by David Crist
20. Ziegler interview; Admiral Crowe message for General Crist, “Threat to Reflagged Ships at Khor Fakkan” (081907Z), August 1987; Bernsen interview.
21. Ziegler interview; Bernsen interview. A brief description of this is also contained in Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, p. 25.
22. Ibid. This was confirmed by another conversation between the author and a U.S. naval officer.
23. This was a clear indication of the Iranian left hand not knowing what its right hand was doing. Tehran laid mines to catch the next U.S. convoy and the first vessel hit was a tanker loaded with its own oil.
24. Norman Hooke, Modern Shipping Disasters, 1963–1987 (London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 1989), p. 34.
25. Lessons Learned, p. 6.
26. United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, “Mine Clearance Operations off Funjahrah by HM Ships, 21 September 1987 to 25 October 1987,” April 1997.
27. Trost interview; Ziegler interview. Lyons met briefly with the French task force commander and broadly explained his ideas to the admiral, but while the French wanted to cooperate with the United States, they remained unwilling to allow their forces to fall in under U.S. command.
28. “Iran Majlis Speaker on Oil Exports and Mine Production,” Iranian News Agency in English, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 16, 1987.
29. “Majlis Speaker’s Prayers Sermon Views Gulf Events,” sermon by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Tehran Domestic Service, FBIS, August 21, 1987.
30. Department of State, “Message for the Government of Iran,” August 31, 1987.
31. COMIDEASTFOR message to CJTFME, “3-87”(230030Z), November 1987, JTFME/MEF Operations Files, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 18, File 8, “Farsi Island Minefield,” September 1987–January 1988,” p. 1.
32. CINCPACFLT message for CINCPAC, “Rules of Engagement Cumulative Indicators” (050535Z), August 1987; CINCCENT message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Rules of Engagement Cumulative Indicators” (071730Z), August 1987.
33. Pfister interview; Secretary of State message to American Embassy Kuwait, “SR-71 Mission into the Persian Gulf” (080542Z), August 1987, p. 1.
34. Interview with retired navy admiral; also Vistica, Fall from Glory, p. 267.
35. COMSEVENTHFLT message to CINCPACFLT, “Reef Point Incident” (091625Z), August 1987, Lyons Papers, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.
36. There are discrepancies regarding this action. In Fall from Glory, p. 267, Vistica states that the pilots, Lieutenant Commander Robert Clement and Lieutenant Bill Ferran, fired three Sparrow missiles and confronted two Iranian F-4s of a total of six aircraft the Iranians had sent up that morning. The messages and after-action reports reviewed by the author indicate one F-4 and the likelihood that it was in fact a C-130. General Crist message to Admiral Crowe, “Message from COMIDEASTFOR” (1121100Z), August 1987; Vice Admiral Paul David Miller message to Admiral James Lyons, “F-14 Sparrow Engagement” (100030Z), August 1987, Lyons Papers, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. See also Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, volume 3, p. 303.
The author gave a talk at the Naval War College in April 2007. One of the students, who had been on the E-2 that tracked the F-4, came up to me afterward. He said there was no mistake that it had been an F-4, but that the Iranians also had a C-130 aloft conducting surveillance.
37. Rear Admiral Lyle Bull, USN (Ret.), interview with author, 2006.
38. Transcripts of phone conversations between Admiral Lyons and Admiral Crowe, and Admiral Lyons and Captain Strasser, August 8 and 9, 1987; Strasser notebook, entry for August 6 and 9.
39. CINCCENT message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Task Force Headquarters” (140519Z), August 1987; Crist, “End of Tour” interview.
40. Crist interview.
41. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Daily Schedule, August 14, 1987; Weinberger Diary, August 14, 1987.
42. “I would never have chosen Brooks in a million years,” lamented Lyons in an interview with the author. “A naval attack pilot who never went to Vietnam—that tells you everything you need to know.”
43. Before retiring, Lyons tried to rally his supporters to counter the decision by Weinberger. He called Webb, but the navy secretary refused to take or return his calls. He talked to John Lehman, who contacted both Crowe and Weinberger to try and get them to reverse the decision, but to no avail. The former head of NSA and onetime CIA deputy under Casey, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, came to Lyons’s defense and called Trost. The two men disliked each other, and Trost refused to change his mind. In the end, Lyons found he had no supporters in Washington.
