by David Crist
After the failed Iranian rescue mission in 1980 and new civilian leadership, both Congress and the Defense Department forced the army as well as the navy and air force to renew these forgotten but choice men. The Joint Chiefs tried to placate the SOF supporters by forming the Joint Special Operations Agency within the Joint Staff. Intended to coordinate special ops training and operations across the military, it was largely inconsequential and purposely made so. Congress eventually forced the issue in 1987 with the establishment of Special Forces Command, which effectively took away training and funding for SOF from these three services. The marine corps opted not to participate in Special Operations Command until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed it in 2005. Department of Defense, Defense Resources Board–Directed Special Operations Review, “Special Operations Forces (SOF): Roles, Missions, and Organization,” June 3, 1982.
32. This was a similar plan to what was employed in 2001 in Afghanistan. While that worked well, the CIA’s record of success in these paramilitary operations has been mixed. “It is extraordinarily hard to foster antigovernment insurgencies in a totalitarian state,” a retired CIA operations officer noted. “You need to develop a network of indigenous supporters, and trying to do that from outside a denied country using CIA resources or exiles rarely works.” Under Casey in the 1980s, the CIA succeeded in fostering the anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua and built a major resistance movement against the Soviets in Afghanistan. But going back to the 1950s, the CIA failed to organize any credible resistance to Soviet occupation in Ukraine and the Baltic states. The agency’s most notable failure was in North Vietnam, where every CIA-led team of South Vietnamese was killed or captured, likely compromised by South Vietnamese double agents working for the communists.
33. “Spy Outlines Recruitment, Training, U.S. Plans,” Tehran Times in English, September 14, 1989, FBIS, September 21, 1989.
34. Control of the critical location was very important to CENTCOM, which assigned one entire special forces battalion to the mission.
35. “CIA Spy Comments Further on Activities,” Tehran Television Service, November 6, 1989, FBIS, NES-89-215, November 8, 1989, p. 57.
36. Hart interview.
37. Sazegara interview.
38. “Adventures with the CIA in Turkey: Interview with Philip Giraldi,” Balkanalysis.com, July 30, 2006, www.balkanalysis.com/blog/2006/07/30/adventures-with-the-cia-in-turkey-interview-with-philip-giraldi, accessed July 5, 2007.
39. “CIA Spies,” News Conference with Minister of Intelligence and Security Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, Tehran Television Service, April 26, 1989, FBIS, NES-89-080, April 27, 1989.
40. Kahlili interview.
CHAPTER 5 A FIG LEAF OF NEUTRALITY
1. Kevin Woods, Michael Pease, Mark Stout, Williamson Murray, and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam Hussein’s Senior Leadership, Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, 2006, p. 7.
2. Saddam Hussein grew alarmed at reports of young Shia officers sabotaging aircraft and tanks in support of the Iranian Revolution. “Interview with Lieutenant General Raad Hamdani,” in Kevin Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday, Saddam’s War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War, McNair Paper 70 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, March 2009), p. 28.
3. Joint Staff, Contingency Planning Group, “Opportunities for U.S. Policy in the Wake of the Iranian Crisis,” January 1980, p. 18.
4. Comments by George Cave, “Toward an International History of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988: A Critical Oral History Workshop,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, July 19, 2004; Cave interview.
5. Mohsen Sazegara, “Engaging Iran: Lessons from the Past,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch Focus 93, May 2009, p. 6.
6. Gary Sick e-mail to author, March 22, 2010.
7. Zbigniew Brzezinski memorandum for President Jimmy Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #122,” December 21, 1979.
