The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran

by David Crist

  Donald Rumsfeld wanted language stating that overthrowing the regime would be American policy. On August 19, 2002, in a letter to Bush, he proposed dealing with two thorns in the American side: “I believe that the situations in Iran and North Korea are sufficiently interesting and unsettled that fashioning a major U.S. government effort, for the most part confidential, to undermine the current regimes and encourage regime change from within is worth consideration.”

  Powell, who along with Myers had been deliberately left off Rumsfeld’s memo to the president, learned of Rumsfeld’s end run. Both he and Myers went to Rice to voice their rejection of arming any opposition groups within Iran. Powell had no confidence that any opposition group had the strength to challenge the current oligarchy. But more important, a scheme to overthrow the Iranian government violated the two-decades-old Algiers Accords, signed in 1981 as a precondition for release of the American hostages, in which the United States pledged “that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.”12

  Condi Rice and Attorney General John Ashcroft agreed with Powell’s view. The final draft included this line: “The United States should not at this time provide overt or covert support to opposition groups or call for regime change.”

  When Peter Rodman saw this, he raised the alarm back with Rumsfeld. This ties our hands in foreign policy, he told the secretary. “The Algiers Accords are not a binding obligation. The U.S. has in any case the right of self-defense. This is a red herring.”13

  “Good!” Rumsfeld wrote in response to Rodman. The secretary recommended that they delete any reference to language that opposed regime change or mentioned obligations signed by President Carter.

  As for the recent overtures from President Khatami, Vice President Cheney pushed to insert language in the draft national security document that flatly rejected them. “The United States should not at this point respond to overtures from the current regime but will continue to meet with the Iranian Government representatives in multilateral settings when it serves U.S. interests.”14

  Whether regime change should be American policy brought Iran policy to a halt. “We were at loggerheads,” Richard Armitage said, “and the president, who has put himself up as the great decider, would never decide.”15 After months of debate and discussion, Rice shelved the national security document. It would be another five years before the administration tried again to formulate a cohesive strategy to deal with this antagonist.

  The Pentagon’s views were heavily influenced by Ahmed Chalabi, the head of a group of Iraqi exiles funded by the U.S. government called the Iraqi National Congress. Founded in 1992, the INC, as it became known, served as an umbrella organization for those opposed to Saddam Hussein, and its contacts within Iraq proved useful for open-source information. Chalabi told the willing listeners in the administration, including an admiring Vice President Cheney, that removal of Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces would put tremendous pressure on the Iranian government. “The U.S. could even build military bases in Iraq to pressure Iran,” said Richard Armitage, recalling a quote by Chalabi.16

  The fact that Chalabi lived in Tehran and that a number of his key advisers were known by the CIA to be on the payroll of Iranian intelligence—with suspicions even pointing to Chalabi—should have given his advocates pause to consider his assessment of the situation. Of particular concern was the INC’s chief of intelligence and close confidant to Chalabi, Aras Habib, whom the CIA and British intelligence believed to be an Iranian MOIS agent. The agency warned senior defense officials and Congress about the penetration of the INC by Iranian intelligence. It raised this as well to Rumsfeld’s newly appointed intelligence director, Stephen Cambone, who met several times with Aras Habib. But senior Bush officials discounted much of this, in part due to profound distrust of the CIA and its information on Iraq. A Defense Department inspector general report later concluded that about one-third of the information provided by Chalabi and the INC proved accurate and actionable, and in 2002, the State Department withdrew its funding of the INC. But Chalabi retained supporters in Rumsfeld’s office, and funding continued through the DIA at $340,000 a month.

  Chalabi never denied his involvement with Iran. Many Iraqi opposition groups were based in Iran and had been so for more than two decades. When questioned about his ties to Iran by an American intelligence officer in October 2002, Chalabi dismissed this criticism. “This relationship is normal and necessary,” he said. It did not alarm senior officials in the Pentagon either. Feith, for one, always assumed that the foreign spy services had penetrated the exile groups. So long as Chalabi and the INC supported the goals of overthrowing Saddam Hussein, their manipulation by Iranian intelligence did not matter to those determined to invade Iraq.

