by Tom Mahon
This plan contains so many improbabilities and assumptions that one would be forgiven for thinking that it had been drawn up by Hans Christian Andersen. What on earth drove O’Donnell (who was, most likely, the principal author) to think that the Free State army could be somehow peacefully disbanded? And why would de Valera submit again to the vagaries of the IRA? What would be the reaction of the unionists of Northern Ireland? How would the IRA defend itself against a British attack?
Though Twomey promoted the plan in public, in private he was less sanguine. He admitted he was prepared to back down in the face of opposition within the IRA: ‘If [there is] any opposition [within the IRA] we will not pursue the matter.’264 And even before formal meetings were held with representatives of Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil he wrote: ‘We are doubtful if either political party as such will accept our basis [for the discussions]. Sinn Féin may absolutely refuse to cooperate with Fianna Fáil on any basis and Fianna Fáil [are] likely to regard [the] proposals as too revolutionary … We believe coordination [is] most difficult, but intend that a decision shall be arrived at without delay.’ His hope was that infuential ‘Individuals in each party may force acceptance’ on their more reluctant colleagues.265
On 5 April the Army Council formally gave its backing to the proposal, provided it was also approved by a specially convened meeting of the senior officers along with representatives of the local units.266 This meeting was held on 9 April. Following the administration of an ‘oath of secrecy’, Moss Twomey made an opening speech in which he stated that the proposal ‘was an effort to keep the Army [IRA] together’ and that ‘an opportunity exists for overthrowing the present Colonial administration’. He was concerned that ‘if the present Government is re-elected it would be difficult to maintain the Organisation [IRA] for another six years.’ But to reach an agreement the parties would have to make concessions: ‘Sinn Féin [must] agree not to insist on an immediate proclamation of the Republic should a [republican] majority be secured and Fianna Fáil [must] agree not to enter the Free State legislature as a minority party.’
In particular, Twomey and the delegates discussed the thorny problem of what to do with the Free State army. Officially the proposals called for ‘the abolition of a standing army and the organisation of the defence forces on a territorial basis’, the ‘territorial basis’ meaning, in effect, the IRA. The process would begin with ‘the removal from Dublin and vicinity of all enemy military forces, and this being done, that they be disarmed and demobilised. All armament be placed under the control of Oglaigh na h-Éireann [IRA]’. Finally, the Army Council would act as an advisory body to the new Minister for Defence.
Peadar O’Donnell suggested that: ‘The Free State Army might fight against disbandment but we could meet and beat them on the grounds of economic necessity.’ If successful, this would have been an event unparalleled in history! An army defeated by a discussion of economic theory. Twomey and Russell were, however, more realistic. Twomey ‘believed a military situation would ensue in which the Army [IRA] could use a strong hand’, and to meet this threat the Dublin brigade would need to be strengthened. After the Free State army was neutralised, the IRA would be ‘in a position to meet the English’. Russell, though against the proposals, concurred with Twomey that ‘a military situation would probably arise from which the Army would benefit.’
As Twomey and Russell envisaged fighting in Dublin, how would the IRA have had a realistic chance of defeating the army? Either by using a masterly surprise attack or with the use of weapons which the army couldn’t defend against. Twomey didn’t answer the question. But it may be more than coincidence that around this time he was writing to the IRA representatives in America inquiring about both tear gas weapons and poisonous mustard gas (see Chapter 7). ‘Mr Jones’ wrote to Twomey in late April that the IRA could capture Dublin by using tear gas weapons and at the same time avoid civilian casualties.267
While an overwhelming majority of delegates supported the proposals, a number of the more militant members voted against them on the basis that they would end up merely ensnaring the organisation in party politics. This was Russell’s position, though he said he wouldn’t work against the proposals if they were approved. The OC of Cork 1 brigade said that the IRA ‘should have nothing to do with present day politics’ and George Plunkett ‘was against anything that savoured of going near Leinster House’.
