by Avi Shlaim
unease Hussein said, ‘Gentlemen, I leave you alone to discuss the idea among yourselves. When you reach a decision, please call me.’ And he left the room.
In the subsequent discussion two rather different attitudes emerged. One group of ministers saw this as an internal Arab affair and was adamantly opposed to asking for outside help. A second group thought that Jordan was engaged in an existential struggle for survival and saw nothing wrong with asking a friend to help, provided it was the US or Britain and not Israel. No one suspected that the friend could be Israel; they all thought that, because of the precedent of 1958, it would be either or both of the Western allies. At the end of the discussion, the second group prevailed, and the king was given the mandate he had asked for.34
Sunday, 20 September, was a long and stressful day. Events on the battlefield influenced the manner in which Hussein used the mandate he had received from his ministers. His management of the crisis was also affected by the recurrent breakdown of communications between the palace and the US Embassy. Walkie-talkies were used some of the time, and the fedayeen who controlled the area round the embassy could eavesdrop on the conversations. Another constraint was the absence of direct ‘across the river’ contact with the Israelis. Zaid Rifa’i, the trusted aide, was by his monarch’s side throughout the crisis and conveyed most of the sensitive messages to his Western allies. Hussein made his first request for help through the British Embassy because his normal channels of communications with the US Embassy were interrupted. He called for ‘Israeli or other air intervention or threat thereof’ against the Syrian troops and he asked the British government to consider this request and to convey it to Israel.
In Britain there was virtually unanimous opposition to military intervention. The experts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office believed that the Palestinians would eventually win the struggle against the king and that it would be damaging to British interests in the Arab world to take action to save his throne. Peter Tripp, who served on the Jordanian desk in the FCO, explained the British predicament: ‘You cannot just nail your colours to the mast and say well, we’ll go down with the ship. I mean, there’s a certain amount of self-interest in all this.’35 The Conservative government headed by Edward Heath shared the view of the experts. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the foreign secretary, advised the prime minister that Western intervention would be deeply resented by the Arab countries: ‘The Palestinian revolt strikes a very deep chord in Arab hearts. Any Western country therefore which intervenes to try to save Jordan will be involving itself in a deep quarrel in Arabia as a whole, the consequences and end of which none could foretell.’ The other argument against intervention was stated even more bluntly: ‘Jordan as it is is not a viable country.’36 After discussion the cabinet rejected any idea of military intervention and feebly decided to transmit the king’s message only to the Americans and to leave it to their discretion whether to convey the message to Israel.37 The truth was that Britain had an each-way bet on the king and on Arafat.
Shortly after his conversation with the British ambassador, Hussein managed to contact the new American ambassador, Dean Brown, who arrived at the height of the hijack crisis and was taken to the palace to present his credentials in an armoured personnel carrier. Hussein made an urgent appeal for air strikes and air cover ‘from any quarter’. Hussein did not explicitly mention Israel this time but the substance of his appeal was passed on to the Israeli representative in Washington.38 Kissinger and Nixon saw the Syrian invasion as a Soviet challenge that had to be met. Kissinger told Nixon that the Soviets were pushing the Syrians and the Syrians were pushing the Palestinians. Nixon shared the conviction that the Kremlin orchestrated the Jordanian crisis in order to challenge US credibility throughout the Third World. In his memoirs Nixon wrote, ‘We could not allow Hussein to be overthrown by a Soviet-inspired insurrection. If it succeeded, the entire Middle East might erupt in war… It was like a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at the end.’39 Kissinger and Nixon tended to see every regional conflict through the lens of their global rivalry with the Soviet Union; in their view, a Russian soldier lurked behind every olive tree in the Middle East. And both men vastly exaggerated the superpower dimension of the Jordanian crisis. There was no concrete evidence at that time to support the theory that the Soviet Union had instigated the Syrian invasion; the little evidence that came to light later on, in fact, pointed the other way. The Egyptian foreign minister, for example, noted in his memoirs that the Soviets made efforts to defuse the crisis and that they also asked Nasser to put pressure on the Syrians to end their military involvement in Jordan.40
