by Avi Shlaim
The outcome of the secret deliberations in the suburban villa was recorded in a three-page document that came to be known as ‘The Protocol of Sèvres’; only the Israeli copy survived. This document constitutes the smoking gun of the conspiracy to attack Egypt. It makes the meeting at Sèvres the best-documented war plot in history. Most of its clauses detail the series of steps by which war was to be instigated: an Israeli strike against Egypt, an Anglo-French ultimatum to the combatants to withdraw from the Canal Zone and allied intervention following the inevitable Egyptian rejection of the ultimatum. Jordan, however, also features in the protocol. If Israel were to attack Jordan, Britain would have been obliged to go to Jordan’s rescue under the terms of their treaty. For Eden this was the nightmare scenario. Article V tried to reconcile these conflicting commitments. Israel undertook not to attack Jordan during the period of operations against Egypt. But in the event of a Jordanian attack on Israel, Britain undertook not to come to the aid of Jordan.8 The decks were now cleared for tripartite aggression against Egypt.
Israel launched its attack on the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula in the early hours of 29 October. Jordan was taken by complete surprise. A state of emergency was immediately declared. Hussein sent a telegram of support to Nasser. Hussein was nearly hysterical with anger and could hardly contain his rage. ‘During this crucial time,’ he said in a radio broadcast, ‘our nation is facing on the dear land of Egypt an unjust attack by the oppressive Zionism and tyrant Judaism, ally of evil and enemy of peace.’ General Amer, the commander-in-chief of the three armies, issued a mobilization order to the Syrian and Jordanian units associated with what came to be known as ‘Operation Beisan’. The plan envisaged a rapid armoured thrust across Israel’s most vulnerable point, its ‘wasp waist’ from the West Bank to the Mediterranean. This was intended to relieve some of the pressure on the Egyptian forces in the south. Hussein pressed for the immediate execution of General Amer’s order, but he met with resistance from Ali Abu Nuwar. The chief of staff considered it too risky to venture alone and counselled waiting until the arrival of the Syrian troops.9
Nabulsi had been prime minister for less than a week when called upon to face a crisis of the greatest magnitude. The king asked him to support Egypt by opening a second front against Israel. Although Nabulsi was ‘a leftist’, to use the king’s word, he refused a direct order from the king to launch a military offensive against Israel. The government was divided. Some of its members argued that opening a front in the war from the Jordanian side would lead to a break with the West and expose the country to the risk of invasion by the Jews. Others thought that it was necessary to consult with Syria and to contact Iraq in order to make a united stand.10 These differences were bridged by a formula that said that Jordan’s first duty to the Arab cause was to defend its own frontiers. Nabulsi himself came down on the side of caution. He was aware of Jordan’s military weakness. He knew that the Jordanian troops were no match for the Israelis. He had his doubts about the reliability of the Syrians, and he was altogether opposed to the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan. Finally, he also took seriously Britain’s warning that it would not come to Jordan’s aid if Jordan attacked Israel.
