by Matt Waters
The inscriptional record for Darius II is thin. Two copies of a building inscription come from Susa and contain the requisite titles (great king, king of kings), lineage (son of Artaxerxes), as well as the all-important favor of Ahuramazda. While formulaic, such proclamations contain some urgency in light of the contested succession. There were obviously other and, on the face of it, equally qualified Achaemenid claimants: sons of Artaxerxes by women other than his primary wife, Damaspia. On a gold tablet from Hamadan, the authenticity of which (like others from the same area) has been disputed, Darius II traced his lineage more explicitly, father to son, back to the important link with Darius I.
Opportunity on the Northwestern Front
Beginning in 431 BCE, much of the Aegean world was involved in the war between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies. Both sides appealed for Persian support throughout the war. One such occurrence dates to the end of Artaxerxes I’s reign: the Athenians at Eion on coastal Thrace captured a Persian named Artaphernes who was bearing a message from the King to the Spartans. The main point, as expressed by Thucydides, was that “… the King did not understand what they [i.e., the Spartans] wanted. For while many (Spartan) ambassadors had come, they never said the same thing.” (4.50) In other words, if the Spartans had specific proposals in mind, they should send men capable of making them. The Athenians decided to send ambassadors instead, but upon reaching Ephesus in western Asia Minor they learned that Artaxerxes had recently died, so they returned home. Because of the structure of Thucydides’ narrative, scholars thus thought for a long time that Artaxerxes died in the year 425/424; however, Babylonian documentation indicates that Artaxerxes’ death occurred in 424/423.9
Beginning in the late 420s, there is a gap in Persian-Greek political relations for roughly a decade. The war between Athens and Sparta was on hiatus but not over. A disastrous Athenian expedition against Sicily from 413 to 411 encouraged many of Athens’ subjects in Ionia to rebel, and Sparta and its allies took advantage as hostilities recommenced. Persia – mainly through its financial resources – then assumed a much larger role in the war. From the Persian perspective, order and stability in the Empire was an expectation: the northwestern territory of Yauna (Ionia) did not fit this expectation. With Athens reeling, the Persian satraps in Anatolia saw opportunities to reassert Persian authority in Ionia.
Pharnabazus in Hellespontine Phrygia and Tissaphernes in Lydia not only sought stability but also increase in their own prestige, and they occasionally were at odds in pursuing their own agendas. Both actively sought Spartan military aid to rid themselves of the Athenian presence in their territories but the Spartans initially chose to help only Tissaphernes. Thucydides notes (8.57) that Tissaphernes’ aim was to keep the two sides (Athens and Sparta) equal, with the hope that this might prevent them from interfering in his satrapy, which included Ionia.
Persian-Spartan coordination was ensured through a treaty negotiated between the King (through his representative Tissaphernes) and the Spartans and their allies. Thucydides preserves actually three treaties, which some scholars consider to be separate drafts, or stages, of the negotiations. An acknowledgement of Persian control of western Anatolia was paramount.10 The rest of the first agreement (Thuc. 8.18) is straightforward. Both parties would prevent Ionian cities from sending money to Athens; both parties would jointly wage war against Athens; neither would make peace with Athens unless both parties agree; and the Persians and Spartans would consider any rebels of their treaty partner as their own enemies. The second (8.36–37) and third versions (8.58) modify the first in diplomatic nuance and in logistics, which reflected changing conditions. For example, the insistence on stopping Athens’ collection of tribute is modified to emphasize that the Spartans would not collect tribute either – that was the Persian prerogative. The issue of pay for Spartan forces was a major one, reflected in these further modifications: Spartan forces operating in the King’s territory and for the King’s aims – that the Spartans did not view their involvement that way was another matter entirely – were to be supported by Persian money. Tissaphernes subsequently spent a great deal of effort trying to stall or circumvent these incredibly expensive obligations, which at least initially would have been from his own resources. His actions in delaying payment may be considered bad faith (a Spartan perspective) or good strategy (a Persian perspective).