The perception of high stakes drove Kissinger and Nixon to respond robustly to Hussein’s plea for help. Nixon enthusiastically approved all the military deployments recommended by his hawkish adviser. Apparently, they appealed to his macho streak. ‘The main thing’, Nixon said, ‘is there’s nothing better than a little confrontation now and then, a little excitement.’41 Nixon ordered the 82nd Airborne Division on full alert; the Sixth Fleet to move demonstratively towards the area of tension in the eastern Mediterranean; a reconnaissance plane to fly from an aircraft carrier to Tel Aviv to pick up targeting information and signal that American military action might be approaching; and a warning to be delivered to the Soviets to restrain their Syrian clients. Kissinger preferred Israeli military intervention against Syria with America holding the ring against Soviet interference with Israeli operations; Nixon was reluctant to rely on Israel and wanted only American forces to be used if a confrontation could not be avoided. In the evening, however, Nixon received a more desperate message from Hussein, which led him to reverse his position on the use of Israeli forces. The message from Hussein said that the situation had deteriorated seriously; that Syrian forces occupied Irbid; and that the troops in the capital were disquieted. Hussein also said that air strikes against the invading forces were imperative to save his country and that he might soon have to request ground troops as well. Reversing his earlier procedure, Hussein asked the Americans to inform Britain of his plight.
Kissinger called Itzhak Rabin, the Israeli ambassador to Washington, and told him that the president and the secretary of state would look favourably on an Israeli air attack, that they would make up any material losses, and that they would do their utmost to prevent Soviet interference. Rabin said he would consult with Prime Minister Golda Meir, who happened to be in New York. Late that night Rabin called back with her answer. Israel would fly reconnaissance at first light. The situation around Irbid was described as ‘quite unpleasant’. Israel’s military leaders assessed that air action alone might not be sufficient. But they promised to consult again before taking any action.42
Monday, 21 September, was another momentous day. In Jerusalem, the cabinet, chaired by Yigal Allon, met in the morning to consider Hussein’s extraordinary request. One group favoured the preservation and the strengthening of Hussein’s regime. It argued that among all the Arab countries the Hashemite dynasty had the best relations with Israel. According to this group, the June War was a tactical mistake on the part of the king that should not be allowed to damage the basically positive relationship between the two sides. This group also considered Hussein to be the most promising Arab candidate for a peace settlement. Another group was in favour of turning the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan into a Palestinian state. The more extreme members of this group advocated active Israeli support for the PLO in bringing this about. Yasser Arafat’s declaration of independence in Irbid helped members of this group to press their case. They recommended allowing the PLO to achieve its goals and to gain control of the whole country. For them this was the ideal solution to the problem of Palestinian independence.43
The pro-Hussein lobby included Meir, Allon, Eban and Rabin. The second group included right-wing politicians, notably Ezer Weizmann and right-wing generals such as Rehavam Ze’evi and Ariel Sharon. Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, who were also ministers in the Labour-led government, told
the media that they would not shed tears if the Palestinians replaced Hussein. Some of the participants in the cabinet debate were worried that, if Israel intervened to save Hussein at America’s behest, it would look like a gun for hire. Yaacov Herzog kept all the little notes he received during that debate. Shimon Peres referred to Hussein as ‘the amateur king’ and gave his opinion that ‘it is not possible to save him but it is possible to stain our reputation.’ Gideon Rafael of the Foreign Ministry warned against getting caught up in all the excitement generated by ‘Dr Strangelove Kissinger and Rabin’.
