by Tom Mahon
For a period of time in the mid and late 1920s the IRA was to be the most promising ally for the Soviets in Ireland – combining, as it did, popular support together with communists in leadership positions. IRA members actively participated in Comintern front organisations – Mick Fitzpatrick was on the presidium of the International Friends of Soviet Russia, Donal O’Donoghue and Frank Ryan attended the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and Peadar O’Donnell, as editor of An Phoblacht, provided the Soviets with a public outlet for their propaganda. In 1926 the paper enthusiastically reported that, in Russia, ‘miners have a 6 hour [work day] … which seems wonderful’. So good that the miners themselves didn’t know it! When the republican and socialist activist Charlotte Despard visited the Soviet Union she observed: ‘There were no locked doors in the prisons, the prisoners managing their own affairs.’14 Communist cadres were recruited from amongst the IRA’s ranks and O’Donnell’s close friend Seán Murray was to become general secretary of the second Communist Party of Ireland in 1933.15 However, despite their disproportionate representation on the Army Council, the vast majority of IRA members had little sympathy or interest in communism.
Irish republicans had a long history of attempting to negotiate an alliance with the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1919, an IRA emissary, Harry Boland, made contact with Soviet representatives in America. In 1921 de Valera sent a representative to Moscow to conclude a recognition treaty and secure arms and ammunition, but the Soviets, having just signed an Anglo-Russian trade agreement, backed out.16 In August 1922 the British Communist Party sent two representatives to Dublin who met with leaders of the IRA (possibly including Ernie O’Malley) and an agreement was reached that the Soviets would supply weapons to the republicans.17 However, there is no evidence for any substantial transfer of weapons to the IRA during the Irish Civil War period. In January 1923, the Free State’s representative in Geneva reported that de Valera had sent a message to the Soviet foreign commissar asking for money.18
However, contacts of some sort must have continued, since Frank Aiken wrote to Liam Pedlar, the republican ‘Military Attaché’ in America, in April 1925: ‘Touch with Russians [sic]. We have definitely decided to drop this – hopeless bunglers, in any case as far as we can see, and not very eager to help.’19
In the summer of 1925 the IRA sent a small delegation to Moscow, led by P. A. Murray of the headquarters staff. Murray had had contacts with the Soviets in 1923 when he was IRA OC in Britain. Also included were Seán Russell, Mick Fitzpatrick a leading IRA communist, and the Sinn Féin TD Gerry Boland. Boland was a close confidant of de Valera’s and was probably sent by him to keep an eye on the other three.
Stalin met privately with Murray, with just an interpreter present, and told the Irishman ‘your revolution has not gone far enough’ – which I suppose could be taken as a compliment. He wanted to find out from Murray to what extent the IRA with their widespread contacts throughout the Irish diaspora could assist Moscow. Murray later claimed that no agreement was reached, as Stalin was concerned that any weapons supplied might be traced back to the Soviets by the British, and that Ireland was too remote to be of interest to the Russians.20 This version is supported by comments later made by General Krivitsky of Red Army Intelligence to MI5 (British secret service) following his defection to the West: ‘The Polit Bureau [sic] refused assistance because of their anxiety not to offend the British Government as well as the impossibility of supporting the nationalistic aspirations of the IRA at the same time as the international activities of the Irish Communist Party.’21
But in fact some sort of an agreement was reached, either at this time or shortly afterwards, and Russell returned to Dublin via Berlin, where he met a Soviet agent, ‘Mr X’, to formalise the arrangements for lines of communications with the Soviets. ‘Mr X’ then came to London where Russell introduced him to the IRA OC in Britain.22 Two later statements confirm that an agreement was reached around this time. In 1926 Andy Cooney said that there was ‘a definite agreement made [by the Soviets] with [the] late C.S. [chief of staff, Frank Aiken]’. This had to be before Aiken was deposed as chief of staff in November 1925.23 And in March 1927 Moss Twomey referred to an ‘agreement made in Lond. [London]’ before May 1926 with the Soviets.24
The apparent contradiction between the statements of General Krivitsky and Moss Twomey and Andy Cooney may be one of semantics. Krivitsky states that there was no agreement with the IRA ‘as a political body’ but he states that ‘individual members [of the IRA] may have been recruited as intelligence agents for special purposes’.25 Thus what the IRA took to be an ‘agreement’, the Soviets may have regarded more as an arrangement with individual IRA members. As far as P. A. Murray’s denial is concerned (it’s reasonable to expect that), just like the remainder of the IRA leadership, he would continue to deny any agreement with the Soviets. When he and other veterans gave interviews and reminisced about their IRA years in later life, their narrative was one of heroic ambushes in the Anglo-Irish War and not cloak-and-dagger with the Russians.