The memoirs of Anwar al-Khatib, the minister of public works in Nabulsi’s government, throw additional light on the discussions of the cabinet and on the positions of the principal protagonists. He relates that Hussein was very eager to open a Jordanian front in order to relieve the pressure on the Egyptian Army. Hussein chaired a long meeting of the cabinet, accompanied by the new chief of staff, Abu Nuwar. The king opened the meeting by saying that they could not abandon Egypt to fight alone and that they had a duty to open a new front and to join in the fighting. The tone of his voice suggested that he was very determined. At this point Khatib asked the king to allow the chief of staff to give his assessment of the situation. Abu Nuwar began his survey with the following observations: ‘The Hebron district will fall into the hands of the enemy in the first twenty-four hours of the war because of the great difficulty of protecting it. After that the Nablus district will also fall. As for Jerusalem, we’ll defend it to the last man and to the last drop of blood.’ After Abu Nuwar completed his survey, Khatib turned to the king and said, ‘Are we in a position to take on more refugees? Can we allow ourselves to lose more land after the loss of the land of Palestine? The picture presented to us by the commander of the army obliges us to behave sensibly and to wait. We all want to relieve the burden on Egypt, but our participation in this manner would only increase the load on Egypt and make it necessary for her to come to our aid while she herself is facing her ordeal.’ Nabulsi was torn by conflicting considerations: his sense of responsibility pointed in one direction, while his sense of solidarity inclined him towards participation in the struggle and in the fighting. The protracted deliberations ended with a decision to hold another meeting in the royal court to allow Salah Tuokan, the minister of finance, to present an assessment by the Jordanian treasury and to consider whether it could bear the cost of war. This took place the following day, and when Toukan finished his report, the king looked crestfallen.11
The second stage of the war consisted of an Anglo-French attack on Egypt following its anticipated rejection of their ultimatum to withdraw from the canal. Collusion between the colonial powers and Israel was widely suspected at the time, and public opinion in Jordan was in a state of great agitation. Hussein was furious and thought he had been double-crossed by the British, as indeed he had, although the proof did not emerge until a decade later. Hussein sent a telegram of support to Nasser. Charles Johnston, the new British ambassador to Amman, soon discovered that Hussein was ‘more resentful and distressed about our action over Suez than the most anti-British of his Ministers and subordinates’.12 In his fury, Hussein called Nasser and told him that he was ready to declare war on Israel. Nasser expressed his appreciation but declined the offer because he had already given his army the order to withdraw from Sinai. Hussein’s anger was cooled only when Nasser begged him not to risk Jordan’s army against overwhelming odds. The military position was hopeless, said Nasser, but he thought he might yet secure the withdrawal of the invading forces by diplomatic means.13
The desperate military situation led Nasser to countermand General Amer’s initial order. On 1 November, while Egypt’s airfields were being bombed by the allies, Amer issued new instructions to the Jordanian and Syrian chiefs of staff: ‘Halt the offensive preparations. Postpone Operation Beisan until further orders. Secure borders and prepare defenses against every possible invasion.’14 The majority of the ministers greeted the new order from Cairo with a sigh of relief. They had been under considerable strain since the outbreak of the crisis, with daily cabinet meetings, all of them dominated by the question of an eastern front. The ministers understood that the war between Israel and Egypt was now transformed into a much bigger one as a result of the intervention of Britain and France. Thus, according to Khatib’s account, the cable from Cairo helped to calm the strained nerves and to settle the tense debate within Jordan.15
From his side of the hill, General Dayan noted that Jordan reinforced its defence system along the border with Israel and that every position that had formerly been manned by a company was now garrisoned by a battalion. ‘From the operational point of view, this move of Jordan is definitely defensive… It offers no sign of serious preparation for war.’16
There is no way of knowing what might have happened had Hussein gone ahead and opened a second front against Israel. History does not reveal its alternatives. But it is arguable that Hussein’s brave stand during the Suez crisis and his loyalty to Nasser greatly enhanced his credentials as an Arab nationalist, especially when compared with the more cautious approach of the leftist prime minister and chief of staff. Abu Nuwar claimed many years later that he had been ready to honour the terms of the new alliance with Egypt and Syria, and had prepared and positioned enough troops ‘to give the Israelis a very rough time’. But ‘when Nasse
r said “stop” and the King was urging me every minute to attack, I said “no, Your Majesty, this would be suicide.” ’17 Hussein was young and impetuous, and he acted with a rush of sudden energy. He had the scent of battle in his nostrils and was bitterly disappointed by the attitude of his advisers. Prince Hassan recalls Hussein’s frustration: ‘My brother wanted to make his own mark… he was thwarted by not having a confrontation in 1956.’18
What the king did do was to invite the Syrian, Saudi and Iraqi governments to sent troops to reinforce Jordan’s defences. In response to this request, a ragbag army of allies poured into Jordan, ‘each with different equipment, different methods, different orders and profoundly different motives’.19 The Syrian troops arrived on 4 November, but, to the great disappointment of the Jordanians, they were a disorderly mob, wholly unprepared for battle and probably more trouble than they were worth. The Saudi troops did not arrive until the fifteenth, long after the fighting had ended. The arrival of the Iraqis was the cause of the first row between the king and his prime minister. Nabulsi objected to the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan on the grounds that Iraq was not a member of the Amman pact. The king made it clear to Nabulsi that the deployment of the Iraqi troops inside Jordan was a royal decision and that the cabinet had to accept it. Nabulsi replied that decisions of this kind were the prerogative of the cabinet, not the king. Nabulsi prevailed, and by the end of the month all the Iraqi troops had withdrawn from Jordan.20
With the British and French acceptance of the United Nations order for a ceasefire on 7 November, the Suez crisis subsided. The Jordanian government requested the withdrawal of all foreign troops, but only the Iraqis complied. Syrian and Saudi forces remained in the country after the military reasons for their presence had disappeared, creating the disturbing impression that they were simply positioning themselves to secure the best results in an eventual carve-up of Jordanian territory.21 The Syrians soldiers continued to prove the most difficult of the foreign guests. According to one account, they started to bring their families, they took over the Jordan Army cantonment in Mafraq, and they gave the impression of intending to remain in the country permanently. Under the cover of Arab patriotism, they seemed to be preparing to grab what they could for themselves.22 Whatever else it might have been, the Amman pact was not a serious threat to Israel’s security.
