“OKAY, MY FRIENDS, LET’S PACK AND GO”
The climactic Carter-Begin meeting with Vance, Barak, and Dayan began after sundown Saturday, Day 12, the end of the Jewish Sabbath. It lasted five hours, until half past midnight on Sunday morning, Day 13. The pressure on Begin was intense throughout, not only from Carter but from Dayan, Weizman, and Barak, as the Israeli prime minister fired back in no uncertain terms: “ultimatum,” “excessive demands,” “political suicide.”70 But for the first time, Begin associated himself with his predecessors on UN Resolution 242: that it applied to all conquered territory, although it did not require a total withdrawal. While Begin wanted to rehash the issue of the settlements, Carter wanted to go over the documents paragraph by paragraph so he could impress on Begin how few differences actually remained. Once again Begin proposed a three-month delay while they negotiated the Sinai withdrawal, after which Begin would submit the proposal to the Knesset. Sadat, however, was insisting on a commitment to remove the settlers before any further negotiations. Carter thought the conversation would never end, but quickly realized that Begin had given him an opening.
Although the Sinai settlements did not have the religious or historical significance of those in the West Bank, Begin worried that his political coalition would come apart if he dismantled them and forced out the settlers, who were tightening their emotional grip on the imagination of many Israelis. This was underscored by the popular song “Al Kol Eleh,” written by the woman called the First Lady of Israeli Song, Naomi Shemer, which the settlers of Yamit, the largest Sinai settlement, adopted as their anthem: “Do not uproot what has been planted.” But there was an even more personal reason: I later learned from Yechiel Kadishai, Begin’s closest friend from his underground days and a member of his delegation, that Begin wanted to retire to one of the settlements71—instead he retired to his Tel Aviv apartment after the disaster of the 1982 Lebanon war.
Recognizing that dismantling the Sinai settlements would be too painful for Begin to agree to on his own, Carter persuaded him to leave final approval to a vote of the Knesset, backed by Carter’s handwritten personal pledge of support. So to diffuse the political burden, Begin agreed to have the Sinai withdrawal approved by Israel’s parliament. Carter and Begin both realized that if the Sinai settlements remained the only barrier to a peace treaty, a parliamentary majority to abandon them was certain: The opposition Labor members would vote in favor even if hard-liners in Begin’s party would not. To ensure that Begin would not publicly urge the Knesset to turn down the agreement, Carter went a step further: He obtained Begin’s promise not to try to sway the votes of the individual members, which meant a suspension of party discipline for a “free vote” on the issue to be held within two weeks. That was a breakthrough—“all that we needed,” Carter told me.72
The framework for forthcoming discussions about the West Bank and Gaza went more smoothly, and the two sides worked out language that Begin had refused only months before; it referred to “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” and “full autonomy” for the Palestinians, who had never governed themselves under either Ottoman or Jordanian rule. Dinitz told me immediately after Camp David that he warned Begin he was in effect agreeing to accept a Palestinian state eventually.73
But it was at this moment, when success was within reach that the seeds of lasting dissension were sown. Sadat insisted on a settlement freeze during the period needed to convert the Camp David Accords into a legally binding treaty. Carter thought he had persuaded Begin to accept a freeze on new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza during those follow-up negotiations. But which negotiations? Two sets remained, one a relatively brief three months to draft the legally binding Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and the other, drawn out and difficult to define, for Palestinian autonomy during a transitional period of five years. Carter and Vance, a careful lawyer, assumed Begin was agreeing to freeze West Bank settlements for a full five years; but Begin and his delegation, including Barak, also a fine lawyer, understood their commitment to mean a settlement freeze would cover only the three-month period allotted to draft the bilateral treaty.74
After only a few hours’ sleep, Carter awoke on Sunday, September 17. He briefed Sadat during his morning walk about the agreement with Begin and assured Sadat that the freeze would last for five years, while details of Palestinian autonomy were hammered out. But Day 13 nevertheless turned into a cliffhanger. While redrafting the final agreement to reflect what he thought was a done deal, Carter received a letter from Begin declaring that Israel would adhere to only a three-month freeze. “This is not what Begin agreed to last night!” he fumed. Begin explained that on Saturday night he had only agreed to consider a longer freeze and said he would let Carter know the next morning.
The letter was his response and should have been a red flag, but the president never confronted Begin, perhaps realizing that this explosive disagreement would have blown up the talks, just as everything seemed to be falling into place. Instead he instructed the State Department’s Hal Saunders to sort out the matter when they returned to Washington. The misunderstanding would sour the relationship between Begin and Carter for the balance of Carter’s term as president and, I believe, colored his relationship with Israel for the rest of his life.75
As the clock ticked, Carter also became entangled in an even more emotional and potentially fatal issue—Jerusalem. To Begin and his delegation Jerusalem was the eternal capital of the Jewish state, dating from the rule of King Solomon through the centuries when exiled Jews were accustomed to chant as they do today, “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand wither.” Kadishai confided to me that Begin told Carter of a famous rabbi in Mainz, Germany, who was required by the local bishop to convert to Catholicism. He told the bishop he would give him an answer in three days. When he returned and refused, he was arrested, and asked that his tongue be cut off for even giving the impression that he would consider converting. Begin told Carter he would not emulate the rabbi’s mistake. He would pack his bags and leave if Jerusalem was injected.76
But Jerusalem is also the site of some of the most revered Muslim symbols, the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as home to tens of thousands of Palestinians in the eastern part of the Holy City. On Saturday night general language on Jerusalem seemed to suffice: The city would remain undivided, the holy places would be protected, and its political status would be negotiated later. But Sadat’s advisers had convinced him that with all his other concessions, this vague language on Jerusalem’s future would inflame the Palestinians and isolate him from the Arab world.
In fact the Camp David language on Jerusalem was hardly very different from the position of the United States from the moment it recognized Israel as a sovereign state in 1948, and has been publicly reaffirmed ever since by the United States, which has maintained its embassy in Tel Aviv and left Jerusalem itself in a sort of diplomatic limbo, down to the Trump administration. Needless to say, this position grated on all Israeli governments and aroused its supporters in America, but Carter was livid at yet another last-minute objection by Begin that Jerusalem was “one city indivisible, the capital of Israel.” Several hours of furious wrangling ensued, with much agitated movement and several exchanges among cabins, as all the delegates were getting ready to finish and pack up. Begin reacted decisively: “Okay, my friends, let’s pack and go.”77
Jerusalem was also a sticking point for the Egyptians. Abdel-Meguid, Egypt’s UN representative, told Sadat that any exchange of letters was not legally binding anyway. Sadat’s response demonstrated that the Palestinians were not his priority: “Listen, Jerusalem’s time will come.… It is obvious that you do not understand what I am aiming at—saving Egypt from an occupation [in Sinai]. My responsibility primarily is to the Egyptians, so I will free Egypt, and from there we will see how to put added pressure on Israel, supported by our friends, to free Palestine.”78
Once again Carter seemed trapped between one of Begin’s angry demands and S
adat’s strategic sense, which the president shared. Carter was down to his last, desperate card. Rather than try to apply last-minute pressure, he ingeniously set the stage for Begin to find a way to reach an agreement. He had asked his secretary, Susan Clough, to prepare eight photographs of himself, Begin, and Sadat together as souvenirs. She called Israel for the name of each of Begin’s eight grandchildren. So instead of his usual neutral sign-off of “Best Wishes, Jimmy Carter,” the president wrote, “Love and Best Wishes” and addressed the greeting to each grandchild by name. Then he walked the photo packet over to Begin’s cabin. Begin greeted him in his usual formal manner. Carter told me: “He turned around and was looking the other way, and he looked at the first photograph and he got emotional; his hand started shaking and he read out the name of his granddaughter. Then he looked at the next one and he read out the name of another grandchild. When he got to about the third one his chin began to quiver and he had a tear. And I got emotional too. He thanked me in a very highly personal way.”79 Carter believed that this simple act of kindness was the turning point for Begin.80
Within minutes after he had delivered the photos, there was a knock on his door. It was Barak with a message from Begin: “Why don’t we make another effort?”81 Carter sat down with Barak to work out language on Jerusalem so that, as the president joked, Begin “would not have to [risk] his right arm falling off.” In the end the two lawyers, Vance and Barak, worked with Carter to devise an elegant solution that accomplished little legally but resolved a diplomatic conundrum. The side letter simply said that the American position on Jerusalem remained as previously set forth by U.S. ambassadors at the UN, without actually saying what it was. Carter walked the new draft over to Begin and left in a state of apprehension and dejection. As he then moved on to tell Sadat, Begin telephoned: “I will accept the letter you drafted on Jerusalem.”82
That should have been a wrap, but in the Middle East bringing down the curtain rarely ends the drama. Another session of redrafting commenced with el-Baz and Barak. Again there was a dispute on language concerning precisely how and when the Knesset’s approval would trigger Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai. This hairsplitting was really a matter of obtaining maximum leverage to reassure Sadat that the vote would actually take place and the settlers would then leave. Carter tinkered with it and asked Mondale to deliver it to Begin and Sadat. But it was never delivered, because Mondale emerged to view an extraordinary sight. He found Begin at Sadat’s cabin. For the first time in ten days the two were together inside the Camp David negotiating arena, after Carter had given up hope that their fractious relationship could ever be repaired.
Carter recounted to me: “I was in my room getting ready to leave, packing my clothes and so forth, and I heard that Begin had taken a golf cart to Sadat’s cabin. I was petrified with fear that they were going to start arguing with each other again. I dashed over there as fast as I could, and I found they were both outside, and they were shaking hands and very friendly.”83 Begin was pleased that Sadat would not insist on pressuring the Knesset. In the relaxed atmosphere, Barak returned to Carter’s cabin, and the president rejiggered the language again to stipulate that negotiations and withdrawal were not directly linked. At last Carter had hit on just the right legalism, and at last Begin was satisfied.84
“HEVENU SHALOM ALEICHEM”
Announced by a huge thunderclap, a furiously heavy wind-driven rain deluged Camp David, delaying the departure to Washington for the formal ceremony to sign the Camp David Accords. What was one to make of the message that suddenly resounded from above? Said Boutros-Ghali: “The heavens are angry at what has taken place at Camp David!”85 Many of Sadat’s entourage, except for Boutros-Ghali, were to boycott the ceremony, and some even feared for their lives. Elyakim Rubinstein went to the Egyptian delegation seeking signatures on a map of the region as a souvenir, but all refused. They also refused to pose for pictures with the Israeli delegation.86 The Egyptian Foreign Ministry’s legal adviser Elaraby counseled Sadat not to sign, because he had failed to receive ironclad guarantees for the Palestinians and on the status of Jerusalem; but Sadat waved him away: “You and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you look at the trees but you don’t look at the forests!”87
The Israelis felt very different. Ed Sanders, the White House Jewish liaison, was standing with Weizman, and both viewed the storm as some kind of favorable omen: The Israelis were euphoric at the prospect of peace with their most powerful enemy. The three leaders boarded Marine One and called former presidents Nixon and Ford to inform them of their success. They landed at the Washington Monument at 9:45 p.m. Sunday night, September 17, and went straight to the White House, returning from almost two weeks in the rustic environment of Camp David to the glittering East Room of the White House.
Kamel, who had just resigned as foreign minister, was driven to the entrance with part of the Israeli delegation; they urged him to join them, but he refused; in the excitement his absence and that of his subordinates in the East Room went largely unnoticed by the press. Sadat was left alone with only Boutros-Ghali; Hassan al-Tuhami, the Egyptian ambassador to the United States; and his grand chamberlain, Ibrahim Kamel.
