It was not until Saturday night, September 20, 2014, five months after the vote, after dozens of calls from and meetings with Obama, Kerry, Cunningham, and other top American officials, that the candidates agreed that Ghani had won the election and there would be a power-sharing agreement giving Abdullah a position with authorities akin to those of a prime minister. At the last minute, Abdullah said he would agree to this only if the results of the audit were not made public, because he felt they were so marred by fraud that they should stay secret forever. Nine days later, Ashraf Ghani, with Abdullah sharing the stage as his chief executive officer, was inaugurated as the new president of Afghanistan.
—
A friend of mine, when I mentioned that I was starting this book, told me the worst part was that I would have to spend so much time with the Karzais. They could be slippery, greedy, histrionic, and vain. I also found them to be thoroughly alive to their times, in thrall to their moment in history. They gave everything to their work, whether building desert cities or waging political wars. They weren’t the type for vacations. And making enemies, it seems, is not the worst fate.
I felt President Karzai was the most misjudged of all. He genuinely cared about his people and wanted them to stop getting killed. The war might have been exhausting, infuriating, and disillusioning, but it somehow didn’t harden him. He wasn’t a despot, or vengeful, or cruel. His government built him a $5 million mansion next to the palace so he could retire in luxury, but he gave it up for a house that was plainer, even though he had three children by the time he finished his presidency. He could take credit for balancing Afghan ethnic factions and perhaps preventing them from reverting to civil war. Millions of Afghans returned home during his government; millions of children, girls among them, enrolled in schools. His great political skill was compromise, and he used it to hold an improbable government together. He stood up to America and for his own people. He put the brakes on something that could have spiraled much further out of control. He didn’t win the war or make peace with the Taliban. But when he left, there was still a democracy.
If you talk to the Americans who spent the most time with Karzai, who fought him the hardest, there’s a surprising amount of respect. They remember his personal gestures, his private condolence calls when something happened in their families, long after they’d left Afghanistan. “I don’t think there was a better choice than Karzai,” Ambassador Ryan Crocker said at the end. “I didn’t think so then, I don’t think so now.” Captain Jason Amerine, the Special Forces commander who accompanied Karzai on the mission to liberate Afghanistan, would almost be in tears a dozen years later discussing the man he knew. He would always consider Karzai a friend—a good, idealistic man whose vision was for consensus, a loya jirga, and a new democratic government. “You’re talking about a man who from the very start thought the U.S. was going to abandon him. We talked about that. I said, ‘I can’t control that, but as long as I’m on the ground I’ll give you everything I’ve got. My life lies with my men to fight with you. That’s all I can control.’ He knew that. But he always assumed we’d abandon him. That was clear,” Amerine said. “You see somebody just fighting for his life over there. And everybody would be defining it as if it’s just him trying to maintain his power. And that was never him.”
By the end of Karzai’s last year in power, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more money for Afghanistan’s rebuilding than America spent on sixteen European nations after World War II. In Karzai’s farewell speech, he didn’t mention that or America’s two thousand dead. He praised minor players like India for their support. The man who began the war as arguably the most pro-American Muslim leader in the world ended it with this message to the United States: thanks for nothing. “Americans did not want peace in Afghanistan,” Karzai said, “because it had its own agendas and goals here.” U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham’s response to that was: “It makes me kind of sad.” Karzai had concluded that the American presence wasn’t leading the country toward peace, although he offered no other strategy to get closer. In some ways, getting pushed out of Afghanistan might be the most valuable gift Karzai could have given the United States.
Afghan politics is about men sitting around telling one another stories. There is always an enemy in them, and the bigger the enemy, the greater the tale. Karzai’s successor would sign the security pact the day after being sworn in to office. But Karzai, if nothing else a patriot, could always say that he hadn’t been the one to lash Afghanistan’s future to the United States. That he wouldn’t accept years more of the Americans’ money and be forced to swallow their advice. He could tell himself the story of how Hamid Karzai became the man who finally refused.
