After assessing the damage in the bivouac area, McClymont pulled what was movable of his weapons and equipment to his CP and then went to the 57th Field Artillery CP for orders. He learned that they were all to prepare at once for movement to the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, perimeter at the inlet.42
Colonel MacLean had left Faith's forward position about dawn on November 28 and returned on the road to his own advance CP. He told his staff that he thought the ist Battalion, 32nd Infantry, had come through the night in pretty good shape. He apparently knew little about the situation at the inlet position-only about the heavy fighting there during the night. Certainly he knew nothing of the Chinese attack just before dawn on the 57th Field Artillery Headquarters and the AAA Platoon just south of the inlet. His view of the general situation at daylight on November 28 was reasonably optimistic. He expected his 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, to arrive during the day, and he felt that with this reinforcement and the tank company at Hudong-ni he could gain control of the situation.
About noon Faith's CP reestablished telephone communication with Maclean's advance CP and learned that he intended to move his CP group to the inlet position with the artillery and the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry. That did not happen, however; only part of the group went to the inlet, and most of MacLean's advance CP joined the 1st Battalion at its forward position. There is some confusion about what happened in the intended move. Intelligence Sergeant Ivan H. Long, who was with MacLean, said that MacLean ordered him to lead a group of men south to the inlet and infiltrate them across to the 3rd Battalion. He said that he did this but that they came under enemy small-arms fire when they tried to cross the inlet in twos and threes and that some of them did not make it. It appears that this difficulty prompted MacLean to decide to take most of his group to join Faith. The move to his forward position under Major Robbins, the S-i, was completed about 3:00 P.m. that afternoon. Robbins reported to Faith that he had brought in io vehicles and 35 men.'
A view, looking southwest toward Hill 1250, from within the western end of the inlet perimeter, showing foxholes and some automatic-weapons positions. Chosin Reservoir is on the west, where a depression in the terrain marks the mouth of the Pungnyuri-gang inlet. The photographer is unknown. Photograph courtesy of Col. Ray 0. Embree.
At Faith's position the first part of the morning was devoted largely to reestablishing the original lines with the help of air strikes and bringing in the dead and wounded. Enemy activity, though greatly reduced, did not entirely cease, but, except at the boundary of C and B companies on the high ground on the east, it was not important.
Ammunition was redistributed. In this connection luck intervened. About 9:00 A.M. a noncommissioned officer, probably from the Ammunition and Pioneer (A&P) Platoon of Headquarters Company, arrived at the forward position with a resupply of ammunition. The A&P party had been on the road to Chosin during all of the 27th but did not reach the troop positions there before dark. Continuing on, they passed Hill 1221 before the CCF established their roadblock and were able to reach MacLean's advance CP and the Heavy Mortar Company position, where they stopped for the night.
A view looking northwest from the west end of the inlet perimeter, November 28, 1g5o. The road on the north side of the inlet turns north around the nose of the long ridgeline (Hill 1324) near the left side of the picture. The photographer is unknown. Photograph courtesy of Col. Ray 0. Embree.
During the night and early in the morning of the 28th the ist Battalion had taken a few prisoners. The S-2 interrogated them and learned that a large Chinese force had surrounded the Marines and the 31st Infantry on both sides of the reservoir and that the enemy attack would be resumed everywhere that night.2
At one sector in the 1st Battalion perimeter the fight continued after daylight and throughout most of the day, despite the best efforts of Marine air strikes. This was in the key terrain in the center, at the boundary of B and C companies. Reinforcements arrived from headquarters to try to recapture a commanding knoll the Chinese had seized during the night. Lieutenant Henry M. Moore's A&P Platoon bore the brunt of the fight during the day. Moore was wounded in the legs by shrapnel but refused evacuation. This young officer made an enviable reputation during the Chosin battles and was admired by everyone. The contest for the knoll went on despite repeated air strikes. Master Sergeant Russavage, the battalion sergeant major, joined the fight, leading a charge with his pistol. He fell in enemy territory, and his body could not be recovered when his group was driven back.
The view southeast from B Battery position, where a successful stand was made during the Chinese attack on the night of November 27-28, igso. Note the Mi9 full-track (dual-4o) at the left center. This and other weapons arrived at the inlet perimeter in the afternoon of November 28, just before the photograph was taken by an unknown person. Photograph courtesy of Lt. Col. Ivan H. Long.
In this continuing fight Captain Stamford called in Marine Corsair strikes on the hill, but C Company counterattacks failed to retake the dominant knoll. The CCF had brought up heavy machine guns, which they zeroed in on the crest of the knoll, and when C Company counterattacked, the Chinese pulled back and let the machine guns rake the crest, forcing the Americans to pull back.
Lt. Col. Ivan H. Long (ca. 1965), who was intelligence sergeant at Chosin. Photograph courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Long.
The nature of the air support should be explained. Stamford called the strikes from the 1st Battalion CP area. Company commanders and platoon leaders at the point of enemy contact telephoned Faith or Stamford where they wanted the strikes. Stamford in turn sent the information to the pilots, who then made the strikes. Sometimes a platoon leader arranged for a ground marking or a signal to guide the pilots. Stamford thought that this method of directing air strikes was ineffective because pilots did not receive enough information to make accurate hits. He believed that he as forward air controller should be up front to see the situation and give the pilots specific instructions for accurate strikes. But Faith would not let him go forward, keeping him at the battalion CP.
On the right of this critical fight in C Company the enemy was also pressing B Company, which had a hard time holding its position. The right flank of B Company bent around to the rear of the battalion CP, and there the CCF attacked hard on the south side. Faith organized most of Headquarters Company as an infantry force and put it into the line there. Stamford gave the heaviest air support during the day to C and Headquarters companies.;
The situation at the boundary of B and C companies led to a readjustment of some troops from C Company's left flank to buttress its right flank. About midmorning Lieutenant Sherrard, executive officer of C Company, came to Mortrude's platoon position at the left flank just above the road at the pass and told him he was to move his platoon to a position on the company's right flank and from there to counterattack to regain lost ground. Mortrude was induced to save time and avoid carrying unnecessary weight by leaving behind his platoon's bedrolls; Sherrard assured him that they would be brought to his new position. He never saw them again, and in the nights that followed, he and his men suffered considerably from their loss. Mortrude described his platoon's move to the counterattack area:
Proceeded generally east up the ridge line through abandoned positions without resistance or casualties. Observed some of our "C" Company dead who had apparently been killed in their sleeping bags during the Chinese attacks the night before.
By midafternoon, we encountered a series of enemy occupied knolls. By the use of the very close (So to ioo yards) air support of US Marine Corsair aircraft, coordinated by telephone communications down to the Battalion Air Controller at the base of the ridge and spotted by our white phosphorus hand grenades, we were able to take the first couple of knolls without a fire fight. Our air support so close we could frequently look down into the cockpit of the aircraft and wave to the pilots. The Air Controller would tell me by telephone that the pilot was on "station" and ready for a run, I would throw my WP grenade as fa
r out in front as possible, and the Aircraft would strike just beyond it.
Later in the afternoon, we were stopped just short of the crest of a larger knoll and a bisecting ridge line [the B and C companies' boundary] by heavy enemy fire which could not be suppressed by our friendly air support. An unsuccessful diversionary attack by my Platoon Sergeant with one squad around the right (south) flank confirmed the enemy was well dug in [in] a reverse slope defense. At this point, after sniper fire killed one man of the Company Headquarters just as they reached our location, I was ordered to pull back and defend the right flank of the previous knoll. Enemy fire ceased on our withdrawal and we established our new defensive positions for the night without incident. Miraculously, and because of our excellent air support, my platoon had suffered no casualties during the afternoon counterattacks.4
During the afternoon personnel of the ist Battalion observed on the eastern skyline long columns of Chinese troops marching past them, going south. Some of the troops were mounted on Mongolian ponies. The columns were out of range of ist Battalion fire. Colonel MacLean received reports from the inlet that men there also saw the Chinese troops bypassing them in the mountains on the east. Major Miller, commenting on this disturbing sight, gave some idea of the volume of the enemy movement: "We watched Chinese troops by-pass us to the east the entire rest of the day." Captain Bigger learned later that air strikes killed "hundreds of these Mongolian ponies," and presumably many CCF soldiers as well, east of the ist Battalion and the other Americans troops east of Chosin on November 28. 5
One good report spread throughout the forward perimeter as evening fell. Captain Stamford recorded it: `About sundown the Able Company observed [artillery forward observer] about 300 to 400 enemy troops moving down the road with a tank and couple of self-propelled guns. By using an SCR 300 to talk to the observer I was able to direct 4 F4Us and 4 RAAF F-Sis on them with devastating results. It took about 20 minutes to knock out this group as a fighting force."6 South African pilots flew the F-5is. The tank and the self-propelled guns were North Korean.
When dusk began to settle over the 1st Battalion battleground, Faith called off the attacks against the enemy-held high ground at the right flank of C Company and concentrated his efforts on trying to consolidate his defense for the night. Headquarters Company was already on the line at its southwestern end, at the rear of his CP, and now he sent all available personnel-clerks, cooks, drivers, and others-to various units on the perimeter to strengthen them for another night of battle. At the end of daylight about zoo casualties had passed through the 1st Battalion aid station.'
General Almond Visits the Forward Position
On November 28, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, the X Corps commander, visited the 7th Division's forward element, the ist Battalion, 32nd Infantry, at its battle-scarred perimeter, as he had the day before when he went to the 1st Marine Division position on the west side of the reservoir at Yudamni. He had driven from Hamhung to Yudam-ni by jeep on the 27th partly to observe the deplorable condition of road traffic, which he ordered improved. He came back down the tortuous mountain road from Yudam-ni in bitter cold, just ahead of the multiple Chinese roadblocks that were being established that night all the way from Yudam-ni to Chinhung-ni, at the foot of Funchilin Pass. The only traffic that got through after that was a large convoy of empty 21/ -ton supply trucks that had just finished unloading Marine supplies at the Yudam-ni forward positions.
On the morning of the 28th, General Almond, with his 26-year-old junior aide, ist Lt. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., flew from Hamhung to Hagaru-ri in an L-17 plane. There he conferred with Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, the ist Marine Division commander, who had just arrived to establish his CP. He then arranged for a helicopter landing near Faith's CP to meet Faith and MacLean.8
In his conversation with these two officers Almond learned that neither of them knew any more about the situation than he did. Almond thought that the previous night's battle had been fought against elements of three Chinese divisions, the 124th, the 125th, and the 126th. These troops, as explained earlier, had been in the Chosin Reservoir area for more than a month.
During these discussions Almond thought that Faith seemed on edge and resentful of the situation. He had suffered heavily in the surprise Chinese attack of the previous night when he had lost several men killed and others wounded. And he had also lost the highest ground of his perimeter to the enemy. Almond told Faith that he should try to get possession of the high ground to the east before nightfall. Part of this high ground was the area that C Company had lost the night before and during the morning.
MacLean told Almond that he planned to establish his CP just south of Faith's position; he thought that his task force could hold on, that he could get his CP completed and functioning. Almond agreed and added that he thought that the combat force could advance northward when the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, arrived. It is not clear whether at this meeting Almond or MacLean knew much about the condition of Lieutenant Colonel Reilly's 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the artillery at the inlet, 4 road miles south. Also, in this meeting Almond seems not to have known that the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, had met serious delays on the road, making it almost certain that it would be unable to join MacLean's force at Chosin.
