by Avi Shlaim
At the meeting in Aqaba, Hussein put forward another disengagement plan in which Jordan and Israel would each pull back their military forces eight kilometres from the river to the foothills of the mountain ranges that marked the Jordan Valley. Jordanian civil administration would be established in the area vacated by Israel, especially in the town of Jericho. A working group would be formed as rapidly as possible to establish Jordan’s claim to represent the Palestinians. Kissinger was non-committal. He told the king that he would discuss his ideas with the Israelis in the coming weeks. Kissinger describes Hussein’s approach as moderate and statesmanlike but futile while a new Israeli coalition was being formed, including a party that opposed any territorial change on the West Bank. That state of affairs, according to Kissinger, precluded even the formation of a working group.6
None the less, Hussein persevered in his efforts to engage in the diplomatic process. Kissinger’s obvious reluctance to involve Jordan in his step-by-step diplomacy impelled Hussein to renew his direct contacts across the river. In the early part of 1974 he had two meetings with Meir, who was facing a storm of domestic protest for the failure to anticipate the Arab attack. With great difficulty she managed to assemble a coalition government following the election of 31 December 1973 but this government had the shortest lifespan in Israel’s history. Even at the height of her power Meir was not noted for her flexibility but now she had less room for manoeuvre than ever before. Hussein had little enough himself. Rifa’i accompanied him to both meetings with Meir and her ministers. By this time Rifa’i had gained a great deal of experience in regional and international diplomacy, and had grown considerably in stature and authority. There was a division of labour between the Jordanian monarch and his prime minister in accordance with the model prescribed in the constitution: the monarch determined the broad lines of policy, while the prime minister was in charge of carrying it out. The monarch set the tone; the prime minister’s role was to deal with the details, to clarify the issues and to dispel ambiguity. He also took notes during the discussion and produced records after the meetings.7 Hussein was courteous, soft-spoken and skilful at creating a congenial atmosphere for negotiations; Rifa’i was a shrewd and hard-headed politician and a tough negotiator who robustly defended Jordanian interests. They were an impressive duo, but they had a very weak hand to play.
On 26 January 1974 Hussein and Rifa’i crossed into Israeli territory to meet with Meir, Dayan and Gazit. The meeting took place in the Araba Desert on the border between the two countries in an air-conditioned caravan. Both sides wanted to move forward towards a disengagement agreement, but they had conflicting ideas about the nature and scale of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Essentially, the Israelis thought in terms of very limited disengagement, whereas the Jordanians demanded vertical disengagement along the entire front. Meir favoured a gradual approach and offered to restore to Jordanian rule the city of Jericho and the heavily populated Arab areas at the centre of the West Bank. Although this was a modest offer, Meir emphasized that it was only a beginning and not the end of the process.8 Hussein, on the other hand, demanded that Israel vacate a strip of land along the entire length of the Jordan River, which would have entailed the dismantling of some Israeli settlements. He regarded her offer as a rehashed version of the Allon Plan, which he had repeatedly rejected as ‘totally unacceptable’. The rationale behind his demand was that even a modest Israeli retreat along the entire ceasefire line would give the Palestinians hope for the future and restore their faith in Jordan.9 The following dialogue took place:
HUSSEIN: If you agree in principle to my proposal for an Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan River to a depth of fifteen kilometres, enabling me to establish a Jordanian civil administration in this strip, we can move on in stages to its implementation. It will help us distance the Palestinians from the PLO.
MEIR: It’s possible to find other ways of separating [our forces] through a corridor connecting you to the Palestinian population.
HUSSEIN: We refuse to be confined to a narrow corridor to the West Bank; and there will be no progress without your withdrawal from the Jordan Valley.
DAYAN: This means that the IDF must pull back from the entire valley?
RIFA’I: Yes, definitely. But we shall not introduce a Jordanian army there.
DAYAN: And what about Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley?
RIFA’I: They must be totally removed.