Acknowledgments
I am indebted to the hundreds of Afghans, from President Karzai and his family to those in more humble circumstances, who shared with me their stories during a time of great upheaval in their country. I am also thankful for the time that dozens of American soldiers and diplomats devoted to explaining their tumultuous tours in Afghanistan.
Thank you to my bosses at The Washington Post, in particular the foreign editors David Hoffman and Douglas Jehl, who set me off on these assignments and then gave me time to turn the experience into a book. My colleagues on the Afghanistan beat—Kevin Sieff, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Griff Witte, Karin Brulliard, Greg Miller, David Nakamura, Greg Jaffe, Karen DeYoung, Craig Whitlock, Ernesto Londoño, Pamela Constable—were my models and inspiration. The Post’s generous support, through the Graham and, now, Bezos eras, has been essential.
Many thanks to my agent, Rafe Sagalyn, who helped shape the book’s contours and then supported it to completion. And to Jonathan Segal at Knopf, whose wisdom and insightful editing transformed an unwieldy accumulation of reporting into an actual book. Jonathan Hillman, Darya Razavi, Christina Marin, and Julie Tate helped with much-needed research along the way.
I am grateful to the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University as well as to Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Both of those institutions generously provided financial support and a stimulating environment in which to work.
Many people in Kabul, in particular those who shared the yellow house on Street 4 in Taimany over the years, blessed me with a warm away-from-home family. Special thanks to Tamim Samee and Aryn Baker, Timur Nusratty, Victoria Longo, Asma Nassery, and John Schroder for showing me around; Lucy Martens, Golareh Kiazand, Scott Shadian, Sarah-Jean Cunningham, Amandine Roche, and Lorenzo Tugnoli for their friendship; and to Matt Rosenberg, Rich Oppel, Azam Ahmed, Maria Abi-Habib, John Dempsey, and Luke Mogelson for camaraderie throughout.
I’m especially grateful for the Afghan colleagues Javed Hamdard and Asad Haidari, who worked alongside me the longest and offered bravery, wisdom, and good humor throughout. And thanks to Habib Zahori, for his brilliant company and generous assistance.
For their unconditional hospitality, I’m indebted to friends Isham Randolph and Olivia Ellis, David Fleisher and Neilah Meyers, Macon and Emily Phillips, Michael Scherer and Yari Lorenzo, Keith Paxton and Susie Gim, and Amit Paley.
Above all, thanks to my parents, Marianne and Kenneth Partlow, and my sister, Liza, for their support and encouragement, and patience with me when I kept wandering off to faraway places. And finally to Mariana Courtney: thank you for your love and kindness as you welcomed me back to the new world.
Notes
1 A RESCUE FROM DEMONS
“a bleeding ulcer”: Dion Nissenbaum, “General ‘This Is a Bleeding Ulcer’ Progress Lags as Troops Labor in Key Taliban Zone,” Houston Chronicle, May 25, 2010, p. 8.
three thousand Taliban attacks: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings Institution, January 10, 2014.
“demons”: Rod Nordland, Alissa J. Rubin, and Matthew Rosenberg, “Gulf Widens Between U.S. and an Increasingly Hostile Karzai,” The New York Times, March 18, 2012, p. 16.
2 ANY PATH WILL LEAD Y
OU THERE
nearly two per day: The August 2009 death toll for U.S. soldiers was fifty-one. Total ISAF coalition deaths for that month was seventy-seven. From the website icasualties.org.
“I won’t say that things are all on the right track”: Anand Gopal, “Afghanistan and Pakistan Take Center Stage in 2009,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 2, 2009, p. 5.
“On all fronts”: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Administration Is Keeping Ally at Arm’s Length; Skepticism of Afghan Leader Shapes Policy,” The Washington Post, May 6, 2009, p. 1.
forty thousand American troops: Information on U.S. troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan by month can be found in this graphic from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/06/22/world/asia/american-forces-in-afghanistan-and-iraq.html.