  The Defense Department expanded its work with the INC in developing the Free Iraqi Forces. Spearheaded by Bill Luti, this idea had captivated the neocons during the Clinton administration, when Wolfowitz and Newt Gingrich had proposed using the army of Iraqi exiles to serve as the vanguard for a “liberation” of the country and establishing a safe zone in southern Iraq backed by American airpower. Now in power, the neocons in the Defense Department and Chalabi moved ahead with the plan. The INC provided nearly five thousand names of “volunteers” to serve in the army. The U.S. military built a camp in Hungary to train the exiles. The entire concept proved a canard. DIA quickly ascertained that most of those on the list either did not exist or were duplicate names. At a cost to the American taxpayer of more than $90 million, fewer than one hundred Iraqis ever showed up at the camp, and of these, only seventy completed the training program—more than $1 million per recruit.

  The Defense Department also opened an old wound from the Reagan administration. In early November 2001, Michael Ledeen arrived at the White House to meet with an old acquaintance, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. Since his fall from grace twenty years earlier as one of the chief instigators behind the Iranian arms sales that led to Iran-Contra, Ledeen had continued his fixation on Iran. In the intervening years, he had switched sides, along with the Israeli government, and now advocated regime change rather than rapprochement. He worked at the hawkish American Enterprise Institute and continued peddling information about Iran to anyone willing to listen; after 2001, he found a number of willing ears among his former think tank colleagues now in senior positions in the new Bush administration. Ledeen told Hadley that he was in contact with Iranians who possessed exceptional information regarding Iran’s links to terrorism. While he did not vouch for its accuracy, Ledeen thought it important enough to bring it to the U.S. government’s attention. The one caveat, however, was that his sources had a deep distrust of the CIA and would not work with Langley. The better conduit would be through the Defense Department, and Ledeen suggested that Harold Rhode and Larry Franklin, both of whom shared a similar view of the Islamic Republic and were fluent in Farsi, meet with the Iranians.17

  What Ledeen omitted telling Hadley was that his chief Iranian conduit was none other than Manucher Ghorbanifar, his old partner in Ronald Reagan’s worst political nightmare. The smooth Iranian had undergone the same political metamorphosis as had his friend Michael Ledeen, and he now offered to arrange a meeting between American officials and senior Iranian officials who had information about the political situation in Iran as well as its support to terrorist organizations, including “plans to kill Americans in Afghanistan.” With a twenty-five-year-old reputation as a fabricator and a burn notice by the agency still hanging over Ghorbanifar, it is not surprising he did not want to meet with CIA officers.

  Hadley agreed with Ledeen’s proposal. On November 7, he called Wolfowitz and requested that the Defense Department handle the meeting. He emphasized to Wolfowitz that the meeting had to remain “very close hold” due to the Iranians’ distrust of the CIA.

  Hadley then phoned both George Tenet and Richard Armitage: “Do you mind—t
he Defense Department believes they have some sources in Italy with information on terrorism. Do you mind if they go to Rome and interview them?” Both men agreed without giving it too much thought. While this lay more in his purview, Tenet did not wish to be seen as parochial just two months after 9/11. Hadley failed to mention to either that the information came from Michael Ledeen, which would have elicited a howl of protest from Armitage, who still vividly recalled the Iran-Contra scandal from his days as a senior defense official under Caspar Weinberger.18

  Rhode and Franklin broke away from the Crocker talks in Bonn over Afghanistan and flew to Rome. On December 10, they met in an apartment in Rome arranged by Ledeen using his contacts with Italian intelligence. Ghorbanifar brought two Iranians with him: one was an exile living in Morocco who claimed to be a former Revolutionary Guard officer, and the other self-reported to be a high-ranking official with Iranian intelligence. The CIA later determined that the latter was an information peddler who sold his memory to the highest bidder. For the next three days, Ghorbanifar and the two Iranians regaled the two American officials with stories on just about anything the U.S. government would have wanted to know. They described the political and economic conditions within Iran, growing discontent within the populace, Iran’s relationship with the Palestinians, its illicit weapons, and of course, Saddam Hussein. One of their more sensational items was a description of Iranian hit teams dispatched to kill U.S. troops in Afghanistan. When Franklin asked for more details on the hit teams, the Iranian claiming to be in the intelligence service provided names and a photograph that he claimed to be one of the team members.19

