ALSO BY STANLEY I. KUTLER
The American Inquisition (1982)
Privilege and Creative Destruction:
The Charles River Bridge Case (1971, 1989)
Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (1968)
EDITOR
American History: The View from Abroad (1986)
The Promise of American History:
Progress and Prospects (1982)
Looking for America, 2 vols. (1975, 1980)
John Marshall (1973)
The Supreme Court and the Constitution:
Readings in American Constitutional History (1969, 1977, 1984, 1990)
New Perspectives on the American Past,
2 vols., with Stanley N. Katz (1969, 1972)
The Dred Scott Decision: Law or Politics? (1967)
THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK
PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.
Copyright © 1990 by Stanley I. Kutler
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published in the United States by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, and simultaneously in Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto. Distributed by Random House, Inc., New York.
All photographs credited to the Washington Star are copyright by the Washington Post and reprinted by permission of the D.C. Public Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kutler, Stanley I.
The wars of Watergate: the last crisis of Richard Nixon / Stanley I. Kutler.—1st ed.
p. cm.
eISBN: 978-0-307-83405-8
1. Watergate Affair, 1972–1974. 2. Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913– . 3. United States—Politics and government—1969–1974. I. Title.
E860.K87 1990
364.1′ 32′ 0973—dc20 89-43351
v3.1
For Jeff, David, Susan Anne, Andy
and
Sandy
At the coming of the seventh month, when the people of Israel were in their towns, all the people gathered as one body in the square in front of the Water Gate. They asked Ezra the scribe to bring the book of the Law of Moses which the Lord had enjoined upon Israel. On the first day of the seventh month, Ezra the priest brought the Law before the assembly, both men and women, and all who could understand; and he read from it, facing the square in front of the Water Gate, from early morning till noon.
NEHEMIAH 8:2–3
CONTENTS
Cover
Other Books by This Author
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Epigraph
Acknowledgments
Preface
Prologue: Triumph and Foreboding: Election Night 1972
Book One
OF TIME AND THE MAN
DISCORD, DISORDER, AND RICHARD NIXON
I Breaking Faith: The 1960s
II Making Many Nixons: 1913–1965
III “Bring Us Together”: 1965–1968
Book Two
FIRST TERM, FIRST WARS
IV “The Man on Top”
V “I want it done, whatever the cost.” Enemies, Plumbers, Taps, and Spies
VI The Politics of Deadlock: Nixon and Congress
VII Media Wars
Book Three
THE WATERGATE WAR
ORIGINS AND RETREAT, JUNE 1972–APRIL 1973
VIII “We should come up with … imaginative dirty tricks.” The Watergate Break-in
Photo Insert
IX “What really hurts is if you try to cover it up.” Watergate and the Campaign of 1972
X “The cover-up is the main ingredient.” A Blackmailer, a Senator, and a Judge: November 1972–March 1973
XI “We have a cancer within, close to the Presidency.” Covering Up the Cover-up: January–March 1973
XII “We have to prick the Goddam boil and take the heat.” Cutting Loose: April 1973
Book Four
THE WATERGATE WAR
DISARRAY AND DISGRACE, MAY 1973–AUGUST 1974
XIII New Enemies. The Special Prosecutor and the Senate Committee: May 1973
XIV “What did the President know, and when did he know it?” The Senate Committee: Summer 1973
XV “Let Others Wallow in Watergate.” Agnew, the Tapes, and the Saturday Night Massacre: August–October 1973
XVI “Sinister Forces.” Ford, Jaworski, Tape Gaps, and Taxes: November–December 1973
Photo Insert
XVII “Fight.” Tapes and Indictments: January–May 1974
XVIII “Well, Al, there goes the Presidency.” The House Judiciary Committee: June–July 1974
XIX Judgment Days. The Supreme Court and the Judiciary Committee: July 1974
XX “I hereby resign.” August 1974
Book Five
THE IMPACT AND MEANING OF WATERGATE
XXI The “burden I shall bear for every day.” The Pardon: September 1974
XXII In the Shadow of Watergate
XXIII Richard Nixon, Watergate, and History
A Note on Sources
Notes
A Note About the Author
Photographic inserts of 16 pages and 8 pages will be found following text this page and this page, respectively
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My debts accumulated in the writing of this book are enormous. But it is a pleasure to thank various institutions and individuals for their extraordinary cooperation.