“a crisis of confidence”: Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Missions Failure’; Top U.S. Commander for Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive,” The Washington Post, September 21, 2009, p. 1.
nearly six hundred attacks: Livingston and O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings Institution, January 10, 2014.
four times Afghanistan’s domestic revenue. “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Afghanistan National Development Strategy: First Annual Report (2008/09),” International Monetary Fund, country report 09/319, November 2009.
“The government and the public here have welcomed”: U.S. Department of State cable, “Scenesetter for Visit of NSA to Afghanistan,” June 21, 2009.
“not waste any more blood”: Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Portfolio, 2013), ePub file.
“I’m the Tom, Dick, and Harry”: U.S. Department of State confidential cable, “Karzai Appeals to Boucher for Security in South,” January 20, 2009.
a seven-foot-tall Afghan man: notes from Washington Post correspondent Kevin Sieff.
“I saved it”: Joshua Partlow, “Karzai Faces Two Rivals in Debate; Answering Criticism of His Rule, President Says of Troubled Afghanistan: ‘I Saved It,’ ” The Washington Post, August 17, 2009, p. 6.
“feel and resources of a sleepy”: U.S. Department of State cable, “Inside Karzai Campaign Headquarters,” May 10, 2009.
Two young Karzai nephews: U.S. Department of State cable, “Kandahar: A Snapshot of Elections Activity in an Active Province,” June 22, 2009.
“We don’t have any alternative”: Joshua Partlow, “ ‘We Don’t Have Any Alternative to Karzai’; Afghans’ Low Expectations Ensure Incumbent Is Favorite in Presidential Race, Despite Poor Record,” The Washington Post, August 19, 2009, p. 1.
“seriously underestimated Karzai’s skill”: U.S. Department of State confidential cable, “More Fractures in the United Front,” March 10, 2009.
“As messy and convoluted”: U.S. Department of State confidential cable, “IEC Publicly Reaffirms August 20 as Voting Day,” March 4, 2009.
“We would like to know what their views are”: Farah Stockman, “Amid Security Concerns, Foes of Karzai See Electoral Opening,” The Boston Globe, June 23, 2009, p. 1.
“Excuses were made”: Richard Holbrooke, “The Longest War,” The Washington Post, March 31, 2008.
“Who would be the best”: Kai Eide, Power Struggle over Afghanistan: An Inside Look at What Went Wrong—and What We Can Do to Repair the Damage (New York: Skyhorse, 2012), ePub file.
“had to go”: Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), ePub file.
“We need to do everything we can”: U.S. Department of State secret cable, “Afghan Elections: Challenging the Process to Deliver,” June 17, 2009.
“using Islamic radicalism as an instrument of policy”: U.S. Department of State confidential cable, “CODEL Reed’s July 20 Discussions with Karzai,” July 24, 2008.
“endemic corruption and widespread frustration”: U.S. Department of State cable, “Scenesetter for Visit of Codel Biden to Afghanistan,” February 19, 2008.
“You’ve already had meetings”: U.S. Embassy Kabul Action Memorandum, “Meetings with Major Presidential Candidates,” June 30, 2009.
“Karzai clearly expected”: U.S. Department of State secret cable, “Karzai Dialogue on U.S.-Afghan Relations Continues,” July 16, 2009.
“A general can lose a battle”: U.S. Department of State confidential cable, “Nangarhar Governor Sherzai Ponders Presidential Run,” January 6, 2009.
“We want very soon to stand on our own feet”: Judy Shelton, “Results Oriented: More Aid? Sounds Great, but Wait…” Wall Street Journal Europe, February 18, 2002.
“sad black-and-white movie”: U.S. Department of State cable, “Governors of Georgia, Kansas, and Mississippi Meet with President Karzai,” December 14, 2005.
“no overt or covert”: U.S. Department of State secret cable, “Karzai on the State of US-Afghan Relations,” July 7, 2009.
