by Mark Zuehlke
Contact was quickly established with the Hasty Ps. The rivalry between these two battalions was legendary. So it was little surprise that the “Glamour Boys” of Toronto crowed about having to rescue the Plough Jockeys, who affected puzzlement over why it had taken them so long to arrive. Setting aside the competition for another day, the two battalions got busy. The Highlanders pitched in to help evacuate twelve stretcher cases off the summit.39 During their stand on the summit, the Hasty Ps had lost only eight men killed and failed to record the number of wounded. It was probably surprisingly low, for divisional headquarters estimated its entire casualties during the July 19-22 period at about 300, and Leonforte accounted for 276 of these.40 For their part, the Highlanders counted two men dead and fifteen wounded.41
While Canadian casualties in this battle were significant, 15th Panzer Grenadier Division’s 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment had taken a harder beating. From captured documents, Canadian intelligence officers estimated its 2nd Battalion had lost seven officers and 230 other ranks as of July 21. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, had reported 385 casualties. Although the division’s 3rd Battalion had just come into contact with the Canadians on July 22, more than one hundred of its troops had been taken prisoner, and the battalion’s No. 10 Company had been “all but wiped out.” They predicted this regiment would soon have to pull back to reorganize.42
“The seizure of the Assoro pinnacle by the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment,” the army’s official historian concluded, “was as significant to the Canadian Division’s advance as it was dramatic, for it upset the whole German plan of defence on that front, and thus hastened the fall of Leonforte.”43
Canadian Press war correspondent Ross Munro joined the Hasty Ps on the summit. Looking down the cliff the soldiers had climbed made him dizzy. The padre, Captain Reg Lane, was having graves dug by the wall of a shattered church. He found Major John Tweedsmuir and some other officer in their outpost. They were using the captured telescope to direct artillery fire on a machine-gun post set in an olive grove about a mile away. As the shells fell upon the position, Munro “could see Germans running through the grove for shelter in a valley behind. The Hastings grinned. They had taken a pounding like that the day before and stuck it out.” Munro later reflected that of “all the actions in Sicily, I look back on this exploit of the Hastings at Assoro as the most daring and spectacular.”44
WHILE THE CANADIANS had been winning Assoro and Leonforte, General George Patton’s highly mobile Provisional Corps had carried out a literal romp through the western part of Sicily. With the Germans having withdrawn eastward to a line running approximately through the centre of the island, there remained only four Italian divisions between the Americans and Palermo. These surrendered by the thousands, usually without offering any resistance. On July 22, Palermo followed suit as three U.S. divisions converged on the city. The remaining western ports—Trapani, Marsala, and Castellammare—were captured the next day, and western Sicily was declared conquered.45 Patton got his triumphal parade through the streets of Palermo, and the Allies inherited thousands of prisoners they then had to care for, as well as gaining the dubious advantage of an excess of ports. The Germans, meanwhile, concentrated their defensive lines on the northeastern corner of Sicily and its all-important port of Messina—their exit point whenever the campaign on the island became too costly.
Eighth Army, meanwhile, had achieved little anywhere but in the Canadian sector. The “Germans were still in possession of the Catania Plain and had successfully defeated every effort of the [XIII] British Corps to move forward. On the [XXX] Corps front, the [51st] Highland Division had run into heavy opposition at the inland end of the Plain. The Canadian division, and the 231st British Infantry Brigade, which was advancing on its right toward Agira under its command, were considerably in advance of the rest of the British forces. In these circumstances, the Army Commander [General Bernard Montgomery] decided to hold on the [XIII] Corps front, while the Canadians were to swing eastward along the main Leonforte- Catania road (Highway No. 121), pushing on towards Aderno (also called Adrano) as rapidly as possible. They were, in fact, to deliver a ‘left hook’ against the inner hinge of the enemy’s line. At the same time, the Army Commander gave orders for the 78th British Infantry Division to be brought over from North Africa with a view to strengthening this left wing which had suddenly acquired such unforeseen importance.”46
This left hook had become Montgomery’s last hope for preventing the deadlock that the Germans threatened to impose on his army. As General Harold Alexander’s 15th Army Group headquarters assessed the situation, it “was plain now that the enemy had concentrated his main forces in the Catania plain opposite [XIII] Corps and intended to retain possession of Catania as long as possible. The terrain was admirably suited to defence, being cut by numerous rivers, drainage ditches and canals, rendering the employment of armour extremely difficult. The enemy’s positions in the plain were backed by the foothills of the Mt. Etna mass, giving the enemy superior observation. In the plain lay the largest group of airfields in Sicily. Although our advance to the Simeto [River] had rendered these airfields virtually unserviceable to the enemy, they were strategically the most important and vital objectives which the enemy sought to deny us the use of by his prolonged defence in Sicily.”
