Lion of Jordan

by Avi Shlaim

  I was privy to numerous reports of meetings and negotiations between Israeli figures and Palestinian counterparts, all of a secret and clandestine nature. Some of these reports or rumours reached King Hussein. He repeatedly asked me about them since he was concerned that he would be surprised by an Israel–Palestinian agreement that would adversely affect his country, a country whose population was more than half Palestinian in origin. Since he was dialoguing secretly with Israel on the possibility of reaching a peace agreement, he believed it only right that he should be kept abreast of developments that had a direct effect on his vital interests. Needless to say, I relayed these fears back to Mr Rabin, and he demonstratively dismissed them with his customary wave of the hand, instructing me to reassure King Hussein and to allay his fears and suspicions.28

  One reason for Rabin’s reticence was that, until very near the end, he assumed that the Oslo channel would remain inconclusive and unimportant. Hussein, however, had every reason to be reproachful when presented with a fait accompli.

  One day in late August, Arafat requested an urgent meeting with the king and came to Amman to inform him that the PLO had concluded an interim peace agreement with Israel. Hussein was very upset. He never liked or trusted Arafat but now his worst suspicions were confirmed. ‘Why not coordinate?’ he said. ‘How can we possibly work this way?’29 Hussein also thought that the Palestinians had given away too much. He himself had been careful ever since 1967 not to bargain away any Palestinian rights to the land, whereas the agreement negotiated by the PLO was vague and imprecise. More troubling to Hussein was the fact that substantive issues like Jerusalem, borders and refugees were not addressed in the accord but deferred for future negotiations.30 Hussein was all the more angry because he had been holding back on the common agenda for almost a year, waiting for progress on the Palestinian track, and now the Palestinians had gone ahead without him. He felt he had been treated shabbily after all the help he had given the Palestinians, especially by providing an umbrella for Madrid. Yet Hussein had no viable alternative to accepting the agreement. He had accepted the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and he could not object to the agreement it had reached with the Israeli government. All the king’s men confirm that his first reaction was one of surprise and anger but also that he quickly came to terms with the new reality. The most revealing account, however, is the one Hussein himself gave in an interview for a TV programme:

  I am afraid at that point I decided the best thing was for me to shut myself off for a couple of days to calm down and collect myself and reflect on what to do. And finally I came up with the conclusion that we should close up the umbrella and really get it into the closet of history, and move on our own to deal with our own problems, and as far as our Palestinian brethren were concerned to give them all the support we could. That was their decision, that was what they had sought all along, that was their leadership assuming a position of responsibility. And I implored them all to gather round this leadership, and not to fragment, and I have supported them ever since.31

  On the positive side the PLO–Israel accord cleared the path to progress on the Jordanian–Israeli track. Arafat had broken the Arab taboo on making peace with the Jewish state: so Hussein was free to proceed along the path charted in the common agenda. The senior Jordanian representatives in Washington were Dr Fayez Tarawneh, the ambassador, and Marwan Muasher, the director of the Jordan Information Bureau. (Tarawneh had replaced Abdul Salam Majali as the head of the Jordanian delegation to the bilateral talks when Majali was appointed prime minister.) Warren Christopher, the secretary of state, called Tarawneh to say that Arafat was coming and to suggest signing the common agenda in the same White House ceremony that was being organized for the PLO–Israel accord. Tarawneh thought that the common agenda should not detract from the Declaration of Principles, but he promised to consult the king. The king told Tarawneh that this was a Palestinian day of celebration and that the common agenda could wait another day. Accordingly, the following day Tarawneh and Elyakim Rubinstein signed the common agenda in the presence of Christopher and Andrei Possobliuk, a senior Soviet representative, in a modest ceremony at the State Department.32

  This, however, is not the whole story. While Hussein moved very quickly from denunciation to acceptance of Oslo, he continued to harbour dark suspicions about the motives of the two signatories. Jordan and Israel had been tacit allies for decades, but now Israel seemed to have changed tack. Hussein feared that Israel might have abandoned its policy of partnership with Jordan in favour of a new partnership with the PLO. Another worry was that Jordan would be shut out of the economic boom that was expected to result from an Israeli–Palestinian peace. Rabin’s abrupt reversal raised doubts about the depth of his commitment to the traditional pro-Hashemite policy of the Labour Party. More than half of Jordan’s 3.9 million people were Palestinian, and there was the risk of increased pressure from them to turn the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan into the Republic of Palestine, as most Palestinians and some Israeli extremists wanted. It is no exaggeration to say that in some respects the accord appeared to endanger Jordan’s stability, security and survival as an independent state. In the words of Adnan Abu-Odeh: ‘King Hussein feared that Israel may have reached with Arafat an agreement that would weaken or threaten Jordan. Regarding the Palestinian question, the king was always afraid of being left out of the picture. This was for good reason because it might entice some to think that “Jordan is Palestine.” The king had to listen to an Israeli, and not to Arafat, to make sure that nothing was being plotted against him.’33

  The initiative for a meeting came from the Israeli side. Halevy, burdened by a lingering sense of guilt towards the king, saw the need to clarify the Labour government’s policy towards Jordan better than most. The Israeli daily newspaper Ma’ariv quoted intelligence reports that said the king felt ‘cheated and neglected’ over the accord. ‘King Hussein’s political world has collapsed around him and the most direct means are required to calm him down,’ the Israeli prime minister was reportedly told. Rabin heeded this advice.34 The meeting took place at the king’s palace in the Red Sea resort of Aqaba on Sunday, 26 September. Rabin was accompanied by Halevy, Rubinstein, and Eitan Haber, the director of the prime minister’s office. The king had with him Prince Hassan, Zaid bin Shaker and Ali Shukri. Given the sensitivity of the situation the domestic staff was kept to the minimum. Queen Noor and her house manager attended to all the details of the preparation. Her most distinct memory of that meeting was the sound of Itzhak Rabin’s deep, sonorous voice for what seemed hours on end. It was at this meeting, according to Queen Noor, that her husband began to establish the mutual trust and respect with Rabin that would lead a year later to the peace treaty.35

  Rabin reassured the king about the continuing strategic value placed on his kingdom by the Israelis, more specifically, that Israel remained firmly committed to upholding his regime; that Jordanian interests would be protected in dealing with the Palestinian issue; and that future peace strategy would be closely coordinated with Jordan.36 Reaffirming the pre-Oslo alliance between Israel and the Hashemite dynasty was one major purpose of the meeting; planning for the future was another. Both sides agreed that the ultimate aim was a peace settlement but differed on the means to achieve it. Rabin wanted to sign a peace treaty first and then attend to the technical details and to the practical problems of implementing it. Hussein firmly rejected this proposal. He took the common-sense view that first you negotiate and reach agreement on all the outstanding issues and only then do you sign the treaty. In support of this approach Hussein invoked the authority of his friend, the lawyer Lord Mishcon. When consulted, Mishcon told Hussein that no one with any sense would sign a treaty first and discuss its technical clauses afterwards.

  After a lengthy discussion Rabin deferred to the superior wisdom of the king and his Jewish friend, as well as to some members of the Israeli delegation. Broad agreement was reached on the format of the negotia
tions but not on a timetable. Detailed discussions were to take place between experts from the two sides on all bilateral issues such as borders, border crossings, security, refugees, trade, water and the environment. Rabin urged the king to hold the Jordanian elections on time because Israel wanted to make peace with the Jordanian people and not just with the regime. A further subject that came up for discussion was the sequence of peace treaties between Israel and the Arabs. Rabin was under the impression that Jordan would not sign a peace treaty with Israel until Syria had done so. This was what Peres had repeatedly told him, though it was not clear on what basis. Hussein made it clear that once agreement had been reached on all the cardinal issues Jordan would be ready to sign a peace treaty, regardless of the situation with Syria. All in all, the meeting was highly significant in restoring trust between the two sides and in laying the foundations for progress towards peace.37