Before the meeting ended, Peadar O’Donnell was able to come up with another idea – that in the newly declared republic the role of the gardaí might become superfluous: ‘If you have the high moral Volunteer spirit there would be no need for the police.’268
The Army Council next moved quickly to get the approval of both Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil, by meeting with senior members from each party – many of whom were also IRA members.269 These meetings were held while de Valera was in America. Given that Twomey regarded him as the ‘chief obstacle in Fianna Fáil’, this was at the very least a fortunate coincidence.270 However, Twomey greatly under-estimated de Valera if he thought the other members of Fianna Fáil could (or would try to) force him to accept an agreement. Twomey wrote: ‘De Valera we believe [is] an obstacle to such an agreement [that would be] satisfactory to Sinn Féin and us. Many of his followers [are] anxious to get [an] agreement in his absence and force it on him. Seán T [Ó Ceallaigh, vice-president of Fianna Fáil] is most anxious for this.’271
Twomey also used the possibility of the pact to try and get desperately needed funding for the IRA, from both the Russians and Irish-Americans. In these attempts he pretended to be far more optimistic of the chances of success. Knowing that the Soviets dearly wanted to see the collapse of the British empire, he asked them for £5,000 and suggested that a republican victory would result in the newly declared Irish Republic withdrawing from the British Commonwealth, which would ultimately undermine the empire through a domino effect (see Chapter 8). In a letter marked ‘secret and urgent’ he wrote to Connie Neenan discussing a possible fund-raising trip to Moscow with Seán Russell: ‘I am keen on this trip … [to Moscow] in view of [the] great probability of coordination between Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil, and their winning of the election.’ The upbeat tone of this letter is in marked contrast to his more realistic assessment in other correspondence. In May when it was clear that there was to be no agreement, Twomey wrote to the OC in Britain telling him not to inform the Soviet intelligence officer ‘James’, in case it would dissuade the Soviets from providing money: ‘Our effort to secure coordination between [the] republican bodies for the election failed. Do not mention anything about this to ‘James’ should you see him.’272
Twomey urged Neenan to raise as much money as possible in the US: ‘We must have all [the] cash possible from you. Do your utmost, even borrow if you possibly can. If we secure coordination, in addition to military expenditure, we may under certain conditions expend money on [the] election.’273 It’s also evident from this statement that Twomey felt that if the plan succeeded there would likely be fghting in Dublin.
The insurmountable obstacle was that Sinn Féin wanted an assurance that Fianna Fáil wouldn’t enter the Dáil in the event that only a minority of republican deputies were returned, while Fianna Fáil were prepared to take their seats provided there was a way to avoid taking the oath of allegiance.274 Twomey implied that the members of Fianna Fáil with whom he had met (including Seán T Ó Ceallaigh, P. J. Ruttledge and Tom Derrig) had agreed in principle to the plan – which amounted to a form of quasi-legitimate coup d’etat – but that the sticking point was what to do if the republican bloc didn’t gain a majority: ‘The proposals for setting up of [the] machinery for coordination during [the] election, the creation of a panel [of candidates] and the line of policy to be pursued if majority were got were acceptable The difficulty, of course, arose on the question if only a [republican] minority being secured. Sinn Féin would not cooperate with Fianna Fáil, while they [Fianna Fáil] [were] prepared to enter parliament on conditions. Fianna
Fáil would not forgo this portion of their policy. The effort failed on this point.’275
By late April the National Executive of Fianna Fáil replied to the Army Council that ‘it was unanimously decided that the proposals were not acceptable’ and the Council accepted that ‘the efforts of the Council had failed, and that no fresh attempt in the same direction should be undertaken’.276 Twomey wrote: ‘We tried our utmost to secure coordination between both political organisations for the election. We failed up to this and I can see no hope now … we feel [that] with coordination, enthusiasm could be aroused [among the electorate] and a majority got and that to get it was worth taking big risks … We found Fianna Fáil would be afraid to do anything in the way of meeting the situation in de Valera’s absence.’277 He added: ‘We found Sinn Féin very difficult to deal with and at times insulting.’278
But in fact one last attempt was made to secure agreement. On de Valera’s return to Ireland the Army Council sent a letter directly to him, which was most likely written by O’Donnell, in which he explained that he was writing to him as ‘the [Fianna Fáil] Executive may have felt reluctant to take such steps in your absence’, adding ‘Trusting you are very well after your tour abroad’.279 De Valera in a terse note rebuffed O’Donnell: ‘I am in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Executive.’280
And so ended O’Donnell and Twomey’s plan. The IRA moved quickly to remind volunteers of General Order 28 (GO 28) which forbade members from accepting nomination as a candidate for election to the Dáil.281 Twomey reported: ‘We are insisting on the rigid enforcement of GO 28 forbidding Volunteers from being [Dáil] candidates since [there are] no hopes of [a republican] majority with [the present] disunion.’282 However, the order hastened the resignation of many Fianna Fáil supporters.
