by Gant, Jim
A strategy of tribal engagement will require a complete paradigm shift at the highest levels of our military organization.
So…what is the answer? My hope is that you will find it as you read through this paper.
You get a much different perspective on what this war means when you’re in a tribal village. You look down at the children and see the hope and trust and anticipation in their eyes. It puts a little more fire in your belly to do something that really matters.
FOREWORD
“Even if you take a Pashtun person to paradise by force, he will not go. He will go with you only by friendly means.”
– Inam-ur-Rahman, head of the Swat Valley Peace Committee in Pakistan
Afghanistan. I feel like I was born there. The greatest days of my entire life were spent in the Pesch Valley and Musa Qalay and with the great “Sitting Bull” (a tribal leader in the Konar Valley) who you will meet later in these pages.
I love the people and the rich history of Afghanistan. They will give you their last bite of food in the morning and then try and kill you in the evening. A people who, despite their great poverty, are as happy as any American I have ever met. A people who will fight and die for the sake of honor. A great friend and a worthy enemy.
I have been asked by several people inside and outside of the military, “Who is your audience for this paper? What are you trying to accomplish?”
The answer is that I have been trying to get back to Afghanistan for several years, to Konar Province, to my old stomping grounds. In June of 2008 I received orders to return there on a transition team. I started this paper as an individual “IPb” or Intelligence Preparation of the battlefield. It began as my attempt to “wrap my brain around” the tribal issues that I knew my team and I would have to face.
I am writing this paper to help myself and possibly others determine how to best utilize the most powerful aspect of Afghan society—the tribes and the tribal system—not only to help the United States accomplish its strategic goals, but to help the Afghan people achieve peace, stability and good governance.
Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs. This includes a central government located in Kabul, which to them is a million miles away from their problems, a million miles away from their security.
“Democracy” only has a chance to be cultivated at the local level by a small group of men—Tribal Engagement Teams—who are willing to dedicate their lives to the Afghan people and cause.
At a time when the outcome of the war in Afghanistan hangs in the balance, when high ranking military officers are asking for more troops, I believe the “light footprint” approach put forth in this paper will not only work, but will help to ease the need for larger and larger numbers of US soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan.
The central cultural fact about Afghanistan is that it is constituted of tribes. Not individuals, not Western-style citizens—but tribes and tribesmen. It is my deep belief—and the thesis of this paper—that the answer to the problems that face the Afghan people, as well as other future threats to US security in the region, will be found in understanding and then helping the tribal system of Afghanistan to flourish.
I firmly believe that a relatively small number of special officers and noncommissioned officers could maintain influence on large portions of Afghanistan by advising, assisting, training and leading local tribal security forces (Arbakai) and building strong relationships with the tribes they live alongside.
One Tribe at a Time reflects what I believe to be the one strategy that can help both the US and the people of Afghanistan by working directly with their centuries-old tribal system. We can only do this by giving top priority to the most important political, social and military force in Afghanistan—the tribes. We must engage these tribes at a close and personal level with a much deeper cultural understanding than we have ever had before.
When we gain the respect and trust of one tribe, in one area, a domino effect will spread throughout the region and beyond. One tribe will eventually become twenty-five or even fifty tribes. This can only have a long-term positive effect on the current situation. It is, however, not without pitfalls and difficulty.
But it can and must be done.
This is my vehicle after it hit an IED on the night of 24 Nov 2006 during my last tour in Iraq. The explosion flipped it three times and it was on fire when it landed. I was pinned inside and could not get out. I remember thinking, “So this is how it ends…” then I lost consciousness. My Iraqis somehow pulled me out and took care of me. Although I want to go back to Afghanistan so badly, I owe the Iraqis my life—and if they still need me, I feel obligated to go.
Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs.
INTRODUCTION
The US has been in Afghanistan for eight years. We have fought hard and accomplished some good. Tactically, we have not lost a battle. Despite the lethal sophistication of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat, we defeat the Taliban in every engagement. But are we closer to our goals than we were eight years ago? Are the Afghan people closer to a stable way of life? Are we closer to our national strategic objectives there?
Based on my time in Afghanistan—and my study of the region, tribes, counterinsurgency (COIN) and unconventional warfare (UW)—positive momentum in Afghanistan depends on the US forces’ support for the tribal systems already in place. Take it a step further and “advise, assist, train and lead” tribal security forces (Arbakais) much like we have been doing with the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Afghanistan National Police (ANP).
I will get into the specifics later in this paper, but what I believe must happen is a tribal movement supported by the US which allows the tribal leaders and the tribes they represent to have access to the local, district, provincial, and national leadership. This process has to be a “bottom-up” approach.
