by David Crist
But Crowe had his own idea of what they should do. “Get a ship!” he told Crist. Tehran had deliberately tried to sink a U.S. warship and had very nearly succeeded in doing so. The only response, he believed, was to put one of Iran’s ships on the bottom of the ocean. To paraphrase a line from the movie The Untouchables: It was the Chicago rules. They put one of ours in the hospital; we were going to put one of theirs in the morgue.
Less too wanted to respond aggressively. He had a powerful armada with which to respond. Thirteen naval combatants sat within the Gulf or just outside, including two cruisers and the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise with its embarked carrier air wing of some sixty combat aircraft. Recently a force of four hundred marines arrived on the USS Trenton to conduct raids and attacks on Iranian islands and platforms. Two full SEAL platoons were on the two mobile sea bases.
Less proposed augmenting his navy air complement with B-52s from Guam or Diego Garcia, which would then fly in toward Bandar Abbas from over eastern Iran and bomb it from “behind,” where Iranian air defenses were not arrayed.27 He raised the idea of using Tomahawk cruise missiles to hit fixed targets such as the Iranian navy headquarters at Bandar Abbas.28 Less called Rear Admiral Guy Zeller, commander of the carrier battle group in the Gulf of Oman, about possibly striking targets at Bandar Abbas, especially the naval headquarters and port facilities that enabled the Iranian navy to operate in the southern Gulf.29 Zeller met with carrier wing commander Captain Bob Canepa, an experienced fighter pilot with one previous air wing command under his belt. He and his deputy, Commander Arthur “Bud” Langston, had considerable combat experience—Langston with two Distinguished Flying Crosses and more than 270 combat missions, many over North Vietnam.30 The carrier crew knew well the targets in Iran. They had conducted twenty-seven exercises targeted at Iranian warships, hitting targets such as Silkworm sites around the Strait of Hormuz and even dropping air-deliverable mines as part of the long-standing CENTCOM contingency plans. Extensive planning had been done on ordnance selection, developing strike packages for over twenty different sets of targets around Bandar Abbas and all the way up to Bushehr.31
After receiving Zeller’s input, on April 15, Less sent Crist a proposal to use aircraft to mine the entrance to Bandar Abbas Harbor, effectively bottling up the Iranian navy. Less also recommended destroying the naval district headquarters building in Bandar Abbas.32 Meanwhile, U.S. forces would destroy three platforms—Rakhsh, Sirri, and Sassan—in the central and southern Gulf. The only apparent complicating factor was that Sirri remained an active oil producer, pumping 180,000 barrels per day.33
Early the next morning, the chiefs met in the Tank. Crowe explained to the assembled brass that there was a consensus within the administration to retaliate for the damage done to the Roberts, but beyond that members of the administration had very different ideas of just what exactly that should entail. With CENTCOM’s proposal in hand, Crowe told them, “Crist wants heavy retaliation. Carlucci wants no loss of life on either side and a very restrained retaliation—little more than a couple of platforms.” Crowe made known in no uncertain terms his own feelings that he wanted to sink an Iranian ship in response to the mining. One ship in particular raised the chairman’s ire: the Sabalan. Reading reports over the past months of the tanker war, he grew increasingly irritated at the antics of Captain Manavi. As a sailor, he was appalled at the Iranian’s deliberate targeting of crewmen, seeming to delight in killing as many as possible. Here was a ship and a skipper that deserved to be sent speedily to the bottom of the ocean.
Neither Carlucci nor Powell had much enthusiasm for a large attack against Iran, and both advocated moderation in the American military response. “No one had been killed,” Powell cautioned during a meeting in the White House Situation Room. “We don’t want to expand this conflict.” He brought up the possibility of grave environmental damage to the Gulf should one of the Iranian platforms be destroyed and tens of thousands of gallons of oil spilled into the Gulf. Carlucci seemed to agree with his old NSC deputy, and expressed an almost obsessive concern with avoiding casualties, both American and Iranian. He insisted that any U.S. attack needed to be preceded by a warning, allowing enough time for the Iranians to abandon their ship or platform.
Normally cautious during such meetings, Admiral Crowe bucked his usual noncommittal stance and voiced strong objections to the line of reasoning being espoused by his boss and the general turned national security adviser. This time, he argued, they had gone too far, and a mere tit-for-tat response was not enough: “We have to let Tehran know that we are willing to exact a serious price,” Crowe said, forcefully arguing to sink a ship. His logic eventually swayed both Powell and Carlucci, and the two agreed on adding a ship to the target list. No one, however, supported an attack on the Iranian mainland. The only condition in which they would attack Iran proper would be if the Iranians launched their Silkworm missiles against U.S. ships, at which time all bets would be off and the secretary of defense would authorize a very strong retaliation.
Afterward, Powell briefed Reagan. After some discussion, the president agreed to the recommendations to sink a ship and attack the Sirri and Sassan platforms, and if need be one other. Should the Charak venture out, or whichever ship had laid the mines, Crowe said they wanted to sink that as well, and Reagan agreed. With the decisions made, Reagan flew off that afternoon to Camp David in the hills of western Maryland for a weekend of horseback riding.
The meeting adjourned and Crowe’s driver took him back across the river to the Pentagon. Once again, he called Crist in Tampa. “I just got back from the White House, and they want a combat ship.” If the Sabalan was at sea, Captain Nasty would be sent to the bottom of the Gulf. To drive the point home in a conference call that evening with Crist, and Less, Crowe ended the conversation addressing Less directly: “Sink the Sabalan. Put her on the bottom.”34
Less’s force would form three surface action groups (SAGs), each comprising three warships. SAG B would attack the westernmost target, the Sassan platform. Commanded by Captain James Perkins of the navy, it comprised two destroyers plus a four-hundred-man marine raid force embarked upon the amphibious ship Trenton.35 SAG C would attack the Sirri platform to the east of Sassan, commanded by Captain David Chandler in the aged cruiser USS Wainwright.36 Due to her enhanced command and control suite, the Wainwright would also serve as the anti–air warfare commander, meaning that any aircraft from the Enterprise coming into the Gulf to strike a target had to check in with the ship before being cleared to attack any target inside the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, SAG D, commanded by Captain Don Dyer, comprising two destroyers and a frigate, would operate in the Strait of Hormuz. It was assigned to find and sink the Sabalan.37
To provide a cover for the impending attack, Less’s joint task force and CENTCOM devised a deception plan to fool the Iranians into believing that the buildup of forces in the Gulf was merely part of a forthcoming Earnest Will convoy. U.S. intelligence suspected an Iranian mole within the Kuwaiti oil ministry. The United States relayed to the Kuwaitis a plan to go ahead with a large inbound convoy and to bring some more ships into the Gulf to support it, hoping this word would get back to Tehran to avert suspicion of the true nature of the force buildup. On April 17, three combatants detached from their carrier and entered the Persian Gulf, joining their respective surface action groups. Meanwhile, the Enterprise launched standard reconnaissance missions over the Strait of Hormuz and surface and air patrols in the Gulf of Oman, all routine prior to a convoy. Whether the Iranians bought the ruse, however, remained uncertain.38
Additionally, both CENTCOM and the State Department worked channels to get Saudi Arabian agreement for AWACS and tankers to air-refuel the navy aircraft over Oman, which had been included in an agreement signed the previous year, although Muscat’s approval was not formally received until the operation was already under way.39
As U.S. forces positioned themselves, American officials were stunned when Iraq launched a massive offensive
to retake the al-Faw Peninsula. Moving their forces at night, the Iraqi buildup had gone relatively unnoticed in CENTCOM. In an amazing coincidence, Iraqi forces attacked Iran on land as the United States attacked at sea.40 Iraq launched a well-planned attack on the Iranian positions on al-Faw, labeled Ramadan Mubarak or Blessed Ramadan. Iraqi artillery opened with a short but intense barrage of a mix of explosive and chemical munitions. A rapidly dissipating, nonpersistent nerve agent was used on the Iranian frontline troops, while a longer-lasting blistering mustard gas was dropped on Iranian rear echelon forces. An estimated fifteen hundred 122-mm rockets filled with nerve agents fell in rapid succession on the hapless Iranian front lines.
While one brigade conducted an amphibious attack on the southern tip of al-Faw, flanking the Iranian positions, two Republican Guard divisions in chemical protective gear simultaneously struck the Iranian positions, supported by two regular army divisions. The Iraq air force finally proved its worth; it conducted three hundred sorties closely coordinated with the ground forces, bombing Iranian command and control, logistics, and reserve forces.
The Iraqi advance was both rapid and methodical. Once the lead Republican Guard units achieved the breakthrough, a third division passed through their lines and proceeded to seize the remainder of the peninsula. With a liberal use of chemical weapons, including deadly nerve-agent gas, it would take only thirty-six hours to overrun the ill-equipped Iranian defenders, who died by the hundreds, desperately injecting atropine to counter the effects of the nerve agent, leaving the empty injectors scattered around their trenches.41 Never again would Iran threaten Basra or Saddam Hussein’s survival.
The next day, the United States would launch its onslaught in the Persian Gulf in an operation called Praying Mantis.
Eighteen
GOOD-BYE, CAPTAIN NASTY
Reveille sounded shortly after four a.m. on April 18, 1988. Nerves and last-minute planning had kept most of the men up throughout the night. After a traditional breakfast of steak and eggs, the marines grabbed their weapons and gear and made their way down the flight deck, where they cued up to load on board four helicopters. At seven fifty-five a.m. the Trenton began broadcasting in English, Farsi, and Arabic: “Gas-oil separation platform Sirri, this is U.S. Navy Warship. You have five minutes to evacuate your platform. Any actions other than evacuation will result in immediate destruction.”1 The marines had arrived in February as part of Crist’s desire to take islands and more platforms in case Washington allowed more aggressive actions against Iran. It was a compact force of four hundred men and eight helicopters embarked on one ship, the USS Trenton, commanded by Colonel William Rakow. Before arriving in the Persian Gulf, they spent nearly five months training for the mission, including working with the FBI and civilian oil companies in the Gulf of Mexico about how to attack oil platforms without causing an environmental disaster.
The Trenton and two other ships of Surface Action Group B, commanded by Captain James Perkins, sat five thousand yards away from the Sassan gas-oil separation platform, one of the larger ones operated by Iran. It comprised seven separate multileveled platforms, each a maze of pipes, ladders, wells, and equipment of every size and variety, all linked by catwalks running fifty feet above the water. Each served a different functional requirement, from crew billeting to pumping to one holding four large tanks containing deadly hydrogen sulfide gas, commonly referred to as sewer gas, an unpleasant natural by-product that is separated from the oil and natural gas as it is extracted.2 After the brief reprieve from Captain Perkins for the Iranians to evacuate, the USS Merrill opened fire, sending seventy-pound shells hurtling toward Sassan, where they burst overhead in large puffs of black smoke raining red-hot metal down on the complex. In response, the defenders of Sassan came to life, and the twin-barrel antiaircraft gun on the southernmost platform returned fire with audible pop-pop sounds, sending large high-velocity rounds in the direction of the Merrill. All fell into the water well short of the warship. The navy shells pummeled the gun and the platform, and the gun went silent as its crew fled for the safety of the lower levels or, in the case of at least one Iranian, leaped into the water to avoid the deadly cascade.3
A Marine radio team monitoring Sassan’s communication with Bandar Abbas learned that several Iranian marines—between three and six—remained on board to “interdict” the Americans in a last, desperate suicidal mission. Neither Perkins nor Rakow wanted to take any chances. After another fusillade, four attack helicopters fired antitank missiles into a multistory structure that served as the workers’ quarters. Then, banking hard, they came back raking the facility with 20-mm gunfire, starting a small fire on one of the catwalks. One of the missiles ignited the wood-framed structure, and soon flames engulfed the entire structure, burning furiously, sending black smoke high into the air.
With no more return fire, Rakow sent in the marines, who approached in two helicopters fast and low.4 As the two attack Cobras peppered the target one last time with fire, the two twin-engine CH-46s popped their noses up slightly and came to a quick hover over their assigned platforms, immediately dropping a rope off their rear ramps, which marines began sliding down.5 Within thirty seconds, each disgorged its passengers and quickly pulled away.6 The marines immediately set about clearing their respective platforms, covering each other as they worked their way from top to bottom through a labyrinth of pipes and machinery. Captain Thomas Hastings, a smart, charismatic marine with a background in unconventional warfare, commanded the assault force.7 Moving gingerly across the smashed and broken catwalks, they searched the remaining platforms. Finding no Iranians, alive or dead, the marines declared Sassan secured shortly after ten a.m. Then one marine climbed up a tall radio tower, the highest point on Sassan. He fastened the Stars and Stripes and, beneath Old Glory, a U.S. Marine Corps flag, to the wild cheers of those looking on below.8 After a couple of hours, a marine sergeant set two timed fuses on thirteen hundred pounds of explosives placed around the seven platforms and flew back to the Trenton. Ten minutes later Sassan erupted in a massive explosion, briefly obscuring the oil facility in a brownish black cloud of smoke and debris.
While the marines stormed Sassan, other navy ships and embarked elite SEALs struck the Sirri oil facility. Much smaller, it comprised just three platforms connected by a long catwalk, with a small natural gas burn-off at one end. U.S. intelligence knew of at least one crew-served twin heavy antiaircraft gun and perhaps ten Revolutionary Guardsmen and twenty civilian workers.9
The senior commander for this group, SAG C, was David Chandler, captain of the large cruiser Wainwright; a Southerner, he had an easy manner and spoke with a slow drawl.10 At six a.m., general quarters sounded on the Wainwright. The executive officer, Craig Vance, took position on the bridge while Captain Chandler took his seat in the combat information center (CIC). To his left sat Lieutenant Martin Drake, the ship’s weapons officer, surrounded by the missile and main gun control consoles.11 At seven fifty-five, with a haze hanging over the water, a sailor issued the same warnings to the Iranians on Sirri as had been given to Sassan, adding, in sardonic humor, Captain Nasty’s famous line: “Have a nice day.”12
Just before eight fifteen, Captain Chandler gave the order “batteries release.” A rapid succession of deafening boom-boom-booms followed. Within a minute, twenty-three shells burst around Sirri, sending the defenders running for cover from the rain of shrapnel.13 Observers on the Wainwright could clearly see uniformed Iranians moving to man an antiaircraft gun. Chandler called off the SEALs and ordered the ships to open fire once again. The American warships opened up, and the first salvo from the Wainwright burst directly over the antiaircraft gun, killing two Iranians and wounding several others. One of the Wainwright’s next rounds exploded near Sirri’s main gas separation tanks, sending a huge fireball mushrooming into the air, with the ensuing conflagration cooking off ammunition as heavy black smoke engulfed the main platform and fires spread down to consume the main platform’s lower level.14 Fatigue-clad soldier
s leaped into the water while others were incinerated. As fires raged, setting off secondary explosions, Captain Chandler and senior SEALs agreed not to try to occupy the platform. Instead, the Americans dropped a life raft and medical kit to the Iranians in the water, six of whom managed to climb in. Sirri had been neutralized, but any intelligence had gone up in the flames.15
To the east, Captain Donald Dyer’s three ships of SAG D hovered near Abu Musa Island. A big man, bald, ever quiet, and supremely self-confident, Dyer used the USS Jack Williams as his command ship, eager to put twenty years of training to work in his first combat operation. His mission was to find and sink the Sabalan, so Dyer monitored the intelligence traffic on the ship’s location. About two a.m. that morning, Captain Nasty, Lieutenant Commander Abdollah Manavi, had radioed back to headquarters in Bandar Abbas that his ship needed to head back to port due to a broken freshwater condenser that prevented the ship from making palatable water. Dyer had his doubts about getting Captain Nasty. “We stirred up a hornet’s nest with the Roberts, and they are not going to come out,” he told his staff.16
At precisely eight a.m. Dyer’s ships nevertheless headed north toward the Strait of Hormuz in search of her quarry. “General quarters!” sounded throughout the task force. The electronic bong, bong, bong sent the sailors scurrying to their battle stations, donning their white balaclavas, glove flash protectors, and olive-drab helmets. On board the command ship Jack Williams, crew hoisted a large battle ensign, and the Stars and Stripes snapped straight out in the strong wind. The three ships headed in a column north at nearly thirty knots, generating great white “rooster tails” off their bows as they cut through the calm, flat waters of the Gulf.17 As Dyer’s ships moved northward toward the strait, they detected nearly forty radar contacts ahead of them: fishing boats, dhows, and merchant ships all crowded the narrow strait. He ordered a helicopter aloft to scout ahead. An hour later, Dyer learned that the Sabalan was indeed in Bandar Abbas, straddled by two tankers, either, as some speculated, to protect herself from American Harpoon missiles or, more likely, to take on needed freshwater due to her mechanical problems.18 Either way, as long as Captain Nasty stayed in port, he was safe from U.S. attack. A frustrated Dyer continued moving north in column, up into the traffic separation scheme, where, due to the narrows, ships are required to stay in a tight two-mile-wide lane either to the right or left depending on whether they are entering or leaving the Gulf.19 The ships slowed and loitered before turning around and heading back south, retracing their steps.
