by Todd Gordon
Marlin’s importance stands out not just as a symbol of the recommencement of large-scale mining in Guatemala, however, but also for its economic significance. As Peter Kent, then Minister of State for the Americas, proudly proclaimed in a speech to the Inter-American Dialogue in 2009, Marlin was the Guatemalan government’s single largest source of revenue in 2009, a fact that undoubtedly affects the influence of Goldcorp and Canada within the country.374 As we demonstrate below, Goldcorp has received considerable support from both the Canadian state and Guatemalan government.
Despite the environmental dangers, indigenous peoples say they were never consulted about the mine by original owner, Glamis Gold.375 Glamis, which was subsequently bought out by Goldcorp, claimed it organized hundreds of consultation meetings in 2003 and 2004, but indigenous activists counter that the meetings were really only promotional sessions that offered no opportunity for meaningful consultation. A human rights assessment of Marlin commissioned by Goldcorp itself states that, with respect to the matter of prior consultation, there “was a failure to respect indigenous peoples’ rights.”376
Local communities have expressed serious concern about the use of cyanide to leach out the gold (the mine contains as much as 225,000 ounces of gold). Another worry is the roughly 760,000 litres of groundwater per minute consumed in the regular functioning of the mine. Both practices threaten the sustainability of farming on which local communities rely. The potentially toxic effects of large-scale industrial mining are always considerable, but they have been compounded in this case by the lackadaisical approach to basic environmental regulation adopted by Glamis and Goldcorp. As Dougherty argues, a scientific examination of the Marlin mine Impact Assessment found there are “major deficiencies in the environmental design of the mine, including Glamis’s failure to line the tailings impoundment pond with an impermeable liner.”377 A study by Physicians for Human Rights not surprisingly finds that “people living closer to the mining site had significantly higher concentrations of arsenic in their urine,” and that “one out of five participants [in their study] indicate skin-related problems.”378 Scientific researchers from Ghent University, meanwhile, conclude that there has been “an enourmous increase in concentrations of many elements, including arsenic,” and that “arsenic concentrations in some groundwater wells around the nearby Marlin mine fall far above the WHO [World Health Organization] and North-American and Canadian health standards for drinking water.” The Ghent researchers also argue that “shallow surface groundwater is disappearing.”379 The Association for the Integrated Development of San Miguel (ADISMI) identifies the problem of water levels due to Marlin as well, complaining that ten wells in the area have dried up.380 ADISMI has also documented death of cattle on nearby farms after they drank from a creek flowing beneath the Marlin mine. One farmer says this is the first time this has happened in his thirty-five years of farming.381
Another study, conducted in 2011 by two economists for the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University in the U.S., argues that the environmental costs will be much greater than any economic benefits from the mine. This is the result of Guatemala’s low royalty rates, the money from which goes to the national government and is not guaranteed to the local community; an environmental risk that is “exceptionally high and likely to increase over the remaining life of the mine and in the post-closure phase”; and the mine “contributing little to long term sustainable development.”382 Goldcorp has provided a C$1 million surety bond to the Guatemalan government for the cleanup of the Marlin mine, nominally as a guarantee that it will close the mine in an environmentally responsible way, but one study suggests that the real cost of the mine closure will be closer to C$49 million.383 It is is not just the health of residents being jeopardized, however. According to residents of nearby communities, dynamite explosions at the mine have led to cracks in the structures of their homes.
Goldcorp has even been fined a number of times by MARN, including for a cyanide spill on the Pan-American highway near the Marlin Mine and for lacking a proper licence to import cyanide. The MARN temporarily prohibited Goldcorp from importing cyanide until it paid the fine, a directive which the company straightforwardly ignored. In the fall of 2010, Goldcorp was accussed by Guatemala’s Environmental Management Unit of the unauthorized discharge of toxic water from its tailings pond into a nearby river, which it is only permitted to do if the water being discharged is free from contamination. In response to the accusations, the company took out paid advertisements declaring that the discharge was supervised by public regulatory agencies. Environmentalists and people from the impacted communities counter, however, that the company did not previously advise the MARN nor did it have a permit for the discharge. The fines, prohibitions, and accusations have not changed the company’s behaviour, though, given the fact that as one of the most important foreign investors in the country it has been assured of the active support of the Canadian and Guatemalan states. Neither the MEM nor the Guatemalan government intervened in any of these cases to force Goldcorp’s compliance with environmental regulations or penalize the company for its legal transgressions.384
The buttressing of Goldcorp’s position within Guatemala through the direct and indirect assistance provided by the Canadian state has been especially important as controversy surrounding the mine has accelerated. Ongoing resistance by indigenous activists has drawn unwanted international attention and criticism of the mining giant and the Guatemalan government alike. In a report in early 2010, the International Labour Organization’s Committee of Experts “urge[d] the Government to suspend the exploitation in question [the Marlin mine] until…the prior consultation provided for in Article 15(2) of the Convention [relating to indigenous peoples] can be carried out.”385 This call from the ILO was followed on May 21 of that year by a Precautionary Measure issued by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR), of which both Canada and Guatemala are members. The Commission calls on member states to adopt Precautionary Measures to prevent what it identifies as potential human rights violations or harms against people. The measure regarding Goldcorp included an order to suspend the mine’s operations, the concession for which, “was issued and mining begun without the prior, complete, free, and informed consultation of the affected communities of the Maya people.”386 The measure also noted that serious claims regarding human rights violations and contamination of local water supplies had not been addressed. Although keen to support IACHR decisions when it suits its interests—for example, when the leftist Venezuelan government of Hugo Chávez was the subject of criticism—the Canadian government has been silent regarding the international legal condemnations of Goldcorp’s activities in Guatemala.
