The council voted unanimously to support Vargas’s statement—although, just as he had predicted, the military voiced objections. Both Dutra and Góes Monteiro warned the meeting that Brazil’s ability to defend itself was very limited, and that one of the main reasons for this was that—despite assurances from the US government—the Brazilian armed forces had not been able to secure anything more than token armaments from the United States.11 They cited the specific example of a shipment of small tanks from the United States, which had been sent without their weaponry and were, therefore, useless. Yet despite their concern about Brazil’s lack of defenses, both the minister of war and the chief of staff informed the meeting that the policy the president had announced was, in their considered opinion, “the only correct policy for Brazil to follow.”12 In private, however, both Dutra and Góes Monteiro remained unconvinced about Vargas’s decision to openly back the United States without any firm guarantee of arms shipments. Both men offered their resignations, but as in the past, President Vargas refused to accept them and told Dutra and Góes Monteiro that they must remain at their respective posts at this crucial juncture in Brazilian history.13
The political and military leadership all agreed on one point: if Brazil broke diplomatic relations with the Axis, sooner rather than later they would be actively involved in the war. This would be quietly confirmed in letters to Vargas from the Axis ambassadors in Rio. Aranha subsequently informed US Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles of the contents of the letters, and Welles reported back to President Roosevelt:
He [Vargas] had received during the day letters addressed to him from the German, Italian, and Japanese ambassadors. These letters, whose texts I had seen, stated—bluntly in the case of the German ambassador and in a more veiled fashion in the case of the Japanese and Italian ambassadors—that if Brazil undertook to break diplomatic relations she could anticipate a state of war with the Axis powers. The letters were regarded as personal by the Brazilian government and they are therefore anxious that no publicity should be given to their contents as yet.14
Brazil’s options could not have been clearer: join the Allies and go to war with the Axis, or wait for an attack that, if it came, would be swifter and more devastating than anyone in Rio could imagine.
Sumner Welles had arrived in Rio on January 12 in order to participate in the foreign ministers’ conference, which was scheduled to start three days later on January 15. On the afternoon of the day Welles arrived, he and Vargas met in the Guanabara Palace for a brief introductory session. During the course of the meeting, Vargas filled Welles in on the background of the policy he had announced on January 10. Alzira, who acted as the translator, noted that her father appeared deeply concerned. Writing in his diary that evening, President Vargas recorded, “I am apprehensive. It seems to me that the Americans want to drag us into war without it being useful, either for us or for them.”15
Later that same evening, Vargas continued to work on his speech for the conference. In his eyes, he had gone out on something of a limb for the Americans, and now felt he could wait no longer for recompense; while Welles was in Rio it was vitally important that Brazil secure the arms it needed to defend itself. Adding to Vargas’s urgency was the fact that Rio was awash with rumors of discontent within the military and of plotting between the military and some factions of the old Green Shirts of the Integralista movement. Though many of the rumors could be traced directly to the German embassy in Rio, they nevertheless added to the tension. Some loose talk from an official at the US embassy in the city, stating that it was desirable to replace Góes Monteiro, further added to the stakes.16 It was later suggested that the leak from the embassy made it virtually impossible for Vargas to fire the chief of staff for fear of giving the impression of being an American puppet.
Vargas and Aranha met on the morning of January 13 to go over tactics for the conference and to look at the likely implications of the Brazilian position regarding the Axis powers.17 Aranha found the president in a pensive mood, still resolute in his decision to support the United States, but also hoping to avoid a military confrontation with the Axis powers. Vargas’s speech was proving difficult to draft: he wanted to express strong support for President Roosevelt but also to remind the United States that it needed to make good on its promises to arm the Brazilian military. Vargas agreed that, outside of the direct proceedings of the conference, he would personally lobby Welles to secure a firm commitment from President Roosevelt on the armaments issue. Both men agreed that this issue needed to be resolved before the end of the conference, when Vargas planned to announce that Brazil was breaking relations with the Axis powers.
The conference opened on January 15, 1942, in the Tiradentes Palace in downtown Rio. Prior to the establishment of the Estado Novo in 1937, the palace had served as the home of the chamber of deputies; after 1937 it had become the headquarters of the department of press and propaganda (DIP), which had now decorated the building with the flags of all the participating countries at the conference. The building had been chosen because of its size and the fact that it was cool inside, offering the ministers some much needed respite from the oppressive January heat in downtown Rio.
Aranha, who was hosting the conference, made himself comfortable in the palace’s large, carved wooden speaker’s chair. Dressed in his favorite white, cotton, double-breasted suit matched with a club tie, he looked like an aging film star as he towered over the rest of the delegates. And indeed, Aranha understood that he needed to give the performance of a lifetime if Brazil was going to avoid being dragged into the war without arms and without a similar commitment from Argentina to join the fight on the side of the Allies as well. It was left, however, to President Vargas to officially open the conference.