DAYAN: If so, what will your final border be?
RIFA’I: Identical with the 1967 lines. We are ready to achieve this in stages.
The dialogue continued but the deadlock could not be broken. Dayan was adamant that in any accommodation, the Jewish settlements and military bases in the Jordan Valley had to stay in place. Meir added that to get agreement even to a corridor from the Knesset would be a tough struggle. Rifa’i was no less adamant that withdrawal could not begin with a corridor. ‘We need “frontage” along the entire Jordan River,’ he said to the Israeli premier. ‘If the Allon Plan is Israel’s goal, there’s no prospect of a settlement.’ So as not to end on a sour note and to keep the lines of communication open, Hussein concluded by saying, ‘Even if there’s no agreement, we could continue with our good relations.’10
A second meeting with the same cast of characters took place in the same caravan on 7 March. Once again Hussein raised the demand for an Israeli withdrawal along the entire front. Meir pointed out that the disengagement with Egypt was not from the whole Suez line but only from part of it. Hussein’s response betrayed his frustration: ‘Would I have had to fight you in the October War to bring you to a disengagement agreement along the whole border?’ The discussion did not go anywhere:
HUSSEIN: If there is peace, we’ll prevent terrorism, but as long as you reject our proposals they [the Palestinians] get stronger…
MEIR: What if the Palestinians on the West Bank want to establish an independent Palestinian state?
HUSSEIN: It will be all right. Such a state would be like a sandwich between you and us and there is nothing to fear.
DAYAN: Can strongholds and settlements remain under Israeli sovereignty?
HUSSEIN: It is difficult for us to accept that.
Dayan continued to press for an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley but Rifa’i rejected this idea much more categorically than the king. Dayan threatened to ask the Palestinian leaders on the West Bank whether they would agree to Israel’s presence there in return for suitable payment. Rifa’i dismissed the threat by stating confidently that they would not agree. Dayan said, ‘We’ll either strive for an agreement with the Palestinians or you agree to significant border changes.’ Rifa’i retorted, ‘At the moment we are discussing the separation of forces.’ Meir became agitated. The question, she said, was: did the Jordanians accept Israel’s right to be on the West Bank? She pleaded with Hussein to move forward step by step without a commitment to total Israeli retreat at the end of the road. She pointed out that the separation of forces with Egypt did not require Israel to pull out of Sharm el-Sheikh. ‘Why is what I am proposing,’ she asked, ‘so unacceptable to you?’ ‘The reasons’, replied Hussein, ‘are psychological. You created a psychological problem with the Allon Plan.’ Another point made by Hussein was that the Palestinians could be more generous in making concessions with their own territory and their own rights than he could. ‘I most certainly have no such right nor the will to exercise it on their behalf,’ he added with uncharacteristic bluntness.11 The meeting ended without any agreement. As Hussein had remarked at the beginning, they were back to square one.
Mordechai Gazit was a largely silent but highly perceptive participant in these meetings. What struck him most was the complete consistency with which Hussein adhered to his basic position, namely, that the price of peace was Israel’s withdrawal from all the territory it had captured in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Hussein was prepared to settle for phased withdrawal from the West Bank, provided Israel accepted at the outset the principle that
it should eventually be total. At the last meeting Hussein made it crystal clear that he could make no compromises over this territory because it belonged to the Palestinians. This was not a new departure but a more forceful statement of Hussein’s consistent position ever since the end of the June War. This principled position stood in marked contrast to the popular Arab view of Hussein as a traitor who was prepared to trade with the Jews on Palestinian rights. Gazit was therefore moved to tell his Palestinian interlocutors that they had no idea how loyal Hussein was to them in all his dealings with Israel or how staunch he was in defence of their interests. Meir was difficult to deal with because she tended to view Arabs as a monolithic and implacable enemy. ‘Do you know one Arab who is prepared to make peace with us?’ she would ask, glowering at her advisers. ‘King Hussein!’ they would reply in unison. She would concede the point about King Hussein but not about any other Arab.12 It is testimony to Hussein’s skills as a diplomat that he managed to remain on good terms until the end with a leader who was unusually truculent and self-righteous, even by Israeli standards. On 10 April, Meir tendered her resignation following the publication of the Agranat Commission’s report. The Labour Party chose Itzhak Rabin to succeed her, and a long chapter in Jordanian–Israeli relations came to an end.
