by Tom Mahon
The ‘most important arm of the Organisation [IRA]’ in Liverpool was the section covering the docks, also called the Special Service Section, which was staffed by the ‘old timers’.157 As well as smuggling weapons and explosives directly to Ireland they helped transfer munitions from ships arriving from New York and New Jersey onto boats crossing the Irish Sea. The IRA leadership was dissatisfied with the performance and discipline of these men, but at the same time dependent on them. Liam Pedlar, one of the leading IRA arms agents in New York, remarked in 1924 that ‘the last consignment [of weaponry] was taken to and fro a number of times causing much extra expense. I am told that pressure is being exercised to have one by the name of Fleming, put in charge there, and this is given as a reason for the disturbance. If it is the same party as I have had experience of they are N.G. [no good].’158 Pedlar claimed that during the ‘war period’ he could get ‘nothing done’ in Liverpool as Fleming and his comrades wouldn’t help him smuggle munitions over from the US, with the result that Pedlar had to send over his own agent to work in Liverpool.159 The adjutant general wrote to Seán Russell that he would have to give very specific instructions to the Liverpool IRA as to the procedure for receiving contraband from the US, detailing how they should contact the crew on the American boat, who should sign for the goods, etc: ‘Unless you put these down in black and white you will have plenty of trouble in Liverpool.’ He commented that the Liverpool men needed to be ordered exactly where to send the munitions as they frequently sent them directly to IRA units in Ireland they had connections with and that ‘every individual coming from Ireland will get some’.160
Notwithstanding their importance, the Liverpool adjutant referred to the Special Service Section as ‘absolutely useless’.161 The men refused to co-operate with the OC; they wanted to elect their own officers and not be mixed in with the recent IRA immigrants to the city. They wouldn’t attend parades – though this was probably very reasonable given that they were already well known to the police. The OC reported that the ‘old crowd’ refused to place their weapons under his control: ‘There are a few of the old crowd … including Tom O’Malley who holds guns and refuses to give them up.’ The weapons included four Webley revolvers and a .38 automatic.162 Twomey initially adopted a non-confrontational attitude and recommended to the OC: ‘What I would suggest is that if they refuse to conform to discipline, I would ignore them but would not create any more rows or bickering.’ He promised to follow up with the OC and at their next meeting they could decide whether to move the men from active service to the ‘reserve’ or whether to dismiss them altogether.163 Twomey wrote to the company’s intelligence officer on the same day and was much more intransigent, perhaps because he knew the intelligence officer was in direct contact with the Special Service Section and wanted the tone of his letter passed on: ‘It must be clearly understood that if these men will not be subject to Volunteer discipline and if they persist in disobeying orders they must be expelled.’164
The local adjutant suggested that the situation could be defused by allowing the men to elect their own officers, a common practice of the IRA early in the Anglo-Irish War.165 GHQ was against this as the ‘old timers’ were well known to the police and any officers chosen from amongst them would have difficulty working covertly. Twomey was in prison at the time and so his final decision on the matter is not known.166
The dockers also made contact with sailors on Russian merchant ships, and the OC commented: ‘It would be an easy matter … to get them [the Russians] to fetch some munitions.’167 Twomey however didn’t want to cut across the existing IRA’s agreement with the Soviets, but at the same time wanted to keep his options open and advised the OC: ‘These men … may be used later, and you should certainly keep in touch with them and find out exactly how much they are prepared to do.’168 The Liverpool adjutant even reported that they were in contact with a boat sailing between Buenos Aires and Liverpool: ‘We are in touch with a friendly Boat plying this route, if the service is any use?’169 To which GHQ noncommittally replied: ‘I have noted your information.’170
In February 1927 Twomey ordered the OC to organise the destruction of arms shipments being sent from Liverpool to Chinese warlords allied with the British, though there’s no evidence this was ever complied with (see Chapter 8).171
While the Liverpool company may have fallen well short of Twomey’s expectations and was incapable of any sustained urban warfare, it at least fulfilled some function for the IRA and far exceeded the capability of the London and Manchester companies.