8. Rumors still persisted that Washington had secretly encouraged the Iraqi attack. In 1981 the new secretary of state, Alexander Haig, reported to President Ronald Reagan in a memo in April 1981 that Saudi foreign minister Crown Prince Fahd had confirmed that Carter had relayed a message through Fahd to Saddam Hussein giving the “green light to launch the war against Iran.” While it’s hard to completely discount Fahd’s statement, it runs counter to the substantial catalog of declassified, once sensitive documents regarding Carter’s views of the Iran-Iraq War. In hindsight, Haig’s motive in the memo was self-conceit, intended to impress Reagan following his first trip as secretary of state to the Middle East. On the same trip, Haig also proclaimed that he had reached an agreement with Israel and the pro-Western Arabs on forging a common front to counter the Soviet Union. “It didn’t happen,” said Nicholas Veliotes, then assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. “So I cast great doubts on almost everything in this memo.” Comments by Nicholas Veliotes, “Toward an International History of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988: A Critical Oral History Workshop,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, July 19, 2004.
9. Ward, Immortal, p. 242.
10. Ibid., pp. 253–54.
11. Sazegara interview.
12. Ward, Immortal, p. 226.
13. Ibid., p. 256.
14. Bing West memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “Opening to Iraq,” February 3, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:683, Folder Iraq.
15. U.S. Interests Section Baghdad message to Secretary of State, “Meeting with Tariq Aziz” (231255Y), May 1981.
16. Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Hatchett memorandum for Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, “Senior Interagency Group Meeting on Iran-Iraq,” July 25, 1982.
17. L. Paul Bremer memorandum, “Discussion Paper for SIG Meeting, Interagency Group No. 2,” July 23, 1982.
18. Sworn Statement by Howard Teicher, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, case number 93-241-CRHIGHSMITH, January 31, 1995; Richard Murphy message to Donald Rumsfeld, “Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran” (120318Z), January 1984.
19. Philip Wilcox, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, interviewed by Stuart Kennedy, April 27, 1988.
20. Robert Oakley, interview with author, December 12, 1994; William Taft IV, interview with author, August 16, 1996.
21. Richard Armitage, interviews with author, December 14, 1994, February 15, 2007, and March 4, 2008.
22. Zbigniew Brzezinski memorandum for President Jimmy Carter, “NSC Weekly Report #157,” October 10, 1980.
23. In 1985, two KC-10 tankers were added to the three KC-135s, bringing a total of five air refuelers supporting the AWACS mission.
24. Brigadier General Wayne Schramm, USAF (Ret.), interview with author, May 26, 1995; Memorandum for General George Crist, “ELF-One Transition,” November 1988. Also Colonel George Williams, USAF (Ret.), interview with author, December 13, 1994. The AWACS initially were under European Command, which in 1980 had responsibility for Saudi Arabia. It continued to be referred to by its initial name, European Liaison Force-One even after EUCOM relinquished control of the operation to CENTCOM. Six crews were on hand for the four AWACS, with each crew flying a mission every two days to provide continuous surveillance.
25. “ELF-One Fact Sheet,” United States Air Force, February 1983, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., JTF/MEF records, Series 3, Box 10, Folder 5, ELF Exchange, p. 2.
26. Secretary of State message to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “De-Designation of Iraq as Supporter of International Terrorism” (272235Z), February 1982.
27. Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 207.
28. Secretary of State message to U.S. Interests Section Baghdad, “U.S. Credit Possibilities with Iraq: Follow-up to February
14, 1983, Secretary Hamadi Meeting” (161515Z), March 1983; Secretary of State memorandum to Donald Gregg, “Eximbank Financing for Iraqi Export Pipeline,” June 12, 1984.
29. Donald Rumsfeld message, “Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraq Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz” (211795Z), December 1983.
30. American Embassy London message to Secretary of State, “Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein” (21165Z), December 1983.
31. Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990 (New York: Norton, 1994), p. 45.
32. Robert McFarlane memorandum, “Iraqi Military Needs,” May 7, 1984; Colonel John Stanford memorandum to Robert McFarlane, “Actions Taken in Response to Interagency Recommendations on Iraqi Military Needs,” June 15, 1984; Walter Patrick Lang, interview with author, April 5, 2010.
33. Jordan became one of the prime conduits for military hardware heading to Iraq. In one deal alone, thirty-two thousand South Korean artillery shells arrived in Iraq by way of the Jordanian port of al-Aqabah. From 1984 to 1985, huge shipments of Soviet-built armored personnel carriers and French armored cars arrived destined for Iraq. A multilane highway was constructed from al-Aqabah to western Iraq, and eight thousand trucks traveled back and forth delivering their deadly cargo for the Iraqi war machine. King Hussein quietly allowed Iraqi aircraft to base out of western Jordan.
34. Bing West memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Sale of Helicopters to Iraq,” January 1983; David Schneider and Jonathan Howe memorandum for Secretary George Shultz, “Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq,” January 30, 1984.
35. Kenneth Timmerman, “Fanning the Flames: Guns, Greed and Geopolitics in the Gulf War,” Iran Brief, 1988, pp. 1–10, www.iran.org/tib/krt/fanning_ch7.htm, accessed November 16, 2007.
36. Secretary of State message to American Embassy Amman, “Kittani Call on Under Secretary Eagleburger” (180139Z), March 1984.
37. Secretary of State message to American Embassy Tel Aviv, “Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran” (140318Z), January 1984, p. 2; Richard Murphy, interview with author, December 21, 1994; Richard Fairbanks, interviewed by Charles Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, April 19, 1989; John Stempel, interviewed by Kristin Hamblin Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 1993.
38. “Iraqi Officer Cited on Cooperation with CIA in War with Iran,” Tehran Times, March 11, 2002.
39. Ibid.
40. W. Patrick Lang, “The Land Between the Rivers,” unpublished, April 2006, p. 21. Written as a supplement to his autobiographical file at the Virginia Military Institute archives.
41. Michael Dobbs, “U.S. Had Key Roll in Iraq Buildup,” Washington Post, December 30, 2002, p. A1.
42. Comments by George Cave, William Eagleton, Nicholas Veliotes, and Steven Ward, “Toward an International History of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988: A Critical Oral History Workshop,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, pp. 263–65. At the height of the fighting, on March 23 the CIA issued a speculative report presenting the “worst-case scenario” on the prospects of an Iranian victory: “Iran is determined to replace Saddam’s secular Baathist government with a radical fundamentalist Shia regime controlled by Tehran.” With three-quarters of the Iraqi army being Shia, there was a distinct possibility of the army disintegrating—a prophetic prediction when one looks at the Iraqi army during the U.S. invasion of 2003. “An Iranian victory could lead fairly rapidly to Iranian hegemony over the entire Gulf—Kuwait and Bahrain would be especially vulnerable,” the CIA report concluded. It went on for eight pages describing dire possibilities if the Iranians triumphed: massive disruptions in world oil supplies; spillover fighting in northern Kuwait; Saddam Hussein’s retaliating by lifting all restraints, including hitting major Iranian cities with chemical weapons; massive airlift of new equipment from the Soviets to shore up their client, which would lead to a closer bond between Baghdad and Moscow. CIA, “Iran-Iraq: Consequences of an Iranian Breakthrough at Al Basra,” March 23, 1984.
43. Thomas Twetten, interviews with author, June 20 and 28, 2007.
CHAPTER 6 SHARON’S GRAND DESIGN
1. John Boykin, Cursed Is the Peacemaker: The American Diplomat versus the Israeli General, Beirut 1982 (Belmont, CA: Applegate Press, 2002), p. 43.
2. Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “Bush: Sharon a Man of Peace,” Washington Post, April 19, 2002, p. A1.
3. Veliotes memorandum to Bremer, “Telcon with Habib 10 July,” July 10, 1982, cited in Boykin, Cursed Is the Peacemaker, p. 365; Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 31–108.
4. American intelligence first detected the Israeli buildup in December 1981, six months before Israel actually launched the attack. Noel Koch memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Lebanon,” February 1, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:687, Folder 1982 Lebanon; Caspar Weinberger handwritten notes from meeting, September 9, 1981, Weinberger Papers; Bing West memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “Invasion of Lebanon Next Moves,” June 15, 1982.
5. L. Paul Bremer memorandum for William Clark, “Status Report on Lebanon Contingency Planning,” February 12, 1982.
6. See “The Green Light,” in Foreign Policy 50 (Spring 1983).
7. Veliotes interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
8. Weinberger memorandum for the President, “POTUS Weekly Report,” June 11, 1982.
9. Cited in Boykin, Cursed Is the Peacemaker, p. 65.
10. President Reagan letter to Menachem Begin, June 9, 1982.
11. Boykin, Cursed Is the Peacemaker, pp. 69–70.
12. Veliotes interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training; Nathaniel Howell, interview with author, December 2, 1994. After the president appointed Philip Habib as his envoy to negotiate a cease-fire, Haig called him in during a meeting while in Paris and gave him instructions that contradicted the president’s own desire to try to stop the war.
13. Department of State memorandum for William Clark, “Lebanon: Elements of a U.S. Strategy,” June 5, 1982.
14. Ronald Reagan, diary entry for June 25, 1982, in Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 91.
15. Reagan note, undated, Weinberger Papers. Reagan followed it up with an angry phone call on August 12. The Israeli prime minister finally bent to the American will. He ordered a cessation of artillery fire, and he called Reagan back pleading for their continued friendship. Reagan Diaries, entry for August 12, 1982, p. 98.
16. Cited in Boykin, Cursed Is the Peacemaker, p. 74.
17. The CIA initially suspected his motivation had been revenge for the killing of Tony Frangieh. Interview with retired CIA officer in 2009.
18. Comments by Colonel Robert Johnston and Colonel Mead, “Lebanon Briefing,” December 1, 1982, Beirut Oral History Transcripts, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Box 2, p. 31.
19. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, February 8, 1983, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.il, accessed February 12, 2011.
20. Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,” November 2, 1983, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 98th Congress, 1st Session; “Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for Improving That Security,” House Armed Services Committee, Report No. 98-58, 1985, p. 96.
21. On October 19, 1982, President Gemayel traveled to Washington. The United States agreed to pay for thirty-five Israeli M-48 tanks for the Lebanese army, the first of some two hundred armored vehicles to be provided to that army.
22. Retired CIA officer e-mail to author, October 13, 2009.
23. Point paper, Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy, and Operations,
“Attack on Marine Positions,” August 10, 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Lebanon Papers, Disc 23.
24. David Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), p. 115.
25. “Agreement between the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel,” May 17, 1983; Major General Andrew Cooley, USA, interviewed by Walter Poole, April 10, 1984.
26. Caspar Weinberger memorandum to William Clark, “Lebanon Initiative,” July 28, 1983.
27. Colonel Timothy Geraghty, interviewed by Benis Frank, May 28, 1983, Beirut Oral History Transcripts, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Box 2, pp. 5–6.
28. Timothy Geraghty e-mail to author, March 3, 2011.
29. Timothy Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Press, 2009), p. 40; Colonel Jerry Walsh, USMC (Ret.), interview with author, June 18, 2010.
30. Colonel Timothy Geraghty, interviewed by Benis Frank, November 21, 1983, Beirut Oral History Transcripts, Marine Corps Archives, GRC, Box 2, pp. 6–7.
31. Authorization Under the War Powers Resolution—Lebanon: Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983, pp. 2–7.
32. In May 1983 European Command looked to expand the marines’ presence along the Sidon highway from Beirut to the Awali River. It was dependent upon the Israeli withdrawal, which did not happen until September. Lieutenant Colonel William Solomon, “Beirut Lessons Learned,” undated [1983], U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Box 1, Folder Chronology of Events.
33. Department of the Army, DAMO-SSM, “Lebanon Update,” August 19, 1983; Walter Poole, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Involvement in Lebanon: July 1982–February 1984,” Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1988.