The cabinet’s reply to the Americans, on 21 September, said that air operations alone were considered inadequate to the situation unfolding in Jordan and that ground troops would be necessary; the air force alone could not remove 300 tanks from the battlefield. In view of the risk of war involved, the cabinet sought reassurance and submitted a list of eight questions about American policy in the event of escalation. Could the king make his approach to Israel directly and make arrangements to coordinate their moves? What guarantees could America give Israel against Soviet military intervention? It took the State Department the best part of the day to prepare written answers to these and the other questions. Israel’s caution and insatiable quest for reassurance took Kissinger by surprise. His advice to Rabin was: ‘Don’t try to extract too many conditions before moving. Conditions don’t mean much any more. If you lick the Syrians that will count.’44 Acting on this advice, the Israelis prepared for an air strike, laid plans for a pincer movement against the Syrian forces in Jordan from north and east, and ostentatiously mobilized their ground forces along the borders with Syria and Jordan. The IDF General Staff also prepared a contingency plan in case Jordan disintegrated and there was a general land-grab involving its Syrian, Iraqi and Saudi neighbours. The military commanders thought that, with or without America’s permission, the IDF should move swiftly to secure the Gilead Heights, Kerak and Aqaba.45
Allon, the acting prime minister, was the most fervent proponent of prompt action to save Hussein. Through the American ambassador in Tel Aviv, Allon sent a friendly message to the king at 9.13 p.m.: ‘Following developments with deep sympathy and goodwill. In view clarify situation suggest immediate meeting with you or with your authorized competent representative. Place time your convenience.’46 Through this message Allon sought to reassure his neighbour not only that Israel would not take advantage of his domestic difficulties but that it was ready to help him against any and all of his Arab enemies.47 An hour later came the reply: ‘Extremely grateful to old friend for concern. Situation very grave up north. Trying to reorganize and given a chance we may be able to contain threat. However, serious threat of a breakthrough does exist. And this will require immediate action. I would have loved to have this chance to meet, but physically impossible at this time. Will arrange meeting as soon as possible. Meantime please keep in touch through this channel. Best regards and wishes.’48 This extraordinary message reveals, first, Hussein’s relief at re-establishing the direct ‘across the river’ contact and, second, that he wanted to keep all his options open.
Part of the problem was that Hussein kept changing his mind during the day about the kind of help his army needed. In the morning he asked for an immediate air strike to check the advance of the Syrian armour. His second message was more desperate and gave notice that he might soon be requesting support from ground forces as well. But in the evening he qualified his request by saying that Israeli ground operations would be fine as long as they operated only in Syria and did not enter Jordan. Two considerations probably prompted Hussein to rule out Israeli ground operations in Jordan: they would have damaged his already tarnished reputation in the Arab world, and there was no guarantee that the Israeli troops would leave the country when they were no longer needed. The Iraqi precedent was not at all encouraging in this respect. Nevertheless, Hussein was evidently very happy to receive the Israeli offer of help.
Tuesday, 22 September, saw the turn of the tide. Emboldened by American and Israeli backing, Hussein ordered his small air force to move against the Syrian forces in the north of the country. Both the air force and the army went into action, and, in a well-coordinated air-ground offensive, inflicted heavy losses on the Syrians. Early signs could be detected that the Syrian forces were preparing to withdraw from Irbid and from the area around it. The great worry of the Jordanian military commanders was that Syria would deploy its air force, which was substantially larger than theirs. Hussein, however, believed all along that the Syrians would not use their air force. He interpreted the PLA markings on the tanks as an attempt to dissociate Syria from the invasion, and considered Hafiz al-Asad, the former minister of defence and commander of the air force, to be a rational and pragmatic man who would not risk an all-out war and super-power involvement.49 It later transpired that Asad had held back the air force for reasons connected with his internal power struggle with Salih Jadid, the deputy secretary-general of the Ba’th Party, who had ordered the invasion. By refusing to commit the air force to the battle, Asad doomed the venture to failure. Shortly after the débâcle in Jordan, Asad ousted Jadid and seized power in Damascus.