  In the negotiations that led to the peace treaty the four principal players were Hussein, Hassan, Rabin and Peres. The Americans encouraged and supported progress on the Jordanian track, but they did not play an active mediating role, as they did on the Syrian track, because the leaders enjoyed direct channels of communication. On the Jordanian side, Hussein was the visionary, the leader and the principal decision-maker. To the talks with the Israelis he brought a rich experience of regional and international affairs, a sense of purpose and renowned social skills, which helped to create a positive, problem-solving atmosphere. Hassan also played a major role in the conduct of peace negotiations. He combined expertise in economic affairs with a wide range of intellectual interests, including medieval Jewish theology. He would surprise and delight the Israeli negotiators by giving them copies of his erudite articles and books with a dedication in Hebrew, a language he had studied at Oxford.38

  Hussein’s attitude towards Peres was ambivalent. He respected his energy, his commitment to the cause of peace and the imaginative ideas he constantly generated. Yet Hussein could not forget that Peres had let him down over the London Agreement of April 1987. Peres, in Hussein’s eyes, was both a dreamer and a publicity-seeker who could not be fully trusted. Peres was also the chief architect of the Oslo Accord, which was taken to indicate a preference for partnership with the Palestinians. Keeping Hussein in the dark about the Oslo channel was Israeli state policy, for which Peres could not be held personally responsible. But Hussein believed that Peres had a preference for the emergence of a strong Palestinian entity as a substitute for the traditional alliance with Jordan.39 Peres denied any such preference. The Oslo Accord, he convincingly argued, was not against Jordan; it was with the Palestinians. Israel’s policy had changed towards the West Bank, not towards the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The king, argued Peres, had no valid grounds for complaint, since he himself had disengaged from the West Bank in 1988, making it necessary for Israel to deal directly with the Palestinians. Even after Oslo, Peres stood by his claim that he was the most consistent advocate of the ‘Jordanian option’.40

  For Rabin, the king had considerable respect, which only grew with the passage of time, because he spoke with the precision of a military man and because he was usually as good as his word. Personal trust between the king and the prime minister was the key to progress on the Jordanian track. ‘We had a unique relationship,’ said the king wistfully after Rabin’s death. ‘I felt he had placed himself in my position many times. I placed myself in his position. We did not try to score points off each other. We tried to develop something that was workable, that was acceptable to both our peoples, something that was balanced, something that was reasonable. And that’s the approach we had and that’s how we managed to get there.’41 Rabin and Hussein took the lead in the political and security-centred negotiations, while Hassan was largely responsible for the economic and technical aspects of the peace process. ‘The personal relationship between the late king and the late Prime Minister Rabin,’ remarked Hassan, ‘was the magic and the salve that resulted in the achievement of the peace treaty.’42 The remark glosses over the crucial part played by Hassan himself in driving and coordinating the work of the negotiating teams. He was the unsung hero of the peace process.

  Rabin’s mistrust of his foreign minister was a complicating factor. Rabin felt that Peres had received most of the credit for the breakthrough on the Palestinian track, and he wanted to keep for himself all the credit for achieving the breakthrough on the Jordanian track. Rabin therefore confined Peres to the low politics of the peace process and excluded him as far as possible from the high. A couple of weeks after the signature of the Oslo Accord and the common agenda, Peres and Hassan travelled to Washington to attend a donors’ conference to support Middle East peace. On 1 October the two stood in front of the press with President Clinton at the White House. This was the first high-level public meeting between Jordan and Israel, and it attracted considerable publicity. Clinton’s participation signalled his administration’s backing for the two countries in their effort to move forward. On the substantive side, a trilateral Israel–Jordan–US economic committee was established at the meeting. This forum convened first in Washington and then periodically in the region. Subgroups were established to discuss specific issues such as trade, finance, banking, civil aviation and Jordan Valley joint projects. One of the committee’s main tasks was to consider how development projects could be put together and funded.

