by Mark Puls
Negotiations grew much tenser when Knox and Morris learned that an American officer had been murdered while being transported from New York to Elizabethtown to be exchanged. The victim, Captain Joshua Huddy, was hanged on Friday, April 12, by the British captain Richard Lippincott in retaliation for the earlier murder of a loyalist named Phillip White. A sign pinned to Huddy's hanging body served as a warning to anyone who did harm to loyalists: "Up goes Huddy for Phillip White."
Knox and Morris sent Washington a report of the murder on Tuesday, April 16. Washington immediately polled twenty-five of his officers as to what action to take, and twenty-two said that a demand should be made for Lord Clinton to turn over Huddy's murderer to the Americans.
Washington demanded that Lord Clinton hand over Lippincott or else a British captain would be randomly chosen by lots from the ranks of prisoners and be put to death in retaliation and to discourage further mistreatment of U.S. prisoners. The British responded that Lippincott had been tried by the British and exonerated after claiming that he was merely following orders, although Clinton denied sanctioning Huddy's murder.
Unable to resolve the issue, Knox and Morris decided to wrap up the prisoner-exchange negotiations without reaching accord on any of the key issues. Feeling slighted and disrespected by the English commissioners, Knox wrote to Washington on Sunday, April 21, explaining why he believed the negotiations had been fruitless: "Every circumstance we observed convinced us, that we never shall obtain justice or equal treatment from the enemy, but what were in a position to demand.“21
In the same letter, Knox thanked Washington for his hand in Congress's decision to promote him. "I cannot express how deeply I am impressed with a sense of your kindness, and the favorable point of view in which you have regarded my feeble attempts to promote the service of my country. I shall ever retain, my dear General, a lively sense of your goodness and friendship, and shall be happy indeed if my future conduct shall meet with your approbation.“22
Knox and Morris reported the circumstances surrounding the failed negotiations to Congress, where delegates approved their decisions "for refusing to admit the other propositions insisted on by [the British].“23
Knox and Lucy then packed their bags and, with their three children, left Philadelphia in mid-May and headed to Newburgh, New York, along the Hudson, where Washington had set up his headquarters and the American army was encamped to keep watch over the British in New York City.
Washington's hard-line policy seeking retaliation for Joshua Huddy's murder, meanwhile, became highly controversial and stirred emotions across the country. Many believed that the tactic of threatening to execute an innocent British soldier as a way to discourage acts of violence against American prisoners was misguided and unjust. Charles Asgill, a nineteen-year-old captain from a well-connected British family, was chosen as the potential victim of the policy, and sympathy for him welled. Among those who questioned the practice was Alexander Hamilton, who suspected that Knox might feel equally uncomfortable with it. Writing from Albany on Friday, June 7, Hamilton reminded Knox of his role on the board that decided to execute Major John Andre: "If we wreak our resentment on an innocent person, it will be suspected that we are too fond of executions." Hamilton recognized that Washington placed a great deal of faith in Knox's judgment. He conveyed his opinion through Knox, in part because his relationship with Washington had become strained in the previous year. To Knox, Hamilton appealed: "I address myself to you upon this occasion, because I know your liberality and your influence with the General.“24
Knox, however, responded that as draconian as the measure appeared, he knew of no other way to prevent the murder of American prisoners by loyalists. He told Hamilton that Washington was not fond of executions and did not take the drastic policy of hanging innocent soldiers lightly. Asgill's life was spared, and he was set free by Washington later that year after mounting pressure from the French.
Knox set up his headquarters at West Point, where he placed the artillery park and stored much of the army's ordnance. Ever fond of entertaining, he orchestrated a celebration of the birth of the French Dauphin, the son of Louis XVI. A huge shelter was erected, and thousands of soldiers attended the daylong festivities. The highlight of the event was the evening ball. Lucy was in high spirits and enjoyed herself dancing. A newspaper reported that "His Excellency General Washington was unusually cheerful. He attended the ball in the evening and with a dignified and graceful air, having Mrs. Knox for his partner, carried down a dance of twenty couple in the arbor on the green grass.“25
After Knox had a chance to thoroughly inspect West Point and its tributary posts, he was alarmed at their vulnerability. Due to the army's depleted finances, he had been unable to transport shells and ordnance to the fort. Knox did not think it could withstand more than ten days under siege and estimated that as much as 1,000 tons of ammunition were needed to secure its safety. In July, he urged Washington to place more emphasis on such a vital link in the country's defenses, whatever the costs.