There is no shortage of information detailing Afghan corruption at all levels of government. This directly affects the tribes. If the national government cannot protect “us,” if US forces cannot protect “us,” if we cannot protect ourselves…the only answer is to side with the Taliban. How can you blame anyone for that? I would do the same. As we all know, the answers to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan have no purely military answer. However, the political strategy of governing from Kabul or fighting the war from there is clearly not working. It never has. More importantly, it never will.
Afghanistan has never had a strong central government. A strategy in which the central government is the centerpiece of our counterinsurgency plan is destined to fail. It disenfranchises the very fabric of Afghan society. The tribal system in Afghanistan has taken a brutal beating for several decades. By supporting and giving some power back to the tribes, we can make positive progress in the region once again.
Even the people who advise our national policymakers see the need to engage the tribes. “The Afghan government is not competent enough to deal with the dire threats that currently face Afghanistan,” says Seth Jones, an analyst at the RAND Corporation who advises the Pentagon. “This means working with tribal leaders.” (Jones 2008, Sappenfield 2008)
I have fought on the battlefields of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is by far the more difficult and brutal operational environment. The enemy there has never been defeated. Time is on their side. Trust me. I have sat face to face with Afghans, both friends and enemies, who endure unimaginable hardships. They will do it, their children will do it and their children’s children will do it. They own all the time.
When one says “Afghan people” what I believe they are really saying is “tribal member.” Every single Afghan is a part of a tribe and understands how the tribe operates and why. This is key for us to understand. Understanding and operating within the tribe is the only way we can ever know who our friends and enemies are, how the Afghan people think and what is important to them. Because, abov
e all, they are tribesmen first.
It is a matter of national security that the US government and specifically the military grasp the importance of the tribes and learn to operate comfortably in a tribal setting. This paper is about why and how we need to engage the tribal structure present in Afghanistan.
A strategy in which the central government is the centerpiece of our counterinsurgency plan is destined to fail. It disenfranchises the very fabric of Afghan society.
1
DEFINING “WIN”
We have killed thousands and thousands of the “enemy” in Afghanistan and it clearly has not brought us closer to our objectives there. We could kill thousands more and still not be any closer five years from now.
Everyone talks about “winning” in Afghanistan. But what does that mean? The most current definition from President Obama is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” the terrorist network, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. More importantly, the president also added, “and to prevent the return of al-Qaeda in either country in the future.”
Although a topic for another paper, US forces in Afghanistan have accomplished that mission and could continue to do so until our national or political will to stay there runs out—and everyone knows this time is quickly approaching.
We cannot make progress in Afghanistan through a war of attrition or a war of exhaustion. As I have said and will continue to say, time is on their side. In an insurgency, all the insurgents have to do is not lose. All they have to do is wear down the will of the counterinsurgent and in this case, the will of the American people and the American politicians.
Either approach (attrition or exhaustion) will not work. We have killed thousands and thousands of the “enemy” in Afghanistan and it clearly has not brought us closer to our objectives there. Just as important is the fact that we could kill thousands more and still not be any closer five years from now.
My definition of “success” (that is, “win”) includes the one currently in use. I would add: “…to facilitate security and prosperity for the Afghan people.” In other words, the tribes.
We will be totally unable to protect the “civilians” in the rural areas of Afghanistan until we partner with the tribes for the long haul. Their tribal systems have been there for centuries and will be there for many more. Why should we fight against not only what they have been accustomed to for centuries, but what works for them? They will not change their tribal ways. And why should they?
Bottom Line
“Winning” in Afghanistan will be an elusive prospect until we base our operations within the cultural framework of the tribal systems already in place.
2
WE ARE LOSING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
The former military commander in charge of Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, said in March 2009, “The coalition is not winning the war against the resurgent Taliban in certain parts of the country.” (Cowell 2009)
Afghanistan has never had a strong central government and never will. That is a fact that we need to accept, sooner rather than later.
Time and US popular support is the strategic center of gravity (COG) for US forces.
Time and the population of not only Afghanistan but Pakistan is the strategic COG for the Taliban.
Using the old “find out what is important to your enemy and destroy it, and know what is important to you and protect it” won’t work in the current fight in Afghanistan. Make no mistake, the people (or politicians) of the US will get tired of the war and will eventually make the US military pull out.
Time is not on our side considering the current level of blood and treasure that we are expending. A war of exhaustion is unacceptable and a war of annihilation is not feasible. We do not have the patience or the resources to stay on our current course.
The sophistication of Taliban attacks in Afghanistan has risen in the last two years to a point where we can clearly see that they will continue to adapt to our strategies and tactics.