The University of Wisconsin Foundation administers the E. Gordon Fox Fund, which has supported my research and writing for the past decade. That support, coupled with additional funds from the Graduate School at the University of Wisconsin, significantly lightened my task. The staffs of various research centers and libraries offered me unfailing courtesy; in particular, I must note the conscientious professionals at the Nixon Archives and in various branches of the National Archives.
Large and small favors came from Stuart Applebaum, Allen Arrow, Tadashi Aruga, M. Carlota Baca, James M. Banner, Michal R. Belknap, William C. Berman, Paul Blustein, the late Beatrice Braude, Ellen Kuniyuki Brown, Thomas Charlton, R. Taylor Cole, Robert Dallek, Elias Demetracopoulos, Philip A. Dibble, Father Robert Drinan, Elaine Edelman, Leon Epstein, Kelly Evans, Susan Falb, David Frohmeyer, Eric Glitzenstein, Patti Goldman, Fred Graham, Otis Graham, Gerald Gunther, William Hammond, Han Tie, William Hanchett, Jonathan Hart, James Hastings, Robert Henderson, Seymour Hersh, Bernard Hollander, J. Woodford Howard, Richard Jacobson, Victor Jew, Barbara Jordan, Harold Kaplan, Robert Kastenmeier, David Kepley, Judith Kirkwood, Harold Koh, Richard Kohn, David Konig, Benedict Leerburger, Wolfgang Lehmann, Liu Xu-yi, Steve Lynch, Tom McCormick, Richard McNeill, Michael McReynolds, Pauline Maier, Marilyn Mellowes, Martha Minow, Tom Mooney, Charles Moser, Jeanne Oates, William Proxmire, Henry Reuss, Donald Ritchie, Martin Ridge, Morris Schnapper, Stanley Schultz, David Shapiro, Father Don Shea, David Shepard, Geoffrey Shepherd, Diane Sherman, Dianne Smith, Aviam Soifer, John Stennis, Carl Stern, Mary Ternes, Steve Tilley, Jay Topkis, David Ward, Peter Weil, David Wigdor, Graham Wilson, Michael Wreszin, the late Tim Wyngaard, and Jerome Zeifman. Harold Hyman and Leonard Levy, truly distinguished historians and longtime friends, especially encouraged me at very crucial moments.
A special thank-you to the anonymous source who, in 1973 or 1974, referred to Watergate as the “War of the FBI Succession.”
Willard Hurst and Richard Sewell have again generously extended their editorial talents, moral support, and friendship to me. As always, they have saved me from gross errors, bad judgment, and dreadful writing. They are not responsible, of course, for anything I have done contrary to their counsel.
The wait was worth it, but I finally have had my chance to work w
ith Ashbel Green, vice president and senior editor at Alfred A. Knopf. He saved me from numerous lapses of good taste, not to mention good sense. (He may also be the only book editor able to share memories of the glory days of the Cleveland Indians.) Castle W. Freeman, Jr., provided magnificent copy-editing, while Jenny McPhee and Melvin Rosenthal shepherded me through the book’s production.
Dan Bailey, my incomparable research assistant, did everything from checking a citation to deciphering and helping me master the White House tape transcripts; moreover, he labored strenuously to make sure that I would sound fair in Oshkosh. Susan Bissegger, Joe Ehmann, Dan Ernst, Ellen Goldlust, David Gordon, and Henry Wend also provided research support. Anita Olson valiantly made sense out of many confusing taped interviews. Susan Dewane is Management masquerading as a Secretary. John Wright—what can I say? Agent extraordinaire, agent provocateur; sans lui, le déluge.
