by Gant, Jim
Sectarianism in Iraq versus government misrule in Afghanistan
The strength of Arab tribes in al-Anbar versus Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s unique history of warlordism
The major rift in the al-Anbar insurgency versus the minor rifts in the Afghan insurgency
Arab tribal customs in Iraq versus the Pashtun tribal code (Pashtunwali) in Afghanistan
The urban al-Anbar insurgency versus the rural Afghan insurgency
The IED and suicide attacks of the Anbar insurgents versus the small-unit tactics of the Afghan insurgents [Note: this point is not as valid in 2009 as it was in 2007.]
Fuel smuggling in al-Anbar versus the poppy trade in Afghanistan
The cross-border sanctuaries surrounding al-Anbar versus Pakistan’s tribal areas
We must learn to understand the tribe’s significance now.
Four Implications of These Differences
Government misrule and warlordism define the problem in Afghanistan. Without reducing the abusive behavior of the government and their warlord clients, it is hard to see how security measures will have a long-lasting effect.
Together, the large sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal area and the poppy trade make the insurgency resilient. They may have the wherewithal to go round after round, fighting season after fighting season.
The fragmented nature of the tribal system, the absence of a major rift between tribes and the insurgents, and the feuding of Pashtunwali demand patience and forethought in the planning and execution of tribal engagement efforts. Small scale community successes are more likely than large-scale province-wide successes.
Pashtunwali, a rural environment, and the tactical skills of the insurgency call for a re-thinking of the tactics of counterinsurgency. Some tactics, most notably cordon and searches, air strikes, and population control measures may need to be restrained. Because of Pashtunwali, their costs may exceed their benefits.
“It’s the Tribes, Stupid”
Steven Pressfield’s videos/writings on tribalism are the most useful resources I have found on understanding tribalism. The author of Gates of Fire and The Afghan Campaign has a blog called “It’s the Tribes, Stupid,” which provides the historical and conceptual context for a tribal engagement strategy in Afghanistan.
See it at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com.
What Scares Me Most
On a personal note, my gravest concern is that a Tribal Engagement Strategy in some form will indeed be adopted and implemented, but that the US may eventually again abandon Afghanistan—and the tribes to whom we have promised long-term support will be left to be massacred by a vengeful Taliban.
I will get on a helicopter tonight, armed with an AK-47 and three hundred rounds of ammunition, and put my life on the line and my strategy to the test. Will you do the same?
This is by far the worst outcome we could have.
It is immoral and unethical to ask a tribe to help us and promise them support and then leave them to defend themselves on their own. If our forces do withdraw from Afghanistan, we should decide now to arm the tribes who support us with enough weapons and ammunition to survive after we leave.
A Commitment to the Tribes and People of Afghanistan
I emphasized at the beginning of this paper that I am neither a strategist nor an academic. I know there will be many criticisms that span all levels of war, from military personnel to pundits.
But I also know this: I will get on a helicopter tonight, armed with an AK-47 and three hundred rounds of ammunition and put my life on the line and my strategy to the test. Will you do the same?
Bottom Line:
There may be dozens of reasons not to adopt this strategy. But there is only one reason to do so—we have to. Nothing else will work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost I want to thank the great warriors of ODA 316. It seems like so long ago. No one will ever believe how much we did with so little in those early days in the Konar. We have all continued to fight and have taken it to the enemy at every opportunity. Leading you was the greatest honor of my life.
Initial members of ODA 316 (by rank):
Ron Bryant
Al Lapene
Chuck Burroughs
Mark Read
Tony Siriwardene
Scott Gross
Dan McKone
James Tierney
Travis Weitzel
Luke Murray
Brent Watson
Dave Casson
Second, my good friend Steve Pressfield. Only he knows what his words have meant to me. I would not have done this without him. He is a great author and historian. He is a better friend.
Third, my wife. She has put up with all the long deployments and all the “baggage” that comes with that. And thanks for all the hours you let me spend in front of the computer just before my upcoming deployment in Iraq.
Fourth, my dad. “The best team always wins…”
Lastly, my second “father,” friend, fellow warrior and great leader, Malik Noor Afzhal, “Sitting Bull.” It was my greatest wish in all the world that I would get to see him with my own eyes again and say, “Sitting Bull, I told you I would come back. I told you I would return.” I could have died a happy man had that happened.
REFERENCES
Sappenfield, Mark. 2008. “To Fight Taliban, US Eyes Afghan Tribes.” The Christian Science Monitor, October 16. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2008/1016/p01s04-wosc.html
Cowell, Alan. 2009 “US General Says Allies ‘Not Winning’ Afghan War.” New York Times, March 9. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10afghan.html?_r=0
Pressfield, Steven. “It’s the Tribes, Stupid.” http://www.stevenpressfield.com/vblog/
Ronfeldt, David. 2006. “Tribes—The First and Forever Form.” RAND Corporation, December: 5, 7, 29, 35, 39, 59, 65, 68, 72, 73, 76. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2007/RAND_WR433.pdf
McCallister, William. 2008. “Operations in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Small Wars Journal, January 30: 4, 7. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/operations-in-pakistans-tribal-areas.
Malkasian, Carter, and Meyerle, Jerry. 2009. “How is Afghanistan Different from Al Anbar?” CNA Analysis and Solutions (February): 5-7, 11. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498368.pdf
Yusufzai, Rahimullah. “Help the Pashtuns.” Foreign Policy Magazine. A daily newspaper in Peshawar.
Jones, Seth G. 2008 “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.” RAND Counterinsurgency Study 4: xiii, xi, 7, 10, 122.
Moreau, Ron, and Yousafzai, Sami. 2009. “Obama’s Vietnam,” Newsweek (February): 32-33.
Kilcullen, David. 2008. “It’s still winnable, but only just,” Interesting Times (November 14).
Kelly, Justin. 2009. “How to Win Afghanistan,” Quadrant (April 1): 5. http://www.quadrant.org.au/magazine/issue/2009/4/how-to-win-in-Afghanistan
Rosenau, William. 2008. “Low-Cost Trigger-Pullers,” RAND National Security Research Division (October): p.22
Giustozzi, Antonio. 2008. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop. New York: Columbia University Press.
Tariq, Mohammad Osman. 2008. “Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan,” Crisis States Research Centre (December): 10.
Wilkinson, Marwat. 2008. “Tribal Chief Takes on Taliban with His Own Army,” London Daily Telegraph (September 23): 14.
DeYoung. 2008. “Pakistan Will Give Arms to Tribal Militias,” Washington Post (October 23): 1.
Roe, Major Andrew M. British Army. 2005. “To Create a Stable Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Good Governance, and a Splash of History,” Military Review (November-December): 20.
2009. “Obama Keeps Karzai at Arm’s Length,” The Washington Post (May 6).
Taylor, Richard L. 2005. “Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Strategy,” Strategic Studies Institute (August): 9.
, Jim, One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan
