by Avi Shlaim
Hussein felt let down by his Iraqi friend, and there was nothing he could do to retrieve the situation. American aid to Jordan was cut off. The Gulf countries that joined the military coalition cut off their aid as well. The imposition of sanctions against Iraq by Security Council Resolution 661 had disastrous economic consequences for Jordan. Another blow to the crippled Jordanian economy was the flood of destitute refugees from the Gulf. So anguished was Hussein that, on 8 August, he talked to his wife about abdication. Given the degree to which he was being personally targeted and maligned, he wondered whether Jordan might suffer less if he handed over his responsibilities to someone else. But a steady stream of messages and phone calls told him that the entire country was behind him. Queen Noor added her encouragement and support. There was no point in abdicating during the crisis, she told him. His people needed him now more than ever, as did others round the world who counted on his moderation to counterbalance the war fever that was sweeping the region.13
Hussein’s popularity at home reached a zenith. The overwhelming majority of Jordanians, both in the country and in the army, sympathized with the Iraqi people. There was also a popular perception that, with the exception of Saddam, the rulers of the Gulf states were an indolent, greedy and venal lot who refused to share their fortuitous wealth with the poor and needy of the Arab world. America stood accused of upholding double standards, on the one hand condoning Israel’s occupation of Arab lands and on the other hand condemning Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Hussein’s stand in the crisis boosted the legitimacy of the regime. For the first time in Jordanian history, the regime allowed and even encouraged the holding of anti-Western demonstrations in public places. The Muslim Brotherhood was given a fairly free hand to mobilize popular support for the king’s policy of opposing Western military intervention in the Gulf.14 The Gulf crisis was one of the few episodes in Jordan’s history with almost complete convergence between the positions of the regime, the army, parliament and public opinion.
Hussein’s popularity at home came at considerable cost to his relations with the West. The West was aware that Iraq and Jordan were allies and that this called for a more pragmatic foreign policy. Nevertheless, Western goodwill was severely strained by material Jordanian support for Saddam in evading UN sanctions and by what was seen as Hussein’s failure of leadership in the early days of the crisis. It was felt that had the king thought more astutely, he would have realized that Jordan’s real interest lay in joining with the rest of the international community against the lawbreaker. Hussein could have told his people that the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force was vital to Jordan and that Jordan’s stand in the current crisis was anchored in this principle. Saddam therefore should not expect any moral or material support from Jordan. Hussein’s lack of leadership at home, it was claimed, had the effect of increasing popular support for Iraq and of intensifying the animus against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Western experts knew that the position of Jordan’s various Bedouin tribes varied according to their connections with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia but that generally they were not in favour of the implicit Jordanian support for Saddam. Hussein’s behaviour was regarded by these experts as emotional and impulsive. He was making one mistake after another and inflicting serious damage on Jordan’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The term ‘plucky little king’ went out of fashion.15
Hussein became somewhat divorced from reality in seeing himself as the victim of cynical Western and Arab politicians who promoted their own selfish interests behind the cloak of international legality. But he was not the only saint in a world of sinners, as the official Jordanian version of the Gulf crisis would have us believe. Although the conspiracy theories that linked him to the invasion of Kuwait were not substantiated, he was strangely naive in what he thought he could achieve. This may have been a case when, once again, his strategic sense let him down. His younger brother certainly thought so. One of the very few flaming rows between the two brothers was on the subject of Saddam. Hassan warned Hussein repeatedly that Saddam was an incorrigible and dangerous despot, but Hussein would not listen. The material benefits of the association with Saddam warped his judgement and blinded him to the dangers. Hussein was always hopeful of restoring Jordanian–Iraqi relations to their pre-1958 glory, hence his sympathy for Saddam. He thought that, through Saddam, Jordan might be able to retrieve the position it lost in Iraq as a result of the July 1958 revolution.16 In the course of one of their periodic rows on the subject, Hussein said to Hassan, ‘If you don’t take this man seriously, I’m really beginning to question, to have my doubts about you.’ ‘Fine,’ retorted Hassan, ‘make your choice.’ During the Gulf War, Hussein was angry and truculent and at times even seemed prepared to throw caution to the wind and to join in the battle alongside the Iraqi dictator. Hassan thought he detected the same suicidal tendency in his elder brother during the Gulf War that he had noticed before, notably in pushing for a second front against Israel in October 1956 and in taking the plunge, without thinking about the consequences, in June 1967.17