The IRA in London and Manchester
In London the OC. Britain largely conducted his duties independent of the local company. In late 1924 the adjutant general commented that the unit was no longer holding staff meetings, and he ordered them to meet every two weeks.172
In May 1927 Twomey wrote a letter to the London adjutant, furious with him for not carrying out a number of duties, including delivering a package to Dublin: ‘It is a very grave matter when the promise and word of a volunteer can no longer be relied on to perform a very simple task.’173
By October, Twomey notified George that he had decided to finish with the unit altogether: ‘It has been decided to disband [the] unit in London. [The] order for this will be sent [over with the] next messenger. You should now recruit people for special work. If you wish the [IRA] Declaration can be administered to them. You will deal with them as individuals. Report what you will do.’174 The IRA’s declaration of allegiance to the Irish Republic had been substituted for the previous oath of allegiance, in response to the Catholic Church’s objection to secular oath-bound societies.175 Not that this would have mollified the Catholic hierarchy.
In the light of actions such as the pathetic smoke bomb attack at the St Patrick’s banquet in 1926, Twomey’s decision seems entirely appropriate. He went on to elaborate that: ‘No results whatever have been obtained … the fault lies entirely with the officers, whom they [the Army Council] wish to be severely reprimanded.’176 There is also evidence in the British secret service files from the period that they had an informer among the IRA in London, though his identity remains unknown.177
The Manchester company was the least significant of the main units in Britain and there’s little reference to it throughout the documents. In March 1926 a report stated that it had fallen ‘out of touch’ with Dublin. This appeared to have been somewhat rectified later in the year, as a number of despatches were sent from headquarters and the officers were introduced to the IRA’s system of cipher.
In October 1926 Twomey wrote to the company’s OC: ‘We wanted to get you the stink bombs for [William] Cosgrave’s visit, as you were anxious to have them.’178 Twomey didn’t seem to have learned his lesson from the abortive attack on the prime minister the previous March. The same month Twomey arranged for gelignite and detonators to be sent from Glasgow to both Manchester and Liverpool. It’s not clear exactly what operation he had in mind for Manchester, though he wanted the Liverpool company to destroy stocks of coal which may have been readied for shipment to British forces and their warlord allies in China (see Chapter 8).179
Figure 22. Moss Twomey wrote to George, the OC in Britain, informing him of the decision to disband the IRA unit in London, and that Andy Cooney (‘Mr Smith’) was to move to London temporarily.
It has been decided to disband [the] unit in London. Order for this will be sent [over, with the] next messenger. You should now recruit people for special work. If you wish, the [IRA] declaration can be administered to them. You will deal with them as individuals. Report what you will do.
‘Mr Smith’ intends going to London to complete his studies. [He] will probably cross [over] this weekend. He wants you to think of one or two suitable places where he might stay, he will call to Number 8, perhaps he could stay. Fix nothing definite about digs until he sees you.
In 1927 the police staged raids in the area looking for wanted men, and the intelligence officer had a close shave when they rai
ded his accommodation.180
The IRA in Scotland
Scotland, and in particular the industrial heartland of Glasgow and the Clyde, had a long history of IRB and later IRA support and organisation. However, there’s very little information available as to what these units actually did and what they planned to do. Though their successes were few, their plans were likely many. One reason for the lack of knowledge is that the Scottish IRA was never fully under the control of headquarters in Dublin. Additionally, unlike the IRA in Ireland, there’s very little documentation or memoirs available on the unit.
The situation in Glasgow differed from that in other British cities. There was a particularly strong history of support for Irish republicans in the city. It was also a stronghold of communism, and this resulted in serious divisions within the local IRA between the supporters and opponents of socialism.
