by Avi Shlaim
With the approach of the Security Council debate, both sides stepped up their lobbying: Jordan for a strong resolution and Israel for as weak a resolution as possible. Hussein remained actively involved in the discussions and the drafting behind the scenes with American, British and Arab diplomats. In the end a British resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. In Jordan this came to be called ‘the Jordanian resolution’. It was considered a great triumph for Hussein and became the cornerstone of Jordanian foreign policy. Resolution 242 was the most significant international pronouncement on the Arab–Israeli dispute after the June War. The preamble to the resolution emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the need to work for a just and lasting peace. Article 1 stated that a just and lasting peace should include two principles: (i) ‘withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’ and (ii) respect for the right of every state in the area ‘to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force’. The resolution went on to affirm the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation and for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. The resolution supported the Arabs on the issue of territory and Israel on the issue of peace. Basically, the resolution proposed a package deal in which Israel would get peace in exchange for returning to the Arab states their territories.
The resolution was a masterpiece of British ambiguity, and it was this ambiguity that won for it the support of the United States, the Soviet Union, Jordan and Egypt, though not of Syria. Israel had many successes on the long road that led to the adoption of this resolution. It defeated a series of Arab and Soviet proposals that called for withdrawal without peace. Another success was to avoid the requirement of withdrawing from ‘the territories’ or ‘all the territories’ occupied in the recent war. The final wording in the English text was ‘withdrawal from territories’, and this gave Israel some room for manoeuvre. The French text of Resolution 242 spoke explicitly of withdrawal from les territoires – from the territories. This made it absolutely clear that the drafters of the resolution had in mind Israel’s withdrawal from all the territories it had occupied in the war. Everyone except Israel understood the resolution in this sense. Israel, however, exploited the ambiguity in the English text to defy international pressure for complete withdrawal. Israel’s interpretation of Resolution 242 also differed from the Arab interpretation in other respects. Egypt and Jordan agreed to peace but insisted that the first step must be complete Israeli withdrawal. Israel insisted that before it would withdraw from any part of the territories, there must be direct negotiations leading to a contractual peace agreement that incorporated secure and recognized boundaries. In sum, 242 invited Israel to trade land for peace, but Israel was more interested in keeping the land than in achieving peace.
Dr Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish ambassador to Moscow, was appointed by the UN secretary-general to promote an Arab–Israeli settlement on the basis of Resolution 242. Having rejected 242, Syria declined to participate in his mission. The other Arab states had high expectations of Jarring, whereas Israel had no expectations at all, perceiving him as personally unimaginative and ineffectual. But the real problem was that Israel had no trust in the impartiality of the UN or in its capacity to mediate. The Israeli tactic was to keep feeding Jarring with proposals and documents to which he was to obtain Arab reactions. The aim was to keep his mission alive and prevent the matter from going back to the UN, where Israel would be blamed for the failure. Abba Eban’s colleagues were happy to leave it to him to conduct the elaborate exchange of notes with Jarring as long as he did not make any substantive concessions. Eban understood better than any of them both the limits and the possibilities of Jarring’s mission. ‘Some of my colleagues’, noted Eban, ‘did not understand that even a tactical exercise fills a vacuum. Even diplomatic activity that is not leading anywhere is better than no diplomatic activity at all. Activity itself gives Arab moderates an alibi for avoiding the military option.’37 A diplomatic vacuum there certainly was but a vacuum of Israel’s making. The urbane and witty Eban liked to say that the Arabs never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity for peace, but after 1967 this description fitted Israel much better than it did the other side. Hussein’s hope of using the Jarring mission to pave the way to direct negotiations between the moderate Arab states and Israel bore no fruit because Israel had no interest in any kind of purposeful diplomacy.
Fearful that Hussein was about to sell them out at the conference table, Fatah and the more extremist groups resumed guerrilla raids against Israel in the autumn of 1967. First they tried to instigate a popular liberation war on the West Bank, but when this failed they moved their operational bases to the East Bank of the Jordan and to Lebanon and started mounting hit-and-run raids against the Israelis from there. They enjoyed a great deal of popular support, and attracted floods of volunteers from Palestinian and non-Palestinian communities throughout the Arab world.38 After the defeat of the regular Arab armies, they became the standard-bearers of Arab nationalism. The Palestinian cause as a whole began to attract more international sympathy and support. In the past the conflict was perceived as one between the large Arab states and little Israel. After 1967 it was increasingly perceived as a conflict between an oppressed people and an oppressive, colonialist state. The biblical image of David and Goliath was reversed, with Israel assuming the unaccustomed role of Goliath.