The IRA agreed to spy for the Russians in Britain.26 In turn the Soviets promised to pay for the information, though they were evasive about whether they’d supply weapons.
Thanks to the success of the IRA in the Anglo-Irish War and its resultant sterling revolutionary credentials, the Soviets likely over-estimated its capability and didn’t fully comprehend the extent to which the organisation had declined. There were many ways in which the IRA could be of value to the Soviets: 1. Conduct military espionage in Britain and America. 2. Assist Soviet agents by providing false passports and other forms of cover. 3. In the event of war between Russia and Britain, attack British merchant shipping and launch diversionary attacks in England. 4. Promote Comintern fronts and Soviet propaganda in Ireland. 5. Enable the Soviets to recruit among IRA members, to build a communist base in Ireland. 6. Provide the Soviets with contacts throughout the Irish diaspora in America and Europe. 7. Provide propaganda and material help to nationalists in China, who were a key Soviet ally. 8. In the unlikely event of the IRA seizing power in the Free State and the subsequent Irish withdrawal from the British Commonwealth, the integrity of the British empire could be threatened. On all but the last of these key points the IRA either delivered or planned to do so.
The risk for the Russians was that discovery of the relationship would bring down on them the wrath of Britain, an important trading partner and their most feared military threat.
The IRA had little to lose from an alliance with the Soviets. They stood to gain money, arms and military training. Furthermore, just as the First World War had provided the IRA in the past with a crucial advantage, an Anglo-Soviet war could provide the IRA with the opportunity to attempt to seize power in Ireland and encourage the Soviets to provide them with significant military aid. The only risks were that the Russians wouldn’t deliver the money and arms, and that communist efforts and propaganda would encourage IRA members to prioritise social revolution over the national revolution. Indeed the latter was to happen in the 1930s as many leading republicans left the IRA for radical or communist politics.
The Soviet–IRA agreement
By 1926 the IRA and Red Army intelligence had a fully operational and clandestine relationship. The cornerstone of this was the supply of information on military technology (much of it gained by espionage) in return for Russian money. The IRA was in contact with the Russians in London, Paris, Amsterdam and New York. The Soviets had a history of dealing with subservient communist parties, but this was a relationship of mutual distrust with both parties trying to exploit the other.