Many of Glasgow’s communists and socialists were in turn very supportive of Irish separatism, including the famous John MacLean. Helen Crawford, a leading member of the Soviet-sponsored Workers’ International Relief, travelled to Ireland in 1925 as a communist organiser, and was in contact with IRA leaders and supporters there. In 1927 the British secret service (MI5) linked her with the IRA’s activities in support of the secret Soviet agent, Kate Gussfeldt and believed she was in contact with the Woods family in London. The Woods were involved with the IRA and had helped Gussfeldt obtain a false passport.
In common with the IRA units south of the border, the Scottish IRA reached peak membership during the Anglo-Irish War, and in August 1920 600 IRA members were reported to be in Scotland. By 1922 this had been reduced to 138.181 In 1921 an attempt to destroy an oil pipeline along the Forth and Clyde canal failed.182 And in May of that year the IRA killed a police inspector in a failed attempt to rescue a prisoner from a police van. The aggressive police response, including the arrest of a priest, resulted in rioting – the only case of a serious confrontation between an Irish community and the police in Britain.183
In September 1923, following the Civil War, morale among the IRA’s supporters in Glasgow was in ‘a condition of coma’. In addition to the disillusionment resulting from the Civil War, there was great uncertainty as to what the policy of the republican leaders in Dublin was. There was infighting among pro- and anti-communist supporters in the Scottish IRA and these problems were compounded by the effects of the post-war unemployment and poverty on ‘the working class [which] have always been the back bone’ of the IRA’s support in the city. The Catholic clergy were no longer supportive: ‘The clergy who formerly helped a good deal, will not touch us, and in a number of cases have actively worked against us publicly and privately.’184
In November 1924 when the adjutant general inspected the Scottish unit he reported that there were 300 members, 200 of whom would turn out for a monthly parade. However, ‘there has been nothing done at these parades save to fall men in and give them a few minutes squad drill, [and] collect subscriptions’. The OC was a ‘hardworking enthusiastic man a little bit militaristic’. This perhaps was not such a damning criticism in what after all was supposed to be a military organisation! The AG wryly commented: ‘On the whole they are the best bunch of officers I ever met in England [sic]. This does not say too much, but they are at least good average men.’ He recommended that the unit should henceforth report directly to headquarters in Dublin and not through the OC. Britain in London – something that was a source of much dissatisfaction.
Aside from the size of the unit, it was of importance to the IRA in that it had members and informants working in the factories of the area, many of which manufactured products that had a military application, and also because of the large number of dockers on the Clyde who were Irish. As in Liverpool, IRA support among the dockers enabled the organisation to smuggle weapons and explosives to Ireland. And for this reason Seán Russell was in direct contact with the unit.185 In 1924, however, the unit appeared not to have any contacts among ships’ crew members sailing in and out of Glasgow, and the AG rejected the adjutant’s suggestion that they pay men to smuggle for them. The OC however reassured him that he could send anything needed to Dundalk and could get as much gelignite as the IRA required.186
Some time after 1924, as part of the IRA’s reorganisation, the status of the Scottish brigade was downgraded to that of a battalion. In 1925 divisions in the unit resulted in a violent feud, with allegations of ‘vice and corruption prevalent among certain officers’, including drunkenness. On one occasion a group of armed men raided a dance hosted by an opposing group and threatened to smash the violin belonging to the musician, who was the widow of an IRA man.187 A little later one of its most prominent officers, Séamus Reader, was charged before an IRA court martial with misappropriation of funds and, though found not guilty, he was convicted of criminal negligence. However, he disputed the IRA’s jurisprudence in the case, arguing that he couldn’t be found guilty of negligence as he was never charged with the offence to begin with.188 Serious allegations were also made against the battalion’s OC, who in September 1926 just upped and left Scotland. Twomey reported: ‘I was amazed when I returned to find that [the] O/C. Scotland had left there for good and is here in Dublin.’189
In February 1927 Twomey wrote to the OC that he was ‘very disappointed that you have not reported to GHQ for a long time’ and he complained about the ‘slackness’ of the battalion’s intelligence officer.190 In his apology the OC claimed that the unit had been busy and had placed 200 bombs among coal sent to China. The plan was that after the coal was shovelled into the boilers of Royal Navy patrol vessels in China, the bombs would explode and sink the vessels.191 This unverifiable claim is further discussed in Chapter 8. Other correspondence with the Scottish brigade mentions attempts to smuggle weapons and to procure a wireless radio.192
ASIDE FROM THE SMUGGLING of explosives and the procurement of false passports, there was little that the IRA in Britain could perform with any degree of competence. The members were demoralised, disorganised and undisciplined. The units were also crippled by infighting and even George, the OC. Britain, allowed personal enmity get in the way of efficiently carrying out his job. While some of the blame lies with the members themselves and their local leadership, GHQ was primarily to blame for its failure to develop and communicate a clear strategy and to adequately train, equip and organise the British units.
