46. On the “good” battle at Marathon versus the rabble’s victory at Salamis, see Plato, Laws, 707c; and in general, Hanson, Stillborn West, 83–84. For the complicated lineage and status of Themistocles, see the discussion in Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, 217–20. Reasons for his exile: cf. Lewis, Cambridge Ancient History, vol. V, 66; Diodorus 11.55–56.
47. On the discrediting of Themistocles in the postwar period, cf. Aristotle, Politics 5.1304a17–24.
48. Plutarch, Themistocles, 2–6.
49. On the assessment of the role of Themistocles, the value of his deceptions, and the tactics at Salamis, cf. Diodorus 11.18–19.
50. Herodotus 8.109–11; Diodorus 11.19. Salamis also ensured that Plataea was an existential battle: Without a fleet to allow a maritime retreat, a defeated Persian army would be trapped deep within Greek territory with the only avenue of escape a march through hundreds of miles of suddenly hostile Greek territory.
51. For ancient generalizations of Themistocles’ gifts, see Diodorus 11.59.4, and especially the blanket encomium of Thucydides, 1.138.3–4.
52. Herodotus 60–61. Note that Themistocles himself engaged in “what if” hypotheticals to persuade his fellow generals to accept his strategic plan.
53. Herodotus 8.57. After the battle, there was widespread criticism of the Persians’ unexpected disastrous defeat—rich material for the storyteller Herodotus to put into the mouths of sympathetic characters like the ignored advisers Artemesia and Demaratus, who both had supposedly advocated quite different Persian strategies.
54. Aeschylus, Persians, 792.
55. Plutarch, Themistocles, 18.2.
56. Aeschylus, Persians, 242.
57. Diodorus extols Themistocles to such a degree that he concludes by apologizing for his effusive portrait, cf. 11.59.4.
58. Again, see the long assessment of Thucydides (1.138.3–4), which concludes (Crawley translation): “To sum up, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency.” And for an in-depth modern appreciation of Themistocles as the father of the Athenian navy and the architect of Athenian maritime hegemony, see Hale, Lords of the Sea, 3–14.
Chapter Two: Byzantium at the Brink
1. See Robert Graves, Count Belisarius (New York: Random House, 1938), 558. The historical version that Graves drew on—that Justinian had Belisarius blinded, reduced to poverty, and turned out in the streets as proof of the ungrateful monarch’s treatment of the loyal patriot—had become a favorite topic of the Romantics, among novelists such as Jean-François Marmontel (Bélisaire, 1767), and artists such as the neoclassical painter Jacques-Louis David (Belisarius Begging for Alms, 1781). For Belisarius in later opera, see Baker, Justinian and the Later Roman Empire, 76–77.
2. The trope of Belisarius as blind beggar in ancient accounts is accepted by Stanhope, Life of Belisarius, 208–9—a narrative long rejected by most historians, given that the story is attributed to the eleventh-century chronicler Michael Psellus, some five hundred years after the death of Belisarius. The supposed final reduction to indigence probably represents some sort of emblematic encapsulation of the lifelong slights shown the general by the emperor and his wife.
3. On the possibility of the historian Procopius being the same Procopius who supposedly conducted the trial, see Evans, Age of Justinian, 257. Cf. Cameron, Procopius, 229–30, for the radical change of views of Procopius toward Belisarius, Justinian, and Theodora.
4. On the fascination with Belisarius in later literature and art, especially during the Romantic period, see Cameron, Procopius, 261.
5. Even as Justinian rebuilt the city, reconquered Italy and Africa, and codified Roman law, fifth-century-A.D. Christianity was torn apart by schisms between Arianists, Monophysites, Dyrophysites, Donatists, Manicheans, and splits between Eastern and Western Orthodoxy. On the religious turmoil, see Moorhead, Justinian, 125–43.
6. Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, 87–210, discusses “The Disappearance of Comfort” in the years after the collapse in the west.
7. Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, 59: “The decisive factor that weighed in favor of the East was not the greater power of its armies and their consequent greater success in battle, but a single chance of geography—a thin band of sea (the Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, and Dardanelles), in places less than 700 metres wide, that separates Asia from Europe.”
8. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix’s classic economic argument for Roman decline (which largely focuses on the east) cites the rise of the Christian bureaucracies, unproductive ecclesiastical ownership of vast estates, and bloated religious orders, e.g., Class Struggle, 491–93.