The Palestinian guerrilla organizations also commanded support at all levels of Jordanian society. Ex-prime minister Wasfi Tall was a member of a royal consultative committee created to advise the king on strategy and policy in the wake of the June War. Tall believed that Israel had no intention of withdrawing from the lands it occupied and no real interest in a political settlement with the Arabs, since this would entail withdrawal. He therefore concluded that the Arabs had no alternative but to resort to prolonged guerrilla warfare in order to drive Israel out. Active resistance, argued Tall, was necessary to provide the Arabs with the ‘psychological umbrella’ to proceed to a political settlement in the unlikely event that Israel changed course. Above all, the ‘psychological umbrella’ was essential to re-establish the king’s authority over his people and to provide the nation with some hope and purpose. Tall’s argument was that a peace based on humiliation would not endure and that any Arab leader who accepted it would be repudiated.39 Within the army the urge to expiate the defeat and to purge the humiliation was particularly acute. Although there was no direct challenge to the king’s authority, his orders were not invariably obeyed. The official policy was to stop Palestinian guerrilla organizations from using Jordan as a springboard for attacks on Israel. Army commanders stationed in the border areas, however, often gave passive and sometimes even active support to the guerrilla fighters.
Trapped between Israeli hardliners and Palestinian radicals, Hussein complained that ‘Jordan had given everything and got nothing’ from the United States. With the US stalling on his request to resume arms supplies, he again hinted that it might be necessary to move towards the Soviets. It was unusual for him to play hardball, but his credibility with the army was at stake. He was also beginning to give up hope that the US would use its muscle to prevent the Israelis from presenting him with a massive fait accompli on the West Bank. His confidence in the Johnson administration began to crumble. Walt Rostow informed Lyndon Johnson that ‘Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn’t better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing.’40 In his despair Hussein began to relax the policy of reining in the fedayeen. Sometimes he would be very tough on them, at other times very lenient. The Israelis noted this change in policy. In the past the Jordanian authorities regarded the fedayeen as an element that endangered the regime. They used to monitor them and to carry out arrests. But they came to see fedayeen harassment of the Israeli forces and settlers
on the West Bank as something that helped Jordan domestically and in the inter-Arab arena.41
Regardless of whether Hussein was unwilling or unable to prevent the attacks from his territory, the Israeli conclusion was the same: to strike at the Fatah bases. Having chased the fedayeen from the West Bank, the Israelis pressed the offensive with raids against their positions on the East Bank inside Jordan proper. The process of escalation reached its climax with a massive attack on Karameh, a village about four miles east of the Jordan River where Fatah’s headquarters were located. Jordanian intelligence alerted Fatah to an imminent Israeli attack on the village and suggested that they make themselves scarce. Fatah’s reply was that it was their duty to set an example and to prove that Arabs are capable of courage and dignity. At dawn on 21 March 1968 a massive Israeli armoured force, supported by helicopters and infantry, attacked Karameh. There were only about 300 Fatah men, but they were well prepared and ably supported by Jordanian artillery, which was stationed near by.42 The casualties were heavy on all sides: 28 Israelis, 61 Jordanians and 92 fedayeen were killed. But all the glory went to Fatah. Karameh is the Arabic word for ‘honour’, and by their brave stand the fedayeen were seen to have redeemed that of the Arabs. The Arab media presented the battle as a turning point and as the first defeat inflicted on the IDF by the Arabs. In the forty-eight hours after the battle, 5,000 new recruits applied to join Fatah. Hussein could not afford to go against the tide and was driven to express his sympathy with the fedayeen in public. ‘It is difficult to distinguish between fedayeen and others,’ he said. ‘We may reach the stage when we shall all become fedayeen.’
However, the aims of Hussein and the fedayeen remained incompatible. He wanted to recover his land, whereas they challenged Israel’s very existence. After Karameh they acted more independently in mounting operations against Israel, and these provoked Israeli reprisals. Hussein was thus caught between the Palestinian militants, who were encouraged by Syria, and Israel’s insistence that he had to bear the responsibility for their hostile acts. Israel bombarded Fatah positions in the Jordan Valley and Jordanian Army bases, as well as the towns of Salt and Irbid, inflicting heavy civilian casualties. These punitive raids, especially the ones involving aircraft (against which Jordan had no defence), undermined Hussein’s position. On the one hand he recognized the right of the Palestinians to resist occupation. But on the other, as he recalled,
we had a very turbulent internal situation; we had continuous reprisals and fire-fights on the long front, essentially from the Dead Sea or just south of the Dead Sea to the northernmost part. And we were hit by both sides. We had an internal problem, we had an external problem, our army was being hit, and one was trying one’s best to ameliorate this situation or save the situation from deteriorating… The Israelis considered that they had to retaliate against actions from Jordan. I kept saying that these actions were by people resisting occupation but it didn’t necessarily mean that Jordan was fighting. Jordan was deployed on the longest border and its army was trying its best to see what could be done. But we had our own problems… I was very worried at the increase of what was almost perpetual fighting until the Egyptians started the so-called War of Attrition.43
This endless chain of fedayeen raids and Israeli counter-raids greatly complicated the search for a peaceful solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict.
