by Tom Mahon
Most republicans in the United States (and Ireland) continued to be unaware of any significant policy differences between Fianna Fáil and the IRA, and were disappointed with Neenan and McGarrity for distancing themselves from de Valera. This was all the more reason for de Valera to remain deliberately ambiguous or misleading in his pronouncements on his plans.
Whatever difficulty the Clan had from Aiken’s visit, it was to be nothing compared with the arrival of de Valera himself in March 1927. Ostensibly the purpose of his trip was to give evidence in a court case brought by the Free State to secure possession of the $2.5 million remaining from the $6 million raised for the Irish Republic Bonds. The court’s decision in May was a defeat for the Free State and a victory for de Valera’s strategy as the judge ruled that the money should be returned to the original subscribers. De Valera hoped that the subscribers would then voluntarily hand over the money to him and Fianna Fáil.165
Twomey warned Connie Neenan: ‘De Valera is sailing for America tomorrow in connection with [the] Dáil loan litigation and chiefly it is believed to get [a] portion for his party from [the bond] subscribers, in case amounts [sic] are returned [by the court to the] subscribers. You must be active too on this matter. Keep in touch with [the] bond holders’ association, and be ready to collect if [the] time comes to do so. You must take it, de Valera will do his utmost to influence and win over influential members of [the] Clan to his party, so be prepared for this … He must be left in no doubt as to [the] attitude of Clan [na Gael] and no receptions or encouragement to his activities must be given.’166 A week later Twomey followed this up: ‘Keep us informed of de Valera’s activities. You will act if he attempts to gain [control] over [the] Clan or prominent members of it. It may be necessary for you and “Jones” to visit various centres [to thwart him].’167
De Valera arrived at a difficult time for Neenan, as Joe McGarrity, one of the few people who could have helped him rally the Clan, had left the country. In December 1926 McGarrity resigned as chairman and headed to Colombia in search of needed business opportunities.168 He was armed with a letter of introduction to the archbishop of Bogota from Cardinal Dougherty of Philadelphia, who described him as ‘an excellent Irish Catholic’.169 Neenan put the reason for his trip delicately: ‘It was not a case of financial difficulties, but he had some idea of improving his accounts.’170 As it was, McGarrity retuned to the United States in May 1927 and quickly resumed his leadership of the Clan.
Within a month of de Valera’s arrival, Neenan reported to Twomey: ‘De Valera has done us a lot of damage since his arrival. Through his influence many good members of [the] Clan are actively engaged with Fianna Fáil. His presence had its desired effect as … certain members [of the Clan] showed their real sympathies. It was the Army [IRA] men that surprises [sic] me. I warned [the] New York [Clan na Gael] Officer Board of the possibilities two months ago, and those who believed I was wrong actually went to meet de Valera … To avoid [the] Dub. [GHQ] position being misrepresented, I consulted with Art [O’Connor, president of Sinn Féin] and ‘Jones’. Later going to meet de Valera and explaining our position and also the good work which the young men had done here, but which could easily be destroyed by his agents. I also told him I disagreed with his policy, so as to avoid a discussion of it.’171 ‘Events at home and de Valera’s visit created misunderstanding and apathy [among IRA veterans in the US]. [A] number of Army men who arrived in this country are of no use, some [are] harmful.’172
All de Valera had to do was avoid, as far as possible, a confrontation with the IRA and the Clan while steadily winning over their members. And his response to Neenan showed that he was now the master of the situation – a politician who could run rings around the IRA. ‘He [de Valera] practically advised us to go on as we were going and stated his desire to bring back the people here to [the] republican idea [sic]. So far he has avoided a full explanation of his policy, so that people cannot locate the weak spots. In personal talk with some individuals he refused to give the important guarantees [such as whether he’d enter the Free State Dáil] which convinced them his policy was wrong.
‘He is very well received and getting large sums for elections, even certain Clan members subscribed liberally, who had given insignificant sums to [the] Army [fundraising] appeal. The sooner he returns [to Ireland] the better for us.
