office. Vargas had also discussed the contents of the speech with Góes Monteiro, telling the general, “one has to shake the tree vigorously to get the dead leaves to fall.” Vargas meant to shake things up a little and remind the Americans that he and Brazil should not be taken for granted.2 Góes Monteiro could hardly contain his joy at the contents of the speech and its likely impact on Brazil’s American friends. While he had run his message past these two confidants, however, Vargas had not discussed the speech with his minister of foreign affairs, Osvaldo Aranha, for fear that Aranha would inform the Americans of the contents of the speech, thereby reducing its impact.3
It wasn’t that the president didn’t trust Aranha, it was simply that Vargas knew his foreign minster could not help himself when it came to forwarding information to Caffery in Rio or speaking directly to the State Department in Washington. Góes Monteiro shared Vargas’s wariness of Aranha; despite their considerable political differences, the general enjoyed a close personal relationship with the foreign minister, yet he too thought it best not to alert Aranha to the speech. Vargas had also not shared its contents with any other member of his cabinet. This was most unusual for the president, who liked to take the temperature of his cabinet on important matters of state—and was all the more unusual given the importance of the speech and its likely implications for US-Brazilian relations.
Vargas’s normal schedule had been suspended on June 11, and he spent the morning out of the office, beginning with a visit to the naval academy to meet the new officer recruits. He was then taken by motor launch out to the Minas Gerais, from which he watched a simulated air attack on the assembled warships. After speaking with senior officers, Vargas settled down with them to a full lunch. When the dessert was finished, Vargas, invigorated, rose to address the gathered officers.
Following the events of May 11, 1938, and the revelation of the navy’s central role in the Integralista plot, Vargas had been careful to promote “right-minded” officers—those loyal to his regime—to senior roles in the navy. In November 1939, the navy’s allegiance to the president was more secure, but most of its officers still favored developing ties with Germany, not the United States. On this day, Vargas selected for his audience those military officers who were pro-German, ensuring that they would be perfect for his message. Vargas started his address on a positive note:
There are no longer any differences on this continent. We are united by bonds of close solidarity to all of the American nations in ideals and aspirations and in the common interest of our defense. We, and all humanity, are passing through a historical moment of grave repercussions resulting from rapid and violent changes in values. We are headed for a future different from anything we have known in the line of economic, social, or political organization, and we feel that the old systems and antiquated formulas have entered into decline. It is not, however, the end of civilization as the pessimists and staunch conservatives claim, but the tumultuous and fruitful beginning of a new era. Vigorous peoples, ready to face life, must follow the line of their aspirations instead of wasting time in the contemplation of t
hat which is tottering and falling in ruins. It is therefore necessary to understand our times and remove the hindrances of dead ideas and dead ideals. Political order is no longer made in the shadow of the vague rhetorical humanitarianism which sought to abolish frontiers and create an international society without characteristics or friction, united and fraternal, enjoying peace as a natural right and not as a day to day conquest. Instead of this panorama of balance and of just distribution of the world’s riches we are witnessing the exasperation of nationalism, strong nations imposing their will by the sentiment of nationality and being sustained by the conviction of their superiority.4
President Vargas’s observations about the challenges facing Brazil were ones that anyone in his audience would have agreed with, although his allusion to a “new era” surely left many of them guessing what this future might look like, and how Vargas planned to lead Brazil into it. They would not have long to wait.
After these opening remarks, Vargas changed his tack and moved to the portion of his speech that he knew would cause great offense in Washington and London. He spoke slowly, to give emphasis to his words. Brazil, he said:
Was witnessing the end of the era of improvident liberalism, sterile democracy where the power, emanating directly from the people and instituted for the defense of their interests, organizes labor—the source of national greatness—and not ways for private fortune. There is no longer room for regimes founded on privilege and class distinction; only those that incorporate the nation in the same duties and offer equitable social justice and opportunities in the struggle for life can survive.
Brazil : The Fortunes of War (9780465080700) Page 7