The US also is losing the information battle. We do not get our message out as effectively as the Taliban does. Our tactical PSYOP (Psychological Operations) is not responsive enough to make the impact we need at the small unity level.
Recruitment for the Taliban is not waning; it is in fact increasing. The US has killed tens of thousands of “insurgents” in Afghanistan, but we are no closer to victory today than we were in 2002.
Pakistan, and in particular, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP) will play a major role in the success or failure of the US counterinsurgency (COIN) effort in Afghanistan, as well as the overall stability of the region. These “ungoverned areas” in Pakistan are among the few areas where al-Qaeda needs to maintain some amount of physical control so they can train and plan in safety. Why is this important? Because these areas are tribal in nature. As I will describe later in the paper, many of the tribes in eastern Afghanistan straddle these border regions. If we can influence the entire tribe on both sides of the border, the US can have greater influence in the entire region.
I like using analogies. If the war in Afghanistan is a boxing match, here’s what’s happening: The US has won every round but has not been able to knock them (Taliban) out. The fight has no limit on the number of rounds that can be fought. We will continue to punish them, but never win the fight. It will go on indefinitely or until we (the US) grow tired and quit.
The only existing structure that offers governance and security for the Afghan people is at the tribal level. We should leverage this and use it to our advantage—before it is too late.
Bottom Line:
We are losing the war in Afghanistan because, simply put, we are not “winning.” All the Taliban has to do is not lose.
We’ve got the watches, but they’ve got the time.
– Army saying in Afghanistan
3
TRIBES UNDERSTAND PEOPLE, PROTECTION, POWER AND PROJECTION
First, tribes understand people. Being illiterate does not mean unintelligent. Tribesmen are extremely adept at understanding one another and others. As I have preached and preached to the Special Forces officers headed to Afghanistan that I have trained in the unconventional warfare (UW) portion of their training, “You damn well better know yourself because they know you.” The Afghan people have a knack for looking straight through deception and incompetence.
Trust me when I tell you, not only are they as smart as you are, they know they are.
Second, tribes understand protection. Tribes are organized and run to ensure the security of the tribe. Not only physical security, but revenue and land protection. But most important of all is the preservation of the tribal name and reputation. Honor is everything in a tribal society. Tribes will fight and die over honor alone (I will speak more about this later). This concept is not understood by a vast majority of strategists who are trying to find solutions to challenges we are facing in Afghanistan.
When honor is at stake, tribal members stop at nothing to preserve their tribe’s integrity and “face.”
Tribes are the most important aspect of Afghan society and have been for centuries.
Third, tribes understand power. How many guns do we have? How many warriors can I put in the field? Can I protect my tribe? Can I attack others who threaten my tribe? Can I back my words or decisions up with the ability to come down the valley and kill you? Can I keep you from killing me?
Lastly, tribes understand projection. Tribes have no “strategic goals” in the Western sense. Their diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) priorities are almost without exception in reference to other tribes.
Can I project my power across the valley? Does the tribe across the river know not to come over here and meddle in my affairs? Does the Taliban know that they are not welcome here? Can I influence decisions, either by force or otherwise, outside of my tribe?
Tribes offer their members security, safety, structure and significance. What other institutio
ns do that right now in Afghanistan?
“Tribes,” says RAND Senior Fellow David Ronfeldt in his paper, “Tribes—The First and Forever Form,” “can foster a sense of social solidarity. [Belonging to a tribe] fills people with pride and self-respect. It motivates families to protect, welcome and care for each other and to abide by strict rituals that affirm their connections as tribal members to their ancestors, land and deity. This kinship creates trust and loyalty in which one knows and must uphold one’s rights, duties and obligations. What maintains order in a tribe is mutual respect, dignity, pride and honor.”
Tribes by nature are conservative. They hate change and they don’t change. “The more tribal the society, the more resistant it will be to change.” (Ronfeldt 2006, 73). The tribal system has been the means of governance in Central Asia for centuries. It has resisted and defeated invaders since Cyrus the Great. The more an alien force tries to change the way tribes live, the more the tribes resist.
“What maintains order in a tribe is not hierarchy and law, but a code that stresses mutual respect, dignity, pride, and honor.”
-David Ronfeldt, “Tribes—
The First and Forever Form”
What about democracy? A tribe is a “natural democracy.” In Afghan shuras and jirgas (tribal councils), every man’s voice has a chance to be heard. The fact that women and minority groups have no say in the process does not make it less effective nor less of a democracy to them. Asking them to change the way they have always conducted their business through their jirgas and shuras just does not make sense.