Moss Twomey appeared impressive when he sent orders for a campaign of sabotage under the cover of the 1926 general strike. But there was no planning, organisation or capability to undertake this, and for these failings he and the rest of the senior leadership in Dublin were also responsible.
As Seán Russell reported, the IRA in Britain needed to be reorganised into small secret highly trained units. It was with this ‘cellular’ structure and a bombing campaign that targeted primarily economic targets in London that the Provisional IRA was to achieve considerable strategic success almost seventy years later in the 1990s.
CHAPTER 7
The IRA in America
With twenty [tear gas] machines you might be able to take all [of] Dublin without killing non-combatants.
IRA agent in America to the chief of staff, Moss Twomey
We have made wonderful progress in [the] GAA and will be able to control it … Our policy otherwise is to purify and cleanse the organisation and [the] games. We will succeed.
Connie Neenan, IRA representative in America
America was an important source of funds and weapons for the IRA. The organisation maintained its own agents in New York, who worked closely with the Irish-American organisation Clan na Gael. Aside from smuggling weapons and money, these agents attempted to acquire chemical weapons for use in Ireland, infiltrated the Gaelic Athletic Association in New York and conducted military espionage for the Soviet Union.
Many of these activities are discussed in detail for the first time ever in this chapter. The Soviet connection is covered in Chapter 8.
Historical backgrou
nd
Since the nineteenth century Irish immigrants in America (especially in the major population centres in the north-east) found kinship in a variety of cultural, religious and sporting organisations. These societies, such as the Galway Ladies’ Association or the County Cork Men’s Benevolent Patriotic and Protective Association, were often based upon the immigrants’ county of origin and created a sense of community while allowing immigrants to share information about jobs and housing.1
Additionally, the Irish community had their own political organisations which supported Irish separatism, and these political societies tended to be more radical than their counterparts in Ireland. This militancy was the product of a number of factors, including the immigrants’ own experience of discrimination and hostility in America from the Protestant ‘Anglo-Saxon’ establishment and the collective Irish-American folk memory of poverty and ‘British atrocities’ in Ireland. These factors were compounded by the immigrants’ distance and separation from the realities of life back home.2 The societies had a history of bitter (and sometimes violent) internal feuds. As societies were dissolved, others took their place. Disputes were as much about personality as political differences. The world of radical Irish-American politics was truly Byzantine. However, a basic overview is important to understand the situation in the 1926–7 period.
Clan na Gael (Family of the Irish) was the single most influential Irish-American society whose primary goal was Irish independence. The Clan was a secret society formed in 1867 by a group of Fenians to bring about an Irish Republic by ‘physical force’.3 It made a formal alliance with the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in Ireland, which it provided with money and some weapons. Internal dissent and fighting bedevilled it throughout its history, and British secret service agents significantly compromised it. The Clan pursued a more violent strategy than the IRB itself, and sent a number of men on bombing missions to England. Most of these disastrous ‘Fenian’ dynamite teams of the 1880s were either created by British agents provocateurs or involved spies who had infiltrated the Clan.4 In 1900 the warring factions of the Clan were re-united under the veteran Fenian, John Devoy.