The Suez War made a major change to the regional balance of power in the Middle East. America and Russia gradually replaced Britain and France as the dominant external players in the region. There were far-reaching consequences for Britain, for Jordan and for the relationship between the two. Suez marked the effective end of what Elizabeth Monroe called ‘Britain’s moment in the Middle East’. Britain alienated the Arab world by its aggression against Egypt and its collusion with France and Israel. A wave of anti-British feelings swept through the Arab world from North Africa to the Gulf.
One British diplomat suggested that the effects of the fiasco on ruling circles in Jordan were not as adverse as they were elsewhere in the Arab world. ‘To Jordanian eyes,’ he wrote, ‘Britain had often appeared in the past as a rather maddening nanny-figure in the Arab nursery. The Suez affair had proved that nanny was human after all and herself capable of the worst kind of naughtiness.’23 This assessment is amusing but unconvincing. The Jordanians took the Suez crisis much more seriously, and the damage to Britain’s reputation there, both at the level of the political elite and at the level of the masses, was much deeper and more lasting than this flippant comment would suggest. One Arab history of Jordan in the twentieth century accurately describes the Suez War as one of the low points in its relations with Britain, comparable to the Palestine war. All Jordanians almost without exception, according to this history, regarded the tripartite aggression against Egypt as an aggression against themselves.24
There was an acute sense of betrayal at all levels of society, from the king downwards, and the political fallout from the war was impossible to contain. On 1 November parliament passed a resolution calling for the severance of diplomatic relations with France. Only the fear of bankruptcy deterred it from calling for a break in diplomatic relations with Britain too. On 20 November, however, parliament unanimously passed a resolution calling for the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and of an exchange of diplomatic representatives with Russia and China. The treaty was clearly doomed, but there was as yet no agreement on how to replace the subsidy it provided. Nabulsi wanted to delay the termination of the treaty until Arab funding could be secured. Hussein, on the other hand, wished to avoid dependence on Arab allies and made a determined bid to secure American financial support for Jordan. His aim was not Arab unity against the West but the replacement of one external patron and protector by another.