My mother, as always, has taken a keen interest in my labors. Through his time of terrible troubles, my brother always managed to ask, “How’s your work?” I have often thought of my late father, who taught us: “A liar is worse than a thief.” My wife, Sandra Sachs Kutler, and my children, Jeff, David, Susan Anne, and Andy, who contributed in unique ways, like to see their names in print. This book is for them for all the reasons.
S.I.K.
Madison, Wisconsin
August 10, 1989
PREFACE
Some fifteen years after Richard Nixon resigned as President of the United States, Watergate remains contested history. Nixon and his partisans still proclaim his innocence, or they dismiss the affair as a minor stumble when measured against his great achievements, or they minimize his responsibility by comparing his sins to similar sins of his predecessors. Nevertheless, apologists and their opponents can agree on the importance of the case: there is no account, no judgment, no history of Nixon without Watergate.
While Watergate is a familiar story for those who were involved and who remember it, for many others today it is merely a word or symbol, dimly recalled or barely and imperfectly understood. This book is addressed to these varied audiences. The perspective of time and the evidence contained in once-unavailable documents add new dimensions to the familiar story of Watergate. The French historian Jules Michelet suggested that history is the “action of bringing things back to life.” But as we revitalize “things,” we also must comprehend them; otherwise the memory will disappear, and we will have learned only to forget.
I hope this book will be a reminder of the importance of most of the characters and the seriousness of the events it describes. Watergate was more than a burglary at the Democratic National Committee headquarters in June 1972, more even than the political and legal consequences of that act. The ensuing drama, culminating in Richard Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, was rooted in the tumultuous events of the 1960s in the United States and abroad, and in the personality and history of Nixon himself, going back to his first presidential term and earlier. Since his resignation, Watergate has echoed loudly in our public life. In its time, and since, Watergate raised weighty issues of governance, especially concerning the role of the presidency and its relation to other institutions in the governmental apparatus.
And yet, though Watergate has implications that go to the heart of our political and constitutional system, Richard Nixon unquestionably stands at the center of that larger story as well. He must be acknowledged as one of a handful of dominant political figures in the United States for more than a quarter-century, but controversy persistently followed and fueled his long public career, making him one of the most divisive personalities in our recent public life. By Nixon’s own assessment, Watergate was essentially one more episode in a series of wars and clashes with long-despised enemies. “I had thrown down a gauntlet to Congress, the bureaucracy, the media, and the Washington establishment and challenged them to engage in epic battle,” he noted in his memoirs. Nixon thrived on conflict, conflict that ineluctably resulted from a lifetime of accumulated resentments, both personal and political.
The Watergate break-in parted the veil on the Nixon Administration’s dubious tactics—the “White House horrors,” as former Attorney General John Mitchell called them. The fury of the response led eventually to the second serious attempt in our history to impeach a president. Despite the vast power and resources of his office, Nixon eventually found himself involved in an inescapable struggle, unable to turn adversity into opportunity as he had done so often throughout his career. Watergate proved fatal to his political life and undoubtedly will haunt his historical reputation. History will record a fair share of the significant achievements of Nixon’s presidency, but Watergate will be the spot that will not out.
Although Nixon is the leading actor in the Watergate drama, this book is neither a biography nor a full-length account of his presidency. He has had a generous number of biographers, and undoubtedly their interpretations will provoke as much heat and division as Nixon himself did throughout his career. His Administration’s programs and policies deserve, and they are receiving, careful attention. The Wars of Watergate, however, focuses on the indelible reasons for his downfall and disgrace. Watergate dominated Richard Nixon’s presidency. We cannot disentangle Nixon’s domestic and foreign activities either from his unremitting warfare against real and imagined enemies at home or from the weighty burden of self-knowledge about his role in the Watergate cover-up. These consumed him, eventually resulting in a fatal self-inflicted wound.
