Lion of Jordan

by Avi Shlaim

  Relations between the king and the Muslim Brotherhood had been through many ups and downs. It was created during the Second World War as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. But during the Arab Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s it did not support Gamal Abdel Nasser’s attempts to overthrow Hussein and turned increasingly pro-Hussein during the decade that followed the June War. Ideologically it was opposed to the Ba’th Party and the communists. Moreover, after considering the alternatives, it concluded that its own interests were best served by the continuation of Hussein in power at the head of an independent state that aimed to preserve the status quo.40 Hussein’s legitimacy in Islamist eyes was further enhanced by the fact that he was a direct descendant of the Prophet. The success of the Islamists raised the alarm in conservative political circles, but Hussein took comfort from the fact that they were now part of the very government they had been challenging. ‘They had been living on slogans,’ he told his wife. ‘Now they are going to have to deliver results.’41

  A further step on the road to democracy was the appointment, in April 1990, of a royal commission to draft the National Charter (Al-mithaq al-watani). The purpose of the exercise was to provide a legal framework for regulating the political life of the kingdom and especially of the political parties. Most of the members of the sixty-strong drafting commission were supporters of the regime, but a fair number of outsiders and even critics of the monarchy were included. The charter, which was ratified by parliament in the late spring of 1991, became part of the organic law of the kingdom. At its heart was a social contract between the king and the people. The king accepted pluralist and participatory politics. In return, the people had to acknowledge Jordan as a legitimate territorial state and the king as the legitimate head of state.42 The National Charter fell a long way short of true democracy, but it was a significant move in a more liberal direction. Although the democratic experiment was an internal domestic affair, it had important ramifications in the Arab world. As Prince Raad bin Zaid noted: ‘Many Arab leaders were not pleased about this. They felt that King Hussein was letting the genie out of the bottle. In addition, they accused him of interfering indirectly in their domestic politics. They were especially critical of the notion of citizens’ rights. The Saudis and others felt that Islamic law, the Shari’a, included that. They were apprehensive. They did not understand the relevance of democracy to the Saudi people. For them the Shari’a was all that the Saudi people needed.’43 Suspicion of Jordan’s cautious move towards democracy and its leading role in the ACC possibly influenced the Saudi attitude towards Hussein during the Gulf crisis that was to come.

  23

  The Gulf Crisis and War

  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 precipitated a major regional and international crisis. Failure to resolve the dispute by diplomatic means culminated, six months later, in a full-scale war, mandated by the United Nations, to eject Iraq out of Kuwait. Jordan remained neutral during the crisis, and resisted all the pressures and blandishments to join the American-led military coalition against Iraq.

  There are two conflicting versions of Jordan’s role in the Gulf crisis and war that may be termed the Republican and the royalist. The American version is that Jordan betrayed its allies and cast its lot with the aggressor in a critical challenge to the post-cold war international order. The bill of particulars against Hussein included the following charges: he had foreknowledge of Saddam Hussein’s plan to invade Kuwait; he gave him tacit support during the crisis; he helped him to circumvent the UN-decreed sanctions against Iraq; and he conspired with him to follow up the annexation of Kuwait with a Jordanian annexation of choice parts of Saudi Arabia. The Jordanian version maintains that the king had no foreknowledge of Saddam’s plan; that the kingdom consistently opposed the invasion and annexation of Kuwait; that it worked to promote an Arab solution to the dispute; that it abided by the UN sanctions at great cost to itself; and that it remained opposed throughout to the use of military force. In support of its version, the Jordanian government took the unusual step of publishing, in August 1991, a 78-page White Paper, which included its account of the crisis, and fifteen official documents. A critical scrutiny of all the available evidence invalidates the American version on a number of counts without fully substantiating the Jordanian one.

  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait took Hussein by complete surprise. The four main issues were Iraqi debts from the era of the Iran–Iraq War, Kuwaiti oil-pricing policy, oil-production quotas from the joint Rumeila Oil Field and a border dispute. Although tension between Iraq and Kuwait had been escalating over these and other issues, Saddam assured Hussein that he would not resort to force so long as there were negotiations in progress, and Hussein conveyed these assurances to his old friend who now occupied the White House. At 5.50 a.m. on 2 August, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia called Hussein with the startling news that Iraqi forces had crossed the border into Kuwait. Hussein was at that time the chairman of the Arab Cooperation Council, so the invasion occurred on his watch. The other members of the ACC were Iraq, Egypt and North Yemen. Fahd asked Hussein to urge the Iraqi leader to limit the invasion to the disputed territories and to stop the thrust into Kuwait. Hussein asked how far the Iraqi forces had penetrated and was shocked to learn that they were six kilometres from Kuwait City and still moving towards the capital. Hussein immediately telephoned the Iraqi leader, but Saddam did not return his call until just after midday. By this time the Iraqi Army was in Kuwait City. Hussein urged Saddam to withdraw. Saddam said that if the Arab governments refrained from condemning and threatening Iraq, the army would begin to withdraw within days and complete its withdrawal within weeks.1 After learning about the Iraqi move from King Fahd, Hussein called General Ihsan Shurdom and ordered him, as a precaution, to put the Jordanian Air Force on a war footing.2

