On May 24, 2003, the Bush administration suspended contacts with Iran over reports that an al Qaeda cell in Iran was involved in the bombings. Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian serving as the group’s military commander, was believed to have given the order to attack. He was believed hiding in Iran along with Abu Mohammed Masri, the group’s training chief; Saad bin Laden, Osama’s son; and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had been in Baghdad. Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told IRNA that Tehran had arrested several al Qaeda members, “but we don’t know who these people are to be able to say whether they are senior or not. They need to be identified and interrogated.” Iran claimed it had deported 500 al Qaeda members in the past year. Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud said the kingdom will seek to extradite anyone who had a role in the bombings.
A second command group was believed to be on the Pakistan–Afghan border.
Saudi oil and security analyst Nawaf Obaid wrote in the May 18, 2003, Washington Post that a captured senior member of the cell said they rushed the attack because the May 6, 2003, group feared it was about to be picked up by the authorities. He noted that two leaders of the cell and most of the explosives had come through Yemen.
On May 20, 2003, Saudi officials said that some al Qaeda members fled the country to the United States before the attacks.
Saudi officials arrested Ali Abdulrahman Gamdi, 29, a key figure in the bombings in Riyadh, on May 27, 2003. The Saudi had attended al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and was in contact with bin Laden at Tora Bora. He was picked up with two other Saudis after they left an Internet cafe; authorities said the trio were planning an attack on a major hotel and commercial center in Riyadh. Authorities confiscated the computers they were using. Ali Aburahman Gamdi was the first of the 19 people Saudi officials said were involved in the bombing. As of that date, Saudi officials had arrested 44 people, including 4 women picked up in Mecca.
Saudi authorities announced on May 28, 2003, that they had captured nine al Qaeda suspects in Medina during the previous 24 hours, along with Ali Khudair and Ahmed Khalidi, two clerics who had called on their followers not to cooperate with the investigation. The London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia said that the two clerics were shot dead in Medina. A third cleric, Nasser Fahd, remained at large. Those detained included two Moroccans and a Moroccan woman stopped at a checkpoint. Saudi Special Forces also surrounded two groups of seven extremists in Medina. Police found explosives and bomb-making equipment at one of the Medina buildings.
In a gun battle on May 31, 2003, Saudi authorities killed Youssef Saleh Eiery, a Saudi national who belonged to the 19-member gang and arrested another after the duo threw hand grenades at a police patrol, killing two policemen.
The United States asked the Saudis to arrest Ahmed Abu-Ali in the case. His family’s residence in Falls Church, Virginia, was searched by the FBI. He was represented by attorney Ashraf Nubani, who also represented some of the defendants in the June 25, 2003, arrests in northern Virginia against Lashkar-e-Taiba.
On July 3, 2003, following a five-hour standoff, Saudi police killed Turki Mishal Dandani and three associates when the terrorists ran out of ammunition in a shootout in a house in Suweir in the north.
On September 23, 2003, Saudi forces killed three terrorists, including Zubayr Rimi, a suspected al Qaeda militant believed involved in the attack, who was named in an FBI terror alert on September 5, 2003. The gun battle occurred at a housing complex in Jizan, near the Yemen border. One security officer died. Two suspects were arrested.
On January 8, 2004, 100 Swiss police officers raided homes throughout the country and arrested eight foreigners suspected of being al Qaeda supporters who aided the attacks. They questioned 20 other people in five states. The detainees were held on suspicion of providing logistical support to a criminal organization, but were not formally charged.
By April 2004, Saudi security forces had arrested more than 600 individuals on counterterrorism charges.
As of late 2013, the case remained open, with Abd-al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Guantanamo Bay military prison awaiting trial.
February 27, 2004
Philippines Superferry 14 Bombing
Overview: The Philippines was the scene of various terrorist insurgencies for decades. The Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf, the Sparrow assassination teams of Communist Party of the Philippines radicals, and numerous other groups have operated, often with impunity, on the islands. Ramzi Yusuf’s hopes to attack the Pope, fly planes into buildings, and other plots took shape in Manila. Bombings, targeted assassinations, kidnappings, and murders— including beheadings—became common in the 2000s. The Abu Sayyaf group’s al Qaeda ties led to stepped-up bilateral efforts by the United States to improve Filipino security response capabilities. Abu Sayyaf’s bloodiest incident to date was its bombing of the Superferry, putting the death toll in the triple digits.