The truth of the matter is that Hussein was only a minor actor in this particular drama. His efforts to find a peaceful way out, sincere and persistent as they were, could not deflect the slide towards war. President Mubarak took the initiative in convening another emergency meeting of the Arab League in Cairo on 10 August. Attempts to revive mediation efforts were brushed aside. The text of a resolution that was probably a translation from English into Arabic was quickly pushed through. It repeated the previous condemnation of Iraq; it refused to recognize the annexation of Kuwait; and it responded affirmatively to the appeal of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states for Arab forces to help defend their territory against outside aggression. Jordan, Yemen and Algeria abstained because they saw the resolution as a cover for foreign inter-vention.18 Hussein sat with his hands on his cheeks in a cloud of gloom. ‘I felt right away, from the first instant, that this was going to be the most tragic summit in the history of the Arab nation,’ he told the secretary-general.19
Two days later, on 12 August, Saddam, in what amounted to a rare political master-stroke, suggested that Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from all occupied Arab territory and Syria withdrew from Lebanon. It was this proposal that introduced the concept of linkage into the Middle East diplomatic lexicon. Overnight Saddam became the hero of the Arab masses and the saviour of the Palestinians. The Gulf conflict and the Arab–Israeli conflict became linked in the public mind. An Israeli government spokesman dismissed Saddam’s proposal as a cheap propaganda ploy. But the proposal landed the Bush administration on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, they did not want to reward Saddam for his aggression; on the other hand, they could hardly deny that the long-festering Arab–Israeli conflict also required a settlement. Bush’s way round this dilemma was to deny that there was any parallel between the two occupations but to promise that once Iraq left Kuwait, a settlement of the Arab–Israeli problem would be high on his administration’s agenda. In other words, he rejected the simultaneous linkage of the two conflicts in favour of a deferred linkage.
Baghdad’s linkage proposal motivated Hussein to embark on a tour of Western capitals in a desperate attempt to scale down the crisis. On 13 August he flew to Baghdad for a meeting with Saddam, giving rise to speculation in the media that he came away carrying a message from Saddam. Hussein said there was no message but once again he put himself forward as an intermediary. He was the only Arab leader who was still talking to Saddam, and he hoped that the Americans would use him as a channel of communications to Baghdad. On his return, he called Bush and requested a meeting. Bush was in Kennebunkport, his summer resort in Maine, and the meeting was arranged for 16 August. A small royal party arrived by helicopter at the summer resort for what turned out to be a rather raw experience. Bush himself was courteous but truculent and dismissed out of hand the king’s negotiations with Saddam for a peaceful withdrawal. Bush expec
ted a message from Baghdad, but, if there was one, the king never mentioned it to him. Hussein appeared to be seeking to play a role as an intermediary but Bush saw nothing to negotiate. In his diary Bush recorded:
We talked very frankly about the differences. I kept trying to say that the friendship was intact… He [pressed] for some middle ground that could solve the problem, and I kept saying, there isn’t any – it’s got to be withdrawal and restoration of the Kuwaiti regime. There cannot be any middle ground, because tomorrow, it will be somebody else’s aggression… Hussein refuses to admit that this is a madman. He talked about the ‘haves and the have-nots’…20
Bush emphasized that, for America, oil was a way of life, and he wanted Hussein to understand America’s resolve. Hussein may have hoped that, because of the historic ties between Jordan and America and their personal friendship, America would moderate or move a little; but, although Bush valued the friendship, he refused to budge. At one point he exclaimed, ‘I will not let that little dictator control 25 per cent of the civilized world’s oil!’ Sharif Zaid bin Shaker found the remark doubly disturbing on account of the property rights it assumed over Gulf oil and the implication that the Arabs were not civilized.21 The remark also inadvertently revealed that in seeking a showdown with Saddam, Bush’s primary concern was with Western access to Gulf oil rather than with upholding international legality. After all, the Reagan administration, in which Bush had been vice-president, supported Saddam throughout the eight years of his war against Iran. That war was a textbook case of unprovoked aggression, and yet not once did the US condemn Iraq. Nor did Saddam’s brutal oppression of his own people and his gassing of the Kurds at Halabja make any difference to American foreign policy. Saddam was a monster in human form but he was America’s monster. His great mistake was to tread on America’s toe by attacking its client and threatening its access to Gulf oil. Hussein’s efforts at mediation were now treated as a personal betrayal of his friendship with Bush. You were either with them or against them.