‘The situation has got so tense that the clause [rule] about [Clan members supporting] outside organisations, [passed] at [the] last [Clan] convention cannot be enforced. As a matter of fact in some districts it has been stated [that Clan] members were free to [do] as they liked. Even some of the Clan executive, favoured the latter course openly in their own areas. At a largely attended reunion in New York, some members wanted the rule enforced: [that] all [Clan] members [who were also members] of constitutional movements be expelled. A very unhealthy discussion arose which lasted a few hours. It did not help the organization in any way. It surprised me the number of Army men who opposed the motion, but their idea was to prevent a split. A certain bunch of old timers would be better out than in.’173
Neenan saw the disagreement within the Clan as a threat to its very survival. ‘I took up the attitude of preventing a split as it would reduce our numbers to a very small amount. Furthermore it would kill any hope of assisting the Army [IRA]. All our schemes and progress … would receive a deathblow. Not that members support Fianna Fáil, but they would drop off disheartened and disgusted. It would drive men to become interested elsewhere. My idea is to save the Army men, as in time de Valera’s policy will prove its futility. We must retain the Army men united.’174
Neenan realised that the Clan rule would be hotly debated at the next convention in the autumn, and he asked Twomey: ‘Let me have your views on the matter and what do you suggest as a course of action. We can have it discussed – pros and cons – before [the] Clan convention.’175 He felt that ‘unless [an] amicable arrangement [is] reached trouble will ensue.’176 ‘De Valera’s presence has caused all this [sic] question to reappear. If he goes so will all [the] anxiety … Joe McGarrity is expected back in a month from now. His presence will be helpful.’177
The news from around the country was similar to that in New York. ‘Boston suffered [the] most from de Valera’s visit. Some members wanted to meet him officially, but my [Neenan’s] advice was sought [and] I refused to agree. [The] trouble ceased on [my] explanation but still several [men] support Fianna Fáil … Some members are definitely lost in Boston but we will get on without them.’ Neenan also noted support for Fianna Fáil among Clan members in Philadelphia and Chicago.178
On 1 May de Valera left Boston to return to Ireland, his visit a success. He had managed to consolidate support in America, while side-stepping any disagreements he had with the IRA. The influential Irish World continued to support both de Valera and the Clan. Even An Phoblacht in Ireland continued favourable coverage of Fianna Fáil.
Twomey wanted Neenan to keep an eye on the AARIR and report back on their work ‘supporting Fianna Fáil’ as well as the organisation’s ‘strength, money raised, activities, nature of [their] propaganda and speeches’. He harboured a hope that IRA supporters within the AARIR would help to split the organisation (just as appeared to be happening to the Clan) and rather wistfully asked Neenan: ‘Any organisation being formed by [the] republican [sic] minority at [the] AARIR convention?’179 While Neenan was unable to detect any sign of dissension, he noted that joint branches of the AARIR and Fianna Fáil were being formed and ‘It won’t be easy to get that lot to work in harmony. The vast majority [of them] are no good.’180
While the activities of de Valera threatened the very existence of the Clan, the breach with Devoy was overall of less significance but far more bitter. Neenan made occasional reports back to Ireland on the activities of Devoy, his paper the Gaelic American and the FOIF. The Gaelic American managed to excel when it came to gutter journalism and its columns reflected Devoy’s spite in his old age; de Valera was called a ‘dead
jew’ and the editor of the Irish World was accused of having overdosed with a ‘chink’ in New York’s Mott Street. However, the paper was closer to the truth when it accused the AARIR of having more initials in its name than actual members.181
At one stage Neenan felt that Devoy might be turning away from supporting the Free State: ‘I have it from [a] reliable source that Devoy’s Clan and [his] paper are going to constitutionally oppose [the] Free State government at a date not very distant. Latterly they have openly attacked [the] Free State in a series of leading articles. I will report any further news but it is best to leave them carefully to themselves, even though they are most anxious to get a grip on the young [IRA] men [who have recently immigrated].’182 Twomey told him: ‘[It’s] advisable [that] touch be kept with Devoy’s Clan. You should be careful not to get mixed up with them yourself. Perhaps if [the eighty-five-year-old] Devoy died many [members] would come over to us.’183
Neenan also reported on the activities of Michael Ryan. Ten years earlier Ryan had been the leader of the United League, the American organisation which supported Irish home rule and John Redmond, but after the collapse of the home rule movement (following the 1916 Rising) he joined Devoy’s FOIF.184 Ryan was a ‘notorious bluffer’, who even after the war remained strongly pro-German. In February 1927 he attended a function in New York in honour of the visiting retired Admiral Paul Behncke of the German navy at which ‘speeches were delivered advocating closer co-operation between Ireland and Germany’.185
As it happened there was to be no further split in the Clan, just inexorable decline. It is a remarkable testament to the depth of devotion and admiration Joe McGarrity had for de Valera that their friendship lasted for almost another ten years. The break finally occurred in 1936 with de Valera and Fianna Fáil in government, when an IRA prisoner died in jail – allegedly murdered. De Valera refused an inquest, leading McGarrity to accuse him of ‘selling out his former friends and repressing all freedom of thought and action in Ireland with the ruthlessness of a dictator’.186
Money
During the Anglo-Irish War, America had been the source of considerable financial support for the IRA and Sinn Féin, and Moss Twomey expected the Clan to continue to provide significant funding for the organisation.