When Carter, Begin, and Sadat entered, each had a broad smile, but Carter’s face was almost translucent. He had bet his presidency on the unprecedented gamble of bringing together two leaders who deeply distrusted each other. But at least for now the president had beaten the odds and produced a formal document titled “The Framework for Peace in the Middle East.” It was signed by Begin and Sadat in the East Room of the White House with the president as witness—and by extension the United States of America as guarantor.
The White House operator telephoned me at home during the afternoon to come down with Fran to witness the occasion from what we regarded as a front-row seat to history. So we were especially moved when Begin remarked that the Camp David conference should be “renamed the Jimmy Carter conference.” He addressed Carter directly: “Mr. President, we, the Israelis, thank you from the bottom of our hearts for all you have done for the sake of peace, for which we prayed and yearned for more than thirty years.… You inscribed your name forever in the history of two ancient civilizations, the people of Egypt and the people of Israel.” He concluded by addressing his countrymen in Hebrew: “Citizens of Israel: When you hear my words, it will be morning, an early hour, and the sun will rise over the land of our forefathers and our sons. We wish to be with you in a matter of a few days and to sing with you ‘Hevenu Shalom Aleichem’ [We have brought peace unto you]. This can be stated: Just as we have made every possible personal effort in order to bring peace, we will continue, so that the day will come that everyone of us can say, ‘Peace has come for our nation and our land not just in this generation, but future generations as well.’ With the help of God, we will reach this goal together, and we will be granted good days of building, brotherhood and understanding. May this be His will.”88
Fran and I were not the only listeners with tears streaming down our faces.
* * *
What, then, were the extraordinary circumstances that helped Jimmy Carter pluck a historic victory from almost certain defeat after thirteen brutal days and nights of negotiations? One was Carter’s choice of the isolated and bucolic setting. Originally started in 1935 and completed in 1938 by the Depression-era Work Projects Administration (WPA) as a vacation resort for senior government workers and their families, the place was converted into a presidential retreat from the crowded and frenetic wartime White House in 1942 by Franklin D. Roosevelt. He called it Shangri-La after the Tibetan valley of perpetual peace imagined in James Hilton’s novel Lost Horizon. It was renamed Camp David by President Eisenhower for his first grandson. On its rolling 125 acres sit eleven cabins and a large assembly hall, each named after a species of the majestic hardwood trees in the mountaintop forest, and connected by winding, paved paths. If any setting could encourage some degree of tranquillity, it was that one. Its seclusion was part of the
second physical factor in promoting success.
On the very day the meeting was announced, Carter made one of his most important decisions: to tell the press as little as possible while it was under way. He sent his communications director, Gerald Rafshoon, and his press secretary, Jody Powell, identical handwritten notes with his inimitable style of salutation: “To Rafshoon (To Jody): Other than cautious, noncontroversial background briefings, I want minimal U.S. Government officials public statements re the Camp David meeting. None until Cy returns & briefs us. I will ask Begin & Sadat to do the same. J.C.”89
Without this he realized that each side would have used the press to play to its home audience, destroying trust and undermining the flexibility necessary to success. When they received his note, both converged almost immediately on his private study to argue against the edict. Carter’s succinct response: “I cannot negotiate in the newspapers.”90 Rafshoon and Jody then reached a compromise with Carter. The press would be kept about thirty miles away at Thurmont, Maryland, and would be fed an official line aimed at damping down expectations and deflecting criticisms while the reporters were locked out.
The administration warned of a deteriorating Middle East situation that could lead to a new war, argued that a settlement could have international economic benefits, defended the personal presidential engagement, and finally expressed the hope that the meeting would narrow differences and encourage all sides to move more directly into continuing negotiations.91 And so, after each negotiating session, Jody would troop down the mountain to give an anodyne briefing, artfully shielding the press and public from what was happening and allowing Carter sole control of the press.
President Carter Page 64