The results of the June election largely vindicated de Valera’s strategy. Fianna Fáil won an impressive 26 per cent of the vote and forty-four seats, as against 27.4 per cent and forty-seven seats for Cumann na nGaedheal, while Sinn Féin imploded and only managed to win five seats. Among those elected was Frank Aiken.283 De Valera then led his deputies to the Dáil but had to withdraw when the clerk of the Dáil blocked their way – unless they complied with the ‘little formality’ of the oath.284 Over the summer de Valera tried to devise a manoeuvre to enter the Dáil without taking the oath, while Cosgrave for his part was determined to prevent him. Then on Sunday 10 July a shooting occurred which was to have a profound impact on Irish politics.
The killing of Kevin O’Higgins
Kevin O’Higgins was the most able parliamentarian in the Dáil and as vice-president of the Executive Council, Minister for Justice and Minister for External Affairs one of the most powerful members of Cumann na nGaedheal. Seán MacBride described him at the time as ‘the brains of the government’.285 Though he dealt firmly with the IRA, he was committed to a civil society based on law and order and had been instrumental in bringing the army under effective civilian control and was strongly critical of garda abuse of IRA prisoners. Seán MacBride later wrote: ‘I was not aware of any particular antagonism to Kevin O’Higgins on the republican side at that period … it was generally felt that he was trying to restore law and that he disapproved of … acts of violence undertaken by the CID or the military. The CID had become a little law unto its own at the time.’286 However, by the time MacBride wrote this in his memoir, his opinion had likely mellowed. But to some republicans O’Higgins was a much hated figure who (as Minister for Home Affairs) was held responsible for the execution of IRA prisoners during the Civil War, including that of Rory O’Connor, who had been the best man at his wedding. In 1923 Éamon de Valera had referred to him as a ‘scoundrel’.287
On that Sunday in July, as O’Higgins was walking to church in the south Dublin suburb of Booterstown, a hijacked car happened to pass by with three IRA volunteers on their way to a football match in Wexford. Recognising O’Higgins they jumped out of the car and, firing at him with their revolvers, mortally wounded him. He died five hours later at home.288 The three IRA men – Bill Gannon, Archie Doyle and Tim Coughlan – were never caught and their involvement only became known to the public in the 1980s.289
GHQ immediately denied responsibility for the attack and it’s unclear when it became aware of the identity of the perpetrators. Not surprisingly, the gardaí launched the most intensive investigation in the history of the Free State, which, however, produced nothing. Senior IRA leaders and associates were arrested, including Michael Fitzpatrick, George Plunkett and Frank Kerlin.290 Tom Merrigan was arrested but freed after priests at the Capuchin friary in Church Street stated that they had been talking to him at the time of the shooting. Merrigan was an IRA company captain, who in 1925 had helped place the bomb in the Masterpiece cinema and went on to become a member of the Dublin brigade staff.291 Jimmie Brennan, a Dublin quartermaster, was questioned by ‘about a dozen CID men [who] were around him all throwing questions & using filthy language. When he said he believed the IRA did not shoot O’Higgins he was told that is what the rank and file are told. They informed him to tell his intelligence [officer] there will be shooting over it.’292 As part of their investigation the Special Branch ordered IRA captain Michael Clark to put on ‘the clothes he wears on Sundays’ after they arrested him.293 Detectives also took away Tom Merrigan’s Sunday clothes.294
The gardaí, along with members of the IRA, also suspected ex-members of the Free State army – bitter about their treatment following the failed 1924 army mutiny.295 As late as September 1927 GHQ must still not have known who killed O’Higgins, for the director of intelligence told the OC in Waterford that it was ‘most important’ that he should investigate a report that ‘a doctor named McGuinness was in Waterford and was entertained by Dr Coughlin. McGuinness is reported as stating he attended O’Higgins after being shot [and] that O’Higgins recognised one of those who shot him and that they were Free Staters.’296