Throughout the Anglo-Irish War (1919–21) the FOIF had raised over a million dollars for the Irish Victory Fund and de Valera’s Republican Bonds brought in over six million.187 Impressive amounts, though admittedly only a fraction ended up in the hands of the IRA. American financial support never again reached such levels, although there were significant amounts raised during and immediately following the Civil War (1922–3).
In early 1923 Joe McGarrity provided $42,000 for Liam Lynch’s abortive plan to purchase mountain artillery in Germany.188 In August of the same year he helped the Clan raise $200,000 to support the Sinn Féin general election campaign, and this effort left the Clan largely broke.189 Following this there was a significant drop off in the ability of the Clan to provide money. A 1924 drive to raise $100,000 for by-elections in Ireland was a ‘miserable failure’.190 Altogether between 1923 and September 1926 the Clan alone raised a total of $500,000 for Irish independence.191
In January 1925 Liam Pedlar reported to Seán Russell that the Clan had raised ‘[$]25,000 since July-August last. All efforts in this direction have been made for the election fund.’192 Russell wanted Pedlar to go to the Clan executive and have the money raised by the Clan directly ‘earmarked’ for the IRA instead of going through the ‘republican government’. In Pedlar’s opinion ‘there are a great many in the Clan who would rather subscribe and raise money for the Army than for any political purpose’, but he recommended that any changes in the arrangement should be made by the IRA leadership in Dublin in communication with the republican ‘government’ rather than by him in the US.193 Frank Aiken angrily wrote to Pedlar complaining about his communicating with ‘every conceivable person here [at GHQ]’ and to henceforth direct all his correspondence to Seán Lemass, Aiken’s partner and the newly appointed ‘Minister for Defence’.194 Aiken was obviously hoping to put an end to this unwanted discussion and keep the Clan on board with de Valera.
However, in August 1925 McGarrity finally declared that henceforth the Clan’s money was to be provided for military activities only and not for electioneering.195 That he didn’t pull the plug on the arrangement with the republican ‘government’ earlier was due to his admiration for de Valera than any abiding faith in the democratic process. This new arrangement with the IRA was cemented by the agreement of September 1926 negotiated by Andy Cooney. When Cooney returned to Ireland in October he brought with him $2,000 from the Clan.196
In November 1926 the Soviets cut back on their monthly payments to the IRA, making the IRA almost entirely dependent on funding from the Clan. As a result Andy Cooney wrote to ‘Mr Jones’ in New York: ‘This is intended as an urgent appeal for immediate financial support [from the Clan]. Spare no effort to ensure that money is sent [to] us without delay … America is our only financial source at present. It is therefore essential that support be sent without delay.’197 Cooney was so desperate that he even threatened to disband the IRA unless the Clan provided adequate support: ‘Owing to [the] non-fulfilment of [the] agreement [by the Soviets] we are absolutely without any money whatever and this at a time when we never needed it more urgently. I have already written [to] you to send on money immediately. If this is not done, we will have no alternative but to close down. Point out to [the] Clann [sic] that with them rests the decision as to whether we can maintain our organisation or not.’198
An Timthire replied: ‘A special appeal for financial help was issued by Clan Headquarters two weeks ago and returns should be completed in another two [weeks]. I attended [a] meeting of [the Clan na Gael] Board of Officers [for] New York and quoted your appeal. As a result each club increased their contribution to [the] appeal by nearly 100%. The Officer Board sanctioned giving at least $300, which should bring [the] total of [the] New York District to $1,000. The Liam Lynch Club [of] New York contributed [the] largest sum, as proof of their repudiation of [the] Cork [IRA] officers [who recently condemned the IRA’s killing of a garda officer in the barrack raids].’199
In addition the Clan na Gael clubs in San Francisco had already in October 1926 promised to provide $500 monthly – but only a portion of this was ever sent.200
Some of the IRA leadership in Dublin suggested that Cooney and Russell visit the US to spearhead an appeal for funds. ‘It is suggested here that Seán Russell and myself [Cooney] should go over for a special drive. I am totally against it, particularly at [the] present time when our place is right here. At the same time I would like to know if a special drive would justify itself.’201 Given the strong support for de Valera among Clan members such a trip would have been potentially divisive, and furthermore, it could have been seen as interfering with the Clan’s own authority. Not surprisingly, ‘[the] executive body of [the] Clan are totally against the proposal of yourself and Seán Russell coming out here. They contend it would not achieve any success, as [the] time and circumstances are unsuitable.’202
In mid December Cooney again wrote to ‘Jones’: ‘The situation here is impossible because of lack of finance. We must now have £1,000 immediately. We have kept going by borrowing and our credit is now at zero.’ Cooney wanted ‘Jones’ to give a bank draft for the £1,000 ($5,000) to the IRA courier, Miss O’Connor, who had just brought this despatch to him. So that Cooney could know what boat she was taking on her return to Ireland and when she was leaving, he told ‘Jones’ to send a cryptic telegram giving the name of the boat and the date the ship set sail from New York. The telegram was to open with the words ‘Dorothy sails on the … [‘Jones’ was to insert the boat name and date here]’.203
The Clan had difficulty raising the money and ‘most districts are slow to furnish returns’, but finally in January 1927 Connie Neenan (who had recently replaced ‘Jones’ as An Timthire) sent
£1,025 by courier. This was equivalent to $5,000 – $4,000 from the Clan and $1,000 which Neenan had received from supporters in California. He took a number of precautions. The money was sent as cash and not as a bank draft ‘as I considered large drafts were suspicious, especially when we had no suitable names for [the] sender or to whom [it was] payable’. Neenan also didn’t send a telegram ahead of the courier, as suggested by Cooney: ‘I did not cable as to [the] date [the] cash was going over, as I did not want to attract suspicion in any way.’204
Neenan expected that when all the returns from the Clan’s appeal were in, he’d be able to send on a similar amount again. But even this hoped-for $10,000 (or £2,000) left Twomey ‘disappointed that [the] anticipated response will not be higher’.205
Twomey explained that while the money from America might be adequate to keep the IRA intact, it was insufficient to carry out the overthrow of the Free State and therefore the IRA was reluctantly forced to continue to work for the Soviets: ‘[I] am sure you realise how absolutely essential cash is and this necessity alone … [is the reason for] our anxiety for keeping in with these people [the Soviets]. America will not supply sufficient [finance] for [our] needs except [to keep the] organisation … this [is] not enough to finance preparations for revolution.’206
Twomey was again desperate for cash in April and having to ‘exercise rigid economy’: ‘We have none whatever. We are borrowing against your remittance.’207 Two weeks later he wrote: ‘We are in a deplorable way for lack of cash. Such a state of things never existed … before. We must know what we can count on from you.’208
In May Neenan sent over another $1,250 ($1,000 of which was from the Clan) to Ireland. The cash was sent in an envelope along with other despatches and addressed to the original courier, Miss O’Connor of Leitrim. The sender was given as her father who lived in the US.209 Later that month the pressure on the IRA eased somewhat when the Russians finally gave them £1,000.
