by Mark Zuehlke
Major Budge Bell-Irving had ‘A’ Company deployed in arrowhead formation, with No. 8 Platoon forming the tip, his company headquarters section directly behind, and the other two platoons flared out on either flank a little farther back. As his men reached the base of Monte Fronte, the Germans struck them with a withering rate of fire. What followed next was a “classic battle-drill attack” carried out to perfection. With no orders from Bell-Irving, No. 8 Platoon’s commander led his men directly into the face of the enemy fire with two sections covering the advance of the third. Once this section gained some protected ground, it began laying down fire to enable those behind to jump past its position. In this manner, one section was able to reach the steep face of Monte Fronte and climb a short distance up to overrun an MG 42 position. When the Germans counterattacked, the section slithered back down the slope, taking the gun with them.33
The moment the company had been struck by the drenching fire from ahead, Bell-Irving had assumed No. 8 Platoon would do the right thing and had signalled No. 9 Platoon on the right flank to begin a wide flanking movement. He tucked the company headquarters section onto No. 9 Platoon’s tail, as No. 7 Platoon cut across from the left to follow the formation southward. Hooking around to the southern flank of Monte Fronte, this element of ‘A’ Company stared up an “almost perpendicular,” nearly three-hundred-foot slope that led to a narrow and apparently undefended summit. Bell-Irving realized the Germans must have thought the slope impossible to climb. The men from British Columbia set about proving the Panzer Grenadiers wrong. Weapons slung and burdened by the rest of their fighting packs, they went up like monkeys from one handhold to another and gained the summit within minutes.
Corporal F.W. Terry was at the head of his section when it clambered over the lip. Seeing a nearby machine-gun position whose crew were firing westward at No. 8 Platoon, Terry charged and captured the gun. His action earned a Military Medal.34 The ground ‘A’ Company found itself on consisted of “very rocky, narrow steps, with a cliff behind.” Bell-Irving advanced his men quickly so that the company’s forward platoon, under Lieutenant Jim Harling, had the “protection of ... a stone wall about two feet high.” Before them the summit levelled off and was only lightly vegetated. Having taken the Germans by surprise, the Seaforths were well positioned when the Panzer Grenadiers realized their presence and rounded on them with machine guns they had been firing at No. 8 Platoon.35 The shifting of this fire enabled the platoon holding on the mountain’s eastern slope to disengage and begin moving to join the rest of ‘A’ Company on the summit.
But that move would take an hour or more to complete. Meanwhile, the men on the summit attracted the full fury of the Germans. ‘A’ Company, like all the other Seaforth companies, had gone into the attack badly understrength. There were barely more than fifty men on the summit. “It was hot, the men were exhausted, ammunition was running short, water was scarce ... A terrific firefight went on, with the Germans using rifle and machine-gun fire as well as rifle grenades, but the various platoons, well tucked into the rocky crevices and using the protection afforded by terraces, suffered few casualties and not only held on to their positions but slowly improved them,” the Seaforth’s regimental historian recorded.36
On the north side of the road, ‘D’ Company had earlier gone for Cemetery Hill. Like most cemeteries in Sicily, this one was surrounded by a high wall braced by family tombs and bordered on the outside by “tall, sombre cypress trees.”37 Captain June Thomas and his men never even got close. Raked by machine guns hidden in and around the cemetery and heavily mortared, ‘D’ Company kept reeling forward despite growing casualties. The wireless signaller next to Thomas was killed and his set destroyed. Forced to ground, Thomas sent a runner back to Tiger to request reinforcements and a new wireless set.38 Hoffmeister instead “decided that the northern end of Grizzly was too strongly held to be captured by one company, so he ordered ‘D’ Company to withdraw into Battalion reserve.” He would concentrate the Seaforth’s effort on winning the battle for Monte Fronte.39
South of this objective, Major Jim Blair’s ‘C’ Company became mired in a hellish maze of “vine-terraced hills and valleys” that had his men constantly either climbing or descending through rugged terrain. Blair had no wireless link to battalion and was so disoriented that even deciding which high point was Grizzly proved impossible. One platoon, under Lieutenant John F. McLean, became separated. At about 1700 hours, McLean and his men charged up what they thought was Grizzly, only to find the summit they won was three-quarters of a mile too far south. Dispirited, the platoon surrendered their undisputed hold on the worthless feature and headed for Monte Fronte. With nightfall, McLean decided if he kept pushing his exhausted men they would be useless, so they settled in for a night of sleeping rough. The rest of ‘C’ Company, meanwhile, had fared little better. It ended the day having stormed a summit that was almost the correct one, but still too far south. Blair, too, opted to hold where he was until morning.