From November 1925 on, Moss Twomey and Andy Cooney oversaw the agreement on the Irish side, and along with Seán Russell they were intensely suspicious of the Russians, to whom they had no ideological commitment. For their part, the Soviets handed over as little money as possible, and did their best to avoid providing weapons. General Walter Krivitsky, was later to admit ‘he worked with them [the IRA] purely as intellige
nce agents and for a time got quite useful information out of them, at the same time experiencing difficulty in evading attempts to interest him in the terrorist activities of their organisation.’27 Twomey wrote: ‘These people [the Russians] are so shifty…they are out to exploit us and use for their ends’ and ‘except for our urgent need of cash, I would not be so keen on this [agreement], but am very much so [enthusiastic] on this account’,28 while Cooney called them ‘people in whom we cannot place much confidence’.29 Somewhat ironically, ‘Jones’ in New York referred to the Soviets as ‘absolutely unscrupulous’.30
Right from the start the IRA tried to prevent the Soviets from using their men as paid agents rather than representatives of the ‘Irish Republic’. Russell in September 1925 was concerned that ‘Mr X’ was trying to use the OC. Britain as an individual agent.31 Seán Lemass, the republican ‘Minister for Defence’, replied: ‘We must be on terms of absolute equality with X’s Government or there can be no liaison.’ Later Connie Neenan echoed this concern when he wrote to Twomey: ‘At the moment we are just paid servants.’32
To maintain secrecy, the IRA was very cautious in making any references to the Soviets. Aside from two documents from the autumn of 1925, any significant information that James Gillogly and I have discovered has been in cipher. There are some references, which are not in cipher, but it would be impossible to deduce their meaning without already being familiar with the encrypted text. It’s also possible that information could have been written in secret ink and no longer available. Even within the coded documents the IRA tended to be indirect and cryptic. For instance there was only one direct mention of ‘Moscow’ and agents were virtually always referred to by their pseudonyms. The IRA agent in America, ‘Mr Jones’, cautioned Twomey: ‘I am [of] the opinion that you should not write any despatches relative to ‘Stephen’ [the Soviet intelligence officer in the US] on official paper even in cipher.’33
The IRA agents in London and America performed a range of services for the Russians and with differing degrees of success.
The IRA–Soviet connection in London
In London the IRA supplied the Soviets with information on military technology and with false passports for spies. They also collected money from the Soviets for the work done in both Britain and America. The quality and quantity of information supplied by the IRA in Britain failed to match that obtained in the US.
The principal agents in London were the IRA OC. Britain and his Red Army intelligence (RU) contact ‘James’. For the first part of 1926 the OC. Britain can only be identified by the last letter of his initials, ‘M’. In September 1926 ‘M’ was replaced by George (also known as ‘HS’). ‘James’ was the RU officer in contact with the IRA in London, and he may have been the same person as ‘Mr X’ whose cryptonym was no longer mentioned after 1925. Also involved with the London connection was Seán MacBride (or ‘Mr Ambrose’), who at the time lived in Paris.
George’s information was acquired by various methods and through a wide range of contacts: visits to the Patent Office, purchases of items (often from shady sources), journal subscriptions under false names, the existing IRA network in Britain, informants in factories supplying military equipment and a small number of informants in the military or police.
In the latter part of 1925 the OC. Britain supplied the Soviets with information on ships, drawings of a specified airplane engine, a sample of a gas mask, and drawings of airplane navigational equipment that had been obtained from the Patent Office. Later George wrote to Twomey asking him to send on specifications of aircraft engines manufactured at the Beardmore engineering company in Glasgow, where the IRA had an informant. He was particularly interested in two powerful engines suitable for air force bombers, the Typhoon and the 1,100 horsepower Simoon: ‘They [Beardmores] make the best aero engine on the market. Could you get me particulars about their Typhoon one, also their Simoon one? All information should be reliable.’34 Twomey even contacted the IRA in Cork and asked them the feasibility of getting ‘working drawings of [the] latest designs of tractors out of Fords [car factory]’.35
At the time the royal navy had the most advanced sonar system (called ASDIC) for detecting submarines and information about this would have been invaluable to the Russians. In the autumn of 1926 Seán MacBride travelled from Paris to London, where he met with both George and Moss Twomey. MacBride asked George for ‘particulars of [a] submarine detector [system]’36 and received back ‘a brief specification and a complete drawing’.37