We met with Javier de León, a leading member of ADISMI, in July 2012, and he told us “that the exploitation of gold and silver in San Miguel Ixtahuacán is an exploitation of the patrimony of the Mam people in a way that…it is occurring without a license from the Mam people of San Miguel because a consultation process was not carried out in any way.” Echoing the position of the ILO, de León insisted that “in no way did the Guatemalan carry out the consultation according to how it should in order to see if the communities were or were not in agreement with the extraction of gold and silver.”387
The concerns of the IACHR, as well as those of the ILO, were ignored by both Goldcorp and the Guatemalan government and thus the Marlin mine continued to operate freely. Goldcorp kept to its script, arguing that despite all evidence to the contrary there were no ecological repercussions flowing from the operations of Marlin site. “The Guatemalan government’s testing and extensive Company monitoring,” Goldcorp insisted, “demonstrate that there is no evidence of adverse impacts related to mining activity from the Marline mine.”388 As it turned out, Goldcorp need not have fretted excessively about pressure from the IACHR. Not only was Marlin never shut down during the period in which the concerns raised by the IACHR were to have been investigated, bu
t after drawing international attention to the controversies surrounding Marlin, the IACHR subsequently revised its position in late 2011. Following the release of new “evidence” by Goldcorp and the Guatemalan government, IACHR acquiesced, stating simply that Goldcorp needed to ensure the quality of drinking water in the area. Banished in the new position was the earlier and bolder IACHR stance calling for the suspension of operations in the mine.389 As Jennifer Moore from Mining Watch, a Canadian non-governmental organization (NGO), argued in response to the revision:
It is unconvincing that the IACHR would be satisfied with the evidence that the company-sponsored water committee and Guatemalan government have presented. The most recent hydro-geological study lauded by the government does not resolve the question of whether the mine is contaminating the local drinking water and its neutrality has been roundly criticized by local authorities.390
Canadian manoeuvring is lurking in the background of the IACHR’s decision to revise the measure, and for Marlin ultimately not having been shutdown down during the investigation. After the IACHR announcement in May, FAIT and the embassy moved quickly to assist both Guatemala and Goldcorp in their response. They leaned on the Guatemalan government when it looked like it might temporarily close Marlin as per the precautionary measure. It also appears very likely that they conducted behind the scenes networking at the IACHR. The full extent of the Canadian state’s role in the eventual revision of the precautionary measure is not clear; there has been no media coverage of it (in Canada or elsewhere), and pertinent documents obtained through Access to Information are heavily redacted. But there was a flurry of meetings and correspondences between Canadian, Goldcorp, and Guatemalan officials immediately after the precautionary measure was announced, with Alexandra Bugailiskis, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Latin America and the Caribbean, assuring a Goldcorp executive that “the embassy of Canada in Guatemala City will be working closely with the Government of Guatemala to encourage a comprehensive approach…so that Guatemalan authorities are equipped with all of the required information to address concerns.”391 In early June 2011, for example, the Canadian ambassador, Leeann McKechnie, met with the Guatemalan Vice President, the Minister of Mines and Energy, and the Minister of the Environment.392 Shortly after, Goldcorp met in Ottawa with the Director General for Latin America and the Caribbean, James Lambert, Minister of State for the Americas, Peter Kent, and the Minister for International Trade, Peter Van Loan. The brief written for Van Loan includes as a talking point that the government “understand[s] the very large investment made in the Marlin mine and its importance to Goldcorp,” and that the “Embassy is monitoring this issue closely on the ground.”393 Representatives of Canada’s Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington also spoke informally to IACHR representatives in June according to communications between Ottawa, the embassy, and the Mission. This is also noted in a communication between Bugailiskis and a Goldcorp executive.394
The stakes were raised higher for Goldcorp when the Guatemalan government announced on June 23 that it was initiating a process to temporarily close Marlin in response to the IACHR’s precautionary measure, despite President Colom stating that the IACHR’s concerns were unsubstantiated. Canadian officials may very well have known about the decision before it was announced. At a minimum, it would be unsurprising if they were cognizant of its real possibility given the close connections between both Goldcorp—whose Marlin Mine is Guatemala’s largest export-earnings source—and the embassy, and the Guatemalan government. As noted, this more or less natural relationship of mutual interest among elites has no doubt been strengthened through the PDAC trips the embassy organizes for Guatemalan politicians and technocrats in the MEM. All of these factors together could go a long way to explaining the flurry of communications with Guatemalan officials mentioned above, and it may also be the reason that the Office of the Minister of International Trade requested on June 18, with relatively short turnaround time, that a letter be written for the Minister to sign to his Guatemalan counterpart, the content of which has not been disclosed.395 But the announcement by the Colom government certainly spawned another flurry of communications and meetings. On June 24 embassy staff, including the ambassador, met a Goldcorp vice president for the region to discuss Guatemala’s decision to temporarily close the mine.396 Also in late June, Lambert met again with a Goldcorp executive in Ottawa, and in July at the request of FAIT the embassy drew up a list of “high level authorities” in the Guatemalan government to contact, with whom Goldcorp is not already in “constant communication.”397 While the details of the meetings are unclear, what is evident is that despite initially stating it would seek Marlin’s temporary closure, the Guatemalan government never actually carried out any action against the mine.
