by Todd Gordon
74 Canadian aid figures to Latin America are from the country profiles of the individual Latin American countries on the website of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Available online at: www.acdi-cida.gc.ca. These figures do not include financing to the regional Inter-American Development Banks, which is included in the separate CIDA statistical tables. While CIDA counts this financing, which totalled C$241.7 million in 2011–2012, as part of its aid budget, just over 1 percent of disbursements from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) are in the form of grants. The rest are loans repayable with interest or loan guarantees rather than direct bilateral or multilateral aid not requiring repayment with interest. And all IADB grants are exclusive to Haiti. See Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report 2012: Financial Statement, Washington, DC: IADB, 2012; Canadian International Development Agency, Statistical Report on International Assistance, 2011–12, Ottawa: CIDA, 2012. Remittance figures are from the World Bank’s “Migration and Remittances Data.” Available online at: www.worldbank.org. Accessed on March 14, 2014.
75 S. Knack, F. Rogers and N. Eubank, “Aid Quality and Donor Rankings,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, May 2010. Available online at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5290. Accessed on January 27, 2013. On Canada’s poor international development aid performance, in terms of spending and programming relative to other donor nations, see H. McGill, “Canada Among Donors: How Does Canadian Aid Compare?” in Brown, ed., Struggling For Effectiveness, 24–52.
76 In “Aid Effectiveness,” Brown also identifies commercial interests as in part behind the increased stress on “effectiveness” in Canadian development aid decision-making in the 2000s. However, his suggestion that “international prestige” has played a more important role in Canadian aid policy, at least from Chretien through the early days of the first Harper (minority) government, considerably weakens his argument. It may be true that there was a desire to “be at the table” with major aid donors in a number of countries in which Canada has concentrated its aid, but even in the late stages of the Liberal governments and early stages of the Harper government one is hard pressed to conclude this trumped the desire to advance the expansion of Canadian capital. Most of the countries Canada identified for “enhanced partnerships” under the Liberals and, subsequently, as “countries of focus” under the Tories were countries in which Canadian companies already had interests or were identified as places with investment potential, particularly in the natural resources sector. And if we situate aid policy first and foremost as always intimately connected to broader foreign policy goals within the global capitalist economy—as one tool for the reproduction of contradictory capitalist market relations—we see that the interests of Canadian capitalism have always played an important role in shaping Canadian foreign, and aid, policy, and that the more explicit pronouncements to this effect by Julian Fantino, and the collapse of CIDA into the new Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development is not a radical break from the past by any means. See, for example, Gordon’s discussion of aid policy in Imperialist Canada, p. 142–152; Barry-Shaw and Jay, Paved With Good Intentions; D. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier, 1998; and B. Campbell, “Peace and Security in Africa and the Role of Canadian Mining Interests: New Challenges for Canadian Foreign Policy,” Labour, Capital and Society, 37, 2004, pp. 104–106.
77 J. Fantino, “Address of the Honourable Julian Fantino, Minister of International Cooperation, for The Economic Club of Canada, ‘Reducing Poverty—Building Tommorow’s Markets’,” November 23, 2012, Toronto: Canadian International Development Agency.
78 J. Fantino, “Effectiveness, not religion, part of aid decisions,” Embassy, January 30, 2013, p. 7. This view of development policy being tied to private sector forces as a matter of economic necessity is articuled in a November 2012 report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, “Driving Inclusive Economic Growth: The Role of the Private Sector in International Development,” 41st Parliament, 1st Session, and the government’s March 7, 2013 response, both available at www.parl.gc.ca. An internal CIDA analaysis of its bilateral aid programming links explicitly decisions on where to focus aid to potential for commerical ties. K. Mackrael, “Ottawa stresses trade prospects in foreign aid decisions,” Globe and Mail, January 8, 2014, p. A1. We also discuss this issue in subsequent chapters. It is important to keep in mind here that Fantino’s position is not a new orientation for Canadian aid policy. His is a blunter exposition than what we have seen in the past, however. See, for example, Gordon, Imperialist Canada, and Barry-Shaw and Jay, Paved With Good Intentions.
79 E. Blackwood and V. Stewart, “CIDA and the Mining Sector: Extractive Industries as Overseas Development Strategy,” in Brown, ed., Struggling for Effectiveness, pp. 217–245.
80 D. Saunders, “Second wave of financial crisis is coming, Brown warns,” Globe and Mail, July 8, 2009, p. A4. As Blackwood and Stewart observe, “nine of the twenty CIDA countries of focus have among the top twelve largest reserves of the six most important metals in world mining.” And another seven countries contain the largest quantities of other minerals considered “vital for industrial purposes” or are “highly valued as in the case of gemstones, such as as uranium, diamonds, and phosphate. Blackwood and Stewart, “CIDA and the Mining Sector,” p. 228. Canadian aid is not being taylored simply for the natural resource industry; companies from a range of industries have met and travelled with Fantino to discuss CIDA support for Canadian investment in Latin America. However, the natural resource sector is obviously a major force behind the international expansion of Canadian capital, and clearly Fantino and the Conservatives paid special attention to its needs. A. Foster, “The private sector and development: More than just mining companies,” Embassy, April 24, 2013, p. 11.
81 L. Berthiaume, “Did KAIROS defunding come down to mining interests and one hand-written note?” Embassy, October 27, 2010, pp. 1, 10. The hand-written note in question led to a rebuke from the Conservative Speaker of the House, as CIDA senior staff, after initial concerns about Kairos, eventually recommended approval of funding for the organization to the Minister for International Cooparation, Bev Oda. But the document recommending approval was subsequently altered—with Oda initially denying involvement—with “not” written by hand onto it between “you” and “approve.” Oda would eventually admit to ordering “not” be written onto the recommendation. A year before this incident aid groups were reporting to media about being warned about doing advocacy work by staffers for Oda. C. Clark, “Aid groups told to keep quiet on policy issues,” Globe and Mail, February 12, 2010, p. A4; B. Curry and G. Galloway, “Oda admits to changing memo, Harper Tories accused of secrecy,” Globe and Mail, February 15, 2011, p. A1; C. Clark, “Speaker rebukes Oda in Kairos case,” Globe and Mail, February 11, 2011, p. A8.
82 K. Shane, “Why did CIDA cut Development and Peace’s funding?” Embassy, March 21, 2012, pp. 1, 5.
83 D. LeBlanc, “Miners show new way for CIDA,” Globe and Mail, January 30, 2012, p. A4.
84 Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Harper Announces Support for Economic Growth and Development in the Americas,” Ottawa: Prime Minister’s Office, April 14, 2012.
85 Canadian International Development Agency, “Extractive Sector Program in the Americas,” Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, April 2012, Access to Information—CIDA, A-2012-00119.
86 Canadian International Development Agency, “Minister Fantino announces UBC-SFU to partner with Government on new extractive institute,” Toronto: Canadian International Development Agency, November 23, 2012.
87 R. Arnold, “Mining, CIDA partnership in Peru is pacification program, not development,” Embassy, March 5, 2012. Available online at: http://m.embassynews.ca/opinion/2012/03/07/mining-cida-partnership-in-peru-is-pacification-program-not-development/41338?device=m
obile. Accessed on March 6, 2012.
88 Canadian International Development Agency, Project Browser, “Indigenous Peoples’ Partnership Program.” Available online at: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/vWebWBSEn?OpenView&RestrictToCategory=A031825. Accessed on February 25, 2013.
89 Blackwood and Stewart, “CIDA and the Mining Sector,” p. 226.
90 Under pressure to take measures as awareness of the predatory activities of the Canadian resource sector began to grow in Canada, the Conservative government decided instead to stall by organizing “roundtables” for “stakeholders” (industry representatives and NGOs) in 2006. Despite the conservative recommondations of the roundtables, the Conservative government instead placed responsibility for accountability and oversight on the governments of the countries where Canadian companies invest—some of whom have been targeted by Canada for the neoliberal reforms of the regulatory regimes. An ombuds office was established as well, allowing for people to make complaints against Canadian companies. However, company participation is purely voluntary and victims of Canadian mining abuses have quit the process, arguing it is useless. Indeed the ombudsperson eventually quit. K. Keenan, “Canadian Mining: Still Unaccountable,” NACLA: Report on the Americas, May/June, 2010, pp. 29–34. A subsequent push for accountability came from Liberal backbench MP, John McKay, in 2010. While limited in the forms of accountability it would have required of Canadian companies—cutting off public financial and diplomatic support if proven they were involved in human rights and ecological abuses and no criminal law implications—the bill still failed to pass in the minority parliament of the day by seven votes: 13 Liberal and 4 NDP MPs failed to show up for the vote. B. Curry, “Ethical mining bill defeated after fierce lobbying,” Globe and Mail, October 28, 2010, p. A6.
91 A. Rosales, “Going Underground: The Political Economy of the ‘Left Turn’ in South America,” Third World Quarterly, 34, 8, 2013, pp. 1443–1457; J. Seoane, E. Taddei, and C. Algranati, Extractivismo, despojo, y crisis climática: Desafíos para los movimientos socials y los proyectos emancipatorios de Nuestra América, Buenos Aires: Herramienta editores, 2013; N. Grinberg and G. Starosta, “From Global Capital Accumulation to Varieties of Centre Leftism in South America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina,” in S. Spronk and J.R. Webber, eds., Crisis and Contradiction: Marxist Perspectives on Latin America in the Global Economy, Leiden: Brill, 2015.
92 This paragraph draws on J. Seoane, “Modelo extractivo y acumulación por despojo,” in J. Seoane, E. Taddei and C. Algranati, eds., Extractivismo, despojo y crisis climática: Desafíos para los movimientos sociales y los proyectos emancipatorios de Nuestra América, Buenos Aires: Herramienta Ediciones, 2013, pp. 26–27.
93 J. Seoane and C. Algranati, “El sabor amargo del crecimiento economic: la expansion del modelo extractive entre 2003 y 2008,” in Seoane, Taddei and Algranati, eds., Extractivismo, despojo y crisis climática, p. 68.
94 Ibid., pp. 68–70. This list of neoliberal militarized states is not exhaustive, and does not include the authoritarian regimes that were installed following coup d’états in Honduras (2009) and Paraguay (2012), which will be discussed later.
95 S. Gindin and L. Panitch, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire, London: Verso, 2013, see pp. 41, 115.
96 Gordon, Imperialist Canada; Barry-Shaw and Jay, Paved With Good Intentions; J. Klassen, Joining Empire: The Political Economy of the New Canadian Foreign Policy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014; J. Klassen and G. Albo, eds., Empire’s Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.
97 Publications include The Bullet (www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/); Upside Down World (//upsidedownworld.org); Dominion (www.dominionpaper.ca), and Znet (znet.org), among others. Solidarity organizations include Rights Action and Mining Watch.
98 L. Salomón, “Honduras: A History That Repeats Itself,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 45, 1, 2012, p. 58.
99 A successful coup was carried out against Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti in 2004, and unsuccessful attempts were made against Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2002 and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2008. A third successful coup, of a specific parliamentary variety, has recently been carried out in Paraguay. See T. Gordon and J.R. Webber, “Paraguay’s Parliamentary Coup and Ottawa’s Imperial Response,” The Bullet, June 26, 2012.
100 G. Grandin, “Building a Perfect Machine of Perpetual War: The Mexico-to-Colombia Security Corridor Advances,” The Nation, February 11, 2011. Available online at: http://www.thenation.com/blog/158492/building-perfect-machine-perpetual-war-mexico-colombia-security-corridor-advances. Accessed on January 15, 2013.