In his much-anticipated speech, Vargas spoke warmly about President Roosevelt and the United States. He talked of the great importance of economic cooperation both within Latin America and with the United States. And he stated in the strongest terms possible that Brazil was determined to defend its borders. He chose not to mention anything about the prime aim of the United States for the conference, which was, of course, to convince the countries of Latin America to break relations with the Axis powers.18 It was a cautious speech, which reflected Vargas’s appraisal of the difficult and unresolved internal and external struggles over Brazil’s wartime role.
By pointedly not addressing what he knew was the top US priority, Vargas’s speech was also intended to buy Brazil a little more time to secure an arms deal from the United States before he went and stuck his thumb in the eye of the Axis. On this issue there were mixed results. The Italian ambassador in Rio wrote to Aranha praising the speech, while the German and Japanese ambassadors reminded Brazil once more that any break in relations would lead very quickly to all-out war.
In case Sumner Welles had not picked up on the message behind the speech, Vargas took him aside at an event at the Itamaraty Palace following the conference and made his case for further arms shipments directly to the undersecretary of state. Vargas started by talking about the letters he had received from the Axis ambassadors, knowing that Welles had been informed of their contents. He then added,
The decision taken by the Brazilian government implies that we will soon actually be at war. The responsibility, which I have assumed on behalf of the Brazilian people, is very great. It is peculiarly great because of the fact that, notwithstanding all my efforts, during the past eighteen months I have not been able to obtain at least a minimum of war supplies from the United States. I feel that in view of the present circumstances I can depend upon you better than anybody else to understand my crucial difficulties.19
Welles, listening as best he could over the background noise of the music of the party, nodded as if to say he had understood the message. Vargas then quickly moved the conversation onto specifics.
Brazil can not be treated as a small Central American power, which would be satisfied with t
he stationing of American troops upon its territory, but rather Brazil has to be regarded by the United States as a friend and ally and is entitled to be furnished under the lend-lease act with planes, tanks, and sufficient coast artillery to enable the Brazilian army to defend at least in part the regions of northeastern Brazil whose defense is as vitally necessary for the United States as for Brazil herself.20
Never before had the Brazilian president laid his cards on the table so openly for an American official. Now, as Vargas returned to his guests at the party, he paused, turned around, and asked that Welles come to see him, alone, two days later, on January 19 at six o’clock in the Guanabara Palace.
The undersecretary of state was experienced enough to know that the president of Brazil had just given him less than forty-eight hours to get a satisfactory response to his request for armaments from the president of the United States. Welles also understood the carrot that was being offered by Vargas—namely, that if Roosevelt came through with enough arms for the Brazilian military, Vargas would authorize the stationing of US forces in northeastern Brazil.
Later that evening, Welles sent a long cable directly to President Roosevelt in which he outlined his conversation with President Vargas at the party. Welles added that when he met with Vargas at the Guanabara Palace to relay Roosevelt’s response, he would like to deliver the following message:
I have communicated directly with you and that you [President Roosevelt] have authorized me to say to him [President Vargas] as chief executive of one great American nation to the chief executive of another great American nation, and also as a personal friend, that if the president will give me a list of the minimum requirements needed urgently by the Brazilian army for the proper protection of northeastern Brazil, you will give orders that the items contained in that list will be made available to the Brazilian government at the possible moment subject only to the exigencies of the present defense requirements of the United States of America and to any subsequent modifications that may later be agreed upon by the United States and Brazilian general staffs.21
Welles’s plea to President Roosevelt was an illustration of not only the importance the undersecretary of state now attached to an arms deal for Brazil, but also the disadvantage at which the United States had suddenly found itself during the conference.
The conference of foreign ministers was not progressing as smoothly as Washington had hoped. The governments of Argentina and Chile made it clear that they were not willing to formally break relations with the Axis powers. Yet in spite of these problems—or perhaps rather as a result of them—Brazil was proving to be an even more important partner than the United States could have expected. Welles noted that, in private, President Vargas and Aranha were working overtime to try to get Argentina and Chile on board while also keeping four other governments in line with the position of the United States. Vargas had sent a personal message to the president of Argentina by courier, stating, “the Brazilian government considers it indispensable that a joint declaration by all the American republics for an immediate severance of relations with the Axis powers be adopted at the conference.”22 Vargas’s personal intervention had little impact, however, as the Argentine government refused to alter its position.
Relations at the conference were quickly deteriorating into regional bickering. Brazil, to be sure, was partly to blame. All the delegations at the conference had been invited to the party in the Itamaraty Palace at which Vargas had spoken to Welles—all the delegations, that is, save for Argentina’s.23 The British ambassador and his staff were invited in their place.24
Desperate to salvage something from the conference, Roosevelt took Welles’s advice. The American president’s reply to Welles the next morning, January 19, 1942, contained the words the undersecretary of state had been hoping to hear:
Tell President Vargas I wholly understand and appreciate the needs and can assure him flow of material will start at once. He will understand when I say there are shortages in a few items, which I do not trust to putting on the wire, but which are soon to come into production. I want to get away as soon as possible from token shipments and increase them to a minimum of Brazilian requirements very quickly. Tell him I am made very happy by his splendid policy and give him my very warm regards.25
American support for Brazil would be forthcoming, just as Vargas had requested. Carrying a copy of Roosevelt’s note, Welles headed off for his meeting. Although he didn’t realize it at the time, it was an encounter that would change the course of Latin American history.