Washington decided to appoint Knox as the commander of West Point. In notifying Knox of the assignment on Thursday, August 29, Washington wrote: "I have so thorough a confidence in you and so well am I acquainted with your ability and activity that I think it needless to point out to you the great outlines of your duty.“26
With Knox in charge at West Point, the location attracted prominent visitors, especially French officers and Henry's colleagues in the army. He had a reputation for hospitality and was popular in the army, and had forged many sincere relationships. Washington later commented on Knox's character and the attraction he represented to visitors in a letter to Benjamin Lincoln, saying that Henry possessed "great politeness, hospitality and liberality.“27
As Knox went about strengthening the defenses at West Point, his family was again struck with personal tragedy. Their nine-month-old son, Marcus Camillus, died on Sunday, September 8. The usually buoyant Knox was thrown into a deep despondency. The loss of the child, coupled with his concern for Lucy and the emotional toll of the war, all left him grasping to cope with his pain. In a letter written to Washington just two days after his son's death, he tried to make sense of the loss: "I have the unhappiness my dear General to inform you of the departure of my precious infant, your Godson. In the deep mystery in which all human events is involved the Supreme Being has been pleased to prevent his expanding innocence, ripening to such perfection as to be a blessing to his parents and connections, when by their advanced years they may find every comfort necessary to sweeten life rendered bitter by a thousand stings."
In the same letter, Henry expressed his concern over whether Lucy could endure the anguish of losing another child. "Mrs. Knox by leaning upon the great principles of reason and religion will be enabled I hope to support this repeated shock to her tender affections.“28
Washington expressed his sympathies in a letter written on Thursday, September 12: "In determining to submit patiently to the decrees of the all-wise disposer of human events, you will find the only true, and substantial comfort under the greatest of calamities. In addition to this, the lenient hand of time will no doubt be necessary to soothe the keener feelings of a fond and tender mother.“29
Henry found it difficult to shake off his depression. He became more solitary than at any time in his life. Letters from even close friends languished without reply. Benjamin Lincoln, who had been named secretary at war under the Confederation government, became concerned.
Lincoln persisted with the correspondence, however, and in one letter raised the issue of pay for the soldiers, suggesting that the men might accept a lump sum for their pension because many state leaders opposed the plan to grant half pay for life. Knox responded apologetically for staying out of touch but expressed his willingness to help lobby Congress and state leaders on behalf of the Continental soldiers.
Knox felt unsettled by fears that another revolt would erupt if the soldiers continued to be denied the emoluments promised pr
ior to enlistment. If the troops decided to march to Philadelphia to coerce Congress at musket point to pay them, the unrest would lead to the ruin and disgrace of the army, Knox believed, and the suffering and sacrifices endured by the troops throughout the Revolution would have been in vain. To Knox, the unblemished honor of the Continental force after eight years of hardship needed to be preserved, even at a high cost.
But there was even a larger issue at stake. If a battle over pay erupted between the army and civil authorities, America's attempt at republican government might be sacrificed in the struggle and the goal of the revolution might be lost to intemperate passions.
Yet Knox also had to consider his own financial situation. Since the beginning of the war, he had longed to provide Lucy with a stable home and give her the style of life she had been accustomed to during her youth. She had been the daughter of privilege and the wife of misfortune. His wife and children had been deprived of countless comforts during the conflict, and Knox felt an acute anxiety over whether he would receive his considerable back pay. How could he tell Lucy that their trials and tribulations would not be rewarded by peacetime prosperity?
To Secretary at War Lincoln, he penned on December 20, 1782: "The expectations of the army, from the drummer to the highest officers are so keen for some pay, that I shudder at the idea of their not receiving it.“30
The concern that ran through the ranks was that once the threat of the war had passed, the soldiers would be completely forgotten and their promised wages and benefits would not be paid. The British evacuated Charleston in December, raising hopes that the fighting was all but over but also reducing the need for the army, and therefore lessening the urgency to pay the soldiers.
The issue of how to compensate the soldiers was hopelessly complicated. Congress had made the promise of half pay for life to many of the soldiers before the Articles of Confederation were approved. Under the Articles, Congress had no constitutional power to fulfill its promises because it had no authority to levy taxes and could only "recommend" to the states that money be raised to compensate the troops. The Articles also required that nine of the thirteen states agree on any proposal.
Knox realized that getting nine of the thirteen states to agree on a pension was unlikely, especially since leaders and residents in nearly every state believed they had already contributed more than their fair share to the war effort. Added to these complications, the prospect of peace led to poor attendance in Congress. Georgia declined to send any delegates to Philadelphia, and many delegates did not show up for sessions.
While his home-state Massachusetts legislature debated whether to grant its soldiers half pay for life, Congressman Samuel Osgood complained to Knox in a December letter that the costs would be "excessive" because the plan rewarded soldiers who served a short stint equally with those who served for the entire war. Osgood objected that Massachusetts would create problems in poorer states by agreeing on half pay for life, and therefore he could not support it.31
Knox felt that with the fighting over, it was a little late for delegates and state leaders to find reasons not to fulfill promises made to soldiers. His high standing in the army and his popularity among the troops made him a point man on the issue. He received a constant stream of letters from Philadelphia keeping him abreast of congressional deliberations over the matter from delegates as well as correspondences from fellow officers such as Baron von Steuben and well-connected friends such as Gouverneur Morris in the finance department.