9. “Byzantine,” as a pejorative adjective, derives from the hostility of the Western post-Roman period. The term was popularized in modern times through Edward Gibbon’s contempt for the empire. Treadgold, History of Byzantium, 1–6, discusses the usual prejudices. On the impregnability of Constantinople, see Kaegi, Byzantine Military Unrest, 19–20.
10. For the traditional view, largely supported by archaeological evidence, that the fifth-century barbarian invasions marked a radical decline in the standard of living and security of life in the western Roman provinces, again, see, Ward-Perkins, Fall of Rome, 182–83.
11. Lee, Empire at War, 128–29. There is little evidence that taxes went down, or security increased, when Justinian’s occupying generals imposed temporary order in the wake of the Vandalic and Gothic defeats.
12. Procopius, History of the Wars, 1.12.20–22. A review of the ancient sources concerning Belisarius’ career before the Persian campaign is found in the valuable synopsis in Hughes, Belisarius, 45.
13. It was central to Justinian’s thinking—again, in the manner that German strategists between the world wars lectured on the need to avoid another two-front conflict—that the east must be quiet before he could pursue his dream of recovering Roman provinces in the west (cf., e.g., Procopius, History of the Wars, 3.9.23–10.25).
14. On Justinian’s “Persian Problem,” see Baker, Justinian and the Later Roman Empire, 112–20.
15. Disputed payments and the falling out with the Persians are summarized in Moorhead, Justinian, 21–25.
16. The outbreak of fighting did not go particularly well for the Byzantines; see the brief account in Procopius, History of the Wars, 1.13.
17. On the Byzantine plan at Dara, see Hughes, Belisarius, 57–59, and the vivid account in Procopius, History of the Wars, 1.13–15.
18. Battle of Callinicum: Procopius, History of the Wars, 1.1.18–20.
19. For a brief assessment of the first Persian campaign, see Moorhead, Justinian, 22–24.
20. There is a lively discussion of the nature of the Blue/Green factions in Norwich, Byzantium, 184–85, especially the identification of the establishment party of the Blues with religious orthodoxy, the Greens with Monophy-site heresy. And cf. Procopius, Secret History, 7.8–30; Kaldellis, Prokopios, 136–44.
21. According to Procopius—often no fan of Theodora—only the obstinacy and calmness of Theodora convinced her husband to stay, fight, and die if need be as royals (e.g., “Royalty is a good burial shroud,” History of the Wars, 1.24.38).
22. The apparent fright of the emperor may have convinced some of the rioters to look toward a replacement like Hypatius. If Justinian’s temporary loss of confidence turned riots into insurrection, the emperor emerged from the Nika crisis forever suspicious of subordinates. The irony of Belisarius’ predicament is that his prompt action saved the emperor, who was convinced never again to be in a position in which a Belisarius might have to intervene to save the head of state. It would later prove to have been a dangerous thing for Belisarius to have seen his emperor once so weak and needy. On the wavering of Justinian at the key moment of the outbreak, see Stanhope, Life of Belisarius, 26–27. And again on the role of Theodora: Ure, Justinian and His Age, 201–4.
2
3. Procopius, History of the Wars, 1.24.40–41. Procopius’ view that Belisarius was the key to the victory over the rioters is discussed in Cameron, Procopius, 159. In the ancient world, combat experience mattered far more than numbers. Belisarius’ contingents were in some ways analogous to Julius Caesar’s small forces that crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C. and panicked the much larger, but largely green, legionary armies of Pompey and the Senate. On the vast numbers slaughtered, see Procopius 1.24.54–56.
24. Antonia was the daughter of a lowborn charioteer and actress; see the discussion of her pedigree in Hughes, Belisarius, 68–69. In Procopius’ view, she was “the most able of all people to achieve the unachievable (History of the Wars, 1.25.13). And cf. Secret History, 1.12–20; Gibbon, Decline and Fall, 4.41 (294); Ure, Justinian and His Age, 205–8.
25. For Procopius’ review of the origins of the Vandal kingdom in North Africa and prior tragic Byzantine efforts to rout them out, see History of the Wars, 3.12–18.