Meanwhile, success on the battlefield led Hussein once again to reassess his earlier request for Israeli support against Syria. In the course of the afternoon the Americans received two messages, one from Jordan, the other from Israel. Hussein was becoming ambivalent about Israeli air strikes and negative about Israeli ground support. The Israelis were prepared to undertake ground operations but only in Jordan, not in Syria.50 Israel’s help was evidently no longer required either in the air or on the ground; nonetheless, the Israeli Air Force played a part in deterring the Syrians from further escalation of the conflict with Jordan. Phantom jets of the IAF flew low over the Syrian units and created sonic booms to suggest that worse might come if they did not turn round and go back where they came from.51
If Israeli support was one factor that helped the Jordanians to gain the upper hand in the conflict with the Syrians, Iraqi neutrality was another. Iraq had two divisions, with about 17,000 troops and 200 tanks, stationed in Jordan. When the fighting erupted the government in Baghdad pledged to use these forces to protect the Palestinian resistance against the royalist army. In an ominous move the Iraqis surrounded the Jordanian Air Force base in Mafraq. Syria’s invasion raised the fear that the Iraqis and the Syrians had joined up to help the resistance overthrow the regime. Both countries had extremist Ba’th regimes, but they were bitter enemies with old scores to settle and they suspected each other of plotting to gain control over Jordan. There were also bitter rivalries inside the Iraqi Ba’th Party that made the behaviour of the Iraqi Army in Jordan all the more unpredictable. The one encouraging factor was that the Iraqi Ba’thists hated the Syrian Ba’thists even more than they hated Hussein. The Iraqi leadership’s main concern was to stop Jordan from falling into the hands of the Syrians, possibly because they wanted Jordan for themselves. In any case, the worst-case scenario did not materialize: there was no coordinated PLO-Syrian-Iraqi effort to overthrow the regime in Amman; each party had its own objectives.52 Upon the outbreak of the civil war, General Hardan al-Takriti, the Iraqi vice-president, took personal charge of the forces in Jordan. Takriti turned out to be much better disposed towards Jordan than his colleagues.53 Fatah’s intelligence chief later claimed that he listened to a taped telephone conversation in which Takriti assured Hussein that his country would not intervene militarily. Takriti was as good as his word. The Iraqis allowed large Jordanian Army units to pass through their lines to attack guerrilla strongholds in and around Zarqa on 17–18 September.54 When the Syrians invaded, the Iraqis remained inactive. When the Syrians withdrew, the guerrillas were left to fend for themselves. Takriti was dismissed for his role in these events and assassinated in Kuwait a year later.55
With the Iraqis remaining on the sidelines, the Jordanians launched continuous attacks on the Syrians. At nightfall, 22 September, the Syrians began to withdraw
across the border, having lost some 120 tanks and armoured personnel carriers and suffered around 600 casualties. The withdrawal of the Syrians enabled the Jordanian Army to mount an all-out offensive against the fedayeen and to drive them out of the cities and their major strongholds. The Palestinians sustained further heavy losses, and some of their leaders were captured, but there were around 300 defections from the Jordanian Army, including an infantry brigade commander. Political pressures from the Arab world forced Hussein to call a halt to the fighting. Accusations that a massacre of the Palestinians was taking place in Jordan circulated in the Arab media. Nasser convened an emergency summit in Cairo at which Jordan was represented by Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud. But soon after his arrival there Daoud – under heavy pressure from Colonel Muamar Gaddafy, who posed as the champion of the Palestinians – resigned his post and went to live in Libya. In the palace there were conflicting opinions as to whether the king should leave the country in the middle of the crisis to attend the Cairo summit in person. A telephone call from Nasser tipped the balance in favour of going. It took some courage on the part of Hussein to agree to face his accusers directly at a time when Arab sympathy was turning rapidly away from him.
Hussein flew to Cairo on 26 September to a hostile reception from the Arab heads of state and a chilly meeting with Arafat. But the next day an agreement was signed by Hussein and Arafat in the presence of Nasser, who had served as its broker. This was to be the Egyptian leader’s last service to the cause of Arab unity: he died of a heart attack the following day. After ten days of fighting the guns fell silent, and the two leaders shook hands over ‘a sea of blood’. The Cairo Agreement provided for an immediate ceasefire all over Jordan, the withdrawal of the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian resistance from all cities before sunset the same day, the release of all prisoners and the formation of an Arab commission to supervise the implementation of the agreement. In victory Hussein displayed magnanimity. He invited Ahmad Toukan, a loyalist Palestinian, to form a government. In his letter of appointment Hussein urged the new prime minister to ‘bandage the wounds’ and combat ‘regionalism’ and Palestinian–Jordanian animosity.56