Incident: On February 27, 2004, an explosion sank the Superferry 14, killing 118 people an hour after it left Manila, Philippines. In March 2004, Abu Sayyaf member Redendo Cain Dellosa confessed to hiding TNT in a TV set he carried onto the ferry before escaping. He later claimed he was tortured into signing the confession.
On October 11, 2004, authorities charged six men, two of whom were arrested shortly after the explosion, with setting off the bomb. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo said the six were also responsible for the 2001 kidnappings of 17 Filipinos and 3 Americans in Dos Palmas; one of the Americans was beheaded and another killed during a rescue attempt. Arroyo said the government was hunting for the attack organizers— Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sulaiman—and two accomplices. Police said Janjalani had demanded $1 million from the ferry company as protection money, which it said was “unhampered use” of the waters in the southern Philippines. Janjalani died in a September 2006 gun battle with Philippine security forces.
March 11, 2004
Madrid Train Bombings
Overview: Although Spain had a long history of attacks by Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Nation and Liberty separatists, terrorists from the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO)—the armed wing of the illegal Communist Party of Spain—and various right-wing groups, its most wrenching attack came at the hands of al Qaeda–inspired Islamic radicals who killed more than 200 and injured another 2,000 in a morning attack on commuter trains in Madrid. Ten million people marched in Madrid, Zaragoza, Valencia, Bilbao, and elsewhere in protest of the terrorist attacks. Public reaction to the attacks led to the March 14, 2003, electoral victory of the opposition Socialist Workers Party. Many voters said they had voted for the opposition because of the discovery that al Qaeda was responsible for the bombings and that most of the electorate was against Spanish involvement in Iraq. This appears to have been the first time a terrorist group had directly influenced the outcome of an election. Prime Minister–elect Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero promised to withdraw Spain’s 1,300 troops from Iraq but make terrorism the government’s chief priority.
Incidents: On March 11, 2004, between 7:35 and 7:55 a.m., 10 bombs hidden in backpacks exploded on four packed commuter trains in three Madrid train stations during rush hour, killing over 200 people and injuring another 2,000. Victims included at least 47 people from 10 other countries, including Ecuador, Peru, the Philippines, and Romania.
Three bombs went off at 7:39 A.M. on a train entering Atocha station. Another four blasts hit a train arriving from Alcala de Henares at Atocha at 7:44 A.M. A bomb went off on a train entering Santa Eugenia station at 7:49 A.M. Two bombs went off on the platform of the El Pozo station at 7:54 A.M., killing 70 people on a double-decked train. Police detonated several unexploded devices. Police said there were 13 bombs, all containing 28–33 pounds of explosives. Police also destroyed a suspicious car near one of the stations.
The government initially blamed the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), but later changed its focus to al Qaeda affiliates.
A van discovered out
side Madrid in Alcala de Henares later in the day contained seven detonator caps and a cassette with Koran verses.
A sports bag found in one of the trains at El Pozo station contained a timed detonator, a mobile phone, wires, and explosives that were commonly available. The explosives had not gone off because the terrorists had mistakenly set the timer to 7:40 P.M., instead of 7:40 A.M.
The al Qaeda–affiliated Abu Hafs al-Masri group claimed credit in an e-mail to the al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper, saying that Spain was a U.S. ally. Spain had been part of the coalition in Iraq. The group said, “Operation Death Trains . . . a way to settle old accounts with Spain, crusader and ally of America in its war against Islam.” The group warned that “the expected ‘Winds of Black Death’ strike against America is now in its final stage.” However, the group had also claimed credit for the East Coast blackout of 2003. Osama bin Laden had warned in an October 2003 tape that al Qaeda would attack Spain. The group later sent a videotape, which some officials suggested was filmed in Brussels or Amsterdam. Police were also investigating the movement of a large amount of money to Morocco to finance Islamic extremist operations. In a message following the election, the group said it would suspend operations to permit Spain time to fulfill the new government’s promise to pull troops out of Iraq.