Bush may also have thought that he had Jordan backed into a corner. He knew that the country was economically dependent on Iraq, from which it imported 95 per cent of its oil and to which it sold 45 per cent of its exports. Bush heard from President Mubarak that Saddam had bought off the Jordanian and Yemeni rulers with the offer of a certain percentage of Kuwait’s oil in return for supporting the invasion. The story was completely groundless, but it was a factor in Bush’s thinking. To wean Hussein away from Iraq, the Bush administration began considering international financial help as well as emergency Arab oil assistance, provided he implemented the UN sanctions.22 Bush said he realized Hussein was worried about Jordan’s economic situation and suggested that the other Arab countries could help. Hussein reportedly replied, ‘I didn’t come to raise that subject. I came because of something bigger: the subject of peace.’23
To Jordanian officials this looked like an attempt to persuade their king to join the allied coalition against Iraq by the offer of financial rewards. They took a dim view of this attempt, particularly against the backdrop of American failure to extend financial help at the height of the crisis the previous year. Hussein, for his part, remained dedicated to finding an Arab solution to an Arab problem, and he was not tempted by the carrot dangled under his nose. As Adiba Mango has observed, ‘had it been a matter of financial payoff, the Jordanian leadership would have been more likely to take up Bush’s offer of financial largesse rather than rely on promises from a cash-strapped Iraqi neighbour.’24
At Kennebunkport the diplomatic shutters were briskly pulled down. The meeting was disappointing for Bush but not half as disappointing as it was for Hussein. It marked the parting of the ways between the two old friends. Bush turned to the task of building up a military coalition against ‘the little Iraqi dictator’ while Hussein continued to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Washington’s attitude towards Jordan hardened, and its tone gradually became more hostile and menacing. To Roger Harrison, the new American ambassador to Amman, fell the difficult task of maintaining contact between the two capitals. In the aftermath of the Kennebunkport meeting, Harrison handed to His Majesty the following message:
We recognize that Jordan, because of its geographical location, is vulnerable to Iraqi pressure. But you should have no illusion that Iraqi success in its invasion of Kuwait will satisfy Saddam Hussein’s ambitions to dominate the region. No neighbour is safe.
It is vital for Jordan’s essential interest that it not be neutral in the struggle between Iraq and the great majority of the Arab states.
The perception of a de facto Iraqi–Jordanian alliance has already damaged the reputation of Jordan in the United States and elsewhere. We sincerely hope that you would take firm steps to reverse this deterioration…
Hussein described this message to an American journalist as ‘nasty’ and ‘very, very rude’.25
In the last week in August, Hussein visited Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco. His purpose was to find some common ground among the Arab states that were opposed to foreign intervention. In the first week in September he visited Spain, Britain, Germany, France and Italy. In all these countries he met with heads of state or government and presented to them the Jordanian version of the origins and causes of the crisis. His main purpose was to persuade them to support a peaceful solution. In all these countries, except Britain, he was encouraged to persevere in his efforts at mediation. Britain’s prime minister at that time was Margaret Thatcher, with whom Hussein had always had close and cordial relations in the past. He was a man with authority who knew how to command her sympathy and support, and she clearly liked him.26 Recent events in the Gulf, however, placed a serious strain on their relationship. Thatcher had successfully led her country into the Falklands War and considered herself an expert on dealing with dictators. She was firmly of the opinion that you do not negotiate with dictators; you throw them out on their ear. On day one of the crisis she dogmatically ruled out diplomacy. She happened to be with Bush in Aspen, Colorado, when news of the invasion arrived, and he talked about referring the matter to the Security Council. Thatcher apparently brushed aside the idea. ‘This is no time to go wobbly, George!’ she said.