The first, secret approach to the Americans was made not by the king himself but by his chief of staff. On 9 November, Abu Nuwar requested from the American military attacheé in Amman American economic and military aid to Jordan in ‘sufficient volume’ to compensate for the imminent loss of British aid. If America put up the money and arms, Abu Nuwar said, communism would be prevented from dominating Jordan; he would dissolve parliament and take over the government: ‘I and the people of Jordan will follow US policies.’ He reiterated that he was strongly anti-communist, but he had to have aid; and if he did not get it from the US, he would get it from the USSR.25 Ten days later Hussein made a personal appeal for aid to the American ambassador, Lester Mallory. Mallory reported that ‘The two young men are changeable and impressionable.’ He was non-committal about aid and merely cautioned the ‘young men’ about the dangers to Jordan of jumping from the frying pan into the fire.26
The American attitude towards the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan up to this point had been one of benign neglect, seeing it as a British fiefdom, and in any case they were party to the widely held belief that King Hussein would not last on his throne for very long. He was therefore a potential liability rather than as an asset. A British diplomat recalled that the American assessment of Hussein during this period was ‘desperately negative’. Hussein had been written off to the point that possible replacements were being discussed.27
Foreign Secretary Lloyd had his own doubts about Jordan’s prospects of survival. He told John Foster Dulles, the US secretary of state, in December that the UK felt that the treaty with Jordan was of no further use and that ‘our money spent there is wasted, except that it may keep out worse money.’ Dulles asked, ‘What is the future of Jordan?’ Lloyd replied, ‘I don’t think it’s got one.’ He then added, ‘Unless it becomes a little Satellite.’ He said he thought the king would go mad. Dulles was not especially alarmed at the prospect of Jordan becoming a Soviet satellite. He said that a non-contiguous satellite could be ‘pinched off’ by the US and the UK working together.28 Worse was to follow later in the month. The British ambassador reported that, in Dulles’s view, ‘the brutal fact was that Jordan had no justification as a state. This of course did not mean that now is the time to liquidate it.’29 Dulles could view the Middle East only through a cold war prism, and, consequently, he preferred to spend America’s money on a country that might make a difference.
The British for their part were not only ready but eager to renegotiate their treaty with Jordan, not least because of budgetary constraints. After the dismissal of Glubb, the election of Nabulsi and the Suez débâcle, the subsidy had become a costly white elephant. The dilemma for the British was how to cut their losses without undermining the Hashemite state that they themselves had created in the aftermath of the First World War. The answer was to offer their ward up for adoption, and the most desirable candidate for parenthood was the United States of America. By a happy coincidence this was also the adoptive parent that Hussein had chosen for himself. Britain’s and Hussein’s efforts thus converged, without any coordination in trying to persuade the US to assume the burden that Britain was about to shed. On 17 January 1957 the British ambassador spoke to Dulles and left him an aide-mémoire saying that Her
Majesty’s Government could not afford to continue indefinitely to give Jordan about £13 million a year and that it hoped the United States would be prepared to take over this commitment. The ambassador wished to point out that this was not a question of pulling a British chestnut out of the fire because no British chestnut was involved. Rather it was a matter for concern to the whole Western alliance that the Soviet Union might move into Jordan. Dulles immediately ruled out military assistance to Jordan, but he left open the possibility of economic assistance.30
For Hussein, time was running out. Washington’s rejection of his urgent plea for aid in December came as a great disappointment. It left him no option but to go along with Nabulsi’s efforts to find an Arab replacement for the British subsidy. Hussein went as the head of a ministerial delegation to Cairo, and, on 19 January, he signed an Arab solidarity agreement. Under its terms, Jordan was to receive £12.5 million per annum for ten years. Saudi Arabia and Egypt pledged £5 million per annum each, while Syria promised £2.5 million. The principal Jordanian protagonist of this agreement was Abdullah Rimawi, the Ba’thi minister of state for foreign affairs. Hussein expressed his deep gratitude to his three new patrons in public, but he was assailed by serious private doubts about their reliability. Britain reacted to the conclusion of the Arab solidarity agreement by requesting negotiations as soon as possible for termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty.
This was one of the low points of King Hussein’s reign. For the first time since 1921, Jordan was to have no defence pact with a Western power. All the main pillars of strength of the Hashemite monarchy seemed to be crumbling – a Great Power guarantee, a united army and a loyal government. External threats compounded the problem. According to one Israeli source, British and American officials were talking frankly to the press about Jordan’s vulnerability and lack of legitimacy in a manner that seemed calculated to prepare the ground for change. Against this background, the prospective visits of the Iraqi regent and of the Saudi monarch assumed particular significance because they represented the traditional contenders in the struggle for Jordan. The Israeli analyst considered it a real possibility that Jordan would be divided between Iraq and Saudi Arabia with the support of Britain and America.31 The atmosphere of crisis was vividly captured by James Morris:
