The deal won Brazil access to a new source of weapons in exchange for defense concessions that the United States had long craved, but the agreement was not as straightforward as it appeared. The United States didn’t have an abundance of armaments, for one thing, so Brazil would not be able to count on the same steady supply it had been promised by the Germans. And while Brazil and the United States needed each other, they both also retained suspicions and fears that would strain their relationship even as they grew closer and more codependent.
Like most armies, the Brazilian armed forces were a complex beast. Even though the United States had promised to deliver weapons of its own, the Brazilian military’s officer class strongly preferred the idea of purchasing arms from Germany. Any alliance with the Americans was, in their view, a mere marriage of convenience brought on by the war and the increasing difficulty of acquiring additional German weapons.24
The military’s preference for German arms was a reflection of its strong anti-imperialist leanings and its traditional distrust of the United States and Great Britain, both of which it perceived as exploiters who wished to keep Brazil underdeveloped and poor in order to maximize their economic gain. Senior officers argued that any alliance with either the United States or Great Britain would endanger Brazilian economic independence.25 There was also the matter of payment: both the Americans and the British demanded that Brazil pay for weapons in an acceptable international currency or in gold, neither of which it possessed in abundance.26 Germany, on the other hand, was willing to barter weapons for Brazilian coffee and cotton, an exchange that greatly pleased the Brazilian military because it gave Brazil access to quantities of weapons that would otherwise have been out of its reach.27
The minister of war and the chief of staff, Dutra and Góes Monteiro, shared the nationalistic politics of the army officer corps. The Allies were deeply suspicious of both men, and Allied intelligence fed stories to their respective political leaderships that portrayed both men as being strong supporters of the Nazis. Dutra and his family were alleged to have cheered when they were informed that Paris had fallen to the Germans.28 In public, Dutra was more diplomatic, avowing “the army is neither pro-American nor pro-German, but pro-armament.”29
Whatever Dutra’s personal sympathies, however, the reality was that—as far as Brazilian foreign policy was concerned—neither he nor Góes Monteiro favored Berlin over Washington or London. Both men realized that the United States and Great Britain represented the best long-term option for helping Brazil. For his part, Aranha was usually quick to defend Góes Monteiro against accusations of being pro-German. “His attitude is one of professional admiration for the efficiency of the German army,” Aranha told a US army officer.30
The US State Department was less sanguine than Aranha, accusing Góes Monteiro of profiting from the clash between the Allies and the Axis. In a 1939 note, the State Department explained:
While it is believed that it may be an exaggeration to state that General Góes Monteiro is pro-German, it is nevertheless felt that he is playing a shrewd game so far as the Brazilian army is concerned. In other words, Góes Monteiro probably figures that Brazil should play ball not only with the United States but also with Germany, with the idea of playing one country off against the other in the currying of Brazil’s favor, and in this manner getting the maximum for Brazil. It should be remembered that Germany has still a great deal to offer Brazil inasmuch as practically the entire re-equipment of the Brazilian army is under contract to that country.31
The American assessment of Góes Monteiro succinctly captured the general’s outlook, but while he may have been ambivalent about allying Brazil with Germany, his willingness to entertain the Axis in order to extract concessions from the Allies nevertheless made the Americans understandably suspicious of him, and of the Brazilian army generally.
While the chief of staff was willing to tread with the Allies, he harbored no affection for them; quite the opposite, in fact. Góes Monteiro reserved special enmity for the British in particular. In private, he criticized officers who preferred an alliance with Great Britain, arguing, “They prefer British slavery because they consider it to be more agreeable and only economic and they have already experienced it.”32 What most angered both Góes Monteiro and Dutra was the British attitude toward the supply and delivery of the German arms from Lisbon to Rio.33 The British interception of the Siqueira Campos only confirmed their feeling that Great Britain not only retained an imperialist attitude toward Brazil but also failed to appreciate Brazil’s legitimate right to develop its own military strength in the interest of national defense. Neither leader, as a result, did anything to defuse the growing anti-British sentiment among the officer’s corps of the Brazilian army.
For their part, the Allies were also quick to try to create disunity between the two military leaders, suggesting falsely on several occasions that Góes Monteiro’s star was on the wane. “Góes Monteiro was the military genius of the revolution, but it is believed that Vargas and Aranha no longer trusted him and consequently would like to see his official stature diminished,” American intelligence in Brazil had speculated to Washington in September 1940. “They are building up the prestige of the minister of war, Dutra, by pushing him into the limelight wherever possible.”34 It was true that there was a historical rivalry between the two leaders, but on the issue of the supply of weapons—and especially in the case of the Siqueira Campos—both men were in complete agreement that Brazil must take a strong stand against the British. Both men also concurred about the usefulness of one particular tactic for doing so: getting the United States, which was fearful of pushing Brazilians further into the Nazi camp, to lean heavily on the British.
President Vargas was out of Rio at the time of the Siqueira Campos crisis, but he had given Aranha his full authority to find a solution that best suited Brazilian interests.35 This represented something of a poisoned chalice for the minister, who was all too aware that any failure to resolve the crisis on terms that appeared favorable to Brazil would lead Dutra and the senior generals in the army to demand his resignation. While the Siqueira Campos had still been in Lisbon, Aranha had of course told the Americans that he might resign if the ship were not released, but that had been a hollow threat; he had no intention of stepping down.
When word of the seizure of the Siqueira Campos reached Rio, Aranha made two immediate decisions: firstly, that he would use whatever leverage he had with the United States to get it to intervene on Brazil’s behalf, and secondly, that he would not publish details of the crisis in the Brazilian press for fear of creating a strong anti-British sentiment in the country and thereby upsetting his own hopes for swaying the country toward the Allies. On November 22, an angry Aranha sent a clear warning to the British through the US State Department:
The Brazilian embassy in London states that the British authorities insinuate that they have taken this step in accord with the American government. I sent a denial of this insinuation. We hope that the decision of the British government is only a formality. We cannot understand such arbitrary action. If this brutality is carried out, we will be forced into an attitude that may unfortunately perturb the continental policy, which with our help has been one of goodwill toward England.36
Aranha’s message was clear: if the United States couldn’t convince Great Britain to release the ship, it would jeopardize whatever sympathies the Allies enjoyed in Latin America.
To further complicate matters for Aranha, his trusted partner Jefferson Caffery was back in the United States on annual leave, forcing the foreign minister to deal with more junior officials, with whom he was not on familiar terms. Still, Aranha stuck with his strategy, continuing to keep the matter out of the Brazilian press. On November 23, the American embassy in Rio reported back to Washington: “No mention whatsoever has yet appeared in the Brazilian press regarding the ship.”37
In Washington the State Department did its best to res
olve what it viewed as a British mess. Both Cordell Hull and his deputy, Sumner Welles, promised to do everything possible to resolve the crisis. On November 25, Hull sent a message of support to Aranha through the embassy in Rio:
I was deeply concerned to learn that the British had stopped and detained the Siqueira Campos in the face of all the efforts that have been made by our two governments. Within the last few days, Caffery and I had fully explained to the British chargé d’affaires here the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the arms and all of the reasons that counseled the desirability of permitting the ship to proceed to Brazil. We could not have been more emphatic or more precise in our views. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador, returned yesterday. I will speak with him most vigorously today, or tomorrow at the latest, in the expectation that he will understand the importance of permitting the ship to proceed.38
The Americans, it was clear, were bending over backward to accommodate the Brazilians, even going so far as to undercut their British allies in the process. Indeed, in private, Hull remained furious with the “ungrateful British,” whose actions he believed threatened the US Good Neighbor Program in Brazil.
If anything, Hull’s deputy was even angrier about Great Britain’s seeming blindness to America’s carefully crafted foreign policy program. Sumner Welles, whose legendary temper tantrums were already the talk of much of the State Department, blew a fuse when he heard about the British action, fearing it had endangered the entire Good Neighbor Program throughout Latin America. Both he and Hull argued that the only winners in the Siqueira Campos affair were the Germans, for whom the crisis was a win-win situation; either the Brazilians would ultimately receive the weapons and Germany’s influence with Brazil would remain intact, or—if Great Britain permanently confiscated the weapons—Germany would be handed a ready-made tool with which to pry the Brazilians from the Allies.
It wasn’t long before the Americans learned that Aranha was equally worried about the strategic implications of the British action. The minister of foreign affairs was still clearly irritated by the whole affair when the American chargé d’affaires, Burdett, met with Aranha in his office late in the evening of November 25, three days into the crisis. Rightly or wrongly, Aranha believed that the British owed him for his overtures and hospitality. Aranha pointed out that he had recently given an anti-German speech to welcome the British economic mission to Brazil headed by the Marquess of Willingdon. The Americans had themselves noted that the Willingdon mission “was received well here, has had a good press, been extensively entertained, and the visit marked by felicitous speeches”—and much of this was due to Aranha’s influence and intercessions.39
Such overt support for the British carried risks. Aranha had made his remarks at a formal white-tie dinner at the Itamaraty Palace in front of not just Willingdon and his entourage but also a who’s who of Brazil’s elites—among them many of the figures from the military who favored trading with the Germans over the British or the Americans. Much of the polite dinner table gossip that had accompanied the meal centered on whether Great Britain would be able to resist a German invasion, which was expected imminently. Aranha felt that he had gone out on a limb to make such a pro-British speech at a time when the British were refusing to let German arms into Brazil.
At the end of his meeting with Burdett, Aranha presented him with a copy of the note that the Brazilian ambassador in London would present to the British foreign office the following day. The letter was a robust defense of the Brazilian position, centering on two main issues that the Brazilians felt the British had chosen to overlook. The first concerned Brazil’s choice of procuring arms from Germany: “We only bought from Germany because it was impossible at that time to buy under better terms anywhere else.”40 The second and more important point was that Brazil had ordered these arms in 1938, before the start of World War II, and that it had already paid for them. Moreover, the British had not objected to earlier deliveries of armaments from this order, and some of the consignment aboard the Siqueira Campos was related to previous orders from Germany for goods such as spare parts and ammunition.41 Aranha pointed out that the Germans would merely keep the other weapons, which were contractually due to be shipped to Brazil, and use them in its war against Great Britain.42
The clear implication of Aranha’s letter was that the British actions were not only unjust but were also strengthening rather than weakening Germany’s position in Latin America.43 As Burdett took his leave, a weary Aranha told the American, “in view of the attitude of the army here I regard the matter as highly dangerous. I believe the generals will take it badly and I’m counting on the help of the State Department to avoid an intolerable situation.” Just as Burdett reached the inner door to the office, Aranha delivered his punch line, which he surely knew would form the subject line of the telegram to Washington: “The success of all my efforts to maintain Brazilian opinion favorable to the democracies is menaced by this lamentable incident.”44
To make sure the Americans got the message, Aranha enlisted the help of Góes Monteiro. He told the general to speak with American officials at the embassy. When Góes Monteiro did so, he was characteristically to the point, warning of reprisals against British commercial interests in Brazil if the Siqueira Campos were not released. He went on to remind the officials that Aranha had to withhold information about the detention of the ship in Gibraltar from the Brazilian people because, “they would be so incensed that they would retaliate against British interests.”45 The general concluded by thanking the Americans, as he put it, “for the splendid help you are giving us.”46
Initially, the British were having none of what they regarded as Brazilian brinkmanship. They remained unimpressed with the attempts of both the Brazilian and American governments to effect the release of the ship, and believed that there must have been some collusion between Washington and Rio to preemptively prepare for this campaign before the ship had set sail. “It is extremely unfortunate that the United States government should have allowed themselves to be maneuvered into supporting an attempt to break our blockade,” an angry foreign office official reported. He added, “The Brazilian government would not, I think, have dared to take this action if they had not thought themselves assured of US support.”47
But the British were pragmatic. They understood, as did the Americans and Brazilians, that “the situation that has been created must be regarded as a great success for our enemies.” The British embassy in Washington warned London that if the ship was not allowed to reach Brazil, Great Britain could find itself involved in a serious dispute with the US State Department for years to come.48
On December 5, 1940, Lord Halifax, the outgoing Foreign Secretary, informed the Americans that the British were privately considering the possibility of a compromise over the ship.49 Their change in course was largely due to pressure from the US State Department, but the British ministry of war was adding to the pressure, arguing, “It is highly desirable that the Brazilian army be permitted to obtain these armaments insomuch as they are vitally needed for the coastal defense of Brazil.”50 The ministry of economic warfare in London, which had caused the crisis by ordering the seizure of the ship, was becoming increasingly isolated as the British struggled to find a formula that would maintain the integrity of their naval blockade while still allowing the Siqueira Campos to proceed to Rio.
As negotiations continued, anti-British sentiment grew in Rio and the rest of Brazil. After initially keeping the story out of the Brazilian press, Aranha had taken the crisis public and put the full force of the government’s propaganda department behind it. The Brazilian press accused the British government of acting like an imperial power and treating Brazil like one of its possessions. Both Dutra and Góes Monteiro made strong public statements against the British position and called for Brazil to consider temporarily breaking relations with Great Britain. Tensions within Brazil were further heightened when Aranha announced that a second Brazili
an ship, the SS Bagé, was readying to sail from Lisbon the following month, January 1941, with a cargo of German exports, including weapons.
Two other, smaller maritime events elicited further protests from the Brazilians. On November 27, 1940, the British had confiscated some seventy packages of goods from a Brazilian ship at Port of Spain on suspicion of their being of Axis origin.51 It later turned out that several of the packages had been seized in error.52 Then, on December 1, a British navy cruiser had removed twenty-two German nationals from the Brazilian steamship SS Itapé only eighteen miles off the Brazilian coast. The Germans, it transpired, were traveling between two internal Brazilian ports.53 During normal times both events would have been regarded as inconsequential, but coming, as they did, at the height of the crisis surrounding the Siqueira Campos, they reinforced the Brazilian impression that the British were being heavy-handed with the imposition of their navy blockade.
Yet Brazil, too, was pragmatic. While President Vargas was furious with the British, labeling them “colonial bullies,” he understood that a solution needed to be found in order for the Siqueira Campos to be allowed to sail. Góes Monteiro continued to attack the British in public, but in private, he was aware that the crisis marked the end of Brazil’s arms trade with Germany. He confessed to Aranha that the game was up and that Brazil should seek a deal with Great Britain to make sure that the arms on the Siqueira Campos reached their destination—with the understanding that this would almost certainly be the last such shipment Brazil received from the Nazi regime. Vargas, Aranha, and Góes Monteiro waited for the British to propose a compromise formula, a precondition of which, all three men understood, would be Brazilian guarantees and strict prohibitions against any future German exports. The Brazilians agreed that Aranha should make one more effort to get the Americans to put pressure on the British, in the hopes that any compromise they offered would be on terms favorable to Rio. Aranha found the US State Department extremely willing to do this, providing that the Brazilian government continued to praise the US role in helping to resolve the crisis.
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