One trend was clear: ‘The longer the delay of negotiations to relieve Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the more inexorable the growth of the political status and weight of the PLO. Stalemate on the West Bank spelled humiliation for King Hussein; it undercut his claim that his moderate course would return Palestinian lands to Arab control.’13 Not surprisingly, Hussein was in a sombre mood when he arrived in Washington. He confided to Kissinger that the Israelis had flatly rejected his proposal for disengagement and countered with their old scheme of inviting him to take over civil administration in the West Bank while their military occupation continued. Kissinger wrote that it was ‘an amazing reflection of how little the Israelis understood Arab psychology that the proposal was continually put forward; not even the most moderate Arab head of government could accept administering the West Bank under Israeli occupation’. Hussein was depressed and seriously considered withdrawing from the negotiations altogether. This, however, would have made the PLO Israel’s only valid negotiating partner, and Hussein continued to be convinced that its hostility towards him and his dynasty was implacable. Kissinger shared Hussein’s frustration, and during the king’s call on Nixon, on 12 March, he said, ‘Israel hasn’t faced what their real alternatives are. They have to deal either with King Hussein or with Arafat. They can’t deal with neither.’14 But Kissinger also had his own priorities and these did not include negotiation over the West Bank. His main aim was to exclude the Soviet Union from playing a part in Middle East diplomacy. He embarked again on his solo shuttle diplomacy, and on 31 May delivered a military disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria on the Golan front. Hussein hoped it would be his turn next. But Sadat pressed for a second agreement with Israel that would give him another slice of Sinai, and the political situation in Israel was not conducive to negotiations on the West Bank.
The government that Rabin presented to the Knesset on 3 June was weak and divided. Allon became minister of defence and Peres foreign minister. The trio had different priorities: Rabin favoured negotiations with Egypt; Allon had a pro-Hashemite orientation; and Peres preferred an agreement with the Palestinian leaders on the West Bank. Peres acknowledged that Hussein was willing to conduct negotiations with Israel for a permanent peace settlement, ‘But he is a weak candidate for peace – because of the weakness of his position… His first problem is that of status and authority. A king is not a president or a prime minister. His authority does not spring from popular elections or from an appointment, backed by force, but from a title inherited from his father. Monarchs today are few and rare, and they are fast disappearing from the world’s landscape. Even a courageous king is not a representative leader, as is the rule in most modern countries, but is born to the title, as in olden times, and most of his thoughts and energies are inevitably concerned with how to preserve it.’15 Allon was not interested in political legitimacy but in an arrangement that would enable Israel to keep substantial portions of the West Bank without responsibility for its Palestinian population. He knew that Hussein was unwilling to compromise on Arab land, but he believed that sooner or later he would be compelled to accept Israel’s terms because he had no alternative if he wished to survive. Allon was also an ardent supporter of the settlement movement in the occupied territories. For him, as for the Zionist leaders in the pre-independence period, settlement established a claim to the land and put paid to the option of negotiations and compromise. In line with this old Zionist logic, the Rabin government continued to expand the settlement project of its predecessors. This project was illegal and, in political terms, a disastrous mistake. Yet, like its predecessors, the Rabin government proceeded on the premise that peace was dispensable while territory was essential.