44. Tom Burgess, “Adm. Lyons Retires from Pacific Post,” San Diego Union, October 1, 1987, p. A2.
45. Admiral William Crowe message to Admiral James Lyons (281915Z), September 1987.
CHAPTER 15 THE NIGHT STALKERS
1. Bernsen interview.
2. Message from Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, to Various Agencies, “Persian Gulf Threat Alert” (032242Z), August 1987, p. 2.
3. His critics believed he spent “too much valuable time on reconstructive intelligence analysis at the expense of analyzing the current tactical situation.” Lieutenant Commander Peter Wikul, “Combat Action at Middle Shoals Light: A Case Study of Intelligence Support for Low-Intensity Conflict,” Defense Intelligence College, December 10, 1989, p. 15.
4. COMIDEASTFOR “Personal For” message for General Crist, “MEF Force Levels” (062107Z), August 1987, p. 2.
5. Bernsen interview; Grieve interview; CENTCOM, “Lessons Learned,” Draft Script Slides 16L and 16R.
6. Lieutenant Colonel James R. Pruden, CO HML-263, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, January 5, 1988. Additionally army personnel for Intelligence Support Activity with direction finding and frequency locators were deployed, sending the information gathered back to the National Security Agency for further analysis.
7. Since 1985, CENTCOM prohibited ships from moving north of 27˚30´—some thirty miles south of Farsi except as part of the convoy escort due to the hazards of the Iran-Iraq War.
8. Bernsen interview.
9. Ibid.
10. The individual Bernsen contacted did not wish to be identified.
11. CENTCOM History Office, Command History 1987, pp. iii–88; Commander Norman Carley, USN (Ret.), interview with author, June 28, 1995.
12. Bernsen interview; Lieutenant Commander Greg McCannel, USN (Ret.), interview with author, March 22, 1995.
13. COMIDEASTFOR message, “MEF Force Levels,” p. 3.
14. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations SITREP 12,” September 24, 1987, p. 1; USS Raleigh, Command History, 1987, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center. In addition, the Mount Vernon arrived with four riverine patrol boats that proved worthless in the high seas of the Gulf.
15. His East Coast counterpart from Special Boat Squadron 2, Jack Gantley, arrived briefly on the La Salle as well, until the two determined that the mission would likely go on for a long time, and in late August Gantley headed back to the States with the intention of relieving Flanagan in a few months. Captain Jack Gantley, USN, interview with author, May 31, 1995.
16. The brotherhood of SEAL officers is a very small community and at times resembles a sewing circle with the abundance of internal gossip. During the course of my researching this book, few SEALs spoke highly of Flanagan, especially those who operated in the Gulf. However, among the “black shoes,” or line officers, in Middle East Force, he receives credit most especially for the mobile sea base.
17. Rear Admiral Harold Bernsen interview with John Partin, May 10, 1989, U.S. Special Operations Command History Office, Tampa, FL; Trost interview. As a junior officer, Lugo served two tours in Vietnam as the commander of the USS Antelope, a large gunboat armed and packing a heavy punch, wit
h a 76-mm gun among its weapons, for the brown-water world of the rivers and coastal waters off the Mekong Delta. He often operated off Sea Float, supporting the swift boats and SEALs engaging in countless skirmishes in the wet, murky world of the special operations forces in the delta. In one incident on Easter Sunday in 1971, Lugo’s gunboat intercepted a trawler carrying ammunition for the Vietcong. After firing a warning shot across its bow, the North Vietnamese responded with a hail of gunfire. A running gun battle ensued, until a 40-mm round from the Antelope hit the trawler’s embarked ammunition. “It erupted like a fireworks factory,” Lugo later recalled, a dramatic image still indelibly ingrained in his brain decades later. Telephone interview with Captain Frank Lugo, USN (Ret.), December 10, 2006.
18. CINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Arabian Gulf Sea Mobile Support Concept,” August 1987, pp. 1–3.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. Howell interview.
21. A similar four-boat detachment arrived from Special Unit 11 in California. It was commanded by Evancoe’s counterpart, Lieutenant Commander Bert Calland, who later commanded CENTCOM’s special operations forces after 9/11.