The third treaty draft finds an echo in an interesting but fragmentary inscription from Xanthos in Lycia (southwestern Anatolia). Thucydides relates that the third treaty was made at Caunus, along the Lycian-Carian frontier, which is identified in the Xanthos inscriptions as the site of a treaty between Tissaphernes and the Spartans. The inscription is found on the side of a funerary pillar that celebrates the accomplishments of the dynast Kheriga (Greek Gergis) buried there. It has two versions in Lycian and a short summary in Greek. In the inscription Tissaphernes is called the son of Hydarnes. Hydarnes is not an uncommon name, but the temptation is strong to connect this Hydarnes with the family name of one of the Seven, thus linking Tissaphernes to a prominent family who supported Darius II’s rise. Hydarnes’ support was rewarded by marriages to Darius II’s children. Not all scholars accept this link for Tissaphernes, however.
Continued Spartan ambivalence about their negotiating partner Tissaphernes led them to consider cooperating with another satrap, Pharnabazus, in Dascylium. Athenian control of the strategic shipping route through the Hellespont, through which the city was supplied with much of its food, was slipping. Pharnabazus, like Tissaphernes, was prepared to exploit Athens’ difficulties. In 411, perhaps dissatisfied with Tissaphernes’ failure to pay them (Thuc. 8.80), the Spartans accepted Pharnabazus’ offer to fund a Spartan fleet operating in the Hellespont. Within two years, thanks to renewed Athenian success in the Hellespont, Pharnbazus was making terms with the Athenians instead.
The ebb and flow of Persian support between Sparta and Athens, on the part of two different satraps, make for a confusing historical period. One wonders how the King and his court officials interpreted the vacillating fortunes and negotiations – of which the King would have been informed – of his two satraps in western Asia Minor. One sign of Darius’ thoughts was the dispatch in 408 of his younger son Cyrus with special powers that superseded those of both satraps. This Cyrus is usually called “Cyrus the Younger” in modern texts to differentiate him from Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Empire. Xenophon, whose Hellenica becomes our main source for this period, uses the title karanos for Cyrus’ position, but it is unclear what exactly that term meant.11 Cyrus’ arrival proved crucial in the Greek conflict. His unwavering support for the Spartans was decisive in ensuring the Spartan victory over Athens in 404.
10 Maintaining Empire: Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III
The Death of Darius II and the Accession of Artaxerxes II
From the historian’s perspective, the last years of Darius II are notable mainly for the events that led to the civil war between Darius II’s successor, Artaxerxes II (Arses), and his younger brother Cyrus. It soon became clear that Cyrus’ aim in trying to hasten the end of the Peloponnesian War was to prepare a Greek mercenary army to help him overthrow his brother. Cyrus’ expedition and the defeated Greek mercenary army’s return westward were immortalized by the Greek writers Ctesias and Xenophon as well as by Plutarch in his Life of Artaxerxes, which relied heavily on Ctesias’ and Xenophon’s accounts. Xenophon was a participant in Cyrus’ expedition and thus well-placed to offer a Greek insider’s perspective. While we have a rich trove of Greek sources to tap, we have relatively little Near Eastern material to supplement or correct them.
The final years of Darius II are mostly opaque. Trouble in Egypt around 410 BCE may presage its full secession between 401 and 399. A terse reference in Xenophon’s Hellenica (1.2.19) implies a rebellion in Media in 408, but no details as to its seriousness or extent are given. Xenophon also alludes to Darius on campaign against rebellious Cadusians (somewhere south of the Caspian Sea,
Hellenica 2.1.13) in 405, but no context is provided. An oblique reference in a Babylonian economic tablet dated to 407 appears to imply, based on similar occurrences of the rare phraseology used in the text, that a state of siege existed in the city of Uruk in southern Babylonia, but one hesitates to read too much into an isolated reference. It is impossible to discern if these episodes were significant problems beyond the routine troubles any imperial power would face.
Darius II with his wife Parysatis had two sons, Arses and Cyrus, with Arses as the designated successor. Arses, sometimes spelled Arsaces, took the throne name Artaxerxes II. Plutarch (Artaxerxes 2.3) suggests that the succession was up for grabs until the end of Darius’ life. Parysatis purportedly preferred Cyrus and wished for him to become king, so she summoned him from his command in Asia Minor in hopes of arranging the succession for him. That Darius II would have waited until his deathbed to proclaim a successor stretches credibility, however. The careful and ritualized preparations of the designated crown prince were not a last minute phenomenon. That Cyrus may have returned when his father’s death was imminent is believable enough, but he would not have done so with hopes that he would be named successor.