Rabin and Peres could hardly cooperate in seeking peace with the Arabs because they were at war with one another. As prime minister Rabin suffered from the additional handicap of presiding over a coalition that had the narrowest of parliamentary majorities: 61 supporters in the 120-member Knesset. The National Religious Party (NRP), which had ten seats in the Knesset, declined to join the coalition. In the hope of attracting the NRP, Rabin had at the outset committed his government to hold an election before concluding a peace agreement that involved the surrender of any territory on the West Bank. In September 1974 the NRP joined the coalition, which broadened the parliamentary base of the government but at the same time it seriously curtailed Rabin’s freedom of action in relation to Jordan and the Palestinians. His party was committed to territorial compromise over the West Bank; the NRP was committed to keeping the whole of the West Bank within Greater Israel.
The PLO was gaining international legitimacy but Rabin’s position remained firm and inflexible: Israel would never recognize or enter into any negotiations with the PLO and it would not agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. If personal conviction precluded Rabin from offering anything to the PLO, domestic political constraints precluded him from offering anything of substance to Hussein. Rabin’s American friends urged him to talk to the pro-Western monarch. Two weeks after Rabin was sworn in, Richard Nixon (who was soon to lose the presidency because of the Watergate scandal) came to Israel on a state visit. Nixon urged that the military disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria be followed up with a similar agreement with Jordan.16 Rabin, however, had tied his own hands by pledging to submit any withdrawal on the West Bank to the verdict of the Israeli electorate, and he was unwilling to risk another election. Consequently, he had nothing to offer Hussein, and the negotiations between them came to nothing. Some of Rabin’s advisers favoured ‘Egypt first’, while others favoured ‘Syria first’, but none favoured ‘Jordan first’.17 Hussein could not make any headway because there was no Israeli partner for peace. The gulf between the two sides could not be bridged and the stalemate persisted.
Although Rabin was not ready for a deal on the West Bank, he valued the contact with Hussein. During the three years of his premiership Rabin, accompanied by Allon and Peres, had half a dozen meetings with the king, who was always accompanied by Zaid Rifa’i. All the meetings took place on Israeli soil, one in Tel Aviv, the rest in Wadi Araba, in the air-conditioned caravan that kept changing its location for security reasons. They would begin with a survey of the regional and global situations, and, since both Rabin and Hussein spoke slowly, this would take a relatively long time. On the Israeli side each meeting was carefully prepared in advance by officials who also produced a detailed record of the discussions. Israel had four main aims in these discussions: to explore the possibilities of a deal with Jordan; to solve minor problems that affected both countries; to promote economic cooperation; and to coordinate policy towards the West Bank and the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. Jord
an put forward two proposals in these discussions: an interim agreement involving partial Israeli withdrawal along the Jordan River; and a full peace agreement in return for complete Israeli withdrawal.18
The first meeting took place on 28 August 1974. Allon introduced Rabin and Peres to Hussein. The king repeated the proposal he had already made to Meir for a military disengagement involving a withdrawal of about eight kilometres on both sides of the Jordan River. Rabin rejected the proposal out of hand and added that he could not even consider it as an option for the future. Peres then put forward a proposal of his own – another instance of an individual minister floating a proposal to relieve the cabinet of collective responsibility. Peres sought to solve the Palestinian problem by means of an Israeli–Jordanian condominium. He proposed the creation of three political entities: Israel, Jordan and a Palestinian entity that would be administered by them jointly. The Palestinian entity, comprising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, would be wholly demilitarized and fall under no single sovereignty. The three entities would form a single economic unit, open to the free movement of goods, of persons and of ideas. Peres conceded that his plan might seem fantastic but argued that ‘fantasy is the only way to solve this situation.’ The king remarked impatiently that he wanted to talk about the present and that meant a military disengagement agreement. Allon stepped in to save the meeting from failure. He suggested that the town of Jericho and the area surrounding it be turned over to Jordan to set up a civil administration and to serve as a bridgehead to the West Bank. This was simply a new version of the Allon Plan. The king rejected the proposal and restated his demand for an Israeli withdrawal along the entire front, as in the case of Sinai and the Golan Heights. The meeting ended, unsurprisingly, without any agreement being reached.19