The undersecretary of state arrived at the Guanabara Palace a little before six o’clock on the evening of January 19. To the American’s surprise, he was not shown into one of the rooms of the palace, but instead was escorted to the small pavilion on top of the hill at the back of the Guanabara Palace where the president liked to work alone during Rio’s balmy summer evenings. As he headed up the hill, Welles could hear the sounds of the staff of the palace preparing the ballroom for the evening ball for the delegations of the conference. By the time he got to the pavilion, however, there was silence save only for the murmur of distant traffic from the road in front of the palace.
“It is cooler and quieter here than in the palace,” Vargas said as he greeted his guest.26 The setting also afforded the two men the utmost privacy. There were no advisors, aides, or translators present. Instead, Vargas spoke slowly in Spanish tinged with a Brazilian Portuguese accent, while Welles—who was fluent in Spanish—made sure to respond with care in case Vargas misunderstood him. From time to time in the course of the conversation that followed, Welles threw in a phrase or two in English, especially when referring to President Roosevelt or Winston Churchill. Vargas spoke only rudimentary English, but could read it well.27 Alzira, who was educated at an English school in Rio, was teaching her father English whenever he had a spare moment.
Welles outlined the nature of his request to President Roosevelt and then read the president’s reply, translating it into Spanish as he went. After he finished reading it aloud, Welles handed it over to President Vargas, who read the text carefully by himself. The conversation then moved on to Argentina, and on this issue Welles gave Vargas his informed but personal opinion. He started, “Mr. President, I am afraid that there is little prospect of getting Argentina to agree to a formal breaking of ties with the Axis powers as our government has requested.”28 Vargas agreed with the assessment, but told Welles that he still had to try. “I need, however to find a formula for the text of the conference that the Argentine government would be able to support.”29 Vargas noted to Welles that this point was of great importance for Brazil, and Welles confirmed to Vargas that he would continue to work toward this purpose, although prospects of winning over Argentina and the other holdout, Chile, still looked slim. “Look, I do not hold out much chance of getting Chile to agree either,” Welles admitted.30 “There are cash advances being made by Japan to certain Chilean political leaders, including the minister of foreign affairs.”
Welles finished by adding, “The issue of Brazil breaking relations with the Axis powers is of great importance and I have risked my own position to secure this commitment from the president for you.”31 Vargas replied, “You can count on Brazil, but I am risking my life on this as I would not survive a disaster for my motherland.”32 Vargas’s life had already been in jeopardy once before, and he had no illusions about surviving a cataclysmic encounter with Argentina, Germany, or his own enemies within Brazil.
Both men’s apprehensions hung over the discussion like a rain cloud, yet taken together, Roosevelt’s promise of immediate arms for Brazil and Welles’s agreement to try to placate Argentina constituted a breakthrough for Vargas. He and Welles had a deal.33 Standing alone outside the pavilion as the sun dipped over the horizon, the two men shook hands and said nothing further.
As they headed back toward the palace where the first guests for the banquet were starting to arrive, Vargas and W
elles were both lost in their thoughts. For Vargas this was the scenario he had long hoped to avoid: a deal with the United States that in all likelihood would not tie Argentina to a similar commitment. He understood that the military would be unhappy to have an aggressive and expansionist pro-Axis Argentine army sitting on Brazil’s southern border, while most of the American weapons would have to go to the defense of northeastern Brazil to protect it from possible Axis attacks or even an invasion. The position of the Chilean government was important to Vargas, as well, but it nevertheless confirmed his impression that the foreign ministers of the Americas would never be able to agree to a meaningful regional strategy for the war.34
Welles, meanwhile, had to come to terms with his own failures. He had come to Rio to convince all the countries of the Americas to break ties with the Axis. Whatever he had accomplished (and he had certainly accomplished much), in that effort at least, he had not succeeded. When Welles’s boss, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, heard the details of the deal, he considered it a total surrender to Argentina.35 On the phone with Welles following the meeting, Hull subjected him to a rant that was so full of professional and personal threats that it alarmed President Roosevelt and the State Department officials who were listening in on the conversation. “I consider this a change of policy without consulting me,” Hull fumed, adding in a voice full of emotion, “The agreement contains an escape clause that will permit the Argentines to return home with a straight face and thereafter move gradually over to the camp of our Axis enemies and render the enemy aid and comfort, to our damage and even to the loss of life as the war progresses.”36 As he was winding down, Hull ordered Welles, “Repudiate the arrangement now.”37
When Hull’s outburst ended, Welles responded. Speaking slowly and without emotion he said, “I have tried hard to secure agreement to the original proposal but found this impossible, and therefore I agreed to the modified arrangement.”38 In so many words, Welles was informing his boss that in his book, this was as good an outcome as the Americans were going to get.
Brazil : The Fortunes of War (9780465080700) Page 16