Xenophon (Anabasis 1.3) and Plutarch (Artaxerxes 3.3–5) both report that Cyrus planned an attempt on Arses’ life during the coronation ceremony at Pasargadae. This was not the work of paid assassins but rather planned as an ambush by Cyrus himself. Tissaphernes revealed the plot, and only Parysatis’ intervention saved Cyrus’ life. He was sent back to his post in Asia Minor. That is a surprise, and one is right to be skeptical, but the incongruity may stem from the sources: details may have been conflated or exaggerated in light of Cyrus’ open rebellion later.
The War between the Brothers
Cyrus’ support of the Spartans in their war against the Athenians thus came to be viewed as motivated by his own agenda. Cyrus mustered his Greek mercenary forces in Thrace and the Hellespont, areas presumably less likely to attract imperial attention. But the ostensible reasons for his campaign would be more important than any attempt to keep the mustering itself a secret. Garrison commanders were initially told that preparations were being made against Tissaphernes, thus cast as an episode in a rivalry. This is told from a Greek perspective. Any such conflict would have been construed by the King as an act of insubordination, if not rebellion. As the muster continued, Cyrus then claimed that he was preparing a campaign against the Pisidians in central Anatolia. Neither Tissaphernes nor Pharnabazus was deceived. Tissaphernes doubted that such a large force was aimed at nettlesome tribesmen (Xen. Anab. 1.2.1–4). Pharnabazus learned the truth of the matter from an Athenian exile and sent a special dispatch, as early as 404, straight to the King (Diodorus 14.11.2–3). These reports suggest that, whatever Cyrus told his followers and however carefully he disguised his intentions, the coming rebellion could not have taken Artaxerxes by surprise.
Xenophon’s Anabasis contains a consistent theme that highlights the precariousness of Cyrus’ army: Cyrus’ Greek followers were not informed of the true goal of the expedition. Time and again their suspicions were raised, until either further deception or an increase in pay was applied to keep the men on the march. The truth was revealed – along with a promise of a huge bonus – only when they were in northern Syria. Despite Xenophon’s clear admiration for Cyrus, it is notable that relatively few high-ranking Persians were to be found in Cyrus’ camp. Stripped of its Greek veneer and considering Xenophon’s perspective as a participant, what we have in the Anabasis is an adventure story: a rogue royal whose charisma and deep pockets presented a clear danger to the King. It is an open question what level of support Cyrus might have generated had he successfully killed his brother. Xenophon does provide the names of some Persian supporters, but both his and Ctesias’ vague references to large numbers defecting to Cyrus are unsubstantiated. One example of resistance occurred while Cyrus was still in central Anatolia. He there plundered the territory of Lycaonia because it was hostile (Anab. 1.2.19), by implication, because the inhabitants refused to support Cyrus with provisions.
Of particular note are those who worked against Cyrus. The Achaemenid system – focused on loyalty to the King – proved effective. As noted above, both satraps in western Asia Minor, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, warned the King about Cyrus’ preparations. Another high-ranking Persian, Orontas, described by Xenophon as a member of the Achaemenid extended royal family, acted as a double agent (Anab. 1.6.1). A subordinate of Tisasaphernes, Orontas initially acted against Cyrus from Sardis, but subsequently went over to Cyrus and offered his services. Gathering some of Cyrus’ cavalry, Orontas then sent to Artaxerxes a message that professed his loyalty and promised to come to the King with cavalry. But Orontas was in turn betrayed, and the message delivered to Cyrus instead, who then executed him after a secret trial. While Cyrus’ forces were marching through Cappadocia in central Anatolia, Cyrus executed a certain Megaphernes – whom Xenophon calls a royal scribe – and another important man among Megaphernes’ lieutenants (Anab. 1.2.20) on the charge of plotting against him. Xenophon provides no other details, but apparently Megaphernes also remained loyal to the King. The local ruler of Cilicia, whom Xenophon calls Syennesis (the name is actually a title), was compelled by the threat of Cyrus’ army to offer aid, but he simultaneously sent messages to the King assuring his loyalty.