Recognizing that Eighth Army was losing the initiative had prompted Montgomery on July 21 to suggest that the Americans—Patton’s business in western Sicily largely concluded—should “thrust eastwards along [the] north coast road towards Messina.” He further asked that all Allied air power in North Africa, and at the few airfields that had been brought into operation in Sicily, be directed against “the enemy army now hemmed in to the northeast corner.” With the Canadian victory at Leonforte, Montgomery reported that this “important centre of road communication is being firmly held and the thrust of Canadian [Division] eastwards from Leonforte toward Agira and Aderno has now begun. 231 [Brigade] moving against Agira from the south is now within two miles of that place. When 78 [Division] has arrived I shall put in a blitz attack supported by all possible air power on thrust line Adrano-Bronte-Randazzo. Date for this will be about 1 August. This attack, if successful, should almost finish the business provided American thrust eastwards along northern coast road is heavy and sustained.”47
XIV Panzer Corps’s General der Panzertruppen Hans Valentin Hube, responsible for Sicily’s defence, was keenly aware of the threat that the Canadian and likely American advances towards the northeast posed to his vital need to keep the Straits of Messina open. Should he have forgotten for even a moment, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht operations chief, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, was quick to send reminders from Berlin. Jodl had one fear about the campaign. “The vital factor,” he warned repeatedly, “is under no circumstances to suffer the loss of our three German divisions. At the very minimum, our valuable human material must be saved.”48
Knowing that once Palermo fell, the Americans would surely do precisely what Montgomery had suggested to Alexander, Hube had been forced to seek permission to reinforce his current three divisions in Sicily with another that had been standing in reserve across the strait at Reggio. Reluctantly, OKW consented to this move on July 21. Over the next couple of days, much of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division was ferried across the strait. In the week prior to this reinforcement, some parts of the division had already been brought into Sicily to strengthen Hube’s defences. The 1st Battalion of 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had arrived on July 14 and been attached to 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. On July 18, Hube had added the other two battalions from this regiment, the IIIrd (Heavy) Battalion of 29th Motorized Artillery Regiment, and 1st Company of the 29th Engineer Battalion. These troops were commanded by 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s Colonel Max Ulich. Group Ulich, as it was called, was brought forward on July 22 to defend the coastal highway by setting up a blocking position at Cefalù. This became Hube’s anchor point for the line facing westward from north of Mount Et
na. By July 25, Hube would push the majority of this division into the line to create a continuous, although in places thinly held, frontage.49
Although the disposition of divisions and battle groups looked strong on a map, the Germans were hamstrung by a lack of numbers and the total loss of air superiority to the Allies. In the move to Cefalù, for example, Ulich’s troops were constantly harried by Allied aircraft and “lost fifty vehicles and a battery of artillery before they even saw an American infantryman.”50 On July 22, American and British fighter bombers, operating out of airfields at Pachino, had struck in support of the Canadians. Ranging westward from Randazzo at the northwestern corner of Mount Etna along the road running to Troina, the planes ambushed a long convoy of about three hundred German vehicles and guns moving towards the Canadians. Repeatedly the planes strafed and bombed the column, flying 156 sorties against it over the course of the day. By evening, they reported sixty-five “flamers” and claimed many more vehicles and guns damaged.51
AGAINST THIS STRATEGIC backdrop, there could be no respite for 1st Canadian Infantry Division. On the afternoon of July 22, Major General Guy Simonds issued detailed instructions to the four brigades under his command. The 231st (Malta) Brigade was to continue threatening Agira from the south, while 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade moved in behind the British troops and took up positions in the Dittaino valley around the Raddusa-Agira railway station. Simonds was getting these two brigades into position to take over the division’s advance once Agira was carried. Until this town fell, however, the main thrust would continue to be delivered by 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade and 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade. The attack on Agira would be put in by one of 1 CIB’s battalions, and another would guard the division’s left flank by straddling Highway 117, which led north off Highway 121 to Nicosia. Remaining in Leonforte and Assoro to provide a firm base for 1 CIB’s operations, 2 CIB would get a short breather.
The distance by road from Leonforte to Agira was only eight miles. The medieval town “perched high on its mountain cone overlooking the Salso and Dittaino valleys. In this sector of its course the main Palermo-Catania highway (Highway 121) followed what was for Sicily a comparatively direct route along the rugged plateau which separated the two river systems. The road was generally free from very steep gradients, but at least four times between Leonforte and Agira it curved over low hill barriers which crossed the plateau from north to south. Four miles west of Agira, in the relatively flat ground between two of these ridges, lay the village of Nissoria, a small community of less than one thousand inhabitants. Because it was overlooked from the high ground to west and east, Nissoria itself was not expected to present a serious obstacle to the 1st Brigade’s advance,” one army assessment concluded.52
Upon receiving his instructions, Brigadier Howard Graham ordered the 48th Highlanders to march from Assoro to occupy the junction of Highway 121 and Highway 117—a mile east of Leonforte. Once the junction was in hand, the Royal Canadian Regiment would pass through and lead the way to Agira. Despite the fact that they had carried the weight of the fight for Assoro that day, ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies were to be on point. The two companies began forming up at about 2300 hours on some open ground north of Assoro. Suddenly, several powerful German artillery shells exploded in their midst. Four men were killed and ten wounded in this deadly salvo. Among the dead were two stretcher-bearers, Privates William James Thompson and Jim Cameron. They had run forward from the cover of slit trenches at the first cries of the wounded, only to be cut down by the last shell.
