The Soviets’ goal is to dominate the world. They want to win, but without war. We also must try to win, but through peace. Our goal should be to engage them in a peaceful competition between our systems that will foster peaceful change in theirs.
Establishing a process for peaceful competition will require creative statesmanship of a high order. We must make the Kremlin leaders understand that aggression, direct and indirect, will lead to war. We must not object to their attempts to spread communism as long as they use peaceful means to do so. In one of our heated exchanges in Moscow in 1959, Nikita Khrushchev shouted, “Your grandchildren will live under communism.” I replied that we had no objection to his saying this but that we would firmly resist if he tried to bring it about by force.
Regardless of the progress we make in reducing tensions that could lead to war, the United States and the Soviet Union are destined to continue to be all-out competitors. What the Soviets must understand is that, if the game is to have any winners, they must abide by rules of engagement in areas short of war.
Our strategy for peaceful competition affects all of our global relationships. We must unify the economic power of the industrial democracies so that we can gain political concessions from the Eastern bloc in exchange for our economic cooperation. We must continue to develop constructive ties with China so that it chooses to align itself with us rather than with the Soviets. We must seek to alleviate poverty and repression in Third World countries so that they do not become tempting targets for Soviet adventurism. Above all, we must not stand aside and let events control us. If we ride the hurricane, we will become part of it.
Our most difficult problem in this competition is finding a way to go over, under, and around the Iron Curtain to carry it on in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. We have no perfect solution, but this should not stop us from applying partial ones. We must recognize that the superiority of local Soviet military forces puts us at a disadvantage in the short run but that the superiority of our system and ideals gives us just as great an advantage in the long run.
We must not treat the countries of Eastern Europe as if they were part of a monolithic Soviet bloc. Those who insist that we do so make the same argument as some did when we opened the door to China in 1972. They say that all these nations are communist, that communism is evil, and that they are therefore all potential enemies and should be treated as such. They fail to recognize the profound truth of British historian Paul Johnson’s dictum: “It is the essence of geopolitics to be able to distinguish between different degrees of evil.”
The extent of Soviet control, though great, is not total. The countries of Eastern Europe are allied with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, and East European communists and Soviet ones share the same ideology. The presence of Soviet military forces within and on the borders of these nations severely limits the scope of independent action their leaders can take domestically and internationally. But the governments of Eastern Europe have developed personal, national, and even some ideological differences. Some East European leaders have exploited these to eke out a small degree of maneuverability. This should not be overestimated, but we should encourage it through the bilateral relations we develop with each country.
The crisis in Poland exemplifies our dilemma. Our hearts tell us to give all-out support and encouragement to the Solidarity labor union and the anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments of the vast majority of the Polish people. But our heads tell us that we cannot play a military role in Poland. We learned that lesson from the uprising in Hungary in 1956, when we appeared to offer support to the freedom fighters only to be proven helpless when the Red Army moved into Budapest. The Soviets will not permit an independent, hostile Polish government to take power, and they have the military power to prevent that outcome. We are left with the painful conclusion that it is better for Poland to be ruled by Polish communists than by Soviet communists, even though internally the two are usually indistinguishable by their actions.
This does not mean we are acquiescing to the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviets always assert that what is theirs is theirs and what is ours is negotiable. Unfortunately, the realities in Eastern Europe force us to accept the fact of Soviet hegemony, but we must never agree to the principle of it. We cannot set the liberation of the captive nations as our short-term policy goal, but we must never cease to proclaim it as our long-term goal.
Although Soviet power makes the cards in our hand seem weak, the magnetism of the West stacks the deck in our favor. How do we play out our hand? Their strong suit is in military power. Our strong suits are in economic power and in the power of ideas. If we play our cards wisely, the Soviets will be left holding theirs.
Increased trade and contacts can advance peaceful change within the Soviet bloc. There are those who argue that we should isolate these countries and let economic necessity force them to reform. They are wrong. The pull of a magnet is greatest nearby it. Similarly, the more contact we have with the East, the more we open it to the force of Western example. This will inevitably add to those internal forces that are generating change. During the long, chilly years of cold war confrontation there was little change in the countries of Eastern Europe. There has been substantial change since then. As I saw on a recent trip to four Eastern European countries, the stirrings of greater freedom are there—economic freedom in some, political or social freedoms in others. And conditions are ripe for further change.
The changes taking place in Hungary today prove the point. Situated on the frontier of the Soviet empire, Hungary is exposed to unjammed Austrian radio and television broadcasts and has become thoroughly infected with the tastes and ideas of the West. General-Secretary Kadar, whom Khrushchev appointed after crushing the uprising in Budapest in 1956, is a dedicated communist but also prides himself on being a patriotic Hungarian. His country languished until he implemented economic reforms during the years of detente. His production figures, while not high by Western standards, are now the envy of the Eastern bloc. Yet he faces a dilemma. Progress requires more freedom for enterprise; more freedom means less control for the state. He must constantly ask himself how much power he can afford to give up without endangering his rule, but for now the reforms continue. Isolating Hungary because of our differences with the Soviet Union would snuff out the prospects for more reform.
Our other strong suit is in the realm of ideas. A visitor to nineteenth-century Russia said that “one word of truth hurled into Russia is like a spark landing in a keg of powder.” Today, the fact that the Soviet system lives on lies makes it extremely vulnerable to the truth. Truth can penetrate borders. Truth can travel on its own power, wherever people and ideas of East and West meet. Russia has heavy censorship, but its people are starved for the truth. Sending the West’s message through every totalitarian barrier—whether by exchange of visitors, or books, or broadcasts—will give hope to millions behind those barriers and will gradually eat away at the foundations of the Soviet system just as seeping water can erode the foundation of a prison.
We should not shrink from the propaganda war, either within the Soviet empire or in the rest of the world. It is not enough to condemn the evil of communism. We must also proclaim the promise of freedom. We should strengthen Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and set up counterparts of them to compete directly with Soviet propaganda in those areas of the Third World that the Kremlin leaders have targeted for aggression. Even in peace, the war of ideas will continue. We must be sure it takes place on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
One great benefit of a summit meeting in Moscow would be that President Reagan would have the opportunity to address the Soviet people on television. Not only could he dispel his image in the Soviet press as a reckless warmonger, but he could also present our point of view as the free world’s most effective spokesman. Some scoff at the thought that such a speech can accomplish anything. After all, the Kremlin leaders are hardly concerned by their Gallup rating. But I had the opportunity to addr
ess the Soviet people in 1959, 1972, and 1974, and if the level of official anxiety over these broadcasts was any measure of their power, it was not insignificant.
Khrushchev often challenged the West to competition with communism. We should accept that challenge and broaden it, bringing to bear the spiritual and cultural values that have distinguished Western civilization. Whether or not the Soviets choose to compete in these areas, we should compete with all the vigor at our command. The Soviets need contact with the West. They need our technology and our trade. They cannot keep out our radio broadcasts today and may not be able to keep out our satellite television broadcasts tomorrow. They cannot seal themselves off totally from the world. When they crack open the door to reach out for what they want, we should push through it as much truth as we can.
Winston Churchill once observed, “Russia fears our friendship more than our enmity.” Churchill’s insight showed a deep understanding of the Soviet leaders. They understand that one of the greatest dangers to the Soviet system is contact between their ideas and ours, their people and ours, their society and ours. This proximity invites unwelcome comparisons. It plants the seeds of discontent that will someday blossom into peaceful change. But if instead we isolate the East and reduce its contacts with us, we would be casting away one of our most effective weapons against the Kremlin leaders.
If peaceful change turns the attention of Soviet leaders toward their internal problems, real peace will have a chance to take hold in the world. It will at best take generations for such a resolution to come about. This is plainly unsatisfactory for a people as impatient as Americans, who are accustomed to solving their problems overnight. But history seldom accommodates the hurried. As with anything that is truly worth having, real peace will take time, effort, and above all patience.
In the meantime, there is no substitute for vigilance. We must restore without delay the military balance of power at the strategic, theater, and conventional levels.
We must also continue to build up our economic strength. Ironically, those who fault President Reagan’s foreign policy but praise his domestic policy may one day look back and recognize that his greatest contribution in foreign policy was his economic policy. A democratic country with a weak economy will have a weak foreign policy. By wringing inflation out of the American economy, President Reagan has established a solid base for a sustained and long economic expansion. A strong American economy will strengthen the economies of our friends and allies abroad. It will enable him to win congressional approval for the defense and non-defense spending that is necessary to achieve our foreign policy goals. It will put him in a stronger position in negotiating East-West trade deals. It will help him fight off forces that advocate protectionism. And it will buoy the world economy and thereby strengthen the vulnerable states that are on the target list of the Kremlin leaders.
We must engage the Soviets in a process of peaceful competition. If they could sell communism in the marketplace of ideas, if they could make their system deliver on its promises, then they would deserve to win the global ideological struggle. But they cannot, and they never will. Thirty years ago, many saw communism as a way to progress, but now its performance has caught up with its promises. It is not enough that the Soviet Union has lost the battle of ideas. It is essential that the West launch an offensive to win it. If we succeed in winning this battle on both sides of the East-West divide, we will lay a firm foundation for building real peace in the years ahead.
Without one key ingredient, none of this is possible. Sir Robert Thompson, the great British strategist, once trenchantly described national strength as manpower plus applied resources times will. We have the manpower. We have the resources. But do we have the will to act as a great power with the vision to move the world toward real peace?
There is no question that if there is to be an arms race, we can win it. There is no question that if there is to be an economic race, we can win it. There is no question that if there is to be a contest for the “hearts and minds” of the world’s people, we can win it. But there is a question whether we can win the contest we are actually engaged in today: a test of will and determination between ourselves and the most powerfully armed aggressive power the world has ever known.
Real peace requires that we resolve to use our strength in ways short of war. There is today a vast gray area between peace and war, and the struggle will be largely decided in that area. If we expect to win without war, or even expect not to lose without war, then we must engage our adversary within that area. We need not duplicate his methods, but we must counter them—even if that means behaving in ways other than we would choose in an ideal world.
National will involves far more than readiness to use military power, whether nuclear or conventional. It includes a readiness to allocate the resources necessary to maintain that-power. It includes a clear view of where the dangers lie, and of what kinds of responses are necessary to meet those dangers. It includes also a basic, crystalline faith that the United States is on the right side in the struggle, and that what we represent in the world is worth defending.
If the Soviet leaders look westward and see an American leadership that eyes their moves in a measured way, that refuses to bow, that walks without faltering, that knows what it is doing, that is determined to do whatever has to be done in order to prevail, then those Soviet leaders will not be tempted to gamble all in high-stakes throws of the dice. They will make their cost-benefit analysis and postpone or abandon any aggression that will not be worth the effort or the risk.
As we look to the future, we should do so with confidence. I do not believe there will be a world war. I believe there can and will be progress in building more peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. I believe our geopolitical competition will continue. But if we muster the will, we need not be pessimistic about the outcome. As one generation succeeds another, we will begin to see the process of peaceful change take hold in the Eastern bloc as it is already doing to a small degree in Hungary and China. In that change lies the ultimate solution to the riddle of peace. We will win in the long run, and win without war.
But we must avoid soft-headed overconfidence. History tells us it is not enough to be on the right side. The pages of history are strewn with the wreckage of superior civilizations that were overrun by barbarians because they awoke too late to the threat, reacted too timidly in devising a strategy to meet it, and because they lacked the will to make the necessary sacrifices to win.
The history of the world is a narrative of man’s struggle to become free and remain free. Freedom has not come cheaply, and keeping it is not easy. We hold a responsibility to the future unique to our time and place. Nothing that today’s generation can leave for tomorrow’s will mean more than the heritage of liberty.
No people have ever had a more exciting challenge. Yet the American people sometimes become deeply disillusioned about playing this role in the world. The loss in Vietnam was traumatically painful. The burden of building the defenses of the free world is great. The fact that countries to which we give billions of dollars in aid vote against us consistently in the United Nations is maddening.
Without the United States, there is no chance for peace and freedom to survive. Without the United States, the dawn of the twenty-first century would open a new age of barbarism on a global scale.
But we must assume this burden not just for others but for ourselves. We have a spiritual stake in not walking away from a great historical challenge. President de Gaulle wrote, “France is never her true self except when she is engaged in a great enterprise.” This is true of individuals; it is true of nations; it is particularly true of Americans. Only by participating in a great enterprise can we be true to ourselves.
There could be no greater enterprise than to build a structure of real peace. The struggle to protect freedom and build real peace can raise the sights of Americans from the mundane to the transcendent, from the immediate to the enduring.
During a m
eeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea in 1974, I jotted down this note on a pad of paper: “Peace is like a delicate plant. It has to be constantly tended and nurtured if it is to survive; if we neglect it, it will wither and die.” Peace has barely survived in the rocky soil of the twentieth century. The violence of two world wars and scores of smaller wars has nearly uprooted it time and again. It has managed to survive, but is far from safe. It is not a grim burden but an inspiring challenge to build and sustain real peace. Given the alternative of suicidal war, we must not fail.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
Winston Churchill once remarked that history would treat him kindly because he intended to write the history. This book was not written to preempt historians. It was written because both during and after the war, as President and private citizen, I found that television and newspaper coverage of the Vietnam War described a different war from the one I knew, and that the resulting misimpressions formed in the public’s mind were continuing to haunt our foreign policy. In these pages, I have set down the story of the war as I saw it, with the advantages and disadvantages that follow from this perspective.
This is the sixth book I have written, and the fifth that I have written since leaving the presidency. It is a book about which I have especially keen feelings. Its roots go back more than thirty years, to my first visit to Vietnam in 1953. But the intensity of my feeling about it stems from having been the President who inherited the Vietnam War at its peak and had to end it, and having then seen the peace that was won at such cost thrown away so cavalierly. The lessons of Vietnam are, to me, very personal ones. The analysis of events that I have given here is, of course, my own, derived from my own experience, study, and observation. Those who may disagree with its conclusions should direct their disagreements at me. However, there are others whose contributions I particularly want to acknowledge.
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