In a video found in a trash can in a parking lot on March 13, 2004, Abu Dujan al-Afgani, who claimed to be head of al Qaeda’s European military wing, said the bombings were to protest Spanish “collaboration with the criminal Bush and his allies. . . . If you do not stop your collaboration, more and more blood will flow.” Police later believed him to be Rachid Oulad Akcha, a Moroccan immigrant.
On March 13, 2004, the government announced the arrest of three Moroccans and two Indians, possibly with links to Muslim extremists. Two Spaniards of Indian descent were also being questioned. Several buildings and houses were searched. The group had been linked to the cell phone and cell phone card found in the gym bag. The Moroccans were identified as Jamal Zougam, who had been listed as an al Qaeda operative in a 9/11 indictment; Mohamed Bekkali; and Mohamed Chaoui. They had criminal records in Spain. Zougam apparently had been under surveillance since the May 2003 bombings in Casablanca, Morocco. The investigating judge also questioned Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas (alias Abu Dahdah), who had been in prison since November 2001 on suspicion of leading the al Qaeda cell in Spain. Zougam was an associate of Yarkas. The suspects purchased 100 prepaid calling cards for mobile phones 15 days before the attack. Zougam owned a cell phone shop in Madrid.
The government also announced that it had received a videotape from the self-described al Qaeda military spokesman in Europe, who said “We declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two and a half years after the attacks on New York and Washington.”
On March 31, 2004, the investigating judge issued international arrest warrants for five Moroccans and a Tunisian. A wealthy Moroccan, Abdelkarim Mejjati, was thought to be the organizer of the attacks. He was also wanted for the bombings in 2003 in Casablanca and Riyadh. Police were now investigating the involvement of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group in the attacks. The Tunisian was identified as Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, the leader and coordinator of the plot. All were wanted for murder and belonging to a terrorist group. The warrant said Fahket had rented a house 25 miles southeast of Madrid, where the explosives were prepared.
Police cornered seven terrorist suspects in the Madrid suburb of Leganes on April 3, 2004, at 7:00 p .m. The terrorists yelled, “Allah is great” and “We will die fighting.” After a two-hour gun battle, the terrorists committed suicide by setting off bombs in their apartment. A Special Forces policeman died and 15 were injured in the nighttime bombing. Police said that four suspects might have escaped. Among those killed were Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet (alias The Tunisian); Abdennabi Kounjaa, a Moroccan; Asri Rifaat Anouar; and Jamal Ahmidan, a Moroccan (alias The Chinese), the suspected operational commander. Police said on April 7, 2004, that the dead terrorists had planned another major attack in Madrid, possibly during Easter, and possibly against Jewish sites. Police found 200 copper detonators, 22 pounds of Goma 2 Eco explosives, money, and other evidence of plans in the apartment debris.
By April 11, 2004, investigators believed that the cell leader, Fakhet, sought out al Qaeda for assistance but that the group did not directly participate. He traveled to Turkey in late 2002 or early 2003 to meet with senior al Qaeda European operative Amer Azizi, to whom he outlined plans for the attack. He asked for manpower and other support to carry it out. Azizi had fought in Bosnia and Afghanistan. He said al Qaeda could not offer direct aid, but it supported the plan and Fakhet could use al Qaeda’s name in claiming credit. Azizi also suggested contacting Jamal Zougam, a follower of Yarkas, imprisoned since November 2001 on suspicion of being al Qaeda’s Spanish cell leader.
Interior Minister Angel Acebes told reporters that the 3/11 financing came from drug deals. Police cited testimony by Khayata Kattan, a Syrian member of al Qaeda who was extradited from Jordan earlier in 2004 on a warrant issued for the 9/11 attacks.
On April 28, 2004, Azizi was indicted on charges of helping to plan the 9/11 attacks by organizing a meeting in northeastern Spain in July 2001 in which key plotters Mohamed Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh finalized details, according to Judge Baltasar Garzon. He had also been charged in a September 2003 indictment against bin Laden and 34 other terrorist suspects. Azizi was charged with belonging to a terrorist organization. He was charged with multiple counts of murder “as many deaths and injuries as were committed” on 9/11. He allegedly provided lodging for the Tarragona meeting and acting as a terrorist courier. He was a close friend of Yarkas. Azizi fled Spain in November 2001.