The confrontation occurred at Cunaxa, northwest of Babylon along the Euphrates River. Xenophon (Anab. 1.7.10–13) states that Cyrus’ army consisted of 10,400 hoplites and 3,500 peltasts (light-armed infantry), along with 100,000 barbarians (non-Greeks). Of the King’s army of 1,200,000 infantry, 200 scythe-bearing chariots, and 6,000 cavalry, only(!) 900,000 infantry and 150 chariots took part in the battle. This was because one of Artaxerxes’ commanders, Abrocomas, arrived from Phoenicia too late for the action. Plutarch’s account (Life of Artaxerxes 7.4–6) echoes Xenophon’s, no accident because Plutarch mentions Xenophon explicitly. Both speak of 900,000 men, a typical exaggeration in Greek sources that – as a very approximate rule of thumb – may be assumed to be exaggerated at least tenfold. For the drama of the battle, and the unsurprisingly valiant and effective efforts of Cyrus’ Greek contingents, one may turn to the pages of Xenophon or Plutarch. And, of course, Cyrus’ own bravery is lionized, even while fighting at 10 to 1 odds, as he sought out and engaged his royal brother. Cyrus in fact wounded the King but was then struck by a javelin and died shortly thereafter.
But the battle was not done. Various Persian contingents regrouped but were still unsuccessful attacking Cyrus’ Greek troops, even though the Greek mercenaries now had no point in being there. Their purpose – Cyrus – was dead on the field. Persian forces had meanwhile plundered the Greek camp and taken many of their provisions. Cyrus’ deputy, the Persian Ariaeus, was induced to leave the Greek forces to their fate and return to the King. The Greek mercenaries then offered to enlist with the King for a campaign against rebellious Egypt but were summarily rebuffed. At a parley after the battle, Tissaphernes arranged the capture of almost all the Greek generals, an act of supreme cleverness or abject treachery that depends on one’s perspective. The remaining Greek forces were left unmolested, though shadowed by Persian forces, to make their arduous journey homeward.
Aftermath of the Rebellion
Because Plutarch chose to dedicate one of his Lives to Artaxerxes II, we have many insights into the aftermath of Cyrus’ rebellion and into court intrigues. Parysatis’ grief and wrath at Cyrus’ death exacted a heavy toll on the wider royal family. In the Classical literary tradition, she thus became a paradigm of the caprice and licentiousness of the Persian court, which – in the stereotype reliant Greek view – revolved around the machinations of powerful royal women and eunuchs (see pp. 94–96). According to both Ctesias and Plutarch, there was also great tension between the queen mother Parysatis and her daughter-in-law, the queen herself, Stateira. Stateira was the daughter of a high-ranking Persian noble, Hydarnes, whose support had been essential in D
arius II’s seizure of the throne.1 The rivalry culminated in Parystis’ clever poisoning of Stateira. As Plutarch relays it (Life of Artaxerxes 19) the two women distrusted each other so much that when they dined they ate the same portions from the same plate. Parysatis arranged a meal of a tiny bird, a delicacy so light that the Persians believed it lived on air and dew. The knife used to slice it was coated with a deadly poison, only on one side. The poisoned portion was given to Stateira, who died horribly a few days later. Artaxerxes in his rage and grief executed the table servants and banished his mother to Babylon. Greek sources reveal Parysatis’ mother’s Babylonian origin, and documents from the Murashu archive show that Parysatis held vast estates in Babylonia – her sojourn there was certainly not in a foreign land. She and Artaxerxes were later reconciled.
When considering these tales of vindictive vengeance and cruel torture, the caprice of tyrants may offer sufficient, if clichéd, explanation. But these stories are also about the integrity and survival of the Achaemenid dynastic principle. The Achaemenids’ emphasis on endogamous marriage was not simply a monstrous perversion of the natural order, as some Greeks believed, but rather a dynastic safeguard. While Ochus (Darius II) was struggling for the throne, intermarriage with another prominent, Persian family – in this instance the family of Hydarnes – was not only acceptable but desirous. But a prestigious family was as much potential rival as ally. In consideration of Darius II’s own less than straightforward path to the throne, the link with Hydarnes’ family may have expanded the potential pool of successors too much.