22. The idea of using helicopters to support Earnest Will had come up even before the Bridgeton mining. COMUSNAVCENT message to CINCCENT, “Attack Helo Offensive Capability vs. High Speed Patrol Boat” (092046Z), July 1987, pp. 1–2.
23. Kenneth Finlayson, “Task Force 160 in Operation Urgent Fury,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History 2:2 (2006), pp. 36–41.
24. Colonel Larry Outlaw, USMC, interview with author, August 9, 1995.
25. CINCCENT message to COMIDEASTFOR, “Helicopter Support for Earnest Will Operations” (261915Z), July 1987, p. 1.
26. Lieutenant Colonel Bryan “Doug” Brown interview with John Partin, June 28, 1989, pp. 2–3.
27. COMIDEASTFOR message to CINCCENT, “LAMPS Upgrades” (240900Z), July 1987, pp. 1–2; Penzler interview.
28. CINCCENT message, “Helicopter Support for Earnest Will Operations,” pp. 1–2.
29. Armitage interview; Penzler interview.
30. While this capability is standard in today’s military in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was, if not revolutionary, a major change in the way the United States used its intelligence, as there had always been the tendency for the intelligence agencies to resist allowing unanalyzed raw information from being sent down to tactical forces, without it first going through the wickets of the agencies’ staff of analysts. Pfister interview.
31. See www.specwarnet.net/americas/isa.htm; Steven Emerson, Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: Putnam, 1988).
32. Master Sergeant James Parran, USMC (Ret.), interview with author, 2006.
33. Colonel Wayne Long, USA (Ret.), interview, January 24, 2007.
34. Ibid.
35. Bernsen interview with Partin, p. 19.
36. CINCCENT message to COMIDEASTFOR, “Barge OICs” (15163Z), September 1987, p. 1.
37. Swart interview. Three years later, Moore would go on to command the marine air wing during Desert Storm. Biographical File, Major General Royal Moore, Jr., Marine Corps History Divison.
38. Lyons interview and his notes.
39. Weinberger interview; Armitage interview.
40. Bernsen interview.
41. Lugo emphasized that the Middle East Force viewed the threat largely as mines or terrorism. The threat from the Iranian air was minimal. The Iranians possessed fewer than twenty functioning aircraft in the north and these were consumed with fighting Iraq. Further, they had not attacked any ship with aircraft in nearly a year, and had shown no inclination to challenge the Fahd Line. The swimmer threat, he believed, was minimal and did not warrant the construction of cumbersome anti-swimmer nets. Lugo added, however, that the possibility existed of a bomb’s being smuggled aboard with the incoming supplies from Brown and Root, and so security background checks needed to be done on the civilian employees, largely from the Philippines and Pakistan, to prevent a suicide terrorist from slipping into the crew. John Partin, Special Operations Forces in Operation Earnest Will/Prime Chance I (Tampa: Special Operations Command, April 1998), pp. 44–45.
42. Lugo interview.
43. CNO-OP 6B memorandum for the record, “Mobile Sea Base,” CM-3-88 Document Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Folder USMC Ops in Persian Gulf, Folder #2, p. 1; Major, pp. 1–4; CINCCENT message to COMIDEASTFOR, “Barge OIC’s” (151639Z), September 1987, p. 1.
44. General Royal Moore, “Personal For” message to Rear Admiral Fogarty, “Mobile Sea Basing Brief” (151820Z), September 1987.
45. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3 Decision paper, September 1987, CM-3-88 Document Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center.
46. Admiral Crowe “Personal For” message to General Crist, “Visit to CMEF” (172330Z), September 1987, pp. 3–8.
47. Parran interview; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Iran Ajr” (252035Z), September 1987.
48. This had led to speculation that Iran had advance information about the La Salle’s schedule.
49. Complete collections of teletype and paper-tape messages found on board the Iran Ajr, in Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibits 70–72, June 23, 1997.
50. Ziegler interview.
51. COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intelligence Advisory—175/87—Landing Craft Engagement” (221735Z), September 1987, Earnest Will Collection, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 10, Folder 9.
52. Grieve interview; Bernsen interview.
53. Captain Marc Thomas, USN (Ret.), interviews with author, August 15, 1995. Also again in 2007; Parran interview.
54. USS Jarrett message for COMIDEASTFOR, “SITREP” (212313Z), September 1987; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intelligence Advisory—175/87—Landing Craft Engagement” (212245Z), September 1987, Earnest Will Collection, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 18, Folder 10.