13
Dialogue across the Battle Lines
Remarkably, although in the aftermath of the June War it held very few cards, Jordan became a major player in Arab diplomacy. How did such a small, impoverished and insignificant country come to occupy such a prominent part in regional and international politics? The answer largely lies in the personality and policies of King Hussein. He was a strong, energetic and charismatic leader who commanded the attention of the great powers by sheer persistence and force of personality. Hussein’s unique brand of personal diplomacy enabled Jordan to exert an influence in foreign affairs that was out of all proportion to its real power. Hussein was the only Arab ruler who had intimate relations with America and relations of any kind at all with Israel, the greatest taboo in Arab politics. And he positioned himself very carefully between the Arab world, the United States and Israel. It was a difficult balancing act but one that Hussein succeeded in sustaining. Other Arab rulers, including Nasser, knew about Hussein’s contacts with their problematic neighbour only what he himself chose to tell them. Nasser needed Hussein as a channel both to Washington and to Jerusalem, and Hussein carried on his contacts with Israel in a way that did not exclude him from the Arab fold. He did not overstep the mark by going public, as Anwar Sadat had in the 1970s, and he did not pay the price that Sadat had for making a separate peace with Israel: the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League. Hussein developed a network of bilateral relations, and he alone knew where he stood with each of his partners.
Whereas before 1967 the Israelis needed Hussein more than he needed them, after the war it was he who desperately needed something from them: his land. Despite all the obstacles along the road, he never despaired of reaching a peaceful settlement. He requested direct contact with Israel at the highest possible level. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was reluctant to go in person, but the cabinet eventually agreed to send the foreign minister to a meeting with Hussein in London. Abba Eban was instructed to stress that he could put forward only private proposals without the approval of the cabinet. The meeting took place at the home of Dr Herbert in St John’s Wood on 3 May 1968. Eban was accompanied by Dr Herzog and Hussein by Zaid Rifa’i, his private secretary. Zaid was the eldest son of the former prime minister Samir Rifa’i. He had been educated at the Bishop’s School and Victoria College, where he formed a close friendship with the future king, and at Harvard, where he took a degree in political science and international law. Zaid Rifa’i was to play a key role alongside his friend the king in the conduct of the secret talks with Israeli officials over the next two decades. He was the adviser, the organizer, the note-taker and the negotiator. His thoughts on these talks, which were related to the present author, therefore merit serious attention.
To understand the course of the next thirty years, Rifa’i believed, one first of all had to understand Hussein’s personality. Hussein was truly a man of peace who hated war. He was intelligent, shrewd and pragmatic enough to know that the Arab–Israeli conflict could not be settled by violence. Only through negotiations and agreement would it be possible for their two peoples to live together in peace. This was Hussein’s frame of mind before and after the June War. The loss of Jerusalem hurt him more than anything else: it had been under Arab sovereignty and was lost on his watch. Regaining it, therefore, was of paramount importance to him. Here again he realized that this could not be done through war, feeling very strongly that only through negotiations and agreement would it be possible for him to get Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Rifa’i believed that, from the outset, Hussein doubted that Israel’s intentions in going to war in 1967 were as claimed: to defend itself from an imminent Arab attack or to gain recognition from the Arab countries. Rather, Hussein started to suspect that the Israelis had wanted to expand all along. What disturbed him most was the Israeli response to an offer he made at their early post-war meetings and kept repeating: to sign a formal peace treaty in return for Israel’s complete withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Hussein realized he was taking a big risk, but he was willing to chance it and to accept the judgement of his people, the Arab nation and history. He also thought that his offer was a very major sacrifice because it would have meant the breaking of an Arab taboo. And he was shocked when the Israeli response was that they were willing to sign a peace treaty with Jordan but only if Jordan agreed to cede parts of the West Bank and all of Arab East Jerusalem to them.
At Rifa’i’s first meeting with the Israelis the question was how the recent war could be used as a window for making peace. It was clear to him from the beginning that it was going to be e
xceptionally difficult: ‘Both sides were interested in making peace: one party wanted to annex Jerusalem and some areas in the West Bank, and the other was not willing even to consider making any territorial concessions. That was the deadlock right from the beginning. The intent for peace was there, but His Majesty was adamant that Israel must return all the territories captured in the war. And the Israelis were unwilling to accept it.’1 Rifa’i’s allegation of Israeli territorial expansionism and diplomatic intransigence after the war is fully supported by the Israeli documentary record.
According to the Israeli record of this first meeting, Abba Eban said that he had come not to negotiate or to make commitments but to clarify two questions. First, could Jordan negotiate and sign a peace treaty with Israel on a separate basis without being dependent on another neighbour? And second, what could the king do to ensure an end to terrorist activities? Hussein’s answer to the first question was that ‘It is not impossible.’ But before taking such a difficult step, he needed to know what kind of a settlement Israel was prepared for. Eban’s answer was evasive: his government saw no reason to come to a binding decision until and unless it was convinced that it had a serious Arab partner for peacemaking. There were three schools of thought, Eban elaborated: those who wanted to keep all the territory west of the Jordan River; those who favoured a settlement with the Palestine Arabs; and those who favoured peace with Jordan on the basis of a new, agreed and secure frontier. Even the last school of thought insisted on four conditions: no return to the borders of 4 June 1967; the changes would take account of security needs and historic association; the area west of the Jordan River would have to be demilitarized; and Jerusalem would remain united as the capital of Israel.