In the end, Nixon offered his own eerie, albeit unintended, insight into his downfall: “[N]ever be petty,” he told loyal members of his Administration as he departed the White House on August 9, 1974, and “always remember, others may hate you, but those who hate you don’t win unless you hate them, and then you destroy yourself.” It was just such corrosive hatred, however, that decisively shaped Nixon’s own behavior, his career, and eventually his historical standing. The net result was a wholly unprecedented testing of the American political and constitutional system, in which Richard Nixon and Watergate are forever entwined—figures and events truly unique and unforgettable.
PROLOGUE
TRIUMPH AND FOREBODING: ELECTION NIGHT 1972
The victory was spectacular. Richard Nixon, who had contested two of the closest elections in American presidential history, was overwhelmingly re-elected on November 7, 1972. Save for Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, Nixon swept the Electoral College vote and captured over 60 percent of the popular vote. It was to be his last electoral campaign; “[M]ake it the best,” he had told his Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, in September. Nixon’s triumph rivaled Franklin D. Roosevelt’s in 1936 and Lyndon Baines Johnson’s in 1964; and like them, President Nixon would quickly discover that the electorate’s mandates were neither absolute nor irrevocable.
From the outset, the enormous victory was not quite satisfactory to Nixon or his family. The President’s daughters, Tricia and Julie, petulantly complained that Democratic candidate George McGovern had not conceded gracefully enough, describing his congratulatory message as ‘cold and arch,” presumably because he had expressed the “hope” that the President would provide peace abroad and justice at home. Nixon himself, for all his outward satisfaction, privately found his joy muted on Election Day night. His reasons ranged from the banal to the serious.
The President worried that a temporary cap on his tooth might fall off if he smiled too broadly. He fretted about having to confront another Democrat-dominated Congress and at his inability to end the Vietnam war. He felt more sadness than relief at having fought his last election campaign. Most of all, Nixon would remember, he felt “a foreboding” that dampened his enthusiasm. Perhaps, he later mused, “the marring effects of Watergate may have played a part.” On election eve, he had noted in his diary that Watergate was the only “sour note” of the moment. “This,” he admitted, “was really stupidity on the part of a number of people.”1
The President’s Press Secretary had smugly la
beled the incident a “third-rate burglary” after police captured five men within the national headquarters of the Democratic Party at the Watergate office complex on June 17, 1972. At the time, the event had sounded only a minor discordant theme in the campaign, barely acknowledged outside Washington. The President and several close aides nevertheless had cause for concern. They realized that an inquiry into the Watergate affair might link the White House to the burglary and its aftermath, and expose a pattern of unethical and illegal conduct condoned and encouraged by the President himself. Nixon later claimed that “when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”2 He knew better.
On election night, therefore, when celebration was in order, Nixon nursed festering grievances. His public image clashed with what he knew to be reality, and he reacted, in anger, resentment, and perhaps even fear, as he had so often done in the past. Within hours, Haldeman asked for resignations throughout the Administration, quickly dampening the joy of the President’s loyal supporters. The signs of Nixon’s overwhelming victory had been apparent for months. Yet during that time, and in the immediate aftermath of the election, the President rubbed old wounds and planned revenge on his “enemies.” Magnanimity, generosity, and tolerance simply did not exist in his political vocabulary. He spurred his chief aides to find men to direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Internal Revenue Service who would do his personal bidding and fill his personal political needs. On September 15, 1972, he called White House Counsel John W. Dean III to the Oval Office and told him to “remember all the trouble” the President’s foes had caused. “We’ll have a chance to get back at them one day,” Nixon promised, adding that he intended to utilize the FBI and other agencies to harass his political antagonists. Nixon also thanked his young aide for his work in containing the Watergate affair. At the time, he undoubtedly never considered that enemies and friends alike eventually would hear their conversation, which he himself had taped.3
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