At their working lunch in Downing Street, Hussein found Thatcher so inflexible and belligerent that he had doubts about her sanity. She assumed a Churchillian posture, glowered at him and sounded like a megalomaniac. She began by asking the king why he was backing Saddam, whom she described as ‘an evil man’. ‘I am not backing anybody. I am trying to save peace in our area,’ the king replied. He told her frankly that gunboat diplomacy belonged to the nineteenth century. Her famous eyes blazed with anger. ‘You are backing a loser and I want you to know that before it is too late,’ she said. She dismissed Saddam disdainfully as ‘a third-class dictator’.27 In an imperious voice she concluded by saying, ‘Your Majesty, you have no more of a role in the Middle East.’ Adnan Abu-Odeh was the note-taker, and he wrote at the end of his notes of the meeting: ‘Oh, God, it was like Queen Victoria speaking to an Indian maharaja.’ He felt as humiliated as the rest of the party. The friendship between the king and the prime minister ended during that working lunch, and the subsequent correspondence between them was less than civil, at least on her part.28
After the lunch with Thatcher, Hussein held a secret meeting with Israeli officials in London. A fascinating glimpse of the evolving relationship is provided in a book written by Efraim Halevy, who was deputy director of the Mossad at that time and probably the king’s closest Israeli contact. The Israelis were watching events from the sidelines with mounting anxiety. Israel had intelligence that Jordanian pilots were being trained together with Iraqi pilots in Iraq. When this intelligence was first presented to the king he did not deny it but explained it in terms of cost-savings; it did not signal a change of policy towards Israel. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Israelis discovered that Iraqi aircraft bearing the insignia of the Royal Jordanian A
ir Force were patrolling the border between Jordan and Israel south of the Dead Sea, virtually within striking distance of the atomic reactor in Dimona. It was inconceivable that these flights were taking place without the king’s approval. In Jerusalem strident voices were raised, calling for an end to the secret honeymoon between Israel and Jordan. Proponents of a Palestinian state on the East Bank saw the approaching war as a chance to achieve two things simultaneously: retaliate against possible Iraqi missile attacks on Israel and strike at the Jordanian Air Force. They knew that this scenario, if carried to its logical conclusion, would spell the end of the monarchy. A decision was taken to confront the king about the consequences of this latest development. He was presented with a stiff warning that the Iraqi flights had to stop instantly. The warning was delivered to the king on the day of his working lunch at 10 Downing Street. In a later conversation the king remarked that while Thatcher’s tone had been bitter and unpleasant, the Israeli message was more threatening in content.29
The king seized the opportunity to explain to the Israelis some of the facts of life as he saw them. In the eyes of the Arab masses Saddam was the real hero. He had saved the Sunni Muslims from the onslaught of the Iranian Shi’ites. He commanded not only respect but awe and fear. He personified the dream of glory, sacrifice and success. What in Western eyes looked like ruthlessness and cruelty stood in Arab eyes for courage, strength and pride. One must never forget the importance of pride, the king kept repeating. He was especially bitter about the treatment he was receiving from Bush. He had known every American president since Eisenhower, and he had invested a great deal of effort in cultivating the friendship with Bush when he was director of the CIA and after. But now he simply could not yield to Bush’s naked pressure with regard to the Iraqi affair. After years of patient cultivation of relations with the United States, he had reached a dead end. His relationship with his long-standing ally was falling apart. For Jordan and for him personally, this was disastrous, but he was powerless to stop the drift towards war. Every time Efraim Halevy met him during those months, the king repeated to him that he was convinced that he had behaved honourably and that he was prepared to confront his fate, just as he had been many times in the past when faced with threats to his life and to the survival of his kingdom. During the lead up to the Gulf War, Halevy saw a leader in a sombre and fatalistic mood but at peace with himself and ready to accept whatever Allah had ordained for him.30