Several Continental officers came together in December to plan a strategy to plead with Congress to address the army's pay grievances. Knox was chosen as chairman of the committee and drafted a petition offering a solution. As the promise of receiving their due pension of half pay for life appeared more and more unattainable, he offered Lincoln's compromise of a lump-sum pension payment. He also stated that the men's back pay, which he calculated to be between $5 million and $6 million, should be paid immediately to prevent unrest or mutiny.
Major General Alexander McDougal, Colonel Matthias Ogden, and Lieutenant Colonel John Brooks were deputed to travel to Philadelphia and present the Knox-authored memorial to Congress.
The men arrived in Philadelphia on Sunday, December 29. James Madison, a thirty-one-year-old Virginia delegate, commented in a letter that the feeling around Congress was that the proposals offered in Knox's memorial "breathe a proper spirit and are full of good sense.“32
McDougal, Ogden, and Brooks had nearly depleted their funds for the trip waiting to meet with a congressional committee. McDougal, suffering from painful bouts of rheumatism, was initially too ill to attend sessions, and asked if committee members could meet at his lodging at the Indian Queen Tavern to discuss the collective grievances of thousands of soldiers. But delegates balked that this would be beneath "the respect due to themselves, especially as the mission from the army was not within the ordinary course of duty," Madison recorded in his notes of the debate.33
McDougal, Ogden, and Brooks addressed Congress on Monday, January 30, detailing the suffering of the soldiers and their need for some kind of immediate payment while offering to compromise on the pension. They expressed the deep bitterness and anger among the soldiers that Congress had found ways to pay civilian salaries but had failed to come up with funds for men who risked their lives on the battlefield. Madison recorded in his notes: "General McDougal said that the army [was] verging to that state which we are told will make a wise man mad," and "They mentioned in particular that the members of the legislatures would never agree to an adjournment with[out] paying themselves fully for their services.“34
Horatio Gates, meanwhile, had returned to the army after his disgrace at the Battle of Camden, South Carolina. His aides began to circulate rumors in Philadelphia that the army was ripe for revolt and would not lay down their arms and return to civilian life until being fully compensated for their service. Alexander Hamilton, who had been elected to Congress the previous July, was uncertain how much weight to ascribe to the whispers. It was said that many soldiers in the army grumbled that Washington was too delicate in dealing with civilian leaders to adequately pressure or threaten politicians on behalf of the men. Hamilton reestablished his relationship with Washington, writing him on Thursday, February 13, 1783, that he should use his influence with elected officials. Hamilton also advised Washington to confide in discreet officers within the army to manage the building torrent of anger within the ranks in order to avoid the risk of appearing to interfere with civil authority. Hamilton suggested: "General Knox has the confidence of the army & is a man of sense. I think he may be safely made use of.“35
As weeks dragged on, Congress failed to act decisively on the pay issue. Knox was crestfallen when he received news from McDougal that Congress was content to leave the soldiers' compensation in doubt. He replied on Friday, February 21, from his headquarters at West Point, pouring out his exasperation and writing for the eyes of congressmen: "The complex system of government operates most powerfully in the present instance against the army; who certainly deserve every thing in the power of a grateful people to give. We are in an unhappy predicament indeed, not to know who are responsible to us for a settlement of accounts."
Knox pointed out that the soldiers had placed their faith in the integrity of national and state legislatures in enlisting and fighting. "Posterity will hardly believe that an army contended incessantly for eight years under a constant pressure of misery to establish the liberties of their country without knowing who were to compensate them or whether they were ever to receive any reward for their services."
In the same letter, Knox gently warned political leaders: "My sentiments are exactly these. I consider the reputation of the American army as one of the most immaculate things on earth, and that we should even suffer wrongs and injuries to the utmost verge of toleration rather than sully it in the least degree. But there is a point beyond which there is no sufferance. I pray we will sincerely not pass it.“36
&nb
sp; In the political morass surrounding the issue, Knox pinpointed the source of the complications: America's framework of government under the Articles of Confederation. As early as the opening months of 1783, he began writing to influential leaders with the extraordinary suggestion that a constitutional convention be called together to replace the existing form of government with a compact that created a stronger union and gave the national legislature the authority to tax.
On the divide between supporters of a strong union and supporters of strong states, Knox clearly fell on the side supporting a vigorous national government. As a member of the Continental army, Knox's allegiance to Massachusetts had yielded to his love of country, which for him was "the United States of America." Many American political leaders—including Virginia's Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee and Massachusetts' John Hancock and Samuel Adams—viewed the states as more important than the national government, which was seen as little more than a skeletal framework that loosely held the alliance of states together. Many state leaders feared a strong national government as much as they had detested British oversight. The national army only brought fears of a growing national government and bureaucracy.
Knox was convinced that the army was the victim of provincial thinking. As a member of a Continental army, he had mixed with soldiers from all regions of the country. Within the ranks of American army, state allegiances blurred and disappeared as soldiers forged close, lasting relationships with men who hailed from towns throughout America. The troops looked to Congress as their government and "the United States" as a single country rather than a wartime alliance of thirteen individual provinces.