The meetings continued into the fall of 2010 as an October 25 IACHR hearing date for the complainants and the Guatemala government approached. On October 8, the new Director General for Latin America and Caribbean in FAIT, and former ambassador to Honduras, Neil Reeder, met with Goldcorp.398 On October 12 the embassy’s Senior Trade Commissioner, Sébastien Moffett, met with a Guatemalan leader (who is not identified), while Alan Culham, the Canadian ambassador to the OAS, met with the head of the IACHR.399 It appears from the communications between Ottawa and the embassy that the Canadians were prepping Guatemalans for the hearings, while Culham, perhaps more familiar with IACHR process, deemed it necessary to explain to FAIT and the embassy that the Canadians needed to be vigilant in sustaining appearances in order not to be seen to be infringing upon the IACHR’s independence. The embassy subsequently reported to Ottawa that the “official” IACHR hearing “went well,” and was followed the same day by what it describes as a second “non-official” meeting at the IACHR, the information from which is not disclosed.400 Meetings involving Canadian, Guatemalan, IACHR, and Goldcorp officials continued into 2011, until the measure had been sufficiently watered down and the call for Marlin’s closure withdrawn.401
The litany of ties wedding the Canadian government to Goldcorp does not end there. Indeed, although passed over entirely in the Canadian press, the array of connections between the company and the Conservatives was further exposed in a trip to Guatemala by Canadian officials organized by Goldcorp executives. Among those present were Conservative MPs Dean Allison, chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID), and Dave Van Kesteren, also a member of the SCFAID (and vocal defender of the 2009 coup against former Honduran President Manual Zelaya as a containment strategy against Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez). Also participating in the delegation were Liberal MP Massimo Pacetti and Independent MP Bruce Hyer. An email written by former Liberal MP, Don Boudria—now in the employ of Goldcorp lobbyist Hill and Knowlton—to a Conservative MP, which was leaked to Mining Watch in August 2012, discusses Goldcorp Chairman Ian Telfer and Goldcorp VP Brent Bergeron’s plans to host “a fascinating visit” to Guatemala, including travel in the country by “Goldcorp aircraft.” The visit included a stopover at the Marlin site and meetings with Guatemalan cabinet ministers. The chair of Guatemala’s Legislative Commission, Edgar Cristiani, reported that discussions with the delegation would include “different positions on mining, the experience of their country with mining, royalty payments, as well as the issue of conflicts.”402
The trip was organized to commence several months after Bergeron testified before the SCFAID, where he brazenly declared that
In Guatemala, I would like to see them modernize their mining regulations. That would add to the stability of the environment within which we deal in Guatemala. Can I go as Goldcorp and start training the Ministry of Energy and Mines? I can’t do that. The credibility behind that is not right. However, I think it makes a lot of sense to have a government institution come in to take our experience here in Canada—the Natural Resources Canada in terms of their experience—and bring that experience to Guatemala.403
Thus Bergeron, e
ven as he urged vigilance against any deterioration in Goldcorp’s public image through a perception of overstretching its power in Guatemala, could admit that he esteemed the Canadian government’s record of facilitating corporate extraction of natural resources at home, and that it would be mutually beneficial to all involved if the government were to more aggressively export these practices abroad. This trip came, moreover, after the Pérez Molina government’s brief flirtation with a constitutional change permitting the Guatemalan government to take up to 40 percent ownership in new mining projects, discussed above. While the proposal was withdrawn, it nevertheless spoke to the climate of instability for the industry even in a country with a government that is generally viewed as having a favourable disposition towards the interests of foreign capital.
Goldcorp: Cerro Blanco
Marlin, as we have suggested, has been at the cutting edge of the wave of new Canadian mining projects. The field of Canadian investments has expanded rapidly in the wake of its successes. Such expansion notably includes another Goldcorp project, Cerro Blanco, a gold and silver property at the advanced exploration stage in the southeastern province of Jutiapa. The Cerro Blanco initiative faces opposition in both Guatemala and El Salvador, as it is located on the border. Critics point out that the proposed development poses an environmental threat to the shared Lake Güija and rivers in both countries. For Salvadorans, there is concern about seepage of mine waste into the Lempa river, upon which 3 million depend for their agricultural and livestock-raising activities. A study of Cerro Blanco by geochemistry and hydrogeology professor at Ohio University, Dina Larios, warns that toxic waste water from the mine could cause serious damage to the surrounding ecosystem.404