  The meeting at the White House persuaded Peres, as he put it to his aides, that it was ‘time to storm Jordan!’ Four weeks later, disguised with a porkpie hat and a moustache, the peripatetic foreign minister crossed the Allenby Bridge and made his way to the royal palace in Amman. He was accompanied by Avi Gil, his chief of staff, and Halevy of the Mossad. In the palace he met Hussein, Hassan and Dr Abdul Salam Majali, now prime minister. Peres ‘assaulted’ his host with a vision of regional peace and prosperity, and the role of the Hashemite kingdom in realizing it. The discussion resulted in an understanding on the parameters of a future peace treaty and in the initialling of a four-page document. Showing his customary flair for the economics of peace, Peres proposed a daring initiative. ‘What do you think, Your Majesty,’ he asked, ‘of inviting four thousand businessmen to Amman to discuss investing in the New Middle East?’ Hussein agreed in principle, and the idea was added to the prospectus.43

  There were three key points in the document. First, Israel would restore land it had appropriated in Wadi Araba and the Dead Sea to Jordanian sovereignty, but these lands would be leased to Israel for a nominal rent. Second, the two countries would establish normal relations and exchange ambassadors. Third, the two countries would cooperate in the fields of agriculture, transport and tourism, and in the development of energy resources. A large international economic conference was to be held in Amman with senior business figures from Israel and the Arab world. Several informal understandings were also reached. Israel would use its influence with the Clinton administration and with Congress to try to secure the remission of Jordan’s heavy external debt. The Jordanian dinar was to remain legal tender in the area of Palestinian self-government. Israel was to provide a military umbrella for Jordan and defend it in the event of attack by a third party. The document was prepared in advance and initialled by Peres and Hassan after nine hours of discussions on the night of 2/3 November. It was a highly significant meeting that foreshadowed much of what came later. The king confided to Peres that he did not feel well, that he may not have many more years to live, and that he wanted to leave the peace treaty as his legacy for future generations.44

  Peres was overjoyed by the results of the meeting with the man he once referred to as ‘His Royal Shyness’. He returned to Israel in a euphoric mood, dropping hefty hints that a peace treaty with Jordan was imminent. ‘Put 3 November in your calendars as an historic date,’ he told journalists. Peres had, of course, gone to Amman with Rabin’s permission. Prior to his departure he had told Rabin that if they met the king’s demands on land, water and guardianship of the Muslim holy places in Jerusa
lem, a peace treaty would be possible. Rabin doubted that the king would be ready to move so fast.45 He also made allowance for the possibility that the king might get cold feet and change his mind, as he had on some past occasions.

  Hussein was incensed by Peres’s indiscretion. He was not ready yet to commit himself to bilateral peace negotiations in public. The rumours that the Israeli foreign secretary had visited him in Amman were liable to complicate his relations with the Palestinians and to antagonize Syria and Saudi Arabia. Strict secrecy was an explicit condition governing the clandestine contacts, and all Israeli officials going back to Dr Yaacov Herzog respected that. Peres, however, apparently could not contain his excitement. In self-defence he pointed out that he made no mention of Jordan, its ruler, the meeting or its subject matter. But there was not a single Israeli journalist who did not know what Peres was talking about. Nor was there any doubt that he was seeking publicity for his achievement. This, at any rate, was how Hussein saw the matter. The disclosure caused a crisis in Jordanian–Israeli relations. Hussein complained to Rabin about his colleague’s indiscretion and warned him that there would be no more secret meetings if they could not be kept secret.

  Rabin did not need much persuasion to relegate his foreign secretary to the sidelines and to keep all contacts with the palace in his own hands. He suggested that he and the king should appoint a number of aides whom they could trust implicitly to keep a secret. The king appointed Hassan, Shaker, Majali and Shukri. Rabin appointed Rubinstein, Halevy, Haber and General Danny Yatom, his military secretary. Rabin ordered his aides in no uncertain terms not to report to Peres and to take every necessary measure to prevent him from knowing what was going on.46 Rabin was a brutal military man who liked a clear chain of command. He used Peres’s indiscretion to gather all the reins of power into his own hands and to set himself up as mover, negotiator and only decision-maker in the peace process with Jordan.