Hoffmeister had spent much of the afternoon going forward through machine-gun and mortar fire in an attempt to establish contact with ‘C’ Company and direct it onto Monte Fronte. Unable to find the lost company, he returned to Tiger and sent ‘B’ Company to ‘A’ Company’s support. Trying to approach the summit from the north flank, the company ran into such strong mortar fire from Agira and Cemetery Hill at 1830 hours that it was driven to ground. ‘A’ Company would have to hold the hill through the night on its own.40
WHEN HOFFMEISTER TOLD Brigadier Chris Vokes that he had shifted the entire weight of his battalion against the Grizzly objective south of the highway, the 2 CIB commander decided to commit another battalion to carrying Cemetery Hill. At 2000 hours on July 27, the Loyal Edmonton Regiment advanced with three companies in line abreast. ‘A’ Company was on the left, ‘B’ Company in the centre, and ‘D’ Company (less Lieutenant John Dougan’s platoon) on the right. With a skeleton battalion headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Jefferson stationed himself behind the centre company. The Edmonton commander was throwing everything he had at the objective, for ‘C’ Company had gone to the aid of Dougan’s patrol.41
With night falling, the Edmontons moved into “country broken by hills and ravines.” Their maps next to useless, they blundered forward as blindly as the Seaforth’s ‘C’ Company had during its right hook towards Monte Fronte. By the time they reached the assigned forming-up position for the final assault, the supporting artillery had finished firing several hours before.42
‘A’ Company was more fortunate than the others. Its objective was Monte Crapuzza, which stuck out prominently on the left-hand flank of the ridge. Captain Pat Tighe and his men swarmed up the mountain to find it undefended. To the south, they could see tracers spitting through the darkness and the flash of explosions. But there were no obvious targets that were clearly Germans and might not prove to be Edmontons. So they settled in and watched the fireworks.
A half mile to the south, the other two companies reached the slope leading up Cemetery Hill shortly after midnight on July 28. In some places the slope proved to be “an absolute cliff.” The Germans above “poured heavy concentrations of mortar fire and threw ‘potato mashers’” down at them.43 Stalled in front of the cliffs, ‘B’ Company was pinned by this fire and racking up casualties. Its commander, Captain A.A. Gilchrist, was wounded, as was one of the platoon commanders, Lieutenant H.M. Turner. To the right, ‘D’ Company’s Major Bury sent a section from one platoon to hook around to the south next to the road and get in behind the Germans. Moments after these men headed out, Bury was killed by a mortar bomb. The attack was beginning to crumble when ‘D’ Company’s second-in-command, Captain H.W. Smith, “came forward and rallied the remainder of the company.” Hearing gunfire to the rear of the Germans defending the cemetery, Smith “deduced the section had been successful in getting into position; he then led the greatly reduced company in an assault up the cliffs and by the use of 2-inch mortars, hand grenades, and [Bren guns] carri
ed the hill against a...numerically superior opposition estimated at 150 of the enemy as against his own total strength of about 40 all ranks. The section behind the hill was particularly effective in distracting the enemy and contributed in no small measure to the success of the engagement. The enemy had, in fact broken their lines under this assault and their flight into the town was nothing more . . . than a disorganized retreat.”