101 J. Littell, “Lost in the Void,” London Review of Books, 34, 11, June 7, 2012; D. Paley, “Drug War Capitalism: Militarization and Economic Transformation in Colombia and Mexico,” Against the Current 159 (July-August), p. 22; P. Watt and R. Zepeda, Drug War Mexico: Politics, Neoliberalism and Violence in the New Narcoeconomy, London: Zed Books, 2012; D. Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia, London: Zed Books, 2005.
102 A. Bird, “Drugs and Business: Central America Faces another Round of Violence,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 45, 1, 2012, p. 35;
103 Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2011, Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 2012.
104 V. Bulmer-Thomas, “Honduras Since 1930,” in L. Bethell, ed., Central America Since Independence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 193, 196.
105 W.I. Robinson, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization, London: Verso, 2003, pp. 118–119.
106 Regime transitions throughout Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s generally involved a shift from direct authoritarian military rule to “low-intensity” democracy, or polyarchy, “a system in which a small group actually rules, on behalf of capital, and participation in decision making by the majority is confined to choosing among competing elites in tightly controlled electoral processes.” See W.I. Robinson, “Global Crisis and Latin America,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 23, 2, 2004, pp. 134–153.
107 W. LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, second edition, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 179.
108 Bulmer-Thomas, “Honduras Since 1930,” pp. 223–224.
109 J.A. Booth, “Socioeconomic and Political Roots of National Revolts in Central America,” Latin American Research Review, 25, 1, 1991, p. 48.
110 See, for example, A. Corr, No Trespassing: Squatting, Rent Strikes and Land Struggles Worldwide, Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999, pp. 30–50.
111 C.D. Brockett, “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America,” Comparative Politics, 23, 3, 1991, pp. 259–260.
112 Ibid., p. 259.
113 Booth, “Socioeconomic and Political Roots,” p. 54.
114 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 182.
115 Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, p. 124.
116 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 264.
117 L. Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004, p. 83.
118 G. Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, New York: Owl Books, 2006, p. 114.
119 Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, p. 124. See also, N. Chomsky, Turning the Tide: The U.S. and Latin America, second edition, Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987, pp. 128–129.
120 P. Flynn, “The United States at War in Central America: Unable to Win, Unwilling to Lose,” in R. Burbach and P. Flynn, eds., The Politics of Intervention: The United States in Central America, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984, p. 113.
121 Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, p. 121.
122 Ibid., p. 123, emphasis i
n original.
123 Flynn, “The United States at War,” p. 111.
124 Chomsky, Turning the Tide, p. 128–129.
125 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, pp. 310–311.
126 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, p. 115. “Most famously,” Grandin writes, “[Oliver] North [of the National Security Council] created an elaborate circuit of exchange that, with the help of Israeli arms traders, sold U.S. missiles to Iran at inflated prices, with the profits from the deal used to supply the Contras. There is ample evidence, not the least of which comes from North’s handwritten notes, that the CIA employed Latin American cocaine and marijuana dealers as middlemen, using their planes to ship arms to the contras in exchange for easy access to American markets.”
127 Gill, The School of the Americas, p. 83.
128 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 312, 331–332.
129 Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, p. 124.
130 G. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 14.
131 J. Dunkerley, The Pacification of Central America, London: Verso, 1994.
132 Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, p. 127.
133 See ibid., pp 127–132, for details on the political expressions of these externally-oriented fractions of Honduran capital in the form of New Right clusters within both the National and Liberal parties.
134 J.A. Booth, C.J. Wade, and T.W. Walker, Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, Fourth edition, Boulder: Westview, 2006, p. 144; and Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, p. 129.
135 Booth, Wade, and Walker, Understanding Central America, p. 145.
136 For a detailed discussion of this general trend across the Global South see M. Davis, Planet of Slums, London: Verso, 2006.