26. The Persians later complained that they had been fooled into signing the supposed “Endless Peace” without realizing that it was an inducement for the Byzantines to increase their power to the west. They soon sent envoys to Constantinople ostensibly for a share in the loot to come from North Africa; cf. Procopius, History of the Wars, 1.26.3–4.
27. It is somewhat unclear why the young Belisarius was given the all-important command of confronting the Vandals. Friendship of the emperor and success against the Persians and the Greens may explain the choice, as well as Belisarius’ proven ability to win over host populations. His native Latin fluency would come in handy in a western province of the old empire. Cf. Hughes, Belisarius, 74–75, for the command and size of the expedition.
28. On the Byzantine landing and plans of Belisarius, cf. Norwich, Byzantium, 208–10.
29. Procopius, History of the Wars, 3.16.1–2; cf. de Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, 482.
30. Stanhope, Life of Belisarius, 53, points out that while Belisarius had matched the achievement of Scipio more than 700 years earlier in taking Carthage, unlike his predecessor, he did not inflict a Roman peace, but rather “far surpassed him in clemency and consideration for the vanquished.”
31. Procopius, History of the Wars, 3.17.6.
32. Procopius, History of the Wars, 4.1.15.
33. Rumor of the size of the booty tended to obsess Byzantine occupation troops in Africa for years, cf. Stanhope, Life of Belisarius, 57 and 59–60 for the general ebullience at the capital. Many of the original architectural and artistic masterpieces of Rome now made their way to Constantinople, after a century’s detour to Vandal-held North Africa.
34. On the origins of the war, see Jacobsen, Gothic War, 75–86. The “slavery” of the Italians, cf. Procopius, History of the Wars, 5.8.15–20.
35. Procopius, History of the Wars, 2.22.1.
36. Procopius gives a vivid description of the carnage and depopulation during these times. In exaggerated fashion, he claimed five million perished in the serial fighting. See Stanhope’s review, Life of Belisarius, 77–78.
37. It is hard to determine whether Italian natives considered their well-known Gothic overseers or the rather strange, Greek-speaking Byzantines the true foreign occupiers. Neither were native Latin speakers, and the customs of Constantinople were perhaps more foreign than those of an accustomed Gothic-ruled Rome.
38. On the elaborate siege, the numbers of attackers, and the condition of the defenses, see Jacobsen, Gothic War, 95–132.
39. Narses, although a sometimes brilliant commander and court insider, was in his sixties and without much recent military experience. He was likely sent to ensure that the now widely popular and extremely rich Belisarius would not return to usurp imperial authority. Accordingly, Narses was sent home when he was assured that Belisarius would not claim the new reclaimed western provinces as his own. On the elaborate siege, see Jacobsen, Gothic War, 157–59.
40. On the personal magnetism and heroism of Belisarius, Procopius has much to say: History of the Wars, 5.18.10–15.
41. Offers of kingship were made to Belisarius by the Goths: Procopius, History of the Wars, 5.18.10–15.
42. Procopius, History of the Wars, 2.1.1–3.
43. Procopius, History of the Wars, 2.13.23–26. At this point, the vaunted Byzantine strategy of paying bribes to Persians to keep on their side of the border was shown to be somewhat shortsighted, inasmuch as Justinian’s western expeditions had made it almost impossible to back any agreement with Chosroes with credible force. For Procopius’ additional gossipy view of the second Persian War, see also Kaldellis, Prokopios, 12–15.
44. Procopius enumerates the various complaints of the Lazicans in a long, obsequious speech of their envoys to Chosroes (History of the Wars, 2.15.14–34).
45. For the terrible outbreak of bubonic plague that reached the capital in spring 542, see Rosen, Justinian’s Flea, 209–12; Treadgold, Byzantine State, 196–217. For at least three months the average rate of death in the plague-infested capital might have soared from a normal twenty to thirty a day to between 2,000 and 3,000. See Luttwak, Grand Strategy, 87–94, who, expanding on Treadgold, makes a number of original arguments why the plague has hitherto been underestimated as a factor in stymieing Justinian’s strategies.
46. On the plague and an assessment of the second Persian War, see Hughes, Belisarius, 199–201; Luttwak, Grand Strategy, 87–91; Treadgold, Byzantine State, 192–96. And cf. the relevant passages in Procopius, History of the Wars, 2.26–30.