Before he left for Hagaru-ri, General Almond remarked to Faith that he had three Silver Stars he wanted to award, one to him and the others to persons Faith should select. Faith saw Lt. Everett F. Smalley, a C Company platoon leader, who had been wounded in the night's battle, sitting nearby and asked him to come over to receive one of the decorations. George A. Stanley, a Headquarters Company mess sergeant, chanced to be passing the group. He had performed well in the battle for the high ground the Chinese had captured during the night, and Faith stopped him and asked him to become the third recipient. Almond had awarded three Silver Stars to members of the 7th Marine Regiment at Yudam-ni the day before, and this ceremony was intended to be even-handed treatment of the Army units at Chosin. Major Curtis came up as the ceremony ended and saw Haig make an entry in his notebook to have official orders issued to confirm the awards.
Later there was considerable comment in the 7th Division that, after General Almond left to return to Hagaru-ri, Lieutenant Colonel Faith and Lieutenant Smalley ripped their Silver Stars off their jackets and threw them into the snow. Curtis, Bigger, Jones, and ist Lt. Hugh R. May have confirmed to me that they were present at the ceremony and that Faith did throw away his Silver Star. Jones recalled that Smalley took his Silver Star off his jacket and put it in his pocket. May was standing close to Almond and Faith when Almond awarded the medals. He wrote:
When Lt. Col. Faith was presented the Silver Star I was about 4 to 5 feet from him. Col. Faith did protest to Gen. Almond that there were others more deserving of the decoration but the General would not hear of this and pinned the Star to Col. Faith's Jacket.
During this time Gen. Almond told Col. Faith not to worry as the Chinese we saw were only the stragglers fleeing north. After Gen. Almond departed Col. Faith ripped off the Silver Star and threw it on the ground at the same time muttering "What a damned (something)" but as his voice was lowered I could not be sure what he said.9
General Almond was the only officer of the 7th Infantry Division, the 1st Marine Division, or the X Corps to visit the forward infantry battalion on the east side of the reservoir after the Chinese launched their surprise attack. The only other visit to the 31st RCT at Chosin was made by Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, who went to the inlet perimeter on November 3o and conferred briefly and privately with Faith. No general officer in Korea went to front troop positions more often than did Almond, frequently at considerable risk to himself. He tried to inform himself about frontline situations and to encourage the troops in their efforts.
On the west side of Chosin Reservoir the situation was no better than on the east. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray's 5th Marines had been stopped by Chinese forces with almost no gain in the first day of their attack west. And
overnight, November 27-28, at the same time that MacLean's army troops were hit hard, massed Chinese assault troops had given the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni a night they would not forget.
General Almond's nature would have prevented him from questioning General MacArthur's standing order to attack toward the Yalu, even if the American forces involved had suffered initial setbacks. One should note that in the conference Colonel MacLean said that he thought he could still attack to the north if his third infantry battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, joined his RCT, as he expected it to do.
From Hagaru-ri, Almond flew back to his CP at Hamhung. He soon continued on to the 7th Division CP near Hungnam, where he conferred with General Barr in midafternoon. There he received an order from General MacArthur to fly at once to Tokyo for a conference that night because of the crisis in Eighth Army in the west. General Walker, the Eighth Army commander, received the same call.b0
Drake's Tank Attack toward the Inlet
Unknown to either of the infantry battalions or to the artillery battalion at the inlet and the forward position, Captain Drake's 31st Tank Company moved out of Hudong-ni's 31st Rear CP area on the morning of November 28 to break through the Chinese roadblock on Hill 1221 and link up with them. The night before, Drake had learned from the first sergeant of the ambushed medical company that there was a strong enemy roadblock on the road over Hill 1221, about two miles north of Hudong-ni, and that he would have to overcome it before he could move on to make a junction with the infantry and the artillery of the 31st RCT Drake did not have any precise information, however, of the enemy strength he expected to meet at Hill 1221.
Drake did not know that General Hodes had spent the night at the Hudong-ni schoolhouse 31st Rear CP. During the night Hodes had decided that in the morning he would have Drake's tanks attack north to join the infantry and that he would accompany the tanks. Hodes and Drake conferred on the matter the next morning; Hodes made no change in plans.
East of Chosin Page 11