After sorting themselves out from this calamity, the Highlanders began marching shortly after midnight. It was the morning of July 23, and ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies had been constantly on the go for more than twenty-four hours. They had five miles to cover. There had been no time for any reconnaissance. They had no idea whether Germans waited to bar their path. The companies moved in single file, one behind the other, the men maintaining five-yard intervals. One and a half miles from the junction, a pause was called while the company commanders finalized the plan for the last leg to the junction. Although they had encountered no opposition, nobody expected the Germans would have left such an important junction undefended. From somewhere, the Germans obviously enjoyed excellent observation of the route, for no sooner had the halt been called than another salvo bracketed the line of troops. Two men were killed and another four wounded. The casualties had been so low only because the Highlanders had maintained their single-file formation and spacing.53
Increasingly sensing their every move was observed, the Highlanders warily approached the junction with ‘B’ Company leading. When Captain Bob Lyon’s advance platoon entered the crossroads, the sudden eruption of machine-gun fire from a rise that overlooked it from a range of only twenty-five yards ended the growing suspense. As Lyon yelled at his men to spread out on either side of the road, the only thing that prevented their being butchered was the fact the German fire was passing overhead. Firing high was a common mistake during nighttime actions, and the German error gave Lyon’s men precious seconds needed to find cover. With mortars adding to the weight of incoming fire, ‘B’ Company was pinned down. Hoping to get men up on the Germans’ left flank, Lyon shouted for Lieutenant Bob Moncur to take his platoon in that direction. Moncur never heard the order. He had been wounded in the leg and was bleeding profusely. Sergeant Charlie Fraser heard Lyon, but there was no way anyone could move forward. Although doing so exposed him to the German fire, Fraser kept dodging back and forth between two Bren gunners to point out targets. When one of the men was wounded, Fraser took over the gun himself. Realizing their two companies were badly outgunned, Lyon and ‘D’ Company’s Major D.W. Banton directed their men to wriggle back out of the ambush zone.
As the rest of the men went back, Sergeant Fraser carefully scoured the open ground around the junction to make sure none of the wounded had inadvertently been left behind. Satisfied everyone was clear, Fraser rejoined his company. His bravery during this action resulted in the war’s first Military Medal award to a 48th Highlander.54
When the two companies fell back on the rest of the battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Ian Johnston ordered ‘D’ Company to set up a defensive position facing the road while he organized a dawn attack. At first light, ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies went forward but found the Germans gone. Johnston brought the rest of the battalion up to a position immediately east of the junction. Setting battalion headquarters in the centre, he surrounded it with the rifle companies to create an all-round defence. A few German stragglers were rounded up. They seemed “to be mostly very young men, including a number from the occupied countries who were forced in.” Shortly after the Highlanders got dug in, they were attacked by long-range mortar and 88-millimetre fire that was so eerily accurate that Johnston suspected the gunners were homing in on their wireless transmissions to brigade with some kind of directional finder. Although the Highlanders possessed the junction, which was to have served as the start line for the Royal Canadian Regiment’s advance to Agira, the heavy shelling convinced Major General Simonds to delay that move for a day while he organized a staged attack.55
PART FOUR
THE EASTWARD ADVANCE
[17]
Follow the Band
IN AN ATTEMPT to gather information on German strength to the north and east of the junction of Highways 121 and 117 outside Leonforte, Major General Guy Simonds ordered ‘A’ Squadron of the Princess Louise Dragoon Guards (PLDG) to push patrols up both roads. No. 2 Troop, under Lieutenant W.C. Stuart, moved along Highway 121 with the intention of going as far as Nissoria. They were just approaching “the flat white cluster” of buildings composing this village when the men in the lead carrier spotted either a tracked personnel carrier or tank in the village. At the same time, a small enemy tank was sighted to the right of the highway and brought under heavy machine-gun fire by another carrier crew. The Germans lashed back with a deluge of mortar fire that convinced Stuart to disengage. As No. 2 Troop bega
n withdrawing, one carrier broke down and had to be abandoned. Once the other carriers were safely behind the high ground west of Nissoria, Stuart returned with several men to see if the carrier could be retrieved. They arrived in time to see the Germans towing it away.
The PLDG patrol up Highway 117 fared no better. Three miles beyond the junction, it came under heavy German fire that forced it to fall back to a hilltop. Here, the men remained through the day, trying to observe suspected German positions. By nightfall on July 23, ‘A’ Squadron had regrouped between Leonforte and the junction. The nine officers and 195 other ranks were settling down to dinner when the area came under heavy mortar fire. While nobody was injured, one round scored a direct hit on a light armoured car. The turret was blown cleanly off and hurled thirty yards through the air.1