47. Procopius, History of the Wars, 2.22–24; cf. Secret History, 4.1–8.
48. For the intrigue, see the discussion in Norwich, Byzantium, 233–34, who rightly emphasizes that the need for Belisarius’ proven talents in the deteriorating provinces alone saved him from court retribution.
49. Procopius did not go back to Italy in 544 (Cameron, Procopius, 14).
50. It is likely that the losses to the plague, suspicion of Belisarius, and the toll of over a decade of continual warring all explain the scanty supplies sent to Belisarius, who in his second invasion of Italy was short of both provisions and money. Cf. Baker, Justinian and the Later Roman Empire, 160–61.
51. For the mess in Italy in the 540s and the final recall of Belisarius from the west, see Moorhead, Justinian, 101–15; and cf. Procopius’s charges of incompetence: Kaldellis, Prokopios, 21–23.
52. There is a brief assessment of Belisarius’ second Italian command and the subsequent role of Narses in Norwich, Byzantium, 244–45.
53. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s poem “Belisarius” ends with the last two stanzas:
Ah! vainest of all things
Is the gratitude of kings.
The plaudits of the crowd
Are but the clatter of feet
At midnight in the street,
Hollow and restless and loud.
But the bitterest disgrace
Is to see forever the face
Of the Monk of Ephesus!
The unconquerable will
This, too, can bear;—I still
Am Belisarius!
In the subhead I have adapted the second to the last line by the addition of “I” (“I can bear”).
54. Belisarius found himself called upon to be an emissary between the feuding emperor Justinian and Pope Vigilius in the so-called crisis of the “Three Chapters,” in which Orthodox Christians fought the Monophysites over the question of whether Jesus Christ had both a human and divine nature (Orthodox) or was always wholly divine (Monophysite). For the religious wars, see again Ure, Justinian and His Age, 121–38.
55. During the career of Belisarius, the emperor expanded its territory by nearly 45 percent, and yet the army did not permanently increase, and, if anything, due to the plague, perhaps shrank. Agathias (Histories, 5.7) claimed that Justinian had allowed imperial forces on all fronts to fall from 645,000 to scarcely 150,000—no doubt in large part because of the devastating outbreak of 542.
56. There is a lengthy account of
Zabergan’s raid in Agathias’ Histories, 5.5–27; and cf. the quotes at 5.15.8 and 5.20.5.
57. There is still some disagreement on the actual end of Belisarius. Stanhope long ago made the case that the popular legends about the beggar Belisarius were in fact plausible (Stanhope, Life of Belisarius, 208–9).
58. On the accomplishments of Belisarius and what might have been, see Hughes, Belisarius, 244–45. “Name can never die,” cf. Gibbon, Decline and Fall, 4.43 (458). For the role of the plague in derailing traditional Byzantine grand strategy and prompting renewed emphasis on diplomatic initiatives, Luttwak’s analyses are excellent and need more dissemination (Grand Strategy, 92–94).
59. Cf. Baker, Justinian and the Later Roman Empire, 75–76, who cites his only—and perhaps fatal—flaw: “his exceedingly trusting and pliant nature” that ensured that Belisarius was often on the wrong end of court intrigue, much of it instigated by his own wife, Antonia. On the loyalty of Belisarius, see Kaegi, Byzantine Military Unrest, 42.
60. Delbrück, Barbarian Invasions, 340–41. We are not sure why Procopius praised and then later damned Belisarius. The about-face may have reflected the general’s own fortunes at the court in Constantinople, or perhaps Procopius saw originally in Belisarius a sort of magnificent hero who might take on Justinian and Theodora but whose unquestioned loyalty in the end meant to Procopius that the maverick, in fact, was little different from other toadies and intriguers, and bullied by a scoundrel like Antonia. Or, most likely, Procopius proved an encomiast when an ascendant Belisarius was of value to his own career and a critic when he became a liability. Cf. Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea, 145–47. Roman discipline under Belisarius: Lee, Empire at War, 122–23.
61. Procopius, History of the Wars, 2.16.7.
62. Liddell Hart, Way to Win Wars, 50–56.
63. The multifaceted nature of the Byzantine military is reviewed by Delbrück, Barbarian Invasions, 342–45.
The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost—From Ancient Greece to Iraq Page 33