On June 8, 2004, police in Belgium and Italy arrested 17 individuals with suspected links to al Qaeda, including Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed (aka Mohamed the Egyptian and Mohamed Abdul Hadi Fayad), believed involved in the bombing. The press reported that Ahmed was a former army explosives expert who conducted training courses at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. He was in Spain in 2003 and in touch with the ringleader, Fakhet. Ahmed recruited Fakhet at a Madrid mosque and may have supplied the explosives expertise. He was traced to Italy via intercepted phone calls. Spain requested extradition so he could face 190 counts of murder, 1,430 counts of attempted murder, and 4 counts of terrorism. A Palestinian and a Jordanian arrested in Belgium were known lieutenants of Ahmed and were believed involved in the 3/11 attacks. Police believed Ahmed and Fakhet were in a house in Morata de Tajuna where the bombs were made. On December 1, 2004, Italy’s top appeals court informed Spain’s High Court that it had approved the extradition of Ahmed, who was being held in the Voghera prison near Milan.
Spanish authorities believed that the overall organizer was Syrian-born former journalist Abu Musab Suri (alias Mustafa Setmarian Nasar), who was once the overall commander of al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and who once headed the group’s propaganda operations.
On November 16, 2004, a court sentenced a 16-year-old Spaniard to six years in a juvenile detention facility after he pleaded guilty to helping steal and transport the dynamite used in the bombings.
In 2005, Azizi, who had recruited the leaders of the bombers’ cell, died in a missile strike on Haisori village near Miranshah in North Waziristan, Pakistan.
In June 2005, forensic experts suggested that Mohamed Afalah, a Moroccan wanted in the Madrid bombings, conducted a suicide attack in Iraq in May 2005.
On April 11, 2006, Judge Juan del Olmo charged six people with 191 counts of terrorist murder and 1,755 attempted murders. Another 23 people were indicted for collaborating in the plot. The trial began on February 15, 2007. On October 31, 2007, a Spanish court convicted 21 of involvement but cleared 3 of being masterminds. Two Moroccans and a Spaniard who provided the explosives were sentenced to 42,924 years in prison. Jamal Zougam was convicted of membership in a jihadist terrorist cell and of terrorist murder. Moroccan citizen Othman el-Gnaoui was convi
cted of membership in a jihadist terrorist cell, terrorist murder, and helping to get explosives to the house where the bombs were made. Spanish citizen Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras was found guilty of providing the explosives. Ahmed was cleared of all charges. His acquittal was upheld by the Supreme Court on July 17, 2008.
On November 6, 2006, a Milan court found Ahmed guilty of conspiracy to participate in international terrorist activities and sentenced him to 10 years. He was extradited to Madrid on November 17, 2006. He would remain in prison on these charges following his acquittal in the 3/11 case.
In November 2009, Judge Eloy Velasco indicted seven Islamic militants— including four Moroccans, an Algerian, and a Tunisian—for providing money, housing, food, and forged documents to the bombers.
August 24, 2004
Two Russian Planes Bombing
Overview: Chechen terrorists continued to conduct mass-casualty attacks, stepping up their operations by introducing women—heretofore less likely to attract the attention of security screeners—to attack squads.
Incident: On August 24, 2004, two Russian passenger jets that left the same Moscow airport within 30 minutes of each other disappeared on radar screens around 11:00 P.M. They crashed within three minutes of each other, killing all 90 on board.
The Islambouli Brigades claimed credit, saying it was avenging Russian abuses in Chechnya. The group said on a website that five attackers were on each plane, adding:
Russia continues to slaughter the Muslims and will not stop unless a war starts where there will be bloodshed. Our mujahideen, thanks to God, were able to make the first strike, which will be followed by a series of other operations in a wave of support to our brothers, the Muslims of Chechnya and other Muslim areas that suffer the blasphemy of Russia.
The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks Page 23