  From this point on Hussein worked indefatigably to keep the dispute within the Arab family and to promote an Arab solution to the crisis. He was the only leader in the world who could describe himself as a personal friend of Saddam Hussein, and he was anxious to talk to him. Hussein also felt that it was his duty to do whatever he could to contain the crisis. Shortly after his conversation with Saddam, Hussein flew to Alexandria for an emergency meeting with President Mubarak. The two agreed that the matter should be resolved inside the Arab family with no outside intervention, and Mubarak urged Hussein to visit Baghdad as soon as possible. King Fahd, who was consulted by phone, endorsed this plan. Hussein and Mubarak also spoke to President Bush. Hussein told Bush that he was about to go to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. ‘I really implore you, sir, to keep calm,’ he said. ‘We want to deal with this in an Arab context, to find a way that gives us a foundation for a better future.’ Bush told the king that the world would not accept the new status quo, and that it was unacceptable to the United States. ‘I’m sure Saddam Hussein knows this, but you can tell him that from me.’ The king replied that Iraq was ‘determined to pull out as soon as possible, maybe in days’, and promised to push for withdrawal.3 He said he needed forty-eight hours to travel to Baghdad to get specific commitments from Saddam and finished the call under the impression that Bush concurred with this. Mubarak agreed that the Arab League should defer issuing a condemnation of Iraq until the king had a chance to find out whether the Iraqi government would give a commitment to withdraw as soon as possible and to attend a mini-summit to discuss all aspects of the dispute with Kuwait. The crux of the matter was to find a face-saving formula, that is, to facilitate Saddam’s withdrawal by undertaking to address simultaneously his grievances against Kuwait.

  On the following day, 3 August, Hussein flew to Baghdad in the morning to a meeting with Saddam. Hussein secured Saddam’s agreement to resolve the crisis within an Arab context: Iraq would attend a mini-summit to be held in Jeddah on 5 August and inform Hussein of the details of its withdrawal before he landed back in Amman. Saddam was adamant, however, that he would respond positively to the proposals of the three Arab heads of state only if the Arab Lea
gue abstained from condemning Iraq. In other words, Saddam was prepared to start withdrawing his troops, but not if he was under duress. He thought he had legitimate reasons for invading Kuwait, and he wanted to withdraw voluntarily and in a manner that would preserve his dignity. Saddam, in Hussein’s view, seemed to be genuinely interested in defusing the crisis on this occasion. That very day, the Iraqi government announced its intention to start withdrawing its troops from Kuwait at 7 p.m. on 5 August. Hussein was elated: he had asked for forty-eight hours to work out an Arab solution and appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough within that time.

  On arrival back in Amman, Hussein called Mubarak to report on the success of his mission, only to discover that the Egyptian leader had changed his mind. In fact, while Hussein was on his way to Baghdad, the Egyptian government issued a statement condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Hussein called Mubarak to inform him of the agreement he had reached and to express his regret at the Egyptian statement. Mubarak explained that he was under strong internal and external pressure not to make any concessions to Saddam and added that he had spoken to King Fahd, who was very angry about the situation. Mubarak now rejected the terms that Hussein had secured and insisted on Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the immediate restoration of the Kuwaiti royal family. At the meeting of the Council of the Arab League in Cairo that evening, the Egyptian foreign minister steamrollered through a resolution condemning Iraq. Jordan’s foreign minister, Marwan Kasim, warned that the resolution would cut across Hussein’s plan for a mini-summit to contain the crisis. The Council, however, adopted the resolution by a majority of fourteen.4 This resolution led to the hardening of the Iraqi position and to the internationalization of the crisis.

  Mubarak’s U-turn calls for an explanation. Egypt was economically dependent on the United States, and Mubarak came under heavy pressure from Bush to demand an immediate and unconditional Iraqi retreat. Bush, by his own account, was wary of an ‘Arab solution’, fearing that it might end up in a compromise with Saddam.5 He regarded the invasion as a blatant transgression that had to be dealt with quickly and firmly. Mubarak wanted to impress upon Bush that Egypt was the leader of the Arab world; he was therefore reluctant to give Hussein the credit for resolving the crisis. Egyptians in general had a low opinion of the Hashemites, regarding them as vagabonds from the Hijaz and their country as the accidental product of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. There was a general perception that Hussein could not be relied on to play a constructive role in the crisis because he was too beholden to Saddam in economic matters and because he was constrained by the size of the Palestinian community in Jordan. Mubarak himself shared this haughty attitude, questioning Jordan’s legitimacy and Hussein’s right to rule.6 To the Americans he freely expressed his disdain for Hussein and accused him of engaging in a conspiracy with the Iraqi dictator to take over Kuwait and divide the spoils of occupation.7