In late August Seán MacBride was arrested, even though he had a watertight alibi of being on the continent at the time and had bumped into a Cumann na nGaedheal TD with whom he was on friendly terms.297 He was ‘charged with conspiracy to murder’ but was eventually released in October.298 On his release, Andy Cooney warned the IRA that MacBride was likely being followed by police agents trying to capture other IRA leaders or discover safe houses: ‘Smith [Cooney] has an idea that they had a reason for letting Seán out and thinks that he will be closely watched for some time. [He] suggests that he remain very quiet.’299 In December the gardaí unsuccessfully tried to link Mick Price to the killing.300
Meanwhile the government’s immediate reaction was to pass an emergency Public Safety Act, but more importantly they enacted a law requiring every candidate for election to the Dáil on nomination to swear to take the oath. This forced de Valera’s hand, and on 11 August he led his deputies into Leinster House. There he pushed the bible to the side, covered the words of the oath and signed his name to the ledger. He later said he took no oath but merely put his name down on the ledger to gain admittance to the Dáil.301 Whatever the semantics, the significance of this occasion was that it marked the beginning of the ‘untreatying’ of the Free State, and it was de Valera and Fianna Fáil, not Moss Twomey and the IRA, who were to achieve this.
The entry of Fianna Fáil into the Dáil resulted in a vote of no confidence in the government which the government barely survived – forcing Cosgrave to dissolve the Dáil and call for an election in September. In the year’s second general election Fianna Fáil increased its share of the vote to 35 per cent and won fifty-seven seats. However, Cumann na nGaedheal also improved its position – winning 39 per cent and sixty-two seats – at the expense of the smaller parties.302 Fianna Fáil, in the words of Seán Lemass ‘a slightly constitutional party’, now entered a period of spirited opposition in the Dáil. Outwardly their rhetoric continued to be strongly republican but de Valera was firmly in control and committed to the ‘constitutional’ path. Though he was interested in
subsuming the IRA’s membership into the ranks of Fianna Fáil, he wasn’t going to share power with them.
For the IRA, 1927 ended on a relatively quiet note. In November eighty delegates attended an army convention in Dublin and passed a motion pledging support for Russia in the event of war with Britain.
WHILE, 1926 AND 1927 have been described as a time of reorganisation and stabilisation for the IRA, they were, in reality, a period of decline and marginalisation. The initiative had clearly passed to de Valera and Fianna Fáil. Though the IRA’s newly installed leadership – with the likes of Moss Twomey, Peadar O’Donnell and Seán MacBride – contained ample talent, it failed to show any real aptitude in guiding and developing the paramilitary organisation. At no time did it develop a coherent strategy or achievable goal, instead rushing from one dream to another.
The failure of the barrack raids should have alerted Twomey to the critical weaknesses of the IRA. Command authority – which is essential to the functioning of every army – had collapsed. Officers and men ran little risk of punishment for failure to obey orders (aside from the offence of informing) and most units lacked cohesion, being divided between supporters of GHQ and de Valera. Few volunteers had shown themselves prepared to kill (or be killed by the) gardaí or Free State soldiers. In short this was a force no longer capable of overthrowing the Free State or of fighting the British.303
Twomey was unable to reconstitute the IRA as a smaller, more disciplined and better trained clandestine organisation. The organisation failed to develop effective social and economic politics attuned to the Irish electorate and to the IRA’s own membership. Time was to vindicate Frank Aiken’s warning in the autumn of 1925 that ‘faith alone is no good for national salvation [the leadership] must use foresight and common sense’.304