  But Ghorbanifar had his own ideas of where these talks should lead. Late one night in the hotel bar, he outlined his plan for overthrowing the Iranian government on a cocktail napkin. He suggested executing a series of operations designed to create havoc and general unhappiness with the Iranian government. He would begin with a simultaneous disruption of traffic intersections all around Tehran, which would create panic and paralyze the city. Not surprisingly, Ghorbanifar wanted the United States to pay for his caper, with an initial payment of $5 million as seed money and another $20 million once he had snarled Tehran’s already congested traffic.

  As the meetings in Rome continued, on December 12 Ledeen had breakfast with the American ambassador, Melvin Sembler. Ledeen bragged that he was in Rome meeting with two Iranians under the auspices of the Department of Defense. Although Sembler remained friendly with Ledeen, this clandestine meeting in his country without his or the CIA station chief’s knowledge alarmed the ambassador. It looked like the beginnings of a covert action, and he knew of no presidential finding authorizing any such operation. Sembler began making inquiries, but it would take until February before the role of Ghorbanifar became known to senior officials in Langley and Foggy Bottom.

  Ghorbanifar’s plan was too much even for those within the Defense Department who agreed with regime change. Franklin recommended to his boss, Bill Luti, against Ghorbanifar’s war on Tehran’s commuters. Luti’s boss, Peter Rodman, raised eyes at the $25 million price tag floated by the Iranian exile. But Franklin claimed that the information provided “saved American lives,” which Luti touted as justification for keeping the channel open. Rodman recommended to Wolfowitz that they should continue meeting with Ghorbanifar and the two Iranians for the intelligence value, but it should be carried on through normal intelligence channels by the DIA, which would keep the CIA out of the picture.

  On February 9, with the full measure of Ghorbanifar’s role now known, both the CIA and State Department raised strong objections. A visibly irate Richard Armitage called Hadley: “If Ghorbanifar sets one foot in an embassy, he’ll be arrested,” he said sternly. “This is the man who almost single-handedly brought down the president’s father, and you are responsible for having him feed us misinformation again. We knew then and we know now that he is an Iranian agent!”20 Hadley reluctantly agreed to shut the talks down.

  But Ledeen retained friends within the Defense Department and continued to find the doors open in the Pentagon to relay his dubious information derived from Ghorbanifar. He contacted the vice president’s office about enriched uranium buried in Iraq that had been moved to Iran. On August 6, he met with senior Pentagon intelligence officials on the location of once buried uranium.21 It turned out to be spurious. As late as 2003, Rhode met again with Ghorbanifar in Paris on returning from a trip to Turkey, but nothing came from the meeting. Powell had won this round.

  As momentum built for invading Iraq, some within the military questioned why Iran should not be the next target in the global war on terrorism. In April 2002, Tom Milton, an army colonel working Iraq policy in the Pentagon, built on these ideas by floating a think piece entitled “Getting to Baghdad through Tehran.” Echoing some of Newbold’s views, he argued that moderate Arab support was vital for success in the war on terrorism, but Arab support for the American policy on Iraq was limited: “They do not see Iraq as a major regional threat.” The better strategy would be to shift the focus to Iran, which posed a greater danger and had a much longer track record of using terrorism. Overthrowing the regime in Iran, the officer believed, would unite the Arabs behind the United States and actually undercut Saddam Hussein, leading to his demise as well.

  Others in uniform agreed. In a memo for Abe Shulsky, another colonel contended “the most urgent threat is arguably Iran.” Iran had “direct links to terrorism worldwide and directly supported Hezbollah…. From a WOT [war on terrorism] perspective, Iran is the most urgent.”