  Distrust was rampant in the Arab world and helped to destroy the possibility of an Arab solution. The view of a benign Jordanian role in the run-up to the invasion was not shared by the countries most directly affected. The Kuwaitis suspected Hussein of being privy to Iraq’s military intentions and of having concealed this knowledge. Saudi Arabia, after being informed that Iraqi troops were massing on the kingdom’s border, suspected Hussein of plotting to join forces with Iraq in order to regain the Hijaz.8 At a later stage in the crisis, when Hussein reminded the world of his title of sharif, this was seized upon by the suspicious Saudis as evidence that he had territorial ambitions of his own. What Hussein actually said, in an address to the Jordanian parliament on 12 August, was the following: ‘I will be for ever honoured to be a soldier serving this nation. This is the history of my family and my circumstances. I plead with you as brothers: who wants to honour me shall call me by my name, and he who wants to honour me more shall call me Sharif Hussein.’9 There was no mention of the Hijaz or of Saudi Arabia. Rather, the purpose of the speech was to invoke the old Hashemite mission of leading and uniting the Arab nation.

  On the morning of 4 August, King Fahd called Hussein and informed him of the American claims that Iraqi troops were advancing towards the border with Saudi Arabia. Hussein did not believe these claims but offered to check them with Saddam. Saddam was also surprised and, after conferring with his senior military staff, reported that their nearest forces were thirty to forty kilometres from the border, adding that he had just given his generals orders to keep a distance of at least fifty kilometres. Hussein relayed these assurances to King Fahd and suggested a bilateral meeting. Fahd clearly did not want a meeting and offered to send his foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, to Amman instead. Prince Saud arrived in Amman the following day with the news that the Americans had given King Fahd a photograph that allegedly showed Iraqi troops advancing. Hussein repeated the assurances that Saddam had given him and added that Iraq had officially notified the UN of its intention to withdraw from Kuwait. As a mark of his own confidence in Saddam’s assurances, Hussein offered to send half his army to patrol the border area between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia so that his men would be the first to face any advancing Iraqi troops. The Saudis did not respond to the offer, not surprisingly given their suspicions, and the offer ran into the sand.10

  What Hussein did not know was that, in view of the allegedly suspicious Iraqi troop movements towards the Saudi border, an offer to send American troops to defend Saudi Arabia had been communicated to Riyadh as early as 2 August, six days before the official announcement was made. On 5 August, Saddam both announced and made a modest start with the withdrawal of troops from Kuwait. This gesture, however, was dismissed by Mubarak as ‘only redeployment’ and by Bush as ‘insubstantial’. The Bush administration spent the period 2–6 August secretly negotiating with Saudi Arabia on the size and composition of the American forces to be dispatched. Initially, King Fahd was very reluctant to have American troops on his sacred soil, so a good deal of scaremongering and arm-twisting by the president and his aides were required to secure his consent. The first contingent arrived as early as 6 August. Mubarak was informed about these negotiations, and he too committed and dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia. This explains his abrupt change of course, his rejection out of hand of Saddam’s proposals and the haste with which he moved to denounce Iraq. There was no way Mubarak and Fahd could attend a mini-summit with Saddam while American and Egyptian troops were arriving in Saudi Arabia to challenge him. Within less than two days, the two Iraqi conditions – no condemnation and no foreign troops – were breached, and the dialogue with Iraq was summarily suspended. Hussein’s credibility as a mediator was destroyed and the possibility of an Arab solution was undermined by the very parties who had asked him to mediate in the first place. It is worth noting that UN Security Council Resolution 660 of 2 August was almost identical to the proposal that Saddam accepted, namely, withdrawal and negotiations. This is a critical part of the story that the American version of the Gulf crisis completely overlooks.11

  Hussein’s heart sank when he heard about the arrival of American forces in Saudi Arabia. The foreign intervention in the affairs of the region that he so much dreaded had now come about. Overnight an Arab–Arab dispute was transformed into a major international crisis pitting America and its allies against Iraq. Suddenly, Saddam had to ‘lose face’, and conciliation was replaced by confrontation. Hussein’s role as a mediator was over: he was outside the tent. Jordan was no longer a player in the issues that interested America. For the next six months America was absorbed in the logistics of deploying forces in the Gulf and in building up a broad military coalition against Iraq. On 6 August the Security Council imposed an embargo on Iraq. In response Saddam declared that his invasion of Kuwait was irreversible, and two days later Iraq announced the annexation of Kuwait in its entirety.

  Until then it was generally assumed in the Arab capitals that Iraq intended to occupy Kuwait only for a short period. Saddam Hussein later explained the thinking behind the annex
ation to the king: ‘I realized that the Americans were determined to go to war.’ He felt that if Kuwait was not part of Iraq, the Iraqi forces there would not be strongly motivated to defend it. It was one thing to expect the Iraqi Army to defend Iraq unto death and another to ask them to die for the defence of Kuwait. If Kuwait was officially part of Iraq, it would make all the difference. ‘That’s why I did it at the time.’12 But from the point of view of the international community, this was the point of no return: the brutal Iraqi dictator had snuffed out a sovereign nation-state and a member of the United Nations, and he could not be allowed to get away with it. Jordan, like the rest of the international community, refused to recognize Saddam’s puppet regime in Kuwait.