Realizing the fight for Agira had tipped far in favour of the Canadians, ‘A’ Company’s Major Tighe sent a patrol under Lieutenant L.T. Swan towards the town. Coming upon a house on the outskirts, Swan observed it was full of heavily armed German and Italian troops that had probably just fallen back from Cemetery Hill. Taking a Thompson submachine gun, he crept up alone and demanded their surrender. The seventeen Germans and four Italians meekly complied. As the platoon led their prisoners back towards Monte Crapuzza, the party was caught by German mortars, and several of the prisoners were killed or wounded. At dawn on July 28, Tighe was further encouraged to send a couple more fighting patrols to the north to cut the Agira-Nicosia road. The Edmontons were solidly in control of Grizzly on the north side of the highway.44
They had suffered relatively light casualties in this protracted night action—three men killed and thirty-one wounded.45 Bury, of course, was among the dead. The forty-five-year-old veteran of the Great War had been a popular officer—the probable motive for Jefferson’s fudging of the facts about Dougan’s patrol. He wanted to ensure the major received a DSO citation as a tribute. Dougan never minded that Jefferson misspoke, for he had found Bury “a very brave, good man.”46
DURING THE NIGHT, while the Edmontons had been assaulting the northern portion of Grizzly, the Seaforth’s ‘A’ Company had staved off several fierce counterattacks. It was a terrific fight, but the Seaforths clung grimly to their summit lodgement on the southern edge of Monte Fronte. Shortly after midnight on July 28, the Panzer Grenadiers came at them with a bayonet charge. “This attack,” Bell-Irving wrote, “was concentrated and heavily supported by point blank small arms fire by plastic rifle grenades.” Lieutenant Jim Harling and his platoon were behind the two-foot stone wall and he “stood up to his full height and threw grenades at the oncoming enemy—one after the other—while singing [a Hawaiian song] at the top of his lungs. He, more than any other, was responsible for the successful holding of Grizzly Hill.”47
Just before first light, Lieutenant McLean’s platoon from ‘C’ Company climbed up the cliff and came in behind ‘A’ Company. The lieutenant had got his men moving as soon as he thought they were rested sufficiently, and they had moved towards the sounds of the fighting. McLean seemed as delighted to see Bell-Irving as the major was to see him. Bell-Irving was ecstatic—less because of the added manpower than because the men carried a good supply of ammunition and 2-inch mortar bombs.
This booty was quickly shared around and then Bell-Irving decided it was time for offensive action. For one thing, his fifty-man force was desperately short of water and the only well stood next to a small German-held house. Bell-Irving worked out a plan whereby McLean and three men would “crawl towards the enemy occupied house under the cover of smoke grenades and the fire” from Harling’s platoons. Once McLean’s party was close enough, “they would rush the building with the two platoons close on their heels.”
In a fine display of fieldcraft, the four men crawled to within charging range of the house. “Close behind them, Harling, a big man, threw grenades over their heads as if [they] were softballs, inspiring his men as he had for the past two days. Then McLean and his men, followed by the two platoons, got up and raced towards the enemy strongpoint and such was the force of their charge that they kept going beyond it to the far end of the feature, clearing it of the enemy.”48
Soon Bell-Irving was able to report back to Hoffmeister that Monte Fronte was in Seaforth’s hands. Despite the fierce and extended nature of the fight, ‘A’ Company had only two men killed and five wounded. Lieutenant McLean’s platoon lost nobody. Seventy-five German dead were counted on the summit, fifteen prisoners were taken, and numerous blood trails indicated a high number of Panzer Grenadiers had been wounded and carried from the field. For their brave handling of this action, Bell-Irving and Hoffmeister were both awarded Distinguished Service Orders. Bell-Irving put Harling in for a decoration as well, but it was refused. He later admitted his inexperienced citation writing was the probable reason.49
At 0855 hours on July 28, Brigadier Chris Vokes sent an exultant message to Major General Guy Simonds. “Whole of Grizzly in our hands. Nearly all enemy killed. Survivors retreating northwards. We have lost contact. All approaches safe.” The door to Agira had been kicked open, and the town was his for the taking.50
[20]
Hard Fighting
FROM PRISONERS AND captured documents, 1st Canadian Infantry Division intelligence officers gleaned that the Germans who had defended Grizzly had consisted of the entire 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. This unit, attached early in the campaign to the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, had taken over the position on July 27 from the battalions of 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which in the fighting for Leonforte and the ridges to the west of Agira had lost more than two hundred men killed and had a far greater number wounded. The estimated dead for 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was conservatively set at 125 with the wounded total far surpassing that. All German units had lost many men as prisoners.
By July 28, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was fast withdrawing to a new position running from Regalbuto through Gagliano to a point just east of Nicosia.1
For their part, the Canadians were not yet thinking about breaking the new German line. There remained still the matter of taking Agira itself. After the street battle for Leonforte, it was feared this medieval town with its narrow, winding streets, barely wide enough to allow passage of a burdened donkey, would be similarly defended.
Taking no chances, Vokes ordered Agira bombarded at 1545 by all divisional artillery and mortars. The Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry would then advance on either side of the highway from a point just west of Grizzly.2
Once again the trucks rolled through the morning to deliver about four hundred rounds to each gun pit. While these preparations were under way, a 1st Field Regiment (Royal Canadian Horse Artillery) FOO and his signaller walked cautiously towards Agira in search of an observation point from which to support the PPCLI with directed artillery fire after the bombardment ceased. Seeing no enemy activity, Captain G.E. Baxter kept moving closer until the two gunners walked right into the town and decided the Germans had withdrawn. Quickly reporting the news by wireless, Baxter was able to stop the bombardment—an act that undoubtedly saved many civilian lives, as well as sparing many of Agira’s ancient buildings from destruction.3
‘A’ and ‘B’ companies were already marching to the forming-up position when Lieutenant Colonel Bob Lindsay advised Captains W. “Bucko” Watson and R.F.S. Robertson that the shoot had been cancelled “to conserve ammunition.”4 The three officers decided Watson’s ‘A’ Company would send a fighting patrol in to confirm the report. If Agira proved clear, both would go up and occupy it. But if any “enemy were encountered the supporting fire would be laid on again.” As these plans were being cut the weather took an unusual turn, as the thin layer of cloud that had been building all morning released a drizzle of rain.
In this cooler, damper weather, the patrol moved along Highway 121 until it was adjacent to a large open plaza that stood at the town’s entrance. Working around the edge of the plaza, hugging the shops and houses for cover, the patrol gained and started up the steep, narrow main street that led into the heart of the mountaintop town. All went well until it came to a second, smaller plaza set on a level shelf, where the main road branched into several narrower lanes all tightly flanked by two- and three-storey buildings. From the plaza to the upper level of the town, the slope became ever steeper u
ntil it reached the summit. On the right-hand side, just below the summit, the tower of a large church was visible. The lanes ahead looked dark and threatening, not a soul to be seen. Cautiously, the patrol edged into the plaza and immediately came under fire from what appeared to be only a small party of Germans. A hasty withdrawal was made, and the patrol reported its findings back to Watson and Robertson.
Deciding the slight resistance met was insufficient to justify unleashing the artillery, the two captains agreed to “divide the town in half between them, ‘B’ Company right and ‘A’ Company left and proceed to a first objective, a line parallel to our front joining two easily distinguishable churches about three quarters of the way up the hill.” At 1430 hours, the PPCLI entered the outskirts and were greeted by “quite an ovation from the local population.”5 Holding at the entrance to the town, in case they were needed, was No. 3 Troop from the Three Rivers Regiment’s ‘C’ Squadron, under command of Lieutenant “Beez” Gordon.
About three hundred yards into the town, however, all signs of civilian activity ceased, and ‘A’ Company’s leading platoon was attacked by fire from a machine-gun position and was forced to take cover. Hearing the gunfire, No. 3 Troop rumbled through the ever-narrowing streets until it came up behind ‘A’ Company. Gordon dismounted and went to find Watson, but a burst from the machine gun knocked the tanker down with a serious wound. Realizing they were next to useless and badly exposed in the tight confines of Agira’s streets, the tankers withdrew.6 Watson, meanwhile, had stationed a Bren-gun section on the roof of a building overlooking the enemy position. From here the Bren gunner was able to kill the machinegun team with some well-aimed bursts.
After having progressed halfway through the town without incident, ‘B’ Company had also become hotly engaged. No. 10 Platoon, under Corporal S.C. Butterick, had been leading the advance up a rain-slicked cobblestone street when it came under fire “from about ten men” armed either with Schmeissers or MG 42 machine guns. A two-hour firefight followed that required “house to house fighting” to roust out the enemy. “Fighting was made all the more difficult because of narrow alleyways paved with slippery cobblestones which the enemy could cover with his automatics.” Only by working around the flanks of the Germans was the platoon able to close in and kill them all. During the shootout, Butterick was wounded in both legs. Propped against a wall, he continued to direct his men until the fight was concluded—garnering a Military Medal for his conduct.