  The civilians within the secretary of defense’s office did not necessarily disagree with these officers’ logic, but Iran posed a far different challenge than Iraq.22 In the days after 9/11, Feith’s subordinates drafted PowerPoint briefings that lumped Iran in as part of the war on terrorism. But as Abe Shulsky later noted, “Iran was a much more difficult country militarily than Iraq, a harder target. With Khatami still in office and a vibrant opposition movement, the United States had other means to bring about regime change in Iran short of war.” Shulsky and Richard Perle both worried that attacking Iran would bog down the war on terrorism. An invasion of the massive country of seventy million people would require all U.S. military resources and end any follow-on operations, while invading Iraq permitted the United States to “maintain momentum” in the war.23 It was best to grab the low-hanging fruit of Iraq—or even Syria—before tangling with Iran.

  Even hard-liners like Luti shied away from sending tanks and troops into Iran. Covert means to overthrow the government offered a better alternative, he argued, especially since the Iranian people already clamored for change. Besides, removing Saddam Hussein would have a “salutary effect” on Iran.24 The Iranian government was fragile and unpopular; change could come from within. “The establishment of a representative government in Iraq would invigorate anticlerical forces in Iran,” Feith wrote in May 2002, in a memo entitled “Strategic Timing.”

  “We understood that removing Saddam would have major impact on Iran,” Feith said. While it could open the door to greater Iranian influence, an alternative scenario also seemed possible to the Pentagon’s civilian leadership. Empowering the Shia in Iraq could have a significant impact on Iran. The sight of Iraqi Shia electing their own leaders might have a subversive effect on Iranians who could question why they did not have the same opportunity. Further, a free Iraq could provide an alternative voice to the world’s Shia. There was no way to know whether Saddam’s removal would eventually end up helping or hurting the Iranian regime’s interests. “It was not inevitable that overthrowing Saddam would over time strengthen the Iranian regime’s hand in Iraq,” said Feith.25

  Feith’s office drafted another paper that circulated around the Pentagon, entitled “What Happens When We Succeed?” It asked other government agencies to examine the effects of overthrowing Saddam Hussein, speculating that it might lead to a transformation of the Arab world, including revolution in Iran. These other agencies agreed.
At a minimum, it would put Iran on the defensive and might lead them to cease their nuclear and missile programs.

  The military, however, remained divided, especially between the colonels and the generals. A June 2002 paper prepared under the auspices of the chairman’s strategy and policy office predicted that overthrowing the Iraqi regime would have little impact on Iranian behavior, especially its support for terrorism or its ballistic missile program. At best, an invasion of Iraq would put Tehran on the defensive and lead to “temporarily” halting overt support for external groups. At worse, it might fuel Iranian paranoia, for Tehran already believed that the United States wanted to encircle and overthrow the regime.26

  One midlevel air force officer, Tom Billick, viewed overthrowing Saddam as an opportunity for Tehran. In a March 1, 2002, paper on possible Iranian reactions to a U.S. invasion of Iraq, Billick wrote, “Iran’s rhetoric in response to U.S. action against Iraq will be harsh. However, Iran will quietly view the removal of Saddam’s regime as an opportunity to influence post-Saddam Iraq. Iran could actually increase in strength and influence with the removal of their chief rival.”27

  But both Joint Chiefs chair Myers and his deputy, Peter Pace, supported or at least went along with the Pentagon civilians. “The Iraqis were not Persians,” Myers explained. “They are nationalistic, and I did not think they would come under Iran’s sway.”28 Pace agreed with another paper churned out from his staff: “Bottom line: a successful campaign to disarm Iraq of WMD, remove Saddam’s regime and replace it with a broad-based representative government will fundamentally change the geo-political landscape in the region.” Iran would see this as a direct threat to the clerical power in Tehran. This direct military and diplomatic pressure could compel or coerce Tehran to change its policies of support for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.