$263 million: U.S. Department of State confidential cable, “GIROA Appears to Retreat on Electoral Reform,” February 15, 2010.
“Massive, unbridled”: Sandra Khadourhi, “A Review of Suspected Electoral Fraud: 2009 Afghan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections,” Democracy International, April 2010.
In his domain, Karzai won: Matthew Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak,” Harper’s Magazine, December 2009.
“no reliable early returns”: U.S. Department of State confidential cable, “Afghan Elections: Successful, Subdued Afghan-Led Day of Voting,” August 20, 2009.
“rage”: McChrystal, My Share of the Task.
“Afghanistan’s elections have unfortunately been defamed”: “Afghan President Seeks ‘National Partnership’ Government, or Coalition,” BBC Monitoring South Asia—Political, supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, October 20, 2009.
3 SO MUCH IN LOVE
salmon-pink house: Christina Lamb, The Sewing Circles of Herat: A Personal Voyage Through Afghanistan (New York: HarperCollins, 2002).
“charming, salon demeanor”: Edward Girardet, Killing the Cranes: A Reporter’s Journey Through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan (White River Junction, Vt.: Chelsea Green, 2011), p. 116.
“born diplomat”: Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), ePub file.
“Hamid Karzai represented for me”: Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Vintage, 2008), ePub file.
“The Taliban are finished”: Bette Dam, A Man and a Motorcycle: How Hamid Karzai Came to Power (Utrecht, Netherlands: Ipso Facto, 2014), ePub file.
five Black Hawk helicopters: Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New Afghanistan (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), ePub file.
“original sin”: Mary Sack and Cyrus Samii, “An Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi,” Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004.
“dissolve their administration”: James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2008), ePub file.
“Someone else would like to talk”: Dam, A Man and a Motorcycle.
“This meeting is a path towards salvation”: Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander (New York: Crown, 2005) ePub file.
“Nothing in his appearance”: Dobbins, After the Taliban.
American B-52 Stratofortress bomber: Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For.
“Congratulations, sir”: Ibid.
Hamid Karzai pulled up to the palace: Berntsen, Jawbreaker.
bare radiator: Jon Lee Anderson, “The Man in the Palace,” The New Yorker, June 6, 2005.
Fahim may well have been in the room: Coll, Ghost Wars.
“I saw that the roof was not there”: Anderson, “The Man in the Palace.”
The only guards: Berntsen, Jawbreaker.
“Until the time that”: Mir Munshi Sultan
Mahomed Khan, ed. The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan (London: John Murray, 1900), p. 223.
“There is no doubt”: Ibid., p. 167.
Peacock Room: Lamb, The Sewing Circles of Herat, p. 239.
Rubbermaid plastic tubs: Berntsen, Jawbreaker.
“We basically need billions”: Liz Sly, “New Afghan Leader Vows Unity, Peace; Afghan Leader Gets Task of Reuniting War-Torn Nation,” Chicago Tribune, December 23, 2001, p. 3.
camouflage clothes and sandals: Lamb, The Sewing Circles of Herat, p. 236.
“Pictures of Ronald Reagan”: Dobbins, After the Taliban.
ambitious infrastructure projects: David Rohde, “Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure,” The New York Times, September 5, 2006, p. 1.
“is not a civilian police force”: Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, January–February 2000.
“deft diplomatic and political touch”: Joshua Partlow, “Podium Wars: President Hamid Karzai, the Foreign Press, and the Afghan War,” Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Discussion Paper Series, No. D-76, January 2013.
“I will cut you in pieces”: Chris Alexander, The Long Way Back: Afghanistan’s Quest for Peace (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), ePub file.
“I had not heard that sound”: Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), ePub file.
An eighteen-year-old shopkeeper: Mujib Mashal, “After Karzai,” The Atlantic, June 23, 2014.
“The stability of the Afghan Transitional Government”: Henry J. Hyde and Tom Lantos letter to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, September 12, 2002.
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