55. Weinberger Diary, entry for September 21, 1987.
56. Thomas interview; Sergeant Gilbert Kerr, USMC Oral History, Marine Corps History Divison, January 5, 1988.
57. Bernsen interview with Partin.
58. Grieve interview; Lugo interview; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Iranian Landing Craft Capture Plan” (212315Z), September 1987.
59. Thomas interview. Combat photographers captured the entire assault on videotape. See Persian Gulf Operations, Defense Visual Information Center, March Air Force Base, Pin No. D5-208DM-002, Series Title DN-DEE-92-0009, Tape 5.
60. Thomas interview.
61. Parran interview.
62. Lieutenant Commander Paul Evancoe, USN (Ret.), interview with author, May 22, 1995; Commander Peter Wikul, interview with author, August 17, 1995.
63. Wikul interview.
64. Ibid.
65. “Excerpts from the Address to the General Assembly by the President of Iran,” New York Times, September 23, 1987.
66. Most of the Iranians captured were very docile. Only a couple of officers showed any real hostility to the Americans. Lieutenant John M. Ickes, USN Oral History, January 28, 1988, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.
67. John Kifner, “United States Blows Up Captured Iranian Vessel,” New York Times, September 26, 1987.
68. The location of the Iran Ajr’s sinking was 27˚00´ north, 051˚23´ east. COMIDEASTFOR message, “After Action Report for Sinking of Iran Ajr” (260030Z), September 1987; Evancoe interview.
CHAPTER 16 A VERY CLOSE CALL
1. CIA, “We Watched the Gulf,” Studies in Intelligence 33:1 (Spring 1989), p. 6; Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Planned Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities” (01150Z), October 1987, pp. 1–2; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intel Advisory 187/87, Persian Gulf Threat Update” (271650Z), September 1987, Files Intelligence Notebook I, 1985–1987, JTFME/MEF Operations, Operations Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 18.
2. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The
General’s War (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), p. 38.
3. Strasser notebook, entry for September 29, 1987, Rear Admiral Strasser, USN (Ret.), interview with author, April 7, 2007.
4. Riahi interview.
5. CIA, “We Watched the Gulf”; Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Planned Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities,” pp. 1–2; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intel Advisory 187/87.”
6. General Crist daily notebook; Crowe, Daily Schedule, October 1, 1987. In May 1988 two additional P-3s were added, based with the others in Dhahran. Command History, 1988, pp. ii–121; Ambassador Edward Gnehm, interviews with author, May 16 and June 29, 1995.
7. USS Guadalcanal, Command History, 1987, entry for October 3, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center.
8. Penzler interview; Crist interview. Many believe that the AWACS radar while operating in maritime mode simply picked up wavelets and mistook them for small boats. As the radar has to be preset to pick up objects traveling at a certain speed, in this case twenty to twenty-five knots, it remains a distinct possibility that on October 3 the AWACS picked up the tops of waves in the water traveling at this speed. General Charles Horner and Colonel George Williams, both of whom were heavily involved with AWACS operations in the Gulf during this period, believe this was in fact the case. However, in light of what happened on October 8 and the additional intelligence indicators, the threat posed by massed Iranian boats was real. General Charles Horner, USAF (Ret.), interview with author, July 28, 1995; Colonel George Williams, USAF, interview with author, December 13, 1994.
9. Fariborz Haghshenass, “Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008, p. 5.
10. Evancoe interview; Grieve interview; Lieutenant Colonel James R. Pruden, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, January 5, 1988. CENTCOM asked the chief of naval operations to dispatch a team from Naval Sea and Air Systems Commands to the Gulf to see the barges firsthand and come up with any additional recommendations. While NavSea established a twenty-four-hour crisis support cell to facilitate support for the barges, a survey team arrived in the Gulf on September 23. Many of its recommendations reiterated earlier concerns, especially ammo handling and HERO problems. One of the team’s best ideas was for a redesign of the proposed helicopter hangar on the Hercules, which allowed for helicopters to be brought in for maintenance without tying down the main flight deck for operations. Additionally, it strongly recommended that a second helicopter deck be constructed on the Wimbrown. The current deck, thirty by thirty feet, while strong enough to support the small army helicopters, would not be strong enough to support the larger navy and marine helicopters.