‘James’ also handed over £200 to George for a piece of telecommunications equipment or wireless (referred to as the ‘phone’). However, George’s middleman, Fitzgerald, took the money and reneged on the deal, leaving ‘James’ out of pocket.38
George spent considerable time and effort buying military manuals, books and journals for both ‘James’ and the IRA’s own use, among them The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.39
The IRA was able to help out the Soviets with false passports, and in March 1927, when a communist agent Kate Gussfeldt was arrested with a passport in a false name, the British secret service, MI5, traced it back to the IRA.40 In April 1927, when the Russians planned to send an agent, ‘John’ on undercover work to Romania, ‘James’ approached George for help. George wrote to Twomey: ‘J [James] told me that “John” is going to Roumania [sic] and J would like if you could make him a representative of some woollen mills for that part of the world, if this is possible. Send papers etc. to my covering address and send [textile] samples to [the] address I gave you when [you were] here. He will need everything a representative of a firm is supposed to have … I would be very glad if you would give it your immediate attention as it’s extremely urgent.’ George typed the name and the address of the false business on a piece of paper and handed it to an IRA volunteer ‘Reynolds’ to bring to Twomey.41 But ‘Reynolds’ then re-wrote the name in pencil and brought this note with him. When he arrived in Dublin, neither he nor Twomey could read the name.42 In the meantime, George, ‘thinking ye [Twomey] had the matter on hand’, destroyed his own copy of the name and address, and so five weeks later the IRA still hadn’t helped
James out.43
Then there’s the strange case of E. Donnelly, a military police officer who was convicted by court martial for stealing secret codebooks. MI5 intercepted a letter addressed to him in prison, which was purported to be from ‘Dr Gately’, the same name the IRA had forged as a referee on the passport application for Kate Gussfeldt.44 In April 1927 Twomey wrote to George: ‘Donnelly has got two years’ hard labour. [He] was tried by court martial. Can you get [the] evidence against him and how he was caught?’45 George replied: ‘I had a letter from him after his arrest saying he was suspected of knowing something about things that were missing. I think myself that he must have been caught in the act.’46 These oblique comments paint a picture of an IRA agent caught stealing secret code or cipher books, which were to be passed on to the Soviets.
On one occasion ‘James’ offered to write for the IRA journal, An tÓglach: ‘James and his friend, who have had great experience in street fighting and guerrilla tactics could be got to write for our paper.’47 Twomey realised the potential instructional value of these articles: ‘Independent of printing James’ articles in An tOglach, we would like to get them. [We] would print some of them.’48
Russian money
The primary reason the IRA worked for the Russians was for the money that was handed over in London and later in Amsterdam. Twomey estimated that it cost about £400 per month to maintain the IRA, with additional money required for any significant operation.49 The two main sources of income were Clan na Gael and the Soviets. Support from the Clan was steadily decreasing and Twomey summed up the situation: ‘Were it not we are in such desperate need of cash and that [the] assistance from Clan [na Gael] is so very disappointing, I would not be so keen on this business [the agreement with the Soviets]. To me the maintenance of this [connection] … ap
pears indispensable to our carrying on the Army here.’50 Later he wrote that the IRA ‘could not carry on’ without Soviet financing.51
Of even greater value than money to the IRA would have been Soviet-supplied weaponry. ‘Stephen’ promised ‘Jones’ that the Soviets ‘would give us all the material [weapons] we would need’. ‘Jones’ didn’t believe ‘Stephen’ and he told Twomey to ‘test them’ on this promise.52 Twomey pushed ‘Jones’ to ‘ask “Stephen” to be more explicit as to [the] offer of material. Where will he give delivery and … what facilities will he give to get it into Ireland?’53 It’s probable that Stephen’s promise was unauthorised and merely given so as to encourage ‘Jones’ to continue to supply him with intelligence. On another occasion ‘James’ obliquely hinted that ‘when our work together comes off better we can help you more and in different ways.’54 Despite these statements the Soviets likely had no intention of ever providing the IRA with weapons, short of war breaking out between them and Britain.
Initially the Soviets agreed to pay over a monthly stipend but they decreased the amount on a number of occasions and sometimes paid nothing for months. Ultimately they were manoeuvring to pay only the IRA’s expenses for acquiring the information and equipment. It seems likely that this was a deliberate Russian ploy, but there was also a financial crisis in Russia, caused by a combination of internal economic woes and the expenditure of large amounts of money on foreign adventures, particularly support for the Chinese nationalists